Michael Tyrone Gant v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Michael Tyrone Gant, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to present evidence on his behalf that would have established both his innocence and the victim’s bias. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bobby Lee Miles, Jr.
The Defendant, Bobby Lee Miles, Jr., pleaded guilty in 1999 to aggravated burglary and received a three-year sentence. On October 21, 2015, the Defendant filed a Rule 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence, alleging that the pretrial credit on the judgment form is incorrect. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion, and the Defendant appeals the dismissal, maintaining that his sentence is illegal. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed the Defendant’s motion to correct his sentence. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Delwin L. Huggins et al. v. R.Ellsworth McKee et al.
Appellant appeals the trial court‘s grant of summary judgment dismissing his claims against a limited liability corporation surrounding the sale of the corporation and the distribution of the proceeds to one member. Although we reverse the trial court‘s ruling with regard to the application of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 48-237-101(d), we otherwise affirm the trial court‘s ruling granting summary judgment to the corporation on all claims asserted by Appellant. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Markhayle Jackson
The Defendant, Markhayle Jackson, entered a guilty plea in 2011 to first degree premeditated murder and was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement. In 2015, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 requesting the correction of an illegal sentence. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion for failure to state a colorable claim. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by dismissing the motion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Quantel Taylor v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Quantel Taylor, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief following remand from the Tennessee Supreme Court. See Taylor v. State, 443 S.W.3d 80 (Tenn. 2014). In his post-conviction petition, Petitioner alleged, in part, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview his three co-defendants. Petitioner subpoenaed the co-defendants to testify at the post-conviction hearing. The post-conviction court granted the State's motion to quash subpoenas for the co-defendants, who were incarcerated. A panel of this court concluded that the post-conviction court erred, but held that the error was harmless under the circumstances. Quantel Taylor v. State, No. W2012-00760-CCA-R3-PC, 2013 WL 6228151 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, April 29, 2013). Our supreme court reversed the decision of this court, holding that the post-conviction court committed prejudicial error by granting the State's motion to quash because the post-conviction court applied an incorrect legal standard. Taylor, 443 S.W.3d at 86. The court remanded the case for reconsideration of the motion to quash under the proper standard. On remand, the post-conviction court denied the State's motion to quash, and all three co-defendants were subpoenaed for an evidentiary hearing. Two of Petitioner's co-defendants, Allen and Bricco, refused to take the stand. The third co-defendant, Spivey, took the stand and refused to testify. The post-conviction court denied post-conviction relief. Petitioner appealed. We conclude that he has failed to establish that he is entitled to post-conviction relief. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Crockett | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Travis Tate
Defendant, Travis Tate, appeals from his convictions of second degree murder, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and from his effective sentence of forty years. Defendant raises the following issues on appeal: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred by admitting hearsay evidence at trial; (3) whether the trial court inaccurately advised Defendant during the Momon hearing; (4) whether the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense; (5) whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury to correct its verdict on employment of a firearm; and (6) whether the trial court abused its discretion during sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court with respect to the first two convictions, but we modify the judgment with respect to the employment of a firearm conviction. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Jayden L. et al.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights as to her three biological children. The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by an incarcerated parent and persistent conditions. The trial court also found that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. We have reviewed the trial court’s findings as to the grounds for termination and the best interests of the children, and we conclude that they are supported by clear and convincing evidence and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Glendall D. Verner
The defendant pled guilty on March 21, 2013, to one count of the theft of $1,000 or more, a Class D felony, and one count of the theft of $60,000 or more, a Class B felony. The defendant was given an effective ten-year sentence, all of which was to be served on probation. As part of his probation, the defendant was required to complete two hundred hours of community service work and was forbidden to sell securities or to work in the financial services or insurance business. On April 26, 2014, the defendant’s probation officer signed a violation of probation affidavit alleging that the defendant was terminated from his community service program for noncompliance. On May 22, 2014, a second affidavit was issued, averring that the defendant violated the special condition forbidding him from working in the financial services industry when he attempted to solicit investors for a project. The trial court held a hearing on three separate days over the course of four months, and the court ultimately concluded that the defendant had violated the terms of his probation. The trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve one year of his sentence in confinement, to be followed by a new probationary period. The defendant appeals, asserting that his due process rights were violated because the terms of his probation were unconstitutionally vague, because the evidence did not establish a violation of his probation, because he was given inadequate notice of the violation, and because the trial court’s written findings were inadequate. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Denny K. Reynolds
A jury in the Maury County Circuit Court convicted the Appellant, Denny K. Reynolds, of simple possession of cocaine. The trial court sentenced the Appellant to eleven months and twenty-nine days in the Maury County Jail. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ricky Flamingo Brown, Sr. v. State of Tennessee
Inmate appeals the dismissal of his claim that funds awarded to him as a result of a claim he filed with the Tennessee Claims Commission were incorrectly applied to his overdrawn inmate trust account. Finding that the application of the funds in this manner did not violate the pertinent statutes, we affirm the judgment of the Commission. |
Court of Appeals | ||
In re Trenton W.
This appeal arises from the termination of a mother’s parental rights. When the child turned six months old, a juvenile court found Mother and Father’s child dependent and neglected and placed the child in the custody of the paternal grandparents. After having custody for nearly five years, the paternal grandparents filed a petition for termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights and for adoption in chancery court. The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights at a separate hearing. At the hearing on Mother’s parental rights, the trial court found clear and convincing evidence that Mother, who was incarcerated when the petition to terminate was filed, abandoned the child. The court also found it to be in the best interest of the child to terminate Mother’s parental rights. Mother appeals, and we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
In re Hailey S.
This appeal involves the termination of a father’s parental rights to his child. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination of his rights on the statutory grounds of abandonment for failure to remit child support, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, and the persistence of conditions which led to removal. The court further found that termination was in the best interest of the child. The father appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified in this opinion. |
Macon | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenderick Michael Tucker
Defendant, Kenderick Michael Tucker, appeals from the trial court’s revocation of probation. Defendant contends that the trial court denied him due process by relying upon evidence that was not alleged in the probation violation warrant. Defendant also contends that he was denied due process because the warrant provided insufficient notice and because the trial court made insufficient findings of fact. The State argues that Defendant admitted his probation violation, and therefore, the evidence supports the trial court’s order of revocation. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Julia H. "Robin" Meyers, et al. v. First Tennessee Bank, N.A.
This is a Tenn. R. App. P. 9 appeal by First Tennessee Bank, N.A. (the Trustee) from the trial court's order denying the Trustee's motion for summary judgment. The beneficiaries of the Ray Haney TUW Residual Trust (the Trust) filed suit against the Trustee for breach of trust. The Trustee asserts that the suit is time-barred; it relies upon Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-15-1005 (2007). The trial court denied the Trustee's motion, holding that there are genuine issues of material fact with respect to whether the suit was timely filed. The Trustee filed an application for an interlocutory appeal, which the trial court granted. We followed suit. We now affirm the trial court's decision denying summary judgment. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
John Smith v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, John Smith, appeals the post-conviction court's denial of relief from his convictions for first degree felony murder, second degree murder, aggravated burglary, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. He argues that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he had received effective assistance of counsel. He further asserts for the first time on appeal that his conviction for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony should be vacated because the indictment failed to specify the underlying dangerous felony. Upon our review, the judgments of the post-conviction court are affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Clark Naifeh
The Defendant, Timothy Clark Naifeh, was convicted by an Obion County jury of six counts of vehicular homicide. Prior to trial, the Defendant filed two motions challenging his competence to stand trial, both of which were denied by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged his convictions into three counts of vehicular homicide by intoxication, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-213(a)(1). The sentence was to be served by split confinement, with one year of incarceration and the remainder on probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding that he was competent to stand trial and that his sentence was improper. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, for purposes of clarity, we remand this matter for entry of corrected judgment forms in Counts 1, 2, and 3, specifying an effective sentence of ten years, with one year of incarceration and the remaining nine years on probation. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Roy Leonard Sewell v. Diane Holland Sewell
In this post-divorce parenting and child support action, the father filed petitions in January 2013 to register and modify the parties' 1997 Georgia divorce decree in the Hamilton County Circuit Court (“trial court”). In the divorce decree, the Georgia court had, inter alia, designated the mother as the primary residential parent of the parties' infant son and directed the father to pay weekly child support. The trial court subsequently entered an agreed order registering the Georgia decree. Following a hearing conducted in March 2013, the trial court entered an order designating the father as the primary residential parent, incorporating a modified permanent parenting plan order, and setting child support to be paid by the mother. The mother subsequently filed a petition to register and enforce a 1998 Georgia court order finding the father in contempt and a 2003 Georgia income deduction order. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Tolbert III a/k/a Micah Joshua Ford
The Defendant, Joseph I. Tolbert III, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of three counts of first degree felony murder, first degree premeditated murder, attempt to commit first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated burglary. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2014) (first degree murder), 39-13-403 (2014) (especially aggravated robbery), 39-14-404 (2014) (especially aggravated burglary), 39-12-101 (2014) (criminal attempt). The convictions for felony murder and premeditated first degree murder were merged and the Defendant received an effective sentence of life plus twenty-two years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) his convictions for especially aggravated burglary are statutorily barred, and (3) his convictions for especially aggravated burglary violate double jeopardy principles. We affirm the judgments of the trial court relative to first degree felony murder, attempted first degree murder, and one of the especially aggravated robbery convictions. We merge the convictions for especially aggravated burglary to reflect one conviction for aggravated burglary and reduce the second conviction for especially aggravated robbery to aggravated assault and remand for resentencing relative to these counts. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. George Coleman
The defendant, George Coleman, was convicted of one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. The trial court imposed a ten-year sentence as a result of the conviction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated sexual battery, that the trial court erred by allowing the victim's brother to testify about why he followed the victim and the defendant to the bathroom, and that the trial court erred in imposing a ten-year sentence. Following our review of the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Jenkins Bonding Company
The Appellant, Jenkins Bonding Company, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s judgment of final forfeiture of bail bonds. The Appellant argues that its obligation to secure the appearance of a defendant had been released; therefore, the trial court erred in issuing a judgment of final forfeiture. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dinnie Merel Robertson
The Defendant, Dinnie Merel Robertson, was indicted for one count of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony; one count of felony reckless endangerment, a Class E felony; three counts of aggravated cruelty to animals, a Class E felony; two counts of vandalism valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony; and one count of carrying a firearm with the intent to go armed, a Class C misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-103, -13-202, -14-105, -14-212, -14-408, -17-1307. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of one count of misdemeanor reckless endangerment, a Class A misdemeanor; three counts of cruelty to animals, a Class A misdemeanor; one count of vandalism valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000; one count of vandalism valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000, a Class E felony; and one count of carrying a firearm with the intent to go armed. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-103, -14-105, -14-202, -14-408. The jury acquitted the Defendant of the felony reckless endangerment charge. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of four years. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on cruelty to animals as a “lesser-included” offense of aggravated cruelty to animals; (2) that the trial court committed plain error by taking his motion for judgment of acquittal “under advisement”; and (3) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for misdemeanor reckless endangerment and both of the vandalism charges. The State concedes that the indictments charging aggravated cruelty to animals failed to charge an offense; therefore, the trial court lacked the authority to instruct the jury on cruelty to animals. Following our review, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions for misdemeanor reckless endangerment, both vandalism charges, and carrying a firearm with the intent to go armed. However, the Defendant’s convictions for cruelty to animals are reversed and dismissed. |
Lawrence | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Maison W.
Deanna R.H.B. (“Mother”) appeals the order of the Chancery Court for Lincoln County (“the Trial Court”) finding and holding that it had been proven by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the minor child Maison W. (“the Child”) for persistent conditions pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3), and for severe abuse pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4), and that it was in the Child’s best interest for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. We find and hold that the evidence in the record does not preponderate against the Trial Court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the Child and that it was in the Child’s best interest to terminate Mother’s parental rights. We, therefore, affirm. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Larry Bachar v. Mike Partin, et al.
In suit arising out of a motor vehicle accident, Defendants appeal the jury’s finding that Defendant driver was 60 percent liable for the accident, the award of damages for lost past and future income, and the failure of the trial court to hold a hearing on alleged juror misconduct. Finding that the jury’s apportionment of liability and award of damages are supported by material evidence and that there is no factual basis for a hearing on jury misconduct, we affirm the judgment. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Russell Dean Long v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Russell Dean Long, appeals as of right from the Washington County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel (1) because a recording of a 911 call was not entered into evidence during the trial; and (2) because lead counsel told the jury during the opening statement that they would hear the recording. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennesse v. Antonio Howard
Defendant, Antonio Howard, along with four co-defendants, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for six counts of aggravated rape, one count of especially aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated robbery, and three counts of aggravated assault. Following a jury trial, he was convicted as charged following a jury trial. The trial court merged counts 4-6 of aggravated rape with counts 1-3 of aggravated rape and sentenced Defendant to consecutive sentences of 25 years on each count. The trial court merged Defendant's convictions for aggravated assault with his convictions for especially aggravated robbery and aggravated robbery and sentenced Defendant to consecutive sentences of 25 years for especially aggravated robbery and 12 years for each count of aggravated robbery. The total effective sentence imposed was 124 years. In this appeal as of right, Defendant raises the following issues for our review: 1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and the trial court erred by denying Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal; 2) the trial court erred by imposing the maximum sentence within the applicable range and imposing consecutive sentencing; and 3) the trial court erred by allowing a co-defendant to testify wearing “street clothing,” by allowing a victim to testify to “prejudicial, irrelevant and inflammatory information,” and by not permitting Defendant to cross-examine a State's witness about the substance of her report. Following a careful review of the record, we conclude that Defendant is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |