State of Tennessee v. Ivan Charles Marable
In 1997, the defendant, Ivan Charles Marable, pled guilty to burglary and two charges of possession of a controlled substance. He claims that, although the offenses were committed serially, with the second and third committed while he was on bond, he pled to concurrent three-year sentences. He does not dispute that these sentences have expired. Now an inmate in a federal penitentiary, he filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 to correct his alleged illegal sentences and to award jail credits. The trial court granted the motion for an evidentiary hearing but ordered that it would not be held until after the defendant’s release from federal prison. The defendant appealed this order and sought to have a hearing after which he would be allowed to withdraw his pleas of guilty. Based upon the decision of our supreme court in State v. Adrian R. Brown, --- S.W.3d ---, No. E2014-00673-SC-R11-CD, 2015 WL 7748275 (Tenn. Dec. 2, 2015), which was released while the appeal was pending in this matter, we reverse the order of the trial court granting a hearing on the defendant’s motion and direct that his motion be dismissed because the 1997 Tennessee sentences of which he complains have expired. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brett R. Carter v. Larry B. Martin, et al
Plaintiff filed a public records request for tax study documents. The request was denied, and Plaintiff filed a lawsuit for access to the records. The trial court denied access to the records, and Plaintiff appealed. This Court has determined that the plain language of Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-1-1701(6)’s definition of “tax administration” encompasses the documents in question and that Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-1-1702(a) makes “tax administration information” confidential. The trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
John Hamer v. Southeast Resource Group, Inc., et al.
Plaintiff, a member of a Limited Liability Company that sells insurance products to credit union members, filed this declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that the LLC’s operating agreement does not require him to make a “telemedicine counseling” business opportunity available to the LLC. The operating agreement requires members to “disclose and make available to [the LLC] each and every business opportunity that is within the scope and purpose of [the LLC] . . . .” However, “no such disclosure or offer shall be required with respect to business opportunities that are not within the scope and purpose of [the LLC].” The trial court granted Plaintiff summary judgment, finding that the undisputed facts demonstrated that the “scope” of the LLC’s business was selling insurance and that the telemedicine opportunity was not an insurance product. We have determined that the parties intended “scope” to have its ordinary meaning and that the undisputed facts show that the scope of the LLC’s business at the relevant time was the sale of insurance products and the telemedicine counseling business opportunity is not an insurance product. Consequently, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony John Silva
The defendant, Anthony John Silva, was arrested on suspicion of driving while intoxicated. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence, which the trial court granted. The State now appeals, arguing that the defendant’s arrest was sufficiently supported by probable cause. Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the trial court granting the defendant’s motion to suppress, and we remand for further proceedings. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony John Silva - Dissent
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the evidence preponderates against the findings of the trial court, thereby finding the Defendant’s warrantless arrest was sufficiently supported by probable cause. I agree with the trial court that the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest were not sufficient to lead a prudent person to believe that the Defendant committed or was committing a DUI offense. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jordan Mansfield Looper v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Jordan Mansfield Looper, pleaded guilty to attempted second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years in confinement. State v. Jordan Mansfield Looper, No. M2012-02523-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 4647629, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 26, 2013). Petitioner unsuccessfully appealed his twelve-year sentence. Id. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and he now appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of relief. Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel “abandoned” his case and when trial counsel told him that he would receive probation during sentencing. Petitioner further argues that these errors, in addition to his grief after viewing pictures of the victim’s injuries for the first time, resulted in his guilty plea not being knowingly and voluntarily entered. Following our thorough review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carlos Campbell
Appellant, Carlos Campbell, stands convicted of two counts of aggravated assault, for which the trial court sentenced him to an effective term of six years' incarceration. On appeal, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that his statement to the police should have been suppressed. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Sammy Steadman
The Defendant-Appellant, Joshua Sammy Steadman, appeals the trial court’s order revoking his community corrections sentence. He argues that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his community corrections sentence and ordering him to serve his original sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Quinton Sanders v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Quinton Sanders, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the post-conviction court failed to make adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding one of his claims, and he argues that trial counsel was ineffective. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Roscoe Graham v. State of Tennessee
In August 2013, Roscoe Graham (“the Petitioner”) was convicted of aggravated sexual battery and sentenced to ten years' incarceration. Thereafter, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by: (1) failing to assert a viable defense; (2) coercing the Petitioner to waive filing of a motion for new trial and direct appeal; and (3) operating under an actual conflict of interest. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alex Hardin Huffstutter
In conjunction with the entry of a nolo contendere plea to first offense driving under the influence (“DUI”), Defendant, Alex Hardin Huffstutter, reserved a certified question for appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A) in which he asked this Court to determine whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313 excluded DUI as an offense for which judicial diversion was available. On appeal, this Court determined that the question was not dispositive and dismissed the appeal. State v. Alex Hardin Huffstutter, No. M2013-02788-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 4261143, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 28, 2014), no perm. app. filed. Subsequently, Defendant filed a motion in the trial court seeking reconsideration of his eligibility for judicial diversion. The trial court considered the motion and issued an order denying relief. Defendant appeals the denial of the motion to reconsider. After a review, we determine that the appeal is not properly before this Court. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Bobo
Prior to his indictment, the defendant entered into a written and signed plea agreement with the State in general sessions court, where he waived his right to a preliminary hearing and presentment to the grand jury and indicated he intended to plead guilty to one count of aggravated burglary. After the matter was transferred to criminal court but before the court could accept the plea agreement, the State indicated that it would refuse to abide by the terms. The defendant was ultimately granted a preliminary hearing and indicted, and he then entered an open guilty plea to one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, one count of vandalism of property valued at $10,000 or more, a Class C felony, and one count of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to serve four years on supervised probation for each conviction, with all the sentences to be served concurrently. In entering his guilty pleas, the defendant reserved a certified question of law asking this court to decide whether a written plea agreement, executed in general sessions court, was binding on the State prior to its acceptance by the criminal court. We conclude that the certified question is not dispositive of the defendant‘s aggravated burglary conviction, and accordingly dismiss the appeal of that offense. We further hold that such an agreement is not enforceable absent detrimental reliance by the defendant, and we conclude that the trial court did not err in remanding for a preliminary hearing and indictment rather than granting the defendant specific performance of the agreement. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donte Dewayne Watson
Donte Dewayne Watson, the Defendant, was sentenced to eight years on community corrections under the supervision of the Davidson County Drug Court Program (“DCIV”). Following the issuance of a warrant alleging violations of the drug court agreement order and an amended warrant alleging as an additional ground an arrest for a criminal offense, the Defendant filed a request that his case be transferred back to the court that sentenced him to drug court. The criminal court judge, who also presided over DCIV, denied the request. Following a hearing, the criminal court revoked community corrections, resentenced the Defendant to nine years, and ordered the sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court revoking the Defendant’s community corrections. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timothy L. Diggs, Sr. v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Timothy L. Diggs, Sr., appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for aggravated child abuse and felony murder and his effective life sentence. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his due process and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donquise Tremonte Alexander
The Defendant, Donquise Tremonte Alexander, pleaded guilty pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement to second degree murder and received a thirty-year sentence. More than three years later, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 requesting that the trial court correct an illegal sentence because his sentence exceeds the sentencing range for a Range I offender convicted of a Class A felony. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion after determining that the Defendant knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty and agreed to a sentence outside the appropriate sentencing range pursuant to Hicks v. State, 945 S.W.2d 706 (Tenn. 1997). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his motion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio M. Crockett
A Davidson County jury found the Defendant, Antonio M. Crockett, guilty of first degree felony murder, for which the Defendant received a life sentence. On appeal from his conviction, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying the Defendant’s motion to sever his case from that of his co-defendant; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (3) the trial court erred in admitting the statement of the victim under the dying declaration hearsay exception; and (4) the trial court erred in ordering the Defendant’s life sentence to be served consecutively to a prior sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William L. Jenkins v. Tennessee Department of Corrections, et al.
Certiorari proceeding in which an inmate seeks review of a disciplinary proceeding finding him guilty of assault on another inmate. Petitioner asserts that the disciplinary board violated various Tennessee Department of Correction regulations in the conduct of the hearing and that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Shemeka Ibrahim v. Mark Williams, et al.
Plaintiff filed a health care liability action against multiple healthcare providers but did not comply with the statutes governing healthcare liability actions. Defendants filed motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motions. Plaintiff appeals, and finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shuan Terrell Marsh
The defendant, Shuan Terrell Marsh, appeals his Marshall County Circuit Court jury conviction of third offense possession of a controlled substance, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Courtney Wesley v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Courtney Wesley, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2013 Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated burglary and theft of property valued at $1,000 or more, alleging that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Richard W. Gibbs, et al v. Clint Gilleland, et al.
Buyers of unimproved real property seek rescission of a Lot/Land Purchase and Sale Agreement on the ground of mutual mistake. Buyers purchased the property for the purpose of constructing a house. It is undisputed that at the time of contracting, Buyers and Sellers believed the property was suitable for that purpose. One week after obtaining the necessary building permits and commencement of construction, Buyers were informed by the county that the property was substantially below the required Base Flood Elevation (“BFE”) and that construction must cease immediately. Buyers halted construction and hired a professional engineer to address the issue. Based on unique drainage and flooding concerns, the engineer concluded that the property was not suitable for construction of a residential building and it had not been suitable for such purpose since the land was subdivided in 1999. After Buyers sued for rescission of the contract, both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court found that when the contract was entered into the property was suitable for construction of a house and it only became unsuitable due to the subsequent action of the county in setting the BFE. Therefore, the court concluded there was no mutual mistake of fact. Based on this finding the court granted Sellers’s motion for summary judgment and summarily dismissed the complaint. Buyers appeal. We conclude that, at the time of contracting, the parties were operating under a mutual mistake as to a contemporaneously verifiable fact; nevertheless, the contract assigned the risk of mistake to Buyers. Therefore, rescission on the ground of mutual mistake is not available. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Justin R. Rogers v. Blount Memorial Hospital, Inc. et al. - Concurring
I concur fully in the majority’s decision in this case. I write separately only to express my opinion that the appropriate summary judgment standard to be applied by Tennessee courts now is as set forth in Rye v. Women’s Care Center of Memphis, MPLLC, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2015 WL 6457768 (Tenn. 2015), rather than Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101. I believe our Supreme Court intended for the retroactive application of Rye when it stated: “In civil cases, judicial decisions overruling prior cases generally are applied retrospectively.” Rye, ___ S.W.3d at ___n.9, 2015 WL 6457768 at *35 n.9. While there may be very little, if any, difference between the summary judgment standard as set forth in Rye and as contained in Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101, I believe Rye sets the standard and is controlling on the courts of this State. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Cathy Turnbo Franks v. Ronald Franks
This is the second appeal of this case involving various financial issues relative to a divorce. Husband appeals the trial court‘s determination of several factual findings relative to alimony, including Wife‘s ability to secure employment, Husband‘s ability to earn in the future, the award of attorney‘s fees to wife, and the value of several marital assets divided in the property division, including the value of an LLC jointly owned by the parties. We now vacate the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
Justin R. Rogers v. Blount Memorial Hospital, Inc. et al.
This appeal involves a health care liability action filed by the plaintiff against Blount Memorial Hospital, Inc. (“BMHI”) and the doctor who treated the plaintiff at BMHI from September 8, 2012, to September 13, 2012. The plaintiff filed his complaint on December 13, 2013, alleging that the defendant doctor had misdiagnosed his illness, causing a delay in treatment and resultant permanent injuries. Both defendants filed motions to dismiss, which were converted into motions for summary judgment with the filing of additional affidavits. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of BMHI based on, inter alia, the applicable statute of limitations and BMHI's immunity as a governmental entity. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
James Burton v. Faye Barna
Due to the inadequacies of appellant’s brief and appellant’s failure to provide a transcript or statement of the evidence, we conclude that he has waived consideration of this appeal, and we affirm the judgment of the chancery court. |
Fentress | Court of Appeals |