Vincent Sims v. Wayne Carpenter, et al
Capital defendant brought a declaratory judgment action seeking to enjoin his execution, asserting that he meets the statutory criteria of being intellectually disabled and, therefore, is ineligible to be sentenced to death. Defendants, the warden of the institution where he is incarcerated and the Tennessee Attorney General, moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, that the suit was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and that the suit failed to state a claim for relief. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case. Finding no error, we affirm the holding of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Tyrone Chalmers v. Wayne Carpenter, et al
Capital defendant brought a declaratory judgment action seeking to enjoin his execution, asserting that he meets the statutory criteria of being intellectually disabled and, therefore, is ineligible to be sentenced to death. Defendants, the warden of the institution where he is incarcerated and the Tennessee Attorney General, moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, that the suit was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and that the suit failed to state a claim for relief. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case. Finding no error, we affirm the holding of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee David Allen Jackson
The Defendant, David Allen Jackson, was arrested without a warrant for driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor; failure to exercise due care while driving, a Class C misdemeanor; and failure to provide evidence of financial responsibility, a Class C misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-8-136, -10-401, -12-139. Over a year after the Defendant's arrest, he waived his right to a preliminary hearing and agreed to have his case bound over to the grand jury. The grand jury subsequently indicted the Defendant for the misdemeanor offenses listed above as well as two counts of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102. After the grand jury returned the indictment, the Defendant filed a motion in Sullivan County Criminal Court seeking to dismiss the misdemeanor charges. The Defendant argued that the affidavit of complaint filed following his arrest was void and that prosecution had not commenced with respect to the misdemeanor charges until after the applicable statute of limitations had expired. The trial court granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss the misdemeanor charges. The State sought and was granted an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's decision. On appeal, the State contends that the fact that the affidavit of complaint was sworn before a notary public rather than a qualified judicial officer was a mere “technical defect” that should not render it void. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tommy L. Harris v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, Tommy L. Harris, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief and/or his petition for a corrected judgment, arguing that the court erred by summarily dismissing the petition without an evidentiary hearing or the appointment of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anthony Dewayne Blaylock v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Anthony Dewayne Blaylock, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lee Stack, III v. Joann Valerie Stack
This appeal arises from post-divorce efforts to modify custody and child support established in a Montana divorce. After the divorce, the mother and the child moved to Tennessee. Although the father was living in Montana, he filed a petition to modify parenting time and child support and for other relief in Tennessee. The trial court found a material change in circumstance sufficient to modify the residential parenting schedule and that modification would be in the child’s best interest. The trial court also found a significant variance between the Montana child support amount and the amount presumed under the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines and modified the child support order. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the Montana custody determination but did have authority to enter a temporary order enforcing visitation. We also find that, although the court had jurisdiction to modify the Montana child support order, the court incorrectly calculated the mother’s gross income and failed to credit the father for his payment of the child’s health insurance premium. Therefore, we vacate and remand with instructions to dismiss the Father’s petition to the extent it seeks modification of the parenting time. To the extent Father seeks to enforce visitation with his child, we affirm the specific visitation schedule ordered by the trial court and remand for the court to set a time for expiration of the temporary visitation schedule. To the extent the petition seeks to modify child support, we vacate and remand for a calculation of child support in accordance with the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines and this opinion. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Destiny S.
This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor child. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support termination on the statutory grounds of substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan, persistent conditions, and severe child abuse. The court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the child’s best interest. The mother appeals. Having reviewed the record, we hold that only the ground of substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan is supported by clear and convincing evidence. Additionally, we hold that clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s finding that termination is in the child’s best interest. Because the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support one statutory ground for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interest, we affirm the trial court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Accredo Health Group, Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline, LLC f/k/a SmithKline Beecham Corporation d/b/a GlaxoSmithKline
The plaintiff purchaser of pharmaceuticals brought suit against the defendant manufacturer of the pharmaceutical for failure to provide discounted pricing based on the parties‘ contract. The defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment based on the issue of contract interpretation. The trial court granted the defendant‘s motion. The plaintiff requested permission for this interlocutory appeal challenging the trial court‘s interpretation of the parties‘ contract. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey Lynn Whitehead
The defendant, Jeffrey L. Whitehead, appeals the order of the Montgomery County Circuit Court denying his motion to waive costs. Because this court lacks jurisdiction of the defendant’s claim, the appeal is dismissed. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brian J. Bledsoe
The defendant, Brian J. Bledsoe, was convicted by a Gibson County Circuit Court jury of assault, a Class B misdemeanor, and sentenced to six months in the county jail suspended after service of sixty days. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sentence imposed by the trial court. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, we remand for entry of a corrected judgment, reflecting that the defendant’s sentence is suspended after service of sixty days. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alexander Jackson
The defendant, Alexander Jackson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of rape, which the trial court merged and sentenced him to a term of nine years. On appeal, he argues that his right against self-incrimination was violated by a statement of the prosecutor during closing argument which he asserts amounts to plain error. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Keith W., Jr., et al.
This appeal involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his two children. In 2011, the children were adjudicated dependent and neglected, and the children were placed in the custody of their great-grandmother, and later, in the custody of a family friend. After the children had lived with the family friend for three continuous years, the caregiver filed a petition to terminate the father’s parental rights. The trial court terminated the father’s rights on the grounds of abandonment, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1), as defined by both Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv), for failure to visit and support and for engaging in conduct that exhibits a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children. The court further found termination was in the children’s best interests. We have concluded that the trial court erred by relying on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv), abandonment by wanton disregard, as a ground to terminate the father’s rights. We also hold that the court erred in terminating the father’s rights on the basis of his failure to support the children. However, the trial court correctly determined that the father abandoned the children by willfully failing to visit. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in part and reverse in part. |
Haywood | Court of Appeals | |
Pervis Tyrone Payne v. Wayne Carpenter, et al
Capital defendant brought a declaratory judgment action seeking to enjoin his execution, asserting that he meets the statutory criteria of being intellectually disabled and, therefore, is ineligible to be sentenced to death. Defendants, the warden of the institution where he is incarcerated and the Tennessee Attorney General, moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, that the suit was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, and that the suit failed to state a claim for relief. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case. Finding no error, we affirm the holding of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Deborah Jean Weston
In this appeal as of right, the State challenges the order of the trial court granting the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop of the defendant and dismissing the driving under the influence charge in this case. Because the community caretaking exception does not apply in this case and because reasonable suspicion did not otherwise justify the stop of the defendant's vehicle, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Hollis Fisk, Jr.
This is Defendant’s, Hollis Fisk, Jr., direct appeal of his robbery conviction and accompanying eight-year sentence in confinement. He argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction and that the trial court abused its discretion in determining the length of his sentence and by denying an alternative sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Norman McDowell
The defendant, Norman McDowell, was sentenced to twenty years in confinement by the trial court for the merged convictions of aggravated rape and rape. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court improperly enhanced his aggravated rape sentence from the minimum fifteen years to twenty years in violation of the purposes and principles of the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act. Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the twenty year sentence. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Jackson
The defendant, Anthony Jackson, was indicted for attempted first degree premeditated murder, employing a firearm with intent to commit a felony, and convicted felon in possession of a firearm. After trial, a jury found the defendant guilty of the lesser-included offense of attempted voluntary manslaughter, employing a firearm with intent to commit a felony, and convicted felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court subsequently held a sentencing hearing and imposed sentences of twelve years for attempted voluntary manslaughter, fifteen years for employing a firearm with intent to commit a felony, and fifteen years for convicted felon in possession of a firearm with all sentences to be served consecutively for an effective sentence of forty-two years. On appeal, the defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions, and the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Vicki Russell v. Dana Corporation
In 1994, the employee received workers’ compensation benefits and future medical benefits for a work-related cervical spine injury and left carpal tunnel syndrome she sustained in 1991. The year after the employee received workers’ compensation benefits, the physician treating her work-related injury referred the employee to her primary care physician for continued treatment of her work injury. From 1995 to the present, the employee’s primary care physician has treated her work-related injury and other medical problems unrelated to her work. In 2010, the employee underwent two surgeries on her left shoulder and left knee unrelated to her work injuries. In June 2013, the employer filed a motion seeking an independent medical evaluation, which the trial court granted. After receiving the report from the evaluation, the employer filed motions seeking to “de-authorize,” or remove the employee’s treating physician and permission to provide a panel of three pain management physicians for the employee’s future medical treatment. The trial court denied the motions. The employer has appealed from that order. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for proceedings consistent with this decision. |
Smith | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Emily Joyce Collins v. William Michael Collins
Parties in divorce proceeding entered into an agreement on the day of trial, memorialized in writing, disposing of the marital assets and debts, adopting a parenting plan, and agreeing “as a division of marital assets” that Wife would “receive the sum of $2,100.00 per month directly from Husband’s military pension.” Husband filed motions both before and after the final decree was entered, seeking to modify the agreement by removing the provision that required him to pay $2,100.00 to Wife on the ground that the $2,100.00 payment exceeded fifty percent of his military retirement and included a monthly payment for service-related disability pay. The trial court denied Husband’s motions and he appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the holding of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Gregory L. Hatton v. State of Tennessee
Nearly four decades after pleading guilty to rape, armed robbery, burglary, kidnapping, grand larceny, and assault with intent to commit murder, Petitioner, Gregory L. Hatton, filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition as time-barred. However, the Tennessee Supreme Court has recently determined that a writ of error coram nobis is not an available procedural mechanism to collaterally attack a guilty plea. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court on the separate grounds discussed herein. |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Prince Dumas
The defendant, Prince Dumas, entered a guilty plea to one count of a first offense for driving under the influence (“DUI”), a Class A misdemeanor. As part of the plea, the defendant reserved a certified question of law. The defendant asserts that police initiated a seizure without reasonable suspicion and that because all of the evidence stems from this seizure, he is entitled to have the indictment dismissed. We conclude that the defendant's certified question, as drafted, is not dispositive of the case, and we are accordingly constrained to dismiss the appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andrew Lorenze Allen
The defendant, Andrew Lorenze Allen, appeals his Washington County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael A. Roberts v. Xaviera C. Forrest
This appeal arises from a change in the primary residential parent for two minor children. Mother and Father divorced in Oklahoma. After Mother and the children moved to Tennessee, Father petitioned to modify the joint custody plan adopted in the Oklahoma divorce proceeding. Father alleged a material change in circumstance based upon Mother’s violations of the joint custody plan and Mother’s interference with Father’s relationship with the children. Following a hearing, the trial court found a material change in circumstance and that naming Father the primary residential parent was in the best interest of the children. While not contesting that a material change in circumstance occurred, on appeal, Mother asserts that a change in primary residential parent was not in the children’s best interest. After reviewing the record, we do not find the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s best interest findings. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Dionne O'Neal v. Mark Goins, et al
Plaintiff, whose rights of citizenship had been restored, brought action against the state coordinator of elections and election commission for declaratory, injunctive, and other relief, asserting that the Defendants had improperly refused to restore his right to vote. On motion of Defendants, the trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim for relief; the court also denied plaintiff’s application to amend his complaint to assert a claim for mandamus. Finding no error, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint and denial of the application to amend; we modify the judgment to make the dismissal without prejudice. |
Court of Appeals | ||
MR Hotels, LLC v. LLW Architects, Inc. et al
This interlocutory appeal arises out of the design and construction of a six-story hotel. The owner of the hotel sued LLW Architects, Inc. for breach of contract based on an AIA Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner and Architect. The owner also asserted claims for professional liability against LLW and its principal architect, Dell Livingston, alleging the breach of a duty of care in carrying out their professional services. The trial court summarily dismissed all claims against LLW and Mr. Livingston as time barred by the three-year statute of limitations for damage to real property: Tenn. Code Ann. § 28 3 105. Portions of the hotel first opened for business on May 30, 2007, and the hotel was approved for final use and occupancy on June 26, 2007. Plaintiff commenced this action on October 20, 2010. The owner-architect agreement states that the statutes of limitations for “[c]auses of action between the parties to this Agreement” begin to run on “the date of Substantial Completion.” The accrual provision also states that “[i]n no event shall such statutes of limitations commence to run any later than the date when the Architect’s services are substantially completed.” The agreement defines “Substantial Completion” as “the stage of progress of the Work when the Work or designated portion thereof is sufficiently complete . . . so that the Owner can occupy or utilize the Work for its intended use . . . .” The agreement also defines “date of Substantial Completion” as “the date certified by the Architect . . . .” The trial court held that the accrual provisions applied to the individual architect because Plaintiff’s claims against him were based on duties specified in the architectural agreement. The trial court also determined that June 1, 2007 was the date of Substantial Completion because the hotel was being used for its intended purpose on that date. We respectfully disagree, having determined that LLW and Mr. Livingston were not entitled to summary judgment because they failed to establish the elements of their affirmative defense based on the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |