State of Tennessee v. Kevin E. Trent
The defendant, Kevin E. Trent, appeals the trial court's denial of his request for alternative sentencing. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to vehicular homicide by intoxication, a Class B felony. The agreement specified an eight-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the court ordered that the sentence be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the decision was error because the trial court incorrectly concluded that confinement was necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offense. Following review of the record and the evidence before us, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in requiring full confinement and reverse the sentence consistent with this opinion. |
Claiborne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Curtis Stanton v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Curtis Stanton, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Leo Pipes
The defendant, David Leo Pipes, was indicted for theft of property valued over $1000 but less than $10,000. After trial, a jury found the defendant guilty. The trial court subsequently held a sentencing hearing and imposed a six year sentence with a thirty-five percent release classification to be served as a Range II, multiple offender. After the denial of his motion for a new trial, the defendant filed this timely appeal. On appeal, the defendant argues there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction, and the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Patrick Wayne Evans
The Defendant, Patrick Wayne Evans, pleaded guilty to vehicular homicide by impairment, a Class B felony, with an agreed sentence length of eight years. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that the Defendant serve his eight year sentence in confinement. The Defendant appeals, asserting that the trial court: (1) erroneously relied upon enhancement factors that are not applicable to the Defendant’s offense; (2) erroneously admitted improper evidence at the sentencing hearing; (3) failed to properly consider mitigating factors; (4) erroneously found the Defendant had no potential for rehabilitation; and (5) failed to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing when it denied a sentence of “split confinement.” After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we reverse and remand to the trial court for re-sentencing. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ram Tool & Supply Company, Inc. v. HD Supply Construction Supply LTD., et al
A construction tools and materials distribution company filed a complaint against one of its former employees for unlawfully recruiting some of the plaintiff company’s other employees to work for a competitor, alleging breach of fiduciary duty/duty of loyalty. The plaintiff company also named as defendants the competing company and one of the competitor’s employees, asserting these defendants aided and abetted its employee’s breach of fiduciary duty/duty of loyalty. The plaintiff company further alleged all the defendants were liable for engaging in a civil conspiracy. All parties moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the defendants’ motions on the basis that the plaintiff company’s claims were preempted by the Tennessee Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“TUTSA”). On appeal, we hold that the plaintiff company asserted viable claims against the defendants that do not depend on the company’s trade secrets and are, therefore, not preempted by TUTSA. The trial court’s judgment dismissing the plaintiff company’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty/duty of loyalty, aiding and abetting, and civil conspiracy is reversed, and the case is remanded. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carmelo Gonzalez-Fonesca
This is Defendant’s, Carmelo Gonzalez-Fonesca’s, direct appeal from his convictions by a jury of one count of possession of 150 grams or more of heroin with the intent to sell or distribute and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to prepare and package a controlled substance. As a result, he was sentenced to an effective sentence of fifteen years in incarceration as a Range I, standard offender. Defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the expert testimony of Sergeant Gene Donegan, and the chain of custody with respect to the evidence. After a review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Melinda K. Fields v. Neil M. Friedman
Mother appeals the juvenile court's child support determinations. Because Mother failed to file a brief in compliance with the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and failed to present arguments to support her contentions, we affirm the decision of the juvenile court. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Brent Richardson v. State of Tennessee
A Madison County jury convicted the Petitioner, Brent Richardson, of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, carjacking, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and aggravated kidnapping. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to serve an effective life sentence plus forty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, this Court affirmed the judgments. State v. Brent Richardson, W2009-00778-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2473299 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, June 17, 2010), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 10, 2010). The Petitioner filed an untimely petition seeking post-conviction relief on June 19, 2012, alleging that he had received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing regarding whether the Petitioner’s petition was untimely filed, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition as time-barred. We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Geraldine Abbott, et al. v. Mark Abbott, et al.
This appeal involves a dispute concerning a purported right of first refusal in a deed. In a section titled "Right of First Refusal," the deed provided that the purported holders of the right "shall have a right of first refusal to purchase said property and once a price is agreed upon," the holder will have a certain time period in which to raise the funds to pay the purchase price. The trial court found that the provision was enforceable and imposed a "reasonable time" in which the parties could negotiate and agree upon a price. The sellers appealed. We reverse. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Elias Mc.
Petitioners sought to terminate the parental rights of both parents. After a trial, the court found that the grounds of wanton disregard, abandonment by willful failure to visit, and abandonment by willful failure to pay support did not exist as to the father. Petitioners took a voluntary dismissal as to the mother. Petitioners appealed the trial court’s decision as to the father. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Utopia Place, LLC, et al v. Eastern Properties, Inc.-Bellevue, et al
A commercial landlord filed suit against its tenant seeking a declaratory judgment that the purchase option and right of first refusal in their lease were no longer enforceable and damages for tortious interference with business relations. On a motion for summary judgment, the trial court found that all rights of the tenant to purchase the leased premises were void. The landlord subsequently voluntarily dismissed its tortious interference claim, and the trial court entered an order dismissing the claim without prejudice. The order dismissing the claim disposed of the last claim asserted by the landlord. Several months later, the trial court entered an order dismissing the case with prejudice and taxing costs to the landlord. The tenant filed its notice of appeal within thirty days of the order dismissing the case with prejudice. Because we find the notice of appeal untimely, we dismiss the appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ronnie Ingram
The defendant, Ronnie Ingram, appeals his sentencing by the Shelby County Criminal Court to twelve years as a career offender for attempted criminal exposure to human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”), which was imposed upon remand after this court reduced his original conviction of criminal exposure to HIV, a Class C felony, to attempted criminal exposure to HIV, a Class D felony. The defendant argues that the trial court erred by relying on facts from the original sentencing hearing in determining that he was a career offender. Following our review, we affirm the sentencing imposed by the trial court and remand for entry of a corrected judgment to reflect the defendant's conviction offense, which was omitted. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rosalyn Small v. Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority
This appeal arises from the Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority's decision to terminate Appellee's employment. Appellee was employed as a police sergeant with the Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority. Appellee received a nine-day suspension from work for insubordination and conduct unbecoming. The suspension also included a requirement that Appellee undergo a fitness for duty assessment before returning to work. Appellee reported for her fitness for duty assessment, but a disagreement with the psychologist performing the assessment over whether she could record the clinical interview resulted in the interview not being completed that day. The Airport Authority consequently terminated Appellee‟s employment on the basis that she was noncompliant with the order to undergo the fitness for duty assessment. Appellee appealed the decision to the Civil Service Commission, which upheld the termination. Appellee then filed a petition for judicial review to the Shelby County Chancery Court, which overturned the Civil Service Commission‟s decision. The Airport Authority appeals. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Preston J. Chapman
The appellant, Preston J. Chapman, pled guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to felony possession of marijuana, third offense, and felony possession of a Schedule II controlled substance and received an effective two-year sentence. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking probation for his failure to pay fines and costs when the evidence shows that he had no ability to pay and for his committing domestic assault. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sharris Nicole Thompson
The appellant, Sharris Nicole Thompson, pled guilty in the Lawrence County Circuit Court to theft of property valued $1,000 or more but less than $10,000; misappropriation of rental property valued $1,000 or more but less than $10,000; three counts of theft of property valued $500 or less; and one count of misappropriation of rental property valued $500 or less and ultimately received an effective four-year sentence to be served on probation. Subsequently, the trial court revoked probation and ordered that the appellant serve her effective sentence in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her request for alternative sentencing. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: I.E.A., et al.
The case involves the termination of Mother‘s parental rights on the ground of severe abuse. The trial court terminated Mother‘s parental rights to the two children at issue based on two previous severe abuse findings against Mother: (1) a finding as to the children at issue during the dependency and neglect portion of the underlying proceedings; and (2) a finding that the children‘s older half-sibling was the victim of severe abuse prior to the children at issue‘s birth. The trial court further found clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the children‘s best interest. Although we conclude that the trial court erred in relying on a non-final order as res judicata of the ground of severe abuse, we find that the trial court did not err in relying on a prior final order of severe abuse as to the children at issue‘s half-sibling. We also affirm the trial court‘s finding that termination of Mother‘s parental rights is in the children‘s best interests. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Delain L. Deatherage v. John C. Hailey, et al
At issue in this case is whether the parties entered into a contract that granted Plaintiff a right of first refusal to purchase Defendants’ real property. Defendants leased their property to Plaintiff for a twelve-month period. After the lease was renewed several times, Plaintiff inquired with Defendants’ agent as to whether Defendants would be interested in selling the property. The agent informed Plaintiff via email that Defendants did not wish to sell their property at the time, but should they decide to in the future, Plaintiff “would have the first right of refusal.” Defendants subsequently decided to sell the property to a third party and did not provide Plaintiff the opportunity to purchase the property. Plaintiff then filed this action for specific performance and breach of contract, asserting that Defendants granted Plaintiff an enforceable right of first refusal. After discovery, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the purported contract fails for lack of mutual assent and consideration. The trial court granted summary judgment, holding that the language in the email correspondence was too indefinite to create a binding contract. We have determined that the agreement to provide Plaintiff with a right of first refusal was not supported by consideration; thus, it did not constitute a binding contract. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Steven Q. Stanford v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Steven Q. Stanford, appeals the Campbell County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2010 convictions for initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine and for misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia and from his effective fifteen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because (1) counsel failed to file a motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of the Petitioner’s mother’s property and (2) counsel failed to explain two plea offers adequately. Although we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court, we remand for the entry of a corrected judgment relative to the initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine conviction. |
Campbell | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Paul Samuel Eslinger
Paul Samuel Eslinger, the Defendant, pleaded guilty to two counts of sale of a Schedule II controlled substance, both Class C felonies, and one count of sale of a Schedule I controlled substance, a Class B felony, and was sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement to three thirty-year concurrent sentences. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it did not allow him to withdraw his guilty pleas. Upon review, we conclude that the Defendant's negotiated sentences were illegal and the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it accepted the negotiated sentences as part of the plea agreement. Therefore, the trial court should have allowed him to withdraw his guilty pleas. The judgments of the trial court are reversed, and the case is remanded. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Bradley Mims
A Chester County jury convicted the Defendant of theft of property valued over $500, and the trial court sentenced him as a Career Offender to six years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After review, we affirm the trial court's judgment. |
Chester | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Darrell Johnson v. State of Tennessee
A Shelby County jury found the Petitioner, Darrell Johnson, guilty of three counts of facilitation of attempted aggravated robbery and two counts of facilitation of aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner as a Career Offender and imposed a total effective sentence of twenty-four years of incarceration. This Court affirmed the Petitioner's convictions and sentence. State v. Darrell Johnson, No. W2012-01467-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 5522220, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Oct. 3, 2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 12, 2014). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his petition. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Samuel W. Hirsch v. State of Tennessee
Samuel W. Hirsh (“the Petitioner”) entered a best interest plea to first degree felony murder and was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. He then filed a timely pro se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief alleging numerous grounds. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief and dismissed the petition. On appeal the Petitioner claims that (1) counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress the Petitioner's statements and (2) “[the] conviction was based upon a coerced [p]lea [a]greement predicated upon an innate fear of receiving the [d]eath [p]enalty.” Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timothy Jermaine Cox v. State of Tennessee
In 2013 the Petitioner, Timothy Jermaine Cox, entered a best interest plea to aggravated sexual battery and violation of the sex offender registry. By agreement, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to ten years, to be served at 100%, with a concurrent sentence of two years for violating the sex offender registry, to be served at 35%. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his petition because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court's judgment. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Henry Albright, Jr.
The Defendant, William Henry Albright, Jr., pleaded guilty to aggravated burglary and theft over $1,000, and the trial court imposed an agreed-upon sentence of ten years for the aggravated burglary conviction and eight years for the theft conviction, concurrent, to be served on supervised probation. In 2015, the trial court issued a probation violation warrant and, after a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant's probation and ordered that the Defendant serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve his sentence in incarceration. After review, we affirm the trial court's judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Alan Corbitt
A Benton County jury convicted the Defendant of one count of rape of a child and one count of aggravated sexual battery as a lesser-included offense of a second count of rape of a child. The trial court sentenced him to thirty-five years, to be served at 100%, for the rape of a child conviction and to a concurrent sentence of ten years for the aggravated sexual battery conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that aggravated sexual battery was a lesser-included offense of rape of a child; and (3) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After review, we conclude that aggravated sexual battery is not a lesser-included offense of rape of a child. State v. John J. Ortega, Jr., No. M2014-01042-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 1870095, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Apr. 23, 2015), no perm. app. filed. As such, the trial court erred when it instructed the jury. The Defendant's conviction for aggravated sexual battery is vacated. His conviction and sentence for rape of a child is affirmed. |
Benton | Court of Criminal Appeals |