State of Tennessee Ex Rel Rebecca Robinson v. Harold Newman, Jr.
In this child support arrearage case Harold Newman, Jr. (“Respondent”) appeals the December 23, 2014 order of the Circuit Court for Roane County (“the Trial Court”) finding Respondent in civil contempt and ordering that Respondent be incarcerated in the Roane County Jail until he pays a purge amount of $150.00. We find and hold that no evidence was produced showing that Respondent had the present ability to pay $150.00, or any amount, and, therefore, the order finding Respondent in contempt and sentencing him to incarceration was in error. We reverse that portion of the Trial Court's December 23, 2014 order finding Respondent in civil contempt and sentencing Respondent to indefinite incarceration in the Roane County Jail with the ability to purge himself of contempt by making a $150.00 purge payment and remand this case to the Trial Court for further proceedings. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Richard Miller
The defendant, Michael Richard Miller, was convicted of three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of employing a firearm in the course of a dangerous felony. On appeal, he challenges the trial court’s imposition of an effective forty-six-year sentence based upon partial consecutive sentencing. Specifically, the defendant argues that: (1) the trial court misapplied the consecutive sentencing factors in making its sentencing determination; and (2) the trial court erred in ordering that the conviction for employing a firearm in the course of a dangerous felony be served consecutively to all his convictions rather than only to the underlying dangerous felony. Following review of the record, we affirm the sentences as imposed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Holly Theresa Self v. Jason Wayne Self
The paramount issue in this parental relocation action arises from a contractual provision in the parenting plan that reads: “If either party should relocate from Lincoln County, Tennessee, the children shall reside primarily with the party remaining so as to keep the children in the Lincoln County School System.” The parties were divorced in 2009 at which time Mother was designated the primary residential parent. In 2014, Mother notified Father that she intended to relocate to Brentwood, Tennessee, because her husband accepted a job there. Father filed a petition opposing relocation relying, in part, on a contractual provision in the parenting plan. Because the parents were exercising substantially equal parenting time, the relocation issue was to be decided pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108(c), which states that no presumption in favor of or against relocation with the child shall arise and that “the court shall determine whether or not to permit relocation of the child based upon the best interests of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108(c). Following a full evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Mother’s request to relocate. The sole basis for the ruling was that Mother was estopped to relocate with the children based on the parenting plan. Having decided the case based on estoppel, the court stated it was not necessary to conduct a best interest analysis. Mother filed a Motion to Alter or Amend insisting the trial court was required to conduct a best interest analysis pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-108(c). The court then conducted the required analysis and additionally found that relocation was not in the children’s best interests. The court modified its order stating that it was denying relocation on the basis of estoppel and its best interest findings. We have determined that the trial court erred in finding Mother was estopped to relocate based upon the parenting plan because the parties contractual agreement merged into the final decree, and the trial court retained jurisdiction on issues concerning the care, custody, and control of the minor children. Nevertheless, we affirm the decision to deny relocation based upon the trial court’s finding that relocation was not in the children’s best interests. Mother also filed a petition to hold Father in civil contempt for failing to pay a debt for which they were jointly liable. The court ruled that Father was not in civil contempt because he had cured his contemptuous conduct and we find no error with the contempt ruling. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
In re Joseph E., et al.
Mother and Father were divorced in 2009; the final divorce decree incorporated a permanent parenting plan designating Mother as primary parent. On May 17, 2010, Mother filed a petition in Davidson County Juvenile Court to have two of the parties’ children declared dependent and neglected based on Father’s alleged physical abuse of the children in two incidents in Davidson County on May 12. At the time of the incidents neither party nor the children were residents of Davidson County. Following a hearing in Juvenile Court, a trial de novo was held in Circuit Court; the court held that the evidence did not support a finding that the children were dependent and neglected and dismissed the petition. Mother appeals, asserting that the court erred in limiting proof to the events which occurred in Davidson County and in excluding the testimony of certain expert witnesses; Mother also argues that the evidence supports a finding that the children were dependent and neglected. Determining that the court did not abuse its discretion in the admission of evidence and that the evidence does not clearly and convincingly show that the children were dependent and neglected, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eric Darnell Whitaker
The Defendant, Eric Darnell Whitaker, was found guilty by a Maury County Circuit Court jury of attempt to commit first degree premeditated murder, a Class A felony, two counts of aggravated assault, Class C felonies, reckless endangerment, a Class E felony, and theft of property valued at $1000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202 (2014), 39-12-101 (2014), 39-13-102 (Supp. 2011) (amended 2013), 39-13-103 (2010) (amended 2011, 2012, 2013), 39-14-103 (Supp. 2011) (amended 2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to twenty years for attempted first degree murder, five years for each aggravated assault, two years for reckless endangerment, and three years for theft. The court ordered consecutive service for one aggravated assault, the reckless endangerment, and the theft sentences, for an effective thirty-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his attempted first degree murder and theft convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Emily Brittany Davis
The Defendant, Emily Brittany Davis, pleaded guilty to one count of vandalism under $500 and was sentenced to serve eleven months, twenty-nine days on supervised probation and pay restitution to the victim. After a hearing, where the victim testified about the cost of the Defendant’s vandalism, the criminal court ordered the Defendant to pay $800 in restitution, and the Defendant appeals this order. Following a careful review of the record and applicable law, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Antonio Bigsbee v. State of Tennessee
Following a jury trial, Antonio Bigsbee (“the Petitioner”) was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping and reckless endangerment and sentenced as an especially mitigated offender to thirteen and a half years’ incarceration. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that trial counsel failed to communicate a plea offer of eight years’ incarceration. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re: Landon R.
This case involves the modification of a parenting plan. The trial court denied Appellant Father's petition to modify the permanent parenting plan and to be appointed primary residential parent. However, the trial court granted Appellee Mother's petition to modify the permanent parenting plan without explicitly acknowledging a material change in circumstance. Mother's petition did not seek to alter the designation of the primary residential parent, and instead sought to modify the parenting schedule. Father appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Janice Newman Krohn v. Kenneth B. Krohn
This is a Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B interlocutory appeal as of right from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. The appellant contends the trial judge should be disqualified on the ground of bias, which is evident from multiple rulings that were adverse to the appellant. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Grogan v. Daniel Uggla, et al.
This appeal concerns a home inspector’s liability for a guest’s injury following the collapse of a homeowner’s second-story deck railing. The accident occurred just one month after the home inspection was performed. In his report to the homeowner, the inspector noted that the deck flooring was warped but failed to report the improper construction of the deck railing. The injured guest filed suit against the homeowner and the home inspector, among others. The inspector moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment, finding that the inspector did not owe a legal duty to the guest. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jesse Allen Christman
The Defendant-Appellant, Jesse Allen Christman, entered guilty pleas to aggravated assault and kidnapping, Class C felonies, with the trial court to determine the length and manner of service of the sentences. Aftera sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing an excessive sentence and in denying him an alternative sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robin Annette Harless
Defendant, Robin Annette Harless, was indicted by the Johnson County Grand Jury for two counts of Class D felony theft. Defendant was a housekeeper for each of the victims and committed the thefts of jewelry, collectible knives, and cash over a period of time while at work. She entered guilty pleas to the charges and requested the trial court to grant judicial diversion. Following a hearing where Defendant and both victims testified, the trial court denied judicial diversion and sentenced Defendant to sentences of three years, concurrent, for each offense, with periodic confinement requiring incarceration of fifty days. In her sole issue on appeal, Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by denying her request for judicial diversion. After review, we affirm pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee. |
Johnson | Juvenile & Family Courts | |
State of Tennessee v. Myron Pierre Walton
Defendant, Myron Pierre Walton, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The State concedes that the trial court erred by summarily dismissing Defendant’s motion. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we reverse the trial court’s order dismissing the motion and remand for appointment of counsel if Defendant is indigent and for other proceedings pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v.Dwight R. Walton
Appellant, Dwight R. Walton, stands convicted of two counts of rape of a child, Class A felonies; three counts of aggravated sexual battery, Class B felonies; and two counts of soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor by electronic means, Class C felonies. He received an effective sentence of fifty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; that the trial court abused its sentencing discretion; that the trial court committed plain error by finding that appellant did not present a prima facie case of gender discrimination by the State in jury selection; and that the trial court committed plain error by denying appellant's request for the offense of child abuse to be charged to the jury as a lesser-included offense of rape of a child. Following our careful review, we conclude that one of appellant‟s convictions for aggravated sexual battery must be reversed for insufficient evidence and that the remaining two convictions for aggravated sexual battery must be merged. We affirm the remainder of appellant's convictions. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Todd Ghormley
The Defendant, Anthony Todd Ghormley, entered a nolo contendere plea to sexual battery by an authority figure and received an effective five-year sentence to be served on community corrections. Approximately nine years after the judgment was filed, the Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36.1 requesting that the trial court correct an illegal sentence. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion as moot on the basis the Defendant had already served his sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his motion. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Loudon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Todd Ghormley - separate opinion
I concur in the finding that Petitioner has not stated a colorable claim for which he is entitled to relief under Rule 36.1. I write separately in order to express my disagreement with the statement in the lead opinion that the plain language of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 forecloses the conclusion that a claim of an illegal sentence is moot because the sentence has expired. I respectfully disagree particularly in this case when the record allows for a common sense, straightforward calculation leading to the inescapable conclusion that Petitioner‟s Community Corrections sentence has long since expired.
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Loudon | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Baxter Bailey Investments LLC v. APL Limited Inc.
Plaintiffs, a debt collection company and a motor carrier, filed suit in general sessions court against defendant to collect unpaid transportation and delivery charges. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment and a motion for sanctions against plaintiffs, arguing that plaintiffs continued to pursue their claims despite knowledge that defendant was not the proper defendant. Plaintiffs eventually voluntarily nonsuited their claim; however, defendants pursued their motion for sanctions. The general sessions court ordered plaintiffs to pay defendants' attorney's fees as sanctions. Plaintiff appealed the award of sanctions to the circuit court, and the circuit court modified the amount of sanctions awarded, but otherwise affirmed the award. On appeal, we reverse, holding the general sessions court did not have the authority to impose attorney's fees as sanctions. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Dana Jo Stricklin v. Jerone Trent Stricklin
This appeal stems from a post-divorce modification proceeding that was commenced by Mother in order to modify the parties' permanent parenting schedule. Following a recess at trial, the parties announced that they had agreed to the terms of a new parenting plan. The agreed-upon terms were announced by the parties' counsel in the presence of the parties in open court. Following the entry of the order approving the modified parenting plan, Father stated that he did not consent to the parenting plan and moved to set the trial court's order aside. The trial court denied his motion. Because the trial court's order does not contain a finding that the modified parenting plan is in the child's best interests, we vacate and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
Alexa Williams EL v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Alexa Williams El, appeals from the trial court's summary dismissal of her three pro se petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed on January 20, 21, and 29, 2015, in which she alleged a number of statutory and procedural violations with regard to the requirements for notifying state officials of a driving infraction after the judgment had issued. She also asserted that the arrest warrants were insufficient with respect to her convictions for driving a motor vehicle while the privilege to drive was suspended, driving an unregistered vehicle, and operating a motor vehicle without evidence of financial responsibility. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Greg Grant v. The Commercial Appeal, et al.
Plaintiff brought action for defamation and false light invasion of privacy based on an allegedly defamatory newspaper article published by defendant newspaper, reporter, editor, and publisher. Defendants moved to dismiss, claiming that liability was precluded based on the fair report privilege. Defendants also asserted that plaintiff failed to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted because the article‘s statements were not capable of being defamatory. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the article was not capable of defamation and that the fair report privilege applied. We reverse in part as to the determination that the fair report privilege applied; affirm in part as to the dismissal of the defamation and false light claims; and reverse in part as to the defamation by implication claims. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
James Fitz v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, James Fitz, pleaded guilty to first degree murder, attempted rape, especially aggravated kidnapping, and theft of property valued over $1,000 but under $10,000. He received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. Subsequently, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which he later withdrew. More than four years after his guilty plea, petitioner filed a second petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition as untimely and alternatively as a failed motion to re-open post-conviction proceedings. Following our review, we conclude that petitioner’s notice of appeal was not timely and dismiss his appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Richard Moreno v. City of Clarksville
In this appeal, the claimant seeks to toll the statute of limitations on his claim against a municipality based on two statutes: (1) Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-1-119, the 90-day “window” in Tennessee’s comparative fault statute to name a non-party defendant as a comparative tortfeasor, and (2) Tennessee Code Annotated § 9-8-402(b), the tolling provision in the Tennessee Claims Commission Act that states that the filing of written notice of a claim against the State tolls all statutes of limitations as to other persons potentially liable to the claimant. The trial court dismissed the claimant’s complaint against the municipality. It held that, because the antecedent complaint against the State of Tennessee was filed in the Tennessee Claims Commission after expiration of the one-year limitations period, the 90-day window under Section 20-1-119 to file the lawsuit against the municipality, as a comparative tortfeasor, was never triggered. The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that the claimant’s written notice of his claim against the State, filed with the Division of Claims Administration before the one-year limitations period elapsed, was an “original complaint” within the meaning of Section 20-1-119, so the lawsuit against the municipality was timely. The municipality appeals. We hold that the complaint, not the written notice of a claim, is the “original complaint” under Section 20-1-119, so the 90-day window to name a non-party defendant as a comparative tortfeasor was never triggered in this case. We also hold that Section 9-8-402(b), the tolling provision in the Claims Commission Act, is not applicable to toll the statute of limitations for a claim against a municipality filed under Tennessee’s Governmental Tort Liability Act. Therefore, this action is time-barred. |
Montgomery | Supreme Court | |
Richard Moreno v. City of Clarksville - Dissenting
As early as 1799, the Superior Court of Law and Equity of Tennessee adopted the principle that the courts of this state should interpret the law in a manner that elevates “the justice of the case” over “technical formality.” Glasgow’s Lessee v. Smith, 1 Tenn. (1 Overt.) 144, 151 (1799). It is equally well established that “Tennessee law strongly favors the resolution of all disputes on their merits,” and that remedial statutes must “be given a broad and liberal construction in order to achieve this goal.” Henley v. Cobb, 916 S.W.2d 915, 916 (Tenn. 1996). This case involves a claim brought pursuant to the Claims Commission Act and hinges on the construction of Tennessee Code Annotated section 20 1 119, a remedial statute intended to provide plaintiffs with a fair opportunity to add a non-party when a defendant alleges that the non-party was comparatively at fault for a plaintiff’s injury. Becker v. Ford Motor Co., 431 S.W.3d 588, 592 (Tenn. 2014). The majority has concluded that in this instance Richard Moreno (the “Plaintiff”) cannot invoke section 20 1 119 because it applies only when the defendant alleging comparative fault is named in a pleading described as a “complaint” rather than a “notice of claim,” the latter being the statutory term used to describe the pleading that commences an action under the Claims Commission Act. In my view, the majority’s interpretation of section 20 1 119 is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute, elevates form over substance, and violates the principle that claims should be decided on the merits whenever possible. I must, therefore, respectfully dissent. |
Montgomery | Supreme Court | |
In re: Estate of Teffany Teresa Love
This case involves a dispute over the name inscribed on the decedent's headstone. The decedents surviving husband and her two adult children had the decedent's headstone inscribed to include her alleged biological father's surname. Appellant, the decedent's adoptive father, brought a petition to replace the headstone selected by the appellees. The appellees moved for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court concluded that the appellant did not have standing to challenge the name on the decedent's headstone selected by the surviving spouse and granted the appellees' motion. We interpret Tennessee Code Annotated Section 62-5-703 to grant the decedent's surviving spouse the right to control the inscription on the decedent's headstone as part of the right of disposition. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Luis Jorge Diaz
Appellant, Luis Jorge Diaz, was convicted of six counts of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court sentenced appellant to ten years for each conviction and aligned two of the convictions consecutively, for a total effective sentence of twenty years. Appellant now challenges his convictions, arguing that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the State to use leading questions during the State’s direct examination of the victim; and (3) the trial court erred in sentencing. Following our review of the briefs, the parties’ arguments, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |