Flat Iron Partners, LP, et al. v. The City of Covington, et al.
This is an appeal from the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Appellees on their Open Meetings Act claim, and the grant of partial summary judgment to Appellees on their Fair Housing Act claims, i.e., disparate treatment and disparate impact. We conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the Open Meetings Act claim. We further conclude that there are disputes of material fact that preclude the grant of partial summary judgment on the FHA claims. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and vacate the trial court’s entry of judgment on a jury verdict on the issue of damages. Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Alfred Gamble v. Abitibibowater, Inc. et al.
An employee sustained an injury to his knee while attempting to repair a piece of heavy machinery owned by his employer. Because of a staph infection, three separate surgical procedures were required. The knee gradually healed, leaving a thick and sensitive scar. An independent medical examiner, who testified on behalf of the employee at trial, found a permanent impairment of 7% to the lower extremity and added 5% based upon the disfigurement section of the AMA Guides. The orthopedic surgeon who performed the surgery found a permanent partial impairment of 7% to the lower extremity. A second orthopedist authorized by the employer assigned a permanent impairment of 2%. The trial court assigned a 7% permanent impairment to the lower extremity and also ruled that the employee did not have a meaningful return to work, thereby authorizing an award in excess of 1.5 times the medical impairment rating. In this appeal, the employee contends that he is entitled to an increase in the medical impairment rating from 7% to 12%. In response, the employer argues that the trial court erred by finding an impairment in excess of 2% and by ruling that the employee did not have a meaningful return to work. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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McMinn | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Travontay Tremont Berry
A jury convicted the defendant, Travontay Tremont Berry, of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony, and carrying a firearm with the intent to go armed, a Class A misdemeanor. The defendant appeals the sufficiency of the evidence for his felony conviction, arguing that he did not know that an investigation was pending at the time of the offense. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court. We remand for correction of the judgment form to reflect the correct classification of the tampering with evidence offense and for reconsideration of the sentence in light of the correction. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Melvin Brown
The Defendant, Melvin Brown, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for driving under the influence (“DUI”); DUI with blood alcohol more than .20%; violation of the implied consent law; reckless driving; and driving with a license revoked, suspended, or cancelled. The Defendant refused law enforcement’s request to submit to a blood test to determine his blood alcohol content, and his blood was taken, without a warrant and over his objections, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-406(f)(1) (Supp. 2011). The trial court subsequently granted the Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of his blood alcohol content. In this interlocutory appeal, the State challenges the trial court’s conclusion that the Code section 55-10-406(f)(1) is unconstitutional and that no exception to the warrant requirement existed to justify the warrantless blood draw. Upon review, we conclude that Code section 55-10-406(f)(1) does not dispense with the warrant requirement and reverse the portion of the trial court’s judgment declaring the statute unconstitutional. Because no exception to the warrant requirement existed, however, we affirm the order of the trial court suppressing the results of the Defendant’s blood alcohol content. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Claudale Renaldo Armstrong
A Marshall County Circuit Court jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Claudale Renaldo Armstrong, of sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine base; delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine base; sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine; and delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417 (2011). The trial court merged the four alternative counts into two convictions and sentenced Armstrong as a Range II, multiple offender to a total effective sentence of twenty-six years in the Department of Correction. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Pinnacle Roofs Plus v. William Murphy
Roofing company filed a civil warrant against homeowner for money owed on a written contract after completion of work and homeowner refused to pay. Homeowner countered by filing a civil warrant for breach of contract alleging that roofing company was not licensed as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 62-6-603 prior to entering into contract. The circuit court found that roofing company was licensed at all material times and awarded a monetary judgment in favor of roofing company. Homeowner appealed. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In re Destiny W.
This appeal involves the termination of Mother’s parental rights to her child. At ten and one-half weeks old, the Department of Children’s Services placed the child with guardians due to Mother’s drug use. About eighteen months after the child’s placement with the guardians, the Guardian ad Litem filed a petition for termination of parental rights. The juvenile court found statutory grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights and that termination was in the child’s best interest. On appeal, Mother argues that the Guardian ad Litem did not have standing to file the petition to terminate parental rights and that clear and convincing evidence did not support the juvenile court’s conclusion that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. We affirm. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
Rutherford Wrestling Club, Inc. v. Robert Arnold, et al.
This appeal involves a dispute over the ownership of both real and personal property located at Blackman Middle School in Rutherford County, Tennessee between the appellant, Rutherford Wrestling Club, Inc., and the Appellees, consisting of Rutherford County, the Rutherford County Board of Education, and the Rutherford County Sheriff’s Department. The trial court rejected various theories raised by the appellant regarding its claim of ownership of the property. After conducting a trial, the trial court concluded that the property belonged to the appellees. On appeal, the appellant claims that the trial court erred in finding that the appellant was merely a booster club and had no ownership interest in either the real or personal property in question. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Community First Bank And Trust v. The Velligan Family Trust, et al
The matters in dispute pertain to four promissory notes. After the Bank filed suit to collect on the notes, Defendants filed counterclaims against the Bank and cross-claims against one of its agents. Following discovery, the Bank and its agent moved for summary judgment on all claims; Defendants opposed summary judgment on several grounds. Finding that the unpaid balances on the notes and the resulting deficiencies were undisputed and that Defendants released all claims against the Bank and its agent when they executed forbearance agreements, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bank in the amount of $204,024.25, and summarily dismissed all claims asserted by Defendants. We affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Regina D. Wiser v. Cyrus W. Wiser, Jr.
Husband was ordered in an earlier proceeding to increase his alimony and child support payments to Wife. The following year, Husband filed a petition to reduce his alimony and child support payments due to a substantial and material change of circumstances. Husband alleged both that Wife was cohabitating with another person and that Husband’s income had significantly decreased. The trial court denied Husband’s petition and awarded Wife attorney’s fees. Husband appeals, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment in all respects. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
In re Mattie H.
The trial court entered an order establishing paternity and setting child support for a non-marital child. The trial court also granted J. W. B.’ s (hereinafter “Father”) oral motion to change the child’s surname from T. H.’ s (hereinafter “Mother”) to Father’s. Mother appeals only the order changing the child’s surname. We reverse. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Robert W. Halliman et al v. Heritage Bank et al
After foreclosing on three lots securing three loans, the mortgagee, Heritage Bank, sought to satisfy the outstanding deficiency by foreclosing on the debtors’ family-owned property that additionally secured these obligations. To prevent the impending foreclosure, the debtors commenced this action contending they are not liable for the deficiency because the properties sold at foreclosure for an amount materially less than their fair market value. In its answer, the bank asserted a counterclaim seeking a deficiency judgment and attorneys’ fees. At the close of the debtors’ case-in-chief, the bank moved for involuntary dismissal pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.02(2). The trial court granted the motion, finding that the debtors failed to prove the fair market value of the three properties at the time of each foreclosure was materially less than the foreclosure sale prices; therefore, the debtors failed to overcome the presumption afforded by Tenn. Code Ann. § 35-5-118(b) that the foreclosure sale prices equaled the fair market value. The court then conducted a trial on the bank’s counterclaim for the deficiency and awarded the bank a judgment of $111,115.66. The trial court also awarded attorney’s fees in the amount of $55,000, which was substantially less than the bank requested. Both parties appeal. The debtors contend the trial court erred in dismissing their claim because they presented sufficient proof that the sale prices were materially less than fair market value; they also contend the bank was not entitled to recover its attorneys’ fees. The bank contends the trial court erred by reducing its fee application. We have determined the debtors failed to prove that the sales price for each of the foreclosed properties was materially less than their fair market value at the time of each sale, and we find no error with the award of attorneys’ fees. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Draine aka Anthony Draine-Love
A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Anthony Draine a.k.a. Anthony Draine-Love, of aggravated burglary. He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress and contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Glen Sewell
The defendant, Glen Sewell, was convicted of one count of Class D felony theft of property, two counts of Class D felony vandalism, one count of Class E felony vandalism, and one count of Class A misdemeanor vandalism. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of thirty-six years, with three twelve-year sentences for the Class D felonies to be served consecutively to each other and concurrently with a six-year sentence for the Class E felony conviction and an eleven month and twenty-nine day sentence for the Class A misdemeanor. On appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for Class E felony vandalism, Class D theft of property, and Class D felony vandalism; (2) the trial court erred when interrupting trial counsel during voir dire; (3) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Loreto Espinosa, Jr.
The Defendant, Loreto Espinosa, Jr., was convicted by a Bedford County Circuit Court jury of eighteen counts of aggravated rape of a child, Class A felonies. See T.C.A. § 39-13-531 (2014). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender to sixty years for each conviction at 100% service and ordered partial consecutive sentences. The court ordered Counts 1 and 18 to run consecutively to each other and Counts 2 through 17 to run concurrently to each other but consecutively to Counts 1 and 18, for an effective 180-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the State failed to make a proper election of the offenses for Counts 2 through 17, and (3) his sentence is excessive. We conclude that insufficient evidence exists relative to Counts 1 through 17, and we reverse the judgments of the trial court, vacate the convictions, and dismiss the charges relative to those counts. Although the trial court failed to require the State to make an election of the offense relative to Count 18, we conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gerald McEwen
A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Gerald McEwen, of first degree premeditated murder and attempted first degree murder. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his convictions and contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Heather Walker Sellers v. Billy Joe Walker
This action involves the modification of a child support award. The trial court determined the self-employed obligor's income to be consistent with amounts deposited in his personal bank account, rather than the income reported on his federal tax returns, and calculated his child support obligation accordingly. The obligor has appealed the trial court's determination regarding his income and resultant child support obligation. We determine that the trial court properly based the obligor's income on the combined amount of his annual deposits. We also determine that the trial court properly set the obligee's income based on her testimony. We reverse the trial court's calculation regarding the amount of child support to be paid, however, due to a mathematical error in the trial court's income calculation and its failure to consider the obligor's self-employment taxes. We remand the case for a recalculation of child support utilizing the proper monthly income for the obligor and taking into consideration the amount of self-employment tax paid by him. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Connie L. Watson v. Ruby Anne Pike
This is an appeal from an order granting a new trial in a Will contest proceeding initiated by the appellant, Connie Louise Watson (“Watson”), seeking to invalidate the Last Will and Testament executed by her father, Noah Richard Earls, Sr. (“Decedent”), in which the appellee, Ruby Anne Pike (“Pike”), was appointed the Decedent’s Personal Representative and Executrix of his estate. Because the order on appeal contemplates further proceedings in the Trial Court, it is not a final order and we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
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Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Timothy Joshua Gooding v. Jessika Ann Gooding
Father appeals the parenting schedule contending it is not supported by the evidence and that the trial court erred by implicitly basing the parenting schedule on an erroneous legal standard, the tender years doctrine. Decisions concerning parenting plans are reviewed based on the deferential abuse of discretion standard. Nevertheless, discretionary decisions must be based on the applicable law and the relevant facts; accordingly, they are not immune from meaningful appellate review. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury, the trial court is required, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01, to find the facts specially, state separately its conclusions of law, and enter judgment accordingly. The underlying rationale for this mandate is that it facilitates appellate review by affording a clear understanding of the basis of the trial court’s decision; in the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law, this court is left to wonder on what basis the court reached its ultimate decision. When a trial court fails to comply with Rule 52.01, the appellate court cannot determine whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard or what reasoning it employed. In such circumstances, the appellate court is not required to review the discretionary decision with deference. In this case, the trial court established a parenting schedule without identifying the legal principles it applied or the factual basis for its decision; therefore, it failed to satisfy the Rule 52.01 mandate. Having no way of knowing the reasoning for the trial court’s decision, we conducted a de novo review of the record to determine where the preponderance of the evidence lies and found no factual or legal basis for the disparity in parenting time afforded the parents. Accordingly, we reverse the parenting schedule and remand with instructions for the trial court to establish a parenting schedule consistent with the statutory aspiration to maximize each parent’s participation in the life of the child based on all relevant facts and circumstances. Further, the court is to identify the factual and legal basis upon which the new parenting schedule is based as Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 requires. |
Fentress | Court of Appeals | |
Leslie Ann Cremeens v. Eric Scott Cremeens
Mother challenges the modification of the parenting plan, specifically the designation of Father as the primary residential parent and the new parenting schedule. Mother contends that the trial court’s best interest determination was flawed because the trial court failed to consider the expert testimony of a psychologist who examined the child in Tennessee. She also contends the court erred by failing to require the guardian ad litem to investigate the records of a psychologist who examined the child in Georgia. Because Mother failed to provide a transcript of the evidence or a statement of the evidence, we must assume there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s factual determinations. We find no error with the investigation by the guardian ad litem because he was not required to investigate the records of every medical professional that examined the child; instead, by rule, the guardian ad litem is to “conduct an investigation to the extent that the guardian ad litem considers necessary to determine the best interests of the child. . . .” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 40A, § 8(b)(1). Further, Mother failed to proffer a summary of the Georgia psychologist’s records or testimony; therefore, there is no factual basis for us to conclude that testimony of the Georgia psychologist would have affected the court’s decision. As for the Tennessee psychologist, the record reveals that the trial court did consider the expert’s testimony. As a result, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. We also declare this a frivolous appeal pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-1-122. |
White | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Broadrick v. Troy Broadrick
Father and Mother were divorced in Kentucky. As part of the divorce, they entered into an agreed custodial arrangement that granted them equal time with their child. Both parties subsequently relocated to Tennessee and now live within sixty miles of each other. Mother filed a petition to register the Kentucky plan and modify residential parenting time. Following a trial, the Tennessee court concluded that a material change in circumstance had occurred and modification of the parenting schedule was in the child’s best interest. In a new parenting plan, the court allocated Mother 246 days and Father 119 days of parenting time. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Eve C.
Mother, whose daughter was placed in custody of the Department of Children’s Services at birth, appeals the termination of her parental rights on grounds of substantial non-compliance with the permanency plans and persistence of conditions. Finding no error, we affirm the termination of Mother’s rights. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Albert Franklin Summers v. Nakisha Layne
At issue in this appeal is a custody dispute between Albert Franklin Summers (“Father”) and Nakisha Layne (“Mother”). In addition to finding that Mother failed to comply with the parental relocation statute codified at Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-108, the trial court determined that it would be in the minor child’s best interests to designate Father as the primary residential parent. Although we conclude that the trial court erred in finding the parental relocation statute to be applicable to this case, we nonetheless determine that it conducted the proper analysis with respect to its custody decision. We affirm the trial court’s designation of Father as the primary residential parent. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
In re Jake S.
This appeal arises out of a dispute regarding parenting time and child support obligations. After Father’s paternity was established, a magistrate judge named Mother the primary residential parent and granted her 230 days of parenting time. The magistrate judge granted Father 135 days. Father was ordered to pay $156 in monthly child support, plus $50 per month towards his arrearage. After Mother’s request for rehearing, the juvenile court judge conducted a de novo hearing. The juvenile court granted Mother 285 days of parenting time and Father only 80. The juvenile court also set Father’s child support at $331 per month, plus $50 towards his arrearage. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Rogelynn Emory v. Memphis City Schools Board of Education, now known as Shelby County Board of Education
This is an appeal by a tenured teacher seeking relief for the school board’s failure to comply with the procedures set forth in the Tennessee Teacher Tenure Act for her termination. After receiving notice of charges pending against her, the teacher demanded a hearing before the school board. Pursuant to the Tenure Act, the school board was required to conduct a hearing on the charges within thirty days of the teacher’s demand. The school board failed to do so. The trial court held that because the delay did not affect the outcome of the hearing, the school board’s failure to comply with the Tenure Act was harmless and the teacher was not entitled to relief. On appeal, we conclude that Ms. Emory is entitled to an award of back pay for the number of days over thirty that she was suspended without pay and without a hearing following her demand for a hearing. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a calculation of the proper amount of damages to which the teacher is entitled. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |