James Lambert v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, James Lambert, appeals the McNairy County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for rape of a child, incest, and aggravated sexual battery, for which he is serving a twenty-five-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
McNairy | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. George Prince Watkins
The Appellant, George Prince Watkins, appeals as of right from the Madison County Circuit Court’s summary denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion without a hearing. The State concedes that the trial court erred. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with Rule 36.1 and this opinion. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. George Prince Watkins-Concurring In Part, Dissenting In Part
I concur with the majority's conclusion that the Appellant has presented a colorable claim as to case numbers 90-227, 90-161, and 90-935 and that those cases must be remanded for appointment of counsel and a hearing unless waived by the parties. I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion that the Appellant presented a colorable claim as to case number 86-521, and I would affirm the summary dismissal of the motion as to that case. I write separately to explain my opinion concerning each of the four cases and to express my opinion that a felony committed while a defendant is released on bail for a probation violation does not trigger mandatory consecutive sentencing, and that if following the hearing on remand, the trial court determines that the six-year, illegal concurrent sentence entered in 1990 has been fully served and has expired, then the promise of concurrence has been fulfilled, and the claim raised by the Rule 36.1 motion is moot. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher M. Epps
Following a jury trial, Christopher M. Epps (“the Defendant”) was convicted of first degree felony murder and sentenced to life. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred when it denied his request for a special jury instruction on eyewitness identification. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Theodore Lebron Johnson
The defendant, Theodore Lebron Johnson, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated robbery, claiming that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction and that the trial court erred by declining to instruct the jury regarding the loss or destruction of evidence. We discern no flaw in the conviction and affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Christopher Bigbee
Defendant, Michael C. Bigbee, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his motion filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the motion. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Lebron Wynn
The defendant, Kenneth Lebron Wynn, appeals the denial of his Rule 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. He argues that the dates of his offenses indicate that he improperly received concurrent sentencing. Following our review, we conclude that the defendant has not stated a colorable claim for relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Lebron Wynn - dissenting
Viewing the defendant's motion in the light most favorable to the movant, as we are obliged to do, see State v. David Morrow, No. W2014-00338-CCA-R3-CO, slip op. at 3-4 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Aug. 13, 2014); see also Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28 § 2(H), we should accede to the State's concession that a fair reading of the claim indicates that it bespeaks an illegal sentence. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Angeli Chan Selitsch v. Michael John Selitsch
Husband filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion to set aside an agreed upon Final Decree of Divorce. He claims the agreed order was the result of a mutual mistake concerning one of his military benefits and that he lacked the mental capacity to understand the agreement. The parties married in 1989. Husband retired from the military in 2009 with 100% disability. Wife filed for divorce in 2012. Over the course of several months, the parties negotiated an agreement as to the division of all of their marital property. The agreement was announced in court in August 2013, at which time both spouses were called to testify concerning their understanding and approval of the agreement. The final divorce decree was subsequently approved by the trial court and entered in January 2014. Pursuant to the final decree, Husband received the entirety of his Veterans Affairs disability benefits, and Wife received one-half of Husband’s other retirement benefit. Husband subsequently filed a Rule 60.02 Motion to Set Aside Marital Agreement for Lack of Capacity and Mistake. He contended that the parties mistakenly believed that his military retirement benefit was marital property when, as a matter of law, the Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act prohibits the courts from treating a disability benefit as marital property. He also contended that he lacked the mental capacity to appreciate the nature of the hearing in which he agreed to the division of marital property due to the pain and stress related to his disease, as well as his medication. The trial court denied relief on both grounds. We affirm. The trial court acted within its discretion by denying Rule 60 relief on the finding that Husband failed to present sufficient proof to obtain relief on the ground of mental incapacity. Furthermore, a mistake of law is not a ground for Rule 60.02 relief and the trial court acted within its discretion when it denied relief on this ground and enforced the parties’ agreement. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Walter Shegog
Aggrieved of his Shelby County Criminal Court jury conviction of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, the defendant, Walter Shegog, appeals, claiming that the trial court was without jurisdiction to impose his conviction because the offense occurred on federal property, that the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss the indictment based upon the State's destruction of certain evidence, and that the trial court erred by permitting the State to use all of the defendant's prior convictions as impeachment evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Albert Taylor
The Appellant, Albert Taylor, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court's summary denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. On appeal, the Appellant argues that the trial court erred (1) by determining that, because his sentences had expired, he was not entitled to a motion hearing and (2) by treating his motion as a petition for habeas corpus relief. The State concedes that the trial court erred. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with Rule 36.1 and this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Albert Taylor-Concurring
Although I concur with the lead opinion's holding that this case needs to be remanded for the appointment of counsel and a hearing, I write separately to express my opinion that, if the evidence at the hearing proves that the effective sentence entered in 1992 has been fully served and has expired, the controversy is moot and not justiciable. Moreover, even if the effective sentence has not expired, if the proof establishes only that the Defendant's three-year illegal concurrent sentence has been fully served, I would hold that the fulfillment of the promise of concurrence purged the illegality from the Defendant's effective sentence such that the controversy is moot and not justiciable and the Defendant would not be entitled to relief under Rule 36.1. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Miqwon Leach
Miqwon Leach, the Defendant, filed pro se a Motion for Correct of an Illegal Sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The trial court found the motion failed to state a colorable claim and summarily dismissed the motion. We affirm. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Lindsey
The Defendant, Michael Lindsey, filed a Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion for failing to state a colorable claim. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donnie Dewayne Davenport
The Defendant-Appellant, Donnie Dewayne Davenport, was convicted by a Cumberland County Criminal Court jury of promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-433. He was sentenced as a Range III, career offender to twelve years' confinement to be served at sixty percent. On appeal, he argues (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and (2) that his sentence is excessive and contrary to law. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Cumberland | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mario D. Frederick
A Montgomery County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Mario D. Frederick, of indecent exposure and public indecency, Class B misdemeanors, and the trial court sentenced him to ninety days for each conviction to be served concurrently. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the definition of “masturbation.” Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Susan Lynn Morgan v. John David Drauss
Appellant appeals the trial court’s denial of a motion filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.02. The trial court denied the appellant’s request to elicit testimony from the appellee during the Rule 52.02 hearing and denied the appellant’s motion. We affirm. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
John A. W. Bratcher, Clerk And Master/Special Commissioner, et al v. Beverly M. Hubler, et al.
This appeal involves a suit to condemn an easement or right-of-way to access landlocked property. The plaintiff named as defendants all neighboring landowners, including the State of Tennessee and the Town of Smyrna. The State and the Town filed motions to dismiss, asserting sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the motions to dismiss but granted the State and the Town permission to seek an interlocutory appeal. This Court granted the applications for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. We hold that the State and the Town are entitled to dismissal based on sovereign immunity and therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Donna Nance McLucas v. Shawn Michael Nance
This appeal arises from a detainer action originally filed by a landlord against a tenant in general sessions court. The general sessions court entered judgment by default against the tenant for $25,000. The tenant filed a notice of appeal to circuit court, along with a pauper’s oath and affidavit of indigency. The circuit court found that the tenant failed to properly perfect the appeal and dismissed the appeal. The tenant appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Macon | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terrell Smith
The defendant, Terrell Smith, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempted voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony; possession of a firearm on school property, a Class E felony; and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, a Class C felony. He was sentenced to an effective term of eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the victim to display scars from his gunshot wounds to the jury; (2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by introducing evidence of the defendant's prior conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon via cross-examination of his mother and the court should have, thus, declared a mistrial; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rodney Glover v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
This appeal involves the dismissal of a petition for a writ of certiorari filed by a prison inmate. The prisoner raises several issues regarding violations of the Tennessee Department of Correction's (TDOC) uniform disciplinary procedures. The prisoner was found guilty of refusing to participate in his assigned educational class. After exhausting his administrative appeals, he filed an application for a writ of certiorari in the trial court. The trial court granted the writ of certiorari, and upon review of the record, granted the TDOC's motion to dismiss. The prisoner now appeals. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
Steven Tucker v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Steven Tucker, was convicted of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony, and was sentenced to twelve years as a career offender. State v. Steven Van Tucker, No. W2010-01943-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 1478774, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 25, 2012). This court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. Id. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and he now appeals the post-conviction court's denial of relief. Petitioner argues that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when law enforcement entered a home, which did not belong to petitioner, with only an arrest warrant for the petitioner and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the search. Following our thorough review of the record, the parties' briefs, and the applicable law, we dismiss petitioner's appeal as untimely. |
Lauderdale | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Timothy Curtis Greeman
The defendant, Timothy Curtis Greenman, appeals his Tipton County Circuit Court jury convictions of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and facilitation of burglary of a motor vehicle, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Gregory Gene Spiceland v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Gregory Gene Spiceland, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2011 Stewart County Circuit Court jury convictions of initiating the process to manufacture methamphetamine and promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Stewart | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mark Thomas Church et al v. Charles Blalock & Sons, Inc. et al.
This action stems from a motor vehicle accident resulting in two fatalities that occurred at the intersection of the newly constructed State Route 91 and Old State Route 91 in Johnson County, Tennessee. Alleging that the design and construction of the intersection were negligent, the plaintiffs filed suit in the Johnson County Circuit Court against Johnson County and the general contractor who constructed the intersection. The plaintiffs also filed claims against the Tennessee Department of Transportation with the Tennessee Claims Commission, asserting that the intersection constituted a dangerous condition on a roadway. The claims filed with the Claims Commission were transferred to Johnson County Circuit Court, and all claims were subsequently consolidated in this action. Johnson County and the general contractor were later dismissed as defendants, such that the trial proceeded regarding the claims against the State only. Following a bench trial, the court granted judgment to the plaintiffs, determining the State to be 53% at fault and the deceased driver to be 47% at fault. The court awarded damages accordingly. The State timely appealed. We conclude that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s determination that the intersection constituted a dangerous condition on the roadway or that the risk involved was foreseeable. We therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals |