State of Tennessee v. Robert Echols
A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Robert Echols, of aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and theft of property valued over $1,000. The trial court merged the theft of property conviction and the aggravated robbery conviction, and it ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the admission of the victim’s preliminary hearing testimony violated his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine itnesses against him; (2) the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence an unsigned statement of the Defendant; (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (4) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sheila Christine Jones Calloway v. Willard Randall Calloway
This appeal arises from a divorce. Sheila Christine Jones Calloway (“Wife”) sued Willard Randall Calloway (“Husband”) for divorce in the Chancery Court for Roane County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court granted Wife a divorce on the ground of adultery by Husband. The Trial Court equally divided the parties’ marital residence but awarded Husband’s onehalf interest in the marital residence to Wife as alimony in solido. The Trial Court also awarded Wife alimony in futuro and attorney’s fees. Husband appeals. Given the parties’ relative earning capabilities and other relevant circumstances of this case, we affirm the Trial Court’s award to Wife of Husband’s one-half interest in the marital residence as alimony in solido. However, once Wife was awarded Husband’s one-half interest in the marital residence, she no longer was financially disadvantaged relative to Husband, and, therefore, the Trial Court erred in awarding Wife alimony in futuro and attorney’s fees. We affirm, in part, and, reverse, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Desmond O'Brian Anderson and Camillia Harrison
A Madison County jury convicted Desmond Obrian Anderson of aggravated burglary, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery. The jury convicted Camillia Harrison of aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery. The trial court ordered the defendants to serve effective sentences of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant Anderson asserts that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court improperly denied his motion to sever after his codefendant had testified; and (3) the trial court erred when it failed to sentence him as an Especially Mitigated Offender. Defendant Harrison asserts that: (1) the trial court should have admitted the transcript of the preliminary hearing into evidence; and (2) the trial court should have severed the defendants’ charges in this case. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timothy A. Baxter v. State of Tennessee
A Madison County jury found the Petitioner, Timothy A. Baxter, guilty of aggravated assault, and the trial court sentenced him to a twelve-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed the conviction in State v. Timothy A. Baxter, No. W2012-00361-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 1197867 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, March 25, 2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 13, 2013). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, pro se, which he later amended with the assistance of counsel. The Petitioner subsequently filed a motion requesting that the post-conviction judge recuse himself. The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to recuse and the petition for post-conviction relief, after which it denied both. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his post-conviction petition because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, and he further contends that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his motion to recuse because there was a reasonable basis for questioning the post-conviction judge’s impartiality. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgments. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carl Renee Brown v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Carl Renee Brown, appeals pro se from the summary dismissal of his 2013 petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his 1987 convictions of criminal attempt to sell cocaine pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-6-417 (1982) (repealed 1989). Because the petition was filed decades beyond the applicable statute of limitations and because the petitioner failed to either allege or prove a statutory exception to the timely filing or a due process tolling of the statute of limitations, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: MacKeznie N., et al.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights on the grounds of abandonment, contending that any failure to support or visit her children was not willful.Mother argues that her failure to support her children was a result of poverty and that her failure to visit was caused by obstruction on the part of the children’s grandmother/guardian. We find that the children’s grandmother/guardian failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence of at least one of the statutory grounds for termination. We therefore reverse the termination of Mother’s parental rights. |
Overton | Court of Appeals | |
Daniel Louis Pinkava v. Tawania Leigh Kovacs-Pinkava
This appeal involves the interpretation of a marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”). Wife filed suit to clarify the terms of the MDA regarding the apportionment of Husband’s future military retirement. The trial court held that the MDA granted Wife twenty-five percent of Husband’s retirement benefits at the rank of captain, his rank at the time of divorce, including cost-of-living adjustments that will be in effect when he elects to retire. Husband appeals and argues that the award of retirement benefits was intended to be alimony in solido and was ascertainable at the time of divorce rather than at the time he elects to retire. We agree with the trial court’s interpretation and affirm the trial court in all respects. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
John Wayne McDonald v. Jamie Rhea McDonald Bunnell
John Wayne McDonald (“Father”) and Jamie Rhea McDonald Bunnell (“Mother”) had two children during their marriage before divorcing in 2012. The permanent parenting plan entered with the divorce named Mother the primary residential parent. After Mother remarried and relocated with the children, Father filed a petition to modify the existing parenting plan and asked the court to designate him the children’s primary residential parent. Father argued that the behavior of Mother’s new husband (“Stepfather”) around the children constituted a material change in circumstance and that the modification would be in the children’s best interest. At a hearing, Father presented evidence that Stepfather used foul language around the children and had, in jest, referred to them using a racial slur. The trial courtfound thatStepfather’sbehavior,though “distastefuland ill-advised,”did not constitute a material change in circumstance. Father appealed. After careful consideration, we conclude that the evidence in the record does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lewis | Court of Appeals | |
Claude R. Ellis v. Melisa Jane Godfrey Ellis
The issue on this appeal is whether the parties’ prenuptial agreement (the agreement) is valid and enforceable. The trial court held that it was not. The court did so based upon its finding that Claude R. Ellis (Husband) failed to prove that he provided a full and fair disclosure of his assets to Melisa Jane Godfrey Ellis (Wife) before the agreement was executed. The trial court further found (1) that, given the date the draft agreement was furnished to wife, she did not have an opportunity to seek independent counsel for advice; (2) that the agreement was unfair; and (3) that Wife was under duress when the draft was presented to her. Applying the principles set forth by the Supreme Court in Randolph v. Randolph, 937 S.W.2d 815 (Tenn. 1996), and its progeny, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Jeremy Shane Grooms v. Gerald McAlister, Warden
In 2009, the Petitioner, Jeremy Shane Grooms, pleaded guilty to theft of property valued over $1,000 and aggravated burglary, and he was sentenced to eight years. One year of his sentence was to be served in jail, with the remainder to be served on community corrections. In December of 2009, a warrant was issued for the Petitioner’s arrest, alleging that he had violated his community corrections sentence by driving under the influence (“DUI”) and by attempting to break into and enter a vehicle. The warrant stated that the Petitioner had been sentenced to twelve years of community corrections for his original convictions. In 2014, the Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, contending that his sentence had expired. The trial court dismissed the Petitioner’s petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred when it dismissed his petition because “it met the qualifications for relief under the statute.” The State counters that the appeal is untimely and further that the habeas corpus court properly dismissed the petition. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of the Petitioner’s petition for habeas corpus relief. |
Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Chelsea B. et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case involving three minor children. In April 2012, temporary custody of the children was granted to the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), and the children were placed in foster care. DCS subsequently filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the mother and father on September 24, 2013. The petition alleged, as statutory grounds for termination, abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, persistent conditions, and severe child abuse. Following a bench trial, the trial court granted the petition as to the mother upon finding that DCS had proven by clear and convincing evidence the grounds of (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home and (2) persistence of the conditions leading to removal. The court also found clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The mother has appealed.1 Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Justin Andrew Jones
Appellant, Justin Andrew Jones, pleaded guilty to driving under the influence of an intoxicant and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty- ine days, suspended to probation after forty-eight hours of incarceration. As part of the plea agreement, appellant reserved a certified question of law in which he challenged the denial of his motion to suppress. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because the arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop appellant and because the officer was acting outside of his community caretaking function when he stopped appellant. Following our review of the briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we dismiss appellant’s appeal. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Earl T. Adams v. Air Liquide America, L. P. et al.
The sole issue presented in this appeal concerns the constitutionality of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103, the ten-year statute of repose under the Tennessee Products Liability Act and the exceptions to the statute of repose for asbestos claims and silicone gel breast implant claims, but not for silica-related claims. After working as a sandblaster for thirty years, Plaintiff developed silica-related injuries. Thereafter, Plaintiff commenced a products liability action against several silica manufacturers and suppliers, which was filed outside the ten-year period. When the defendants moved for summary judgment contending the action was timebarred by the ten-year statute of repose, Plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the statute of repose as applied to silica claimants on equal protection grounds. Utilizing a rational basis analysis, the trial court found that silica claims were not similarly situated by injury or class to asbestos claims, and, if they were similarly situated, a rational basis exists to distinguish between the two. The trial court also found that silica has no similarity to silicone gel breast implants. Thus, the trial court summarily dismissed the action as timebarred based on the ten-year statute of repose under the Tennessee Products Liability Act, specifically Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103(a). We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Caira D. et al.
Department of Children’s Services filed petition to terminate mother and father’s parental rights to two minor children. Mother subsequently surrendered her parental rights, and the trial court found father abandoned the minor children by willful failure to support and willful failure to visit. The trial court also found termination of father’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. Father appeals. We affirm the trial court’s finding that father abandoned his children by willfully failing to support them;however,we have concluded that the evidence is insufficient to clearly and convincingly establish that father’s visitation with his children was merely token and that he willfully failed to visit his children. We affirm the trial court’s finding that termination of father’s parental rights is in the best interests of the children. Therefore, we affirm the termination of father’s parental rights. |
White | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Jacob B.
In this termination of parental rights case, Father appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights is in the child’s best interests. Father was convicted of murdering the child’s mother and is imprisoned on a life sentence. We have reviewed the evidence and affirm the trial court in all respects. |
White | Court of Appeals | |
Ann C. Akard v. Wayne F. Akard
This is a divorce case. After the trial court entered the final decree of divorce and awarded Wife/Appellee attorney’s fees associated with a motion to compel, Husband/Appellant filed this appeal. Although Husband did not formally file a motion to recuse either trial judge involved in this case, his appeal centers on alleged judicial and opposing counsel misconduct. Husband also seeks a new trial. We affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Valena E.
The Notice of Appeal was not timely filed, and we therefore have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. Consequently, this appeal is dismissed. |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gregory Duff
A Knox County Criminal Court jury found the Defendant, Gregory Duff, guilty of two counts of aggravated kidnapping, Class B felonies. See T.C.A. § 39-13-304. The trial court merged the two counts and sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to nineteen years’ imprisonment at 100 percent release eligibility. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred in admitting 911 recordings into evidence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment 1 of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Larry Lee Smith
A Knox County Criminal Court jury found the Defendant, Larry Lee Smith, guilty of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and two counts of ggravated kidnapping, Class B felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-502, -304. The trial court merged the two counts of aggravated kidnapping and sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of life without parole. On appeal, the Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce evidence of his prior felony convictions; and (2) the trial court erred in the manner in which it allowed the State to present proof of his prior convictions. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
M&T Bank v. Joycelyn A. Parks, et al.
The trial court dismissed this detainer appeal for failure to post a bond in compliance with Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-18-130(b)(2). Because Appellant’s brief contains no argument regarding the applicability of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 28-18-130(b)(2), we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Tray D. Turner v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Tray D. Turner, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2010 Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated robbery and resisting arrest, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Houston Isley v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Houston Isley, appeals pro se from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his 2012 convictions of aggravated sexual battery, incest, and attempted rape of a child and which was styled as requesting deoxyribonucleic acid “DNA”) analysis. Because the petitioner failed to allege any basis to support an order for DNA analysis and because his petition for post-conviction relief is otherwise procedurally barred, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Justin William Voto
In 2008, the Defendant, Justin William Voto, pleaded guilty to kidnapping and was granted judicial diversion for a period of ten years. In 2013, the Defendant’s supervising officer filed a warrant to revoke his judicial diversion based upon new charges. At subsequent hearings, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s judicial diversion, entered a judgment of conviction, and sentenced him to ten years of supervised probation. The Defendant filed a notice of appeal. While the appeal was pending, the Defendant’s probation officer filed a warrant to revoke his probation based upon the Defendant’s failure to follow probation requirements, and the trial court revoked the Defendant’s probation sentence and ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. In this consolidated appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it revoked his judicial diversion and his probation sentence. The Defendant also asserts that the trial court’s imposition of a ten-year sentence was improper because the proper range in this case is three to six years. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment revoking the Defendant’s judicial diversion, vacate the ten-year sentence imposed, and remand for a sentencing hearing. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Barbara Lynn Horine v. James Alan Horine
In this divorce appeal, Wife appeals the trial court’s rulings with regard to the calculation of child support, the award of alimony, the requirement that she reimburse Husband for one-half of the mortgage payments on the marital home until the home is sold, and the trial court’s refusal to order an income assignment to secure Husband’s child support obligation. We vacate the trial court’s judgment with regard to child support and alimony, and remand for the entry of an order containing appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm the trial court’s order requiring Wife to reimburse Husband for the mortgage payment. However, we reverse the trial court’s refusal to order an income assignment to secure the child support obligation. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and reversed in part. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Serenity S.
This is a termination of parental rights case brought by the guardian ad litem. The trial court terminated Mother/Appellant’s parental rights on the grounds of severe child abuse pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(g)(4), and persistence of conditions under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(g)(3). The trial court also found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Because there is clear and convincing evidence in the record to support both the grounds for termination of Mother’s parental rights and the trial court’s finding on best interest, we affirm and remand. |
Madison | Court of Appeals |