Vernon Lavone Roberts v. State of Tennessee
Vernon Lavone Roberts (“the Petitioner”) appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we conclude that the Petitioner’s claim was previously determined by this Court on direct appeal. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timothy Davis ex rel. Katherine Michelle Davis v. Michael Ibach, MD, et al.
The Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against the Defendants. Following the Defendants’ motions to dismiss the action, asserting that the certificate of good faith was noncompliant with the requirement in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-122(d)(4) (Supp. 2008), the trial court granted the Plaintiff’s request to voluntarily dismiss the action. The Defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the trial court. We granted review to determine whether the requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-122(d)(4) that a certificate of good faith filed in a medical malpractice action disclose the number of prior violations of the statute by the executing party also requires disclosure of the absence of any prior violations of the statute. We hold that it does not. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. |
Dyer | Supreme Court | |
Elizabeth Sanders, by and through her next of kin, Tonita Minter v. Harbor View Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, Inc., et al.
This is an appeal from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration in a healthcare liability case. The Decedent executed a power of attorney in favor of her daughter, the Appellee, granting Appellee broad powers, but exempting healthcare decisions. The Decedent was subsequently admitted to the Appellant nursing facility. The Appellee signed the Decedent's admission contract and a separate, voluntary arbitration agreement. After the Appellee filed this action against the nursing facility and its managing companies, the Appellants filed motions to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreement signed at the time of the Decedent's admission. The trial court denied the motions. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Christie Crews v. Gary Jack
Plaintiff filed suit against defendant in general sessions court. After the general sessions court entered judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court conducted a trial de novo, but the defendant failed to appear and defend. The circuit court entered a default judgment in favor of plaintiff after she presented her proof. Defendant filed a motion to set aside the default judgment alleging that he never received notice of the trial date in circuit court. The circuit court denied defendant's motion to set aside the default judgment. We reverse the circuit court's ruling and remand for further proceedings. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In re Adison P.
This case arises from a writ of mandamus issued by the Circuit Court for Henderson County. The writ of mandamus directed Appellant/Judge Robert Stevie Beal, of the Juvenile Court for Henderson County, to hold a hearing on Appellee’s motion for a show cause order in the underlying child custody case. Appellant appeals, arguing that the Circuit Court did not have authority to issue a writ of mandamus to the Juvenile Court because the Circuit Court and Juvenile Court have concurrent jurisdiction over custody matters. Before oral argument in the instant appeal, this Court entered judgment in Appellee’s separate, accelerated, interlocutory appeal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B. In re Adison P., No. W2015-00393-COA-T10B-CV, 2015 WL 1869456 (Tenn. Ct. App. April 21, 2015) (“Adison I”). In Adison I, this Court reversed Judge Beal’s order denying Appellee’s motion for recusal. Although not part of our appellate record in this appeal, we take judicial notice of our judgment in Adison I. Having removed Judge Beal from the underlying case, we conclude that the writ of mandamus, which is issued directly to “Judge Beal,” is rendered null by his removal from the case. Because no present ongoing controversy remains in this case, this appeal is dismissed as moot. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Deborah B. Bowes
The appellant, Deborah B. Bowes, pled guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to one count of filing a false report, for which she received a sentence of eight years. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Harry Joseph Chase v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Harry Joseph Chase, appeals as of right from the Greene County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, the Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because lead trial counsel was not present when he pled guilty, did not review the Petitioner’s discovery with him, and did not fully discuss a possible self-defense claim with the Petitioner. Following our review, we conclude that the record supports the post-conviction court’s conclusion that the Petitioner received the effective assistance of counsel, and we therefore affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Jamie G.
In this termination of parental rights case, Mother appeals the trial court’s findings of abandonment by willful failure to support and the persistence of conditions as grounds for termination. Mother also appeals the trial court’s conclusion that termination was in the child’s best interest. Pre-adoptive parents appeal the trial court’s decision declining to find the ground of willful failure to visit. We affirm the trial court’s findings of willful failure to support and persistent conditions. Further, albeit for different reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decision declining to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the ground of willful failure to visit. We also affirm the trial court’s finding that termination is in the child’s best interest, and therefore, affirm the termination of the Mother’s parental rights. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mark Stephen Keown v. Alyson Savino Keown
The parties were married for less than two years, and they had one child together who was three years old at the time of the divorce. Shortly after the child’s birth, Mother moved with the child to New York to be near her family. The trial court named Mother the primary residential parent, ordered Father to pay $697 a month in child support, awarded Father one weekend a month of visitation, and ordered Mother responsible for the transportation costs of the child to visit Father, including the cost of an additional ticket for a parent or guardian to fly with the three-year-old child. In dividing the parties’ property, the trial court found that a 2006 Range Rover, purchased by Father’s business before the marriage, was not marital property. Mother appeals the trial court’s ruling that she pay all transportation costs to facilitate Father’s parenting time, and the classification of the Range Rover. We have determined that the annual cost to Mother to transport the child to Tennessee to facilitate Father’s parenting time will likely exceed the annual award of child support until the child reaches the required age to fly alone, creating an injustice to Mother; moreover, Father only requested that Mother be responsible for half of the cost of transportation, not all costs. Concluding that the trial court abused its discretion, we modify the trial court’s judgment to require both parties to equally share the costs of transportation concerning Father’s parenting time. We affirm the trial court in all other respects. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Spydell Davidson v. Nader Baydoun, et al.
This is Plaintiff’s second appeal of the dismissal of his legal malpractice claim. The first appeal arose from the grant of a motion to dismiss under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) wherein the trial court concluded that Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued more than one year before the complaint was filed and was time barred. Based solely on a review of the allegations in the complaint, we concluded that the action was not time barred. See Davidson v. Baydoun, No. M2008-02746-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 2365563 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2009). On remand, the parties engaged in discovery, which revealed that Plaintiff knew he had been injured by Defendants’ alleged negligence more than one year before the commencement of this action. Defendants then filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.02 motion for summary judgment, which was properly supported by a statement of undisputed facts, contending they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Plaintiff’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court summarily dismissed the complaint finding it was undisputed that Plaintiff knew he had suffered an injury because of Defendants’ alleged negligence more than one year before the commencement of this action. The trial court also granted Defendants’ motion for discretionary costs. On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and by awarding Defendants discretionary costs. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Kline Preston v. W. Stanford Bralock, et al.
This is a malicious prosecution case. In the underlying case, plaintiff was sued by defendants for abuse of process. That case was resolved on summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. Thereafter, plaintiff filed this case for malicious prosecution. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Plaintiff appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Braydon C.
Petitioners Father and Stepmother filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights on the ground of abandonment for failure to visit and failure to support. The trial court denied the petition upon determining that Petitioners failed to demonstrate willful abandonment by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In re Wesley P.
The trial court terminated the parental rights of both mother and father on the ground of severe abuse. Because there is sufficient evidence to conclude that mother and father were engaged in methamphetamine manufacture in their home, we affirm the finding of severe abuse. However, because no clear and convincing evidence exists in the record that termination is in the child's best interest, we reverse the termination of both mother's and father's parental rights. |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
Rebecca Burke Pair v. Chris Franklin Pair
In this divorce action, Wife appeals the trial court’s finding that Husband did not dissipate marital funds, the award of alimony, and the division of marital property. Finding that the award of support and division of property is supported by the evidence and consistent with the applicable law, we affirm the judgment. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
David R. Smith v. The Tennessee National Guard
This is the second appeal from an action filed by Plaintiff against the Tennessee National Guard in which he contends Defendant violated the Uniformed Service Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (“USERRA”) by refusing to rehire Plaintiff after he returned from active duty military service. In the first appeal, we affirmed the grant of Defendant’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon sovereign immunity from USERRA claims, noting that only the Tennessee General Assembly could waive the state’s sovereign immunity. See Smith v. Tennessee Nat. Guard, 387 S.W.3d 570 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012). Shortly after we issued that opinion, the Tennessee General Assembly enacted Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-208, which waives sovereign immunity for USERRA claims that accrue on or after July 1, 2014. Relying on the new statute, Plaintiff filed a Rule 60 motion seeking to have his original lawsuit reinstated. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Plaintiff’s claim was still barred by sovereign immunity because it accrued before July 1, 2014. We affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Synovus Bank v. David A. Paczko, et al
Bank sued borrowers on a lost or destroyed promissory note. Borrowers, among other defenses, denied that the note was in default and the amount due. Borrowers also claimed that bank had destroyed the note with the intention of discharging the obligation. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court entered judgment in favor of bank. Borrowers appeal, claiming the affidavits filed in support of the bank’s motion for summary judgment were deficient, the existence of disputed material facts, the indebtedness had been discharged, and that further discovery should have been permitted by the trial court. We vacate and remand. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In re: Justin H.
This appeal involves a child support order entered after an international adoption. The trial court found that the child's adoptive mother failed to pay child support as previously ordered by the court, and therefore, the mother was adjudged in contempt. On appeal, the mother argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the previous order requiring her to pay child support and also lacked jurisdiction to hold her in contempt of that order. Alternatively, she argues that she did not willfully violate the court's order. Finally, the mother argues that a separate injunction entered by the trial court is also void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and/or procedural irregularities. We affirm. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
In re Estate of Leonard Malugin
This is a will contest case. The Decedent executed a will in 2006 and a codicil to the will in 2012. The will specifically disinherited the Appellant, and the codicil removed one of the Decedent’s children as co-executor of the estate. Appellant contested the will, arguing both that the Decedent lacked the testamentary capacity to execute either the will or the codicil and that the will was executed under undue influence. The trial court found that the Decedent possessed the testamentary capacity necessary to execute both the will and the codicil and that the Decedent did not execute the will or codicil under undue influence. On appeal, Appellant only challenges the trial court’s findings regarding the Decedent’s testamentary capacity. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio Williams aka Antwoin Williams
Appellant, Antonio Williams a.k.a. Antwoin Williams, pleaded guilty to selling a controlled substance and received a suspended three-year sentence with eighteen months on probation. Appellant’s probation officer issued a probation violation warrant before appellant had completed his eighteen months on probation. While the warrant was pending, appellant received four additional charges and subsequently pleaded guilty to the violation of probation and the four additional charges, receiving concurrent sentencing. Appellant later filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, which the trial court summarily dismissed. On appeal, appellant argues he stated a colorable claim in his motion because the trial court erroneously imposed concurrent sentencing and the trial court failed to make proper findings during sentencing. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. George Robert Hamby
Appellant, George Robert Hamby, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced appellant as a Range II offender to twelve years in confinement. On appeal, appellant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in not accepting a negotiated guilty plea; (2) the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing. Following our review of the evidence and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Wayne Britt v. Debra Johnson, Warden
The Petitioner, David Wayne Britt, appeals the Circuit Court of Hardeman County‘s denial of his third petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court‘s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State‘s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mark A. White, et al v. Turnberry Homes, LLC, et al.
Homeowners sued the builder and others for defects in their home. The builder sought to compel arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause in the purchase agreement. The trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration except as to the fraudulent inducement claim. The builder appealed. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Terry Lynn King v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Terry Lynn King, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis regarding his convictions for felony murder, for which he was sentenced to death, and for armed robbery, for which he is serving 125 years. The coram nobis court dismissed the petition because it was untimely and because due process did not require tolling the one-year statute of limitations. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the court erred by dismissing the petition. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.
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Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Alejandro Neave Vasquez v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Alejandro Neave Vasquez, was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone and possession with intent to deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone. He received concurrent twenty-year sentences for each count, for a total effective sentence of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel: (1) failed to utilize an interpreter during all meetings and at trial; (2) advised petitioner not to testify; and (3) failed to adequately explain the school-zone enhancement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Phyllis Smith v. Shelby County
In this premises liability action, Appellant Phyllis Smith (“Ms. Smith”) appeals the trial court’s finding that Shelby County (“the County”) is immune from suit under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. Because we conclude that the order appealed from is not a final judgment, we dismiss the appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |