Jacob Brown v. State of Tennessee
W2015-00887-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker

The petitioner, Jacob Brown, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his 2012 convictions of two counts of first degree murder and the accompanying sentences of life without parole. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that the trial court‘s denial of funds for an expert prior to the transfer hearing ran afoul of his due process rights, that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, and that the consecutive sentences of life without parole, imposed when the petitioner was a juvenile, violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The petitioner‘s claims of a violation of his due process rights and deprivation of his right to the effective assistance of counsel were previously determined and cannot avail him of post-conviction relief. We conclude that the imposition of a sentence of life without parole in this case did not violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment but that consecutive alignment of the petitioner‘s sentences does not comport with the recent rulings of the United States Supreme Court. Therefore, we remand the case for the entry of corrected judgment forms reflecting concurrent alignment of the sentences.

Tipton Court of Criminal Appeals

Covenant Health v. Tennessee Health Services And Development Agency, et al.
M2014-02538-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Richard H. Dinkins
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen H. Lyle

This appeal arises out of the Tennessee Health Services and Development Agency’s decision to grant a certificate of need to a company to acquire and operate a linear accelerator; the decision was opposed by another company that operated a linear accelerator. After a contested case hearing, an administrative law judge issued an initial order holding that the certificate of need should not have been granted. On the applicant’s appeal, the agency reviewed the initial order and reversed it. The company which contested the application filed a petition for review in chancery court, where the Chancellor reversed the agency’s decision, finding that it was not based on substantial and material evidence. On appeal to this court, we conclude that substantial and material evidence existed to support the agency’s decision to issue the certificate of need. We therefore reverse the order of the chancery court and remand the case for entry of an order affirming the agency’s decision.  

Davidson Court of Appeals

Tennessee Department of Correction v. David Pressley
M2015-00902-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Claudia Bonnyman

Employee of the Tennessee Department of Correction filed an administrative appeal challenging the termination of his employment. The board of appeals reduced the termination to a fourteen-day suspension. On appeal to the trial court, the chancery court ruled that the burden of proof was improperly allocated to the Tennessee Department of Correction in the hearing before the board of appeals. We reverse the decision of the chancery court and conclude that the board of appeals properly allocated the burden to the Tennessee Department of Correction. We further conclude that no substantial and material evidence in the record exists to support the board of appeals’ finding that the employee committed negligence in the performance of his duties. We also reverse the board of appeals’ decision denying the employee’s request for attorney’s fees in the prosecution of his appeal to the board of appeals and remand to the board of appeals for a determination of those fees. 

Davidson Court of Appeals

Dustin Scott Roberts v. William R. Ray
E2015-01522-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis

This is a legal malpractice action in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant attorney failed to conform to the applicable standard of care in drafting a prenuptial agreement. The trial court granted the defendant attorney's motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Knox Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Jessie R. Bailey
E2015-01323-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert H. Montgomery, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge G. Scott Green

The Defendant, Jessie R. Bailey, entered a guilty plea to possession of 0.5 gram or more of cocaine with the intent to sell. The Defendant was sentenced to serve eight years. In a separate case, the Defendant pleaded guilty to facilitation of second degree murder and was sentenced to serve eight years concurrently to the sentence in the cocaine possession case. Approximately sixteen years after the judgments were filed, the Defendant filed motions pursuant to Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 requesting that the trial court correct illegal sentences. The trial court summarily denied the motions. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Knox Court of Criminal Appeals

Jeffery L. Vaughn v. State of Tennessee
W2015-00921-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter
Trial Court Judge: Judge R. Lee Moore, Jr.

Petitioner, Jeffery L. Vaughn, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to convey a favorable plea offer, failed to file a motion to suppress text messages, and failed to adequately prepare Petitioner to testify. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Dyer Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Christopher Brown
W2015-00990-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert L. Holloway, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Robert Carter, Jr.

A Shelby County jury found the Defendant, Christopher Brown, guilty of one count of first degree premeditated murder and three counts of aggravated assault. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of prior bad acts under Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence and that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Brian Christopher Dunn
M2015-00759-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert L. Holloway, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Walter C. Kurtz

Brian Christopher Dunn (“the Defendant”) was convicted of initiation of the process to manufacture methamphetamine and driving with a suspended, cancelled, or revoked license—6th offense.  On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for initiation of the process to manufacture methamphetamine.  Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Williamson Court of Criminal Appeals

Michael Kent Walker v. State of Tennessee
M2015-00861-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert L. Holloway
Trial Court Judge: Judge Gary McKenzie

The Petitioner, Michael Kent Walker, appeals the Putnam County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2012 convictions for selling Schedule I and Schedule II controlled substances in a drug-free zone, for which he received an effective sentence of twelve years.  The Petitioner contends that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary based upon erroneous advice from trial counsel regarding the amount of jail credit to which he was entitled.  We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Putnam Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Anmichael Leonard
W2015-01313-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert H. Montgomery, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Chris Craft

The Defendant, Anmichael Leonard, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, identity theft, a Class D felony, and fraudulent use of a credit card, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103 (2014) (theft of property); 39-14-150 (2012) (identity theft); 39-14-118 (2014) (unauthorized use of a credit or debit card). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective twenty-four years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Billy Ramer
W2015-01692-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Weber McCraw

The defendant, Billy Ramer, pled guilty to one count of sexual battery for crimes committed against his granddaughter. The trial court denied judicial diversion, and the defendant appeals. We conclude that the defendant’s appeal was not timely filed and that the interest of justice, having been served by the denial of diversion, does not demand that we waive the time for filing a notice of appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. We remand the case for correction of the judgment form.

McNairy Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Preston Rashad Royal
W2015-01334-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald H. Allen

Defendant, Preston Rashad Royal, pled guilty to thirteen counts of burglary of an automobile and received an effective sentence of six years to be served on supervised probation after one year of confinement in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). Defendant argues that his sentence is illegal because it directly contravenes Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-122(a). The State concedes error. We conclude that Defendant’s sentence is illegal, vacate the judgments of the trial court, and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing.

Madison Court of Criminal Appeals

Damien C. Darden v. Tennessee Department of Correction
W2015-01595-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Brandon O. Gibson
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Tony Childress

This appeal involves an inmate's petition for writ of certiorari, in which he challenged a decision of the prison disciplinary board finding him guilty of drug possession. After reviewing the record of the disciplinary hearing, the trial court dismissed the inmate's petition. We affirm.

Lake Court of Appeals

In Re: F.N.M.
M2015-00519-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Chief Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor James G. Martin, III

This is a termination of parental rights case. F.N.M. (the child) was born out of wedlock while her biological father, W.C.G. (father), was incarcerated. Shortly after the child’s birth, A.M.M. (mother) gave the child’s physical custody to individuals, who would later choose to be the prospective adoptive parents. Soon thereafter, mother surrendered her parental rights to the child. The prospective adoptive parents filed a petition for adoption and termination of father’s parental rights. Father opposed the adoption and filed a petition to establish paternity. After a hearing, the trial court found father to be the child’s biological parent; but it also found that there is clear and convincing evidence supporting termination of his parental rights. Furthermore, the court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child’s best interest. Father appeals. We modify the trial court’s judgment. As modified, the judgment terminating father’s rights is affirmed. 

Williamson Court of Appeals

In Re: F.N.M.- Dissenting
M2015-00519-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor James G. Martin, III

I agree with the majority that the prospective adoptive parents, S.L.D. and B.W.D., failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that W.C.G. (“Father”) acted with wanton disregard for the child’s welfare within the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) (2015).  I also agree with the majority’s interpretation of Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) (2015).  However, in my view, our Supreme Court has interpreted Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(9)(A) differently, and therefore, I am constrained by that interpretation to respectfully dissent.          

Williamson Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Victoria Monquette Orr
M2015-00690-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael Binkley

The defendant, Victoria Monquette Orr, appeals her conviction for theft of property over $1,000 but less than $10,000, a Class D felony.  On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction and that the trial court erred in admitting the prior consistent statement of a witness.  Following our review of the briefs of the parties, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Williamson Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Victoria Monquette Orr - Dissent
M2015-00690-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael Binkley


Because I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to corroborate the accomplice’s testimony implicating the Defendant in the crime, and, because I similarly disagree with the conclusion that the trial court’s admission of Mr. Taylor’s prior consistent statement was harmless error, I respectfully dissent.

Williamson Court of Criminal Appeals

American Heritage Apartments, Inc. v. The Hamilton County Water and Wastewater Treatment Authority, Hamilton County, Tennessee
E2014-00302-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Justice Holly Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jacqueline Schulten Bolton

We granted permission to appeal to determine whether a customer who seeks to challenge monthly rates charged by its sewer service provider must exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit. The plaintiff apartment complex filed this action individually and as a class representative, arguing that the monthly charge assessed by the defendant water and wastewater treatment authority is unlawful. In response, the defendant asserted that a customer who seeks to dispute the rates charged must first follow the administrative procedures provided in the Utility District Law of 1937, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 7-82-101 to –804 (2015). On this basis, the water and wastewater treatment authority sought dismissal of the lawsuit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and the Court of Appeals reversed. We hold that the administrative procedures in Part 4 of the Utility District Law of 1937 do not apply to a rate challenge filed by an individual customer against a water and wastewater treatment authority, so we agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred in dismissing the lawsuit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. We affirm the remainder of the Court of Appeals’ decision, except that we vacate the trial court’s alternative ruling on class certification and remand that issue to the trial court for reconsideration.

Hamilton Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. Christopher Bailey
W2014-02434-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Paula L. Skahan

The defendant, Christopher Bailey, was convicted of one count of rape of a child, a Class A felony. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of uncharged sexual conduct; that the trial court erred by preventing him from impeaching a witness with evidence of the witness's prior convictions; and that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the victim's prior sexual abuse. Following our thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

Kelcey Z. Williams v. State of Tennessee
W2015-01170-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge Clayburn Peeples

The Petitioner, Kelcey Z. Williams, appeals from the post-conviction court's denial of relief from his conviction for second degree murder. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Gibson Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Devonte Bonds, et al.
E2014-00495-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Timothy L. Easter
Trial Court Judge: Judge Bobby R. McGee

Defendants Devonte Bonds, Thomas Bishop, Jason Sullivan, and Brianna Robinson were tried jointly and convicted of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The jury found that the underlying offenses committed by Defendants Bonds, Bishop, and Sullivan constituted criminal gang offenses, and they received enhanced punishment under Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-121. All of the defendants raise multiple procedural and evidentiary issues with regard to the guilt phase of the trial on the underlying offenses. Defendants Bonds, Bishop, and Sullivan also raise several issues regarding their criminal gang enhancements. Defendants Bishop and Sullivan each raise an issue with regard to their sentencing. After an exhaustive review of the record, we ascertain no error in the guilt phase of the trial on the underlying offenses. Accordingly, the trial court‘s judgment as to Defendant Robinson is affirmed. However, because the subsection of the criminal gang enhancement statute employed by the State violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is facially unconstitutional, we reverse the judgments of the trial court as to Defendants Bonds, Bishop, and Sullivan, vacate the criminal gang enhancements, and remand for modification of the judgments and a new sentencing hearing on the underlying offenses of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony.

Knox Court of Criminal Appeals

Pervis Tyrone Payne v. State of Tennessee
W2013-01248-SC-R11-PD
Authoring Judge: Justice Jeffrey S. Bivins
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Robert Carter, Jr.

We granted permission to appeal in this case to determine whether a capital defendant, via a petition for writ of error coram nobis, may obtain a hearing to determine whether he is ineligible to be executed because he is intellectually disabled. The Petitioner, Pervis Tyrone Payne, was convicted in 1988 of two first degree murders, and the jury imposed the death sentence for each murder. In 2001, this Court held that the federal and state constitutions prohibit the execution of individuals who are intellectually disabled. Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790, 812 (Tenn. 2001). The Petitioner asserts that he meets the statutory definition of intellectually disabled, but he has not yet been afforded an evidentiary hearing on his claim. In this proceeding, he has sought to establish his right to such a hearing via a claim of error coram nobis. The trial court denied relief without a hearing, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed with one judge dissenting. We hold that the Petitioner is not entitled to relief under a claim of error coram nobis. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Shelby Supreme Court

State of Tennessee v. William Pillars
M2015-01032-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Curtis Smith

The defendant, William Pillars, appeals his Franklin County Circuit Court jury convictions of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court erred by improperly admitting and excluding certain evidence, that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the defendant’s prior convictions, and that the sentence imposed was excessive.  Discerning no error, we affirm.

Franklin Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Mark Tracy Looney
M2014-01168-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Mitchell Keith Siskin

A Rutherford County jury convicted the Defendant, Mark Tracy Looney, of four counts of rape of a child, one count of felony child abuse, and one count of misdemeanor child abuse.  The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of fifty years in prison.  On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it: (1) denied his motions for mistrial; (2) denied his motion to suppress his pretrial statements; (3) refused to grant a new trial based upon the State’s failure to provide a recorded statement by the victim; (4) admitted inadmissible testimony from an expert witness; (5) allowed a witness to refresh her memory by viewing a video recording; (6) determined that the evidence against him is sufficient to sustain his convictions; (7) failed to grant a mistrial in light of a juror’s failure to disclose exposure to pretrial publicity; and (8) ordered consecutive sentencing.  After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Rutherford Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Susan Jo Walls
M2014-01972-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Kelly Thomas, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Forest A. Durard, Jr.

The Defendant, Susan Jo Walls, was convicted by a jury of being criminally responsible for the first-degree premeditated murder of her husband and of conspiring with others to commit said murder.  The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment for these convictions.  In this direct appeal, the Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions; (2) the trial court erred in allowing late-night jury deliberations; (3) the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress an involuntary statement made to law enforcement; (4) the trial court failed to properly sanction the State for its untimely disclosure of certain phone records; (5) the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion for a mistrial or to strike a witness’s testimony based on an alleged Jencks Act violation; and (6)the trial court erred by modifying the jury instructions in response to a jury question that was presented after deliberations had commenced.[1]  Because we conclude that the trial court erred by allowing jury deliberations to continue into the late-night hours, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand this case for a new trial.

 

Bedford Court of Criminal Appeals