Jason Lee Fisher v. State of Tennessee
Jason Lee Fisher (“the Petitioner”) was convicted of four counts of burglary, four counts of theft of property, and three counts of vandalism. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging, among other things, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel and co-counsel failed to file a motion to suppress evidence found during the inventory search of the Petitioner’s vehicle. Following a hearing where only the Petitioner, trial counsel, and co-counsel testified, the post-conviction court found that the Petitioner failed to show that he was prejudiced by counsels’ alleged deficiencies. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the State failed to prove that impounding the Petitioner’s car was necessary and, therefore, the inventory search was invalid. Accordingly, he contends that, had trial counsel and co-counsel filed a motion to suppress, it would have been successful, and all the evidence against the Petitioner would have been excluded. Upon review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Chartis Casualty Company, et al v. State of Tennessee
Five groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed complaints in the Tennessee Claims Commission seeking a refund of retaliatory taxes paid under protest. The Commissioner entered judgments denying the requested refunds, and the insurance companies appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgments. We granted permission to appeal to consider whether certain Pennsylvania workers’ compensation assessments result in a financial burden on Tennessee insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania, thereby triggering the imposition of retaliatory taxes against the Pennsylvania insurance companies doing business in Tennessee. Because the workers’ compensation assessments must be paid by employer–policyholders in conjunction with their premium payments, the administrative task of collecting and remitting those payments does not qualify as a burden on the insurance companies for purposes of the retaliatory tax. The judgments of the Court of Appeals are, therefore, reversed. |
Supreme Court | ||
Wendy A. McCulley v. Robert McCulley
This is a breach of contract case. In 2012, the parties entered into a contract to resolve an issue of past-due child support owed by Appellant to Appellee. The contract provided that Appellant would grant a remainder interest in his home to Appellee, reserving a life estate interest for himself. In exchange, Appellee agreed to forgive the past-due child support owed to her by Appellant. The contract provided, among other things, that Appellant would pay the taxes on the property during his lifetime and would make monthly payments to Appellee's attorney to repay Appellee's attorney's fees. In 2014, Appellee filed a petition alleging that Appellant breached the contract by, among other things, failing to pay the taxes on the property. After a hearing, the trial court found that Appellant breached the contract and that forfeiture of his life estate in his home was the appropriate remedy. On appeal, Appellant admits that he breached the contract but argues that the trial court erred in holding that forfeiture was an appropriate remedy. Because the trial court failed to provide any reasoning for its decision, we are unable to perform a meaningful review of this issue on appeal. We affirm in part but vacate the trial court's revocation of Appellant's life estate and remand for further findings and conclusions on that issue. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
American Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania v. State of Tennessee
Five groups of Pennsylvania-domiciled insurance companies filed complaints in the Tennessee Claims Commission seeking a refund of retaliatory taxes paid under protest. The Commissioner entered judgments denying the requested refunds, and the insurance companies appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgments. We granted permission to appeal to consider whether certain Pennsylvania workers’ compensation assessments result in a financial burden on Tennessee insurance companies doing business in Pennsylvania, thereby triggering the imposition of retaliatory taxes against the Pennsylvania insurance companies doing business in Tennessee. Because the workers’ compensation assessments must be paid by employer–policyholders in conjunction with their premium payments, the administrative task of collecting and remitting those payments does not qualify as a burden on the insurance companies for purposes of the retaliatory tax. The judgments of the Court of Appeals are, therefore, reversed. |
Supreme Court | ||
In re Jatavious M.
This appeal involves the termination of a mother's parental rights to her severely disabled son. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that several grounds for termination exist and that termination is in the child's best interest. On appeal, the mother challenges only the best interest finding. We affirm and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Danny Santarone
Defendant, Danny Santarone, was convicted of possession of dihydrocodeinone, oxycodone, cocaine, and heroin within 1000 feet of a school with the intent to sell or deliver. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that application of the school zone enhancement violates public policy. Based upon a thorough review of the record, authorities, and arguments, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions and that his argument regarding the public policy behind the school zone enhancement is without merit. We therefore affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terry Lynn Priest
The Appellant, Terry Lynn Priest, pled guilty to theft in an amount more than $1,000 and less than $10,000. He was sentenced as a Range II offender to five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mark A. Cohen v. Richard A. Demonbreun
This appeal arises from the dismissal of suit for unpaid fees. An expert and an attorney entered into a services agreement in March 2005. The expert first invoiced for his services in January 2006. Additional services were rendered after that date, and the expert sent additional invoices. Despite repeated requests from the expert and promises from the attorney, invoices went unpaid except for a small partial payment. On September 19, 2013, the expert filed suit against the attorney in general sessions court and obtained a default judgment. Attorney then appealed to circuit court. On a motion for summary judgment, the trial court found that suit was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. We reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Lisa Holt v. Jeremy B. Holt
The matters in dispute pertain to a retroactive child support judgment for a period of time prior to the filing of the child support petition. The trial court assessed a retroactive judgment that included a period of time prior to the filing of the petition, holding that the petition filed by the State on behalf of Mother was to “set” child support not to “modify” support. Father contends a prior support order was in effect when the petition was filed; thus, the trial court violated Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(f)(1) by awarding a judgment based on an increase in child support for several months prior to the filing of the petition. In the trial court the State insisted that the petition was to set support; however, on appeal, it concedes that a child support order was in effect when this petition was filed. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(f)(1) directs that a judgment for child support shall not be subject to modification as to any time period or amounts prior to the date a petition for modification is filed. Therefore, we vacate the retroactive child support judgment and remand for the trial court to calculate the judgment from the date the petition to modify support was filed. |
Wayne | Court of Appeals | |
Austin Davis v. Covenant Presbyterian Church of Nashville, et al.
A former church member brought suit against the pastor and other defendants not involved in this appeal. The trial court dismissed all of the plaintiff’s claims against the pastor with the exception of the causes of action for defamation and outrageous conduct. We have concluded that the plaintiff’s complaint does not make out claims for defamation or outrageous conduct. The decision of the trial court is, therefore, reversed and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint in in its entirety. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Americus C., et al.
This appeal arises from the termination of parental rights to an adopted child. The boyfriend of the adoptive mother physically and sexually abused the child. Upon a petition filed by the Department of Children’s Services, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that the adoptive mother had committed severe child abuse. The juvenile court also found by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the child’s best interest. The adoptive mother appeals claiming that she was not the perpetrator of the abuse and that she had not been given an opportunity to adjust her circumstances. We affirm the termination of parental rights. |
Clay | Court of Appeals | |
Eileen F. Carman Ex Rel. Rodney Carman v. Tracy L. Carman-Thacker
The defendant appealed from a judgment entered on May 12, 2014, and a post-judgment order entered on October 2, 2014. Because the defendant did not file her notice of appeal within the thirty day time period required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terry Norris
In this procedurally complex case, a Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Terry Norris, of second degree murder in 1999, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-one years of incarceration. After several proceedings and filings, discussed in detail below, the U.S. Sixth Circuit granted the Defendant habeas corpus relief unless the State allowed the Defendant to reopen his original direct appeal and raise an issue regarding whether his confession should have been suppressed pursuant to County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991). The State allowed the Defendant to reopen his appeal. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress his confession to police because he gave his confession after being held for more than forty-eight hours without a probable cause hearing. This Court addressed the issue pursuant to plain error review. State v. Terry Norris, No. W2000-00707-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 6482823 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Nov. 18, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 22, 2015). The Defendant filed a Rule 11 application, pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, to the Tennessee Supreme Court. Our Supreme Court granted the application and remanded the case to this Court for plenary review. The State filed a petition to rehear, which the Tennessee Supreme Court denied on May 15, 2015. After our plenary review, we conclude that the Defendant is not entitled to relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Richard Herrera v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Richard Herrera, appeals the Obion County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2010 convictions for sexual battery and attempted sexual battery and his effective one-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terrance Wilks
The Petitioner, Terrance Wilks, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s order summarily dismissing his petition requesting deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) testing pursuant to the 2001 Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act (“the Act”). See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-30-301 to -309. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it concluded that he had not proven the statutory prerequisites for DNA analysis set forth in the Act. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of the Petitioner’s petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carlos Wilson
A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant of aggravated sexual battery and especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twenty-one years, to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it required that he be represented by counsel at trial; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (3) the trial court erred when it ordered consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude that there exists no error in the judgments of the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgments. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donald Biggs, Alias
The Defendant, Donald Biggs, alias, appeals as of right from his guilty-pleaded convictions for four counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of theft by shoplifting, and one count of attempted aggravated robbery. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -13-402, -14-103, -14-105, -14-146. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-two years each on two aggravated robbery convictions. The trial court ordered that the Defendant serve these two sentences consecutively. The Defendant’s remaining sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, resulting in a total effective sentence of forty-four years. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred when it imposed partial consecutive sentences. Following our review, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed partial consecutive sentences, and the judgments of the trial court are, therefore, reversed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donald Biggs, Alias - Dissenting
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court in this case, and therefore I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I want to make it clear that I do not dissent for the reason the sentence imposed by the trial court is the most appropriate sentence for the Defendant. In fact, had I been the trial judge, I would have been persuaded by the logic set forth in Judge Thomas' opinion to sentence the Defendant to an effective sentence of 22 years. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lionel R. Lindsey
The Petitioner, Lionel R. Lindsey, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his motion. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Malina W., et al.
In this termination of parental rights case, the father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights to his two daughters on the grounds of abandonment by failure to visit and support the children in the four consecutive months preceding his incarceration and conduct prior to his incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children. The father also asserts the court erred in finding that termination was in the children’s best interest. We fail to find clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that the father abandoned the children by failing to visit or support them in the four months preceding his incarceration; however, we affirm the trial court’s finding that father engaged in conduct prior to his incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the children. Likewise, we affirm the court’s best interest determination. The trial court’s finding that father’s parental rights should be terminated is affirmed. |
Lewis | Court of Appeals | |
Frances E. Miller Ex Rel. Arnold Edward Miller, Sr. v. Cookeville Regional Medical Center, et al.
Plaintiff filed this medical malpractice action on September 8, 2011, pursuant to the Tennessee Medical Malpractice Act (“the TMMA”) against Cookeville Regional Medical Center, which is a governmental entity subject to the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“the GTLA”). The Medical Center filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, relying upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Cunningham v. Williamson Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 405 S.W.3d 41 (Tenn. 2013), to support its assertion that Plaintiff’s suit was untimely filed because it was not filed within the one-year statute of limitations set forth in the GTLA, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-305(b) (2012). Plaintiff responded contending that the Cunningham decision should be applied prospectively only, so as to preserve Plaintiff’s claim as timely. The trial court found the decision in Cunningham controlling and dismissed the complaint as untimely filed. We affirm. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Marvin Dewayne Echols v. Elke Monika Echols
This appeal arises from a divorce involving a challenge to the validity of the marriage. Marvin Dewayne Echols (“Husband”) filed suit for divorce against his wife Elke Monika Echols (“Wife”) in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (“the Trial Court”). Husband later alleged that his marriage to Wife was void. Husband and Wife had married shortly after a German court had pronounced Wife divorced, and Husband’s position is that Wife’s divorce was not yet legally binding under German law when they married in Kentucky. The Trial Court, among other things, found the marriage valid and granted the parties a divorce. Husband raises several issues on appeal, chief among them the issue of the validity of the marriage in the first place. We hold that Husband failed to prove that his marriage to Wife was invalid. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in its entirety. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Historic Sylvan Park, Inc., et al. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee, et al
Residents of the Sylvan Park neighborhood of Nashville filed a petition for writ of certiorari, seeking review of a decision by the Metropolitan Planning Commission to recommend that the Metropolitan Council disapprove an ordinance which would expand the historic conservation overlay district in the neighborhood. The Planning Commission moved to dismiss the petition, asserting that the Planning Commission’s decision “was only a recommendation and not a ‘final order’ from which an appeal may be taken with a writ of certiorari.” The court granted the motion, holding that the decision by the Planning Commission was not a final order, and thus the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Residents appeal. Because the Metropolitan Council must take further action on the Planning Commission’s recommendation before the zoning ordinance is enacted, the decision of the Planning Commission is not a final order or judgment for purposes of judicial review; accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Libertad Claborn v. Bobby L. Claborn
In 2013, Libertad Claborn (Wife) obtained a “default judgment for dissolution of marriage” from a trial court in Illinois. Wife had resided in Illinois since 2011. The Illinois court ordered the sale of the marital residence in Chattanooga and directed Bobby L. Claborn (Husband) to “cooperate fully” in the sale. The Illinois judgment also ordered Husband to pay child support and educational expenses for the parties’ children. Wife properly enrolled the judgment in Tennessee and sought its enforcement. The trial court in Tennessee accorded full faith and credit to the Illinois judgment. Husband appeals, arguing that (1) the Illinois court did not have jurisdiction to order the sale of the marital residence; (2) the foreign judgment contains provisions at odds with Tennessee public policy; (3) the trial court improperly declined to transfer the matter to chancery court; and (4) the trial court entered a “default” judgment without allowing him to present defenses. We affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Winters v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Robert Winters, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his motion. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals |