In Re Lyrik L.
This appeal arises from a pending petition for termination of parental rights and adoption. Two weeks after the maternal grandparents commenced their action to terminate the parental rights of the mother of their grandchild (the father being deceased), the paternal grandparents (“the Intervenors”) filed a motion to intervene for the purpose of filing a competing petition for adoption and termination of parental rights; they also sought to set aside an order granting permanent guardianship over the child to the maternal grandparents previously issued by the juvenile court in a separate proceeding. The Intervenors also filed a motion for leave to intervene for the purpose of filing a petition for grandparent visitation. The maternal grandparents opposed all relief sought by the Intervenors. The trial court denied the motion to set aside the juvenile court’s order of permanent guardianship for lack of jurisdiction, and it denied the motion to intervene for purposes of adoption on the ground that the Intervenors lacked standing because they did not meet the definition of prospective adoptive parents under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-102(44). However, the court granted their motion to intervene for the purpose of grandparent visitation. The Intervenors appeal the denial of the motion to intervene for purposes of adoption, and the maternal grandparents appeal the order granting the Intervenors leave to intervene for the purpose of grandparent visitation. We have determined that the Intervenors have standing to file a petition for adoption and termination of parental rights; thus, we reverse the trial court’s ruling on that issue. We affirm the trial court in all other respects. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Brooklyn M.
A father and stepmother appeal from an order dismissing their petition to adopt a child and to terminate the mother’s parental rights. The trial court held that the evidence presented supported termination of the mother’s parental rights based on her failure to support and failure to visit the child. However, the trial court found that the alleged ground of failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody or financial responsibility of the child had not been proven. The court also found that termination of the mother’s rights was not in the child’s best interest. We affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Paul Plofchan v. James Hughey Et. Al.
A man sued his arresting officers and others. He claimed he was neither drunk nor violent when he was arrested and charged with public intoxication, resisting arrest, and assault on an officer. During discovery, the man claimed to have no communications between him and a companion that were not protected by attorney-client privilege or as work product. When such communications were uncovered, the defendants moved for sanctions and attorney’s fees. The trial court awarded attorney’s fees to the defendants and the companion. And it dismissed the case as a sanction. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeremiah Leavy
A Tipton County jury convicted Jeremiah Leavy, Defendant, of first degree murder, felony murder, aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated kidnapping. The trial court merged the two murder convictions and imposed an effective sentence of life plus fifteen years’ imprisonment. On direct appeal, we affirmed Defendant’s convictions, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied Defendant’s application for permission to appeal. Defendant then sought post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court dismissed his petition, and we affirmed the post-conviction court’s dismissal. Defendant then moved to correct a clerical mistake that he was not on probation at the time of the offense. The trial court entered an order to correct the record accordingly. At issue here, Defendant subsequently moved under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 to correct what he alleged was an illegal sentence, and the trial court denied his motion. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying relief. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Pedro Ignacio Hernandez v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Pedro Ignacio Hernandez, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received the effective assistance of counsel. After our review of the record, briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rusty Amos Long
The Defendant, Rusty Amos Long, appeals the Robertson County Circuit Court’s order revoking his community corrections sentence for his conviction for burglary other than a habitation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his five-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a new sentencing hearing and by failing to consider whether revocation was in the interests of justice. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Flexibility Capital, Inc. v. Sabatino Cupelli, Et Al.
This is a breach of contract case involving the defendants’ purported failure to pay amounts |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lanoris Cordell Carter
Defendant, Lanoris Cordell Carter, appeals his Lake County Circuit Court conviction for |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anderson Poured Walls, Inc. v. Gilbert Clark et al.
This appeal concerns a subcontractor’s claims for non-payment. The trial court dismissed the claim for unjust enrichment against defendant Clark, the home owner, as not ripe because the plaintiff subcontractor had not exhausted its remedies against the party with whom it had contracted. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Masquerade Fundraising Inc. v. Patrick Horne et al.
The plaintiff corporation filed this action against the defendant independent contractors, alleging, inter alia, that the defendants violated their contracts and covenants not to compete. We granted this interlocutory appeal in which the defendants request review of the trial court’s denial of their motion in limine to exclude an email sent to defense counsel that contains privileged information. The email was inadvertently attached as an exhibit on two separate briefs filed with the court by defense counsel and then repeatedly referenced by defendants in later briefs in response to a motion to disqualify counsel and for sanctions. The trial court held that the repeated disclosure of the email operated as a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. We affirm the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Diane Mauriello v. Branch Banking and Trust Company
The plaintiff in this action, alleging mutual mistake, sought rescission and nullification of a promissory note and deed of trust related to the plaintiff’s 2005 purchase of multiple parcels of unimproved real property. Upon the defendant bank’s counterclaim and motion for summary judgment, and following a hearing in which the plaintiff participated pro se after the court denied her motion for continuance, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the bank. The court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice and awarded a judgment to the bank in the amount of $306,392.14, inclusive of the principal owed on the promissory note, accrued interest at the time of the hearing, reasonable attorney’s fees, and expenses. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Percy D. Thompson
Defendant, Percy D. Thompson, was indicted by a Davidson County Grand Jury for the attempted first degree murder (count one) and aggravated assault (count two) of his wife. Following a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder in count one, and aggravated assault as charged in count two. The trial court sentenced Defendant to twelve years for count one and ten years for count two and merged the aggravated assault conviction into the attempted second degree murder conviction. Defendant appeals his convictions arguing the trial court failed to find him guilty of aggravated assault at the conclusion of the proof and therefore erred in sentencing him for count two and that the evidence was insufficient to support either of his convictions. Following our review of the record, including the briefs of the parties and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Unifirst Corp. v. Indus. Fabrication & Repair, Inc. et al.
This appeal arises from confirmation of an arbitration award. The appellants objected to confirmation, arguing that they lacked notice of the arbitration. One of the appellants also claimed that it never agreed to arbitrate. The winning party submitted that the objections were untimely and did not state a cognizable ground for vacatur under the Federal Arbitration Act. We vacate and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Trinces Eugene Hart
Following a Henderson County jury trial, Defendant, Trinces Eugene Hart, was convicted of three counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He appeals, arguing the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court; however, we remand the case to the trial court for merger of the three counts into a single judgment of conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Seth Powell
A Knox County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Seth Powell, of possession |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Arlene Ernstes v. Printpack, Inc.
Employee sought worker's compensation benefits based on hearing loss allegedly caused by continuous noise exposure during her employment with Employer. Employer denied the claim, asserting Employee failed to give timely notice of injury. After a compensation hearing, the trial court rejected Employer's notice defense and awarded benefits to Employee. The Workers' Compensation Appeals Board reversed the trial court's finding that Ernployee gave timely notice; vacated the order awarding benefits; and remanded the case for a deterrnination of whether Employee had a reasonable excuse for failing to give timely notice or whether Ernployer was prejudiced by the failure. On remand, the trial court again awarded benefits, concluding Employee did not offer a reasonable excuse but Employer failed to establish prejudice. In a second appeal, the Appeals Board construed the notice statute and concluded the clairn should have been denied and disrnissed. In this appeal, Employee argues the Appeals Board erred in its conclusion that Employee failed to satisfy the statutory notice requirement. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Suprerne Court Rule 51. We affirm. |
Workers Compensation Panel | ||
Taylor Brocato (now Dunn) v. Kyle Young
This is a post-divorce partition action in which the ex-wife asked the trial court to order the sale of the former marital residence and to award her, as specified in the parties’ marital dissolution agreement (“the MDA”), half of the equity resulting from the sale. The ex-wife relied on the provision in the MDA, which provides that she is entitled to fifty percent of any equity in the former marital residence “when the house sells.” The ex-husband opposed the partition action, arguing that he was awarded the former marital residence pursuant to the MDA and that the ex-wife was only entitled to half of the equity valued as of the date of their divorce in 2019. The ex-husband also contended that the ex-wife’s claims were barred under the doctrine of equitable estoppel because he had remitted $6,600.00 in monthly payments toward the ex-wife’s equity pursuant to an oral agreement that set her equity interest at $9,750.00. The court granted the partition petition and ordered that the property be sold. The court also found that the MDA was a contract in contemplation of divorce; therefore, acting pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(b)(2)(A) (“the Distribution of Marital Property Statute”), the court valued the ex-wife’s equity in the former marital residence based on an appraisal near the date of the final divorce decree. The trial court refused to credit the ex-husband for the payments he made to the ex-wife according to their alleged oral agreement, finding that to do so would be a violation of the statute of frauds. Both parties appeal. For the reasons explained below, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Willie Locust
Defendant, Willie Locust, was convicted after a bench trial in Count 1 of possession of |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Demarcus Keyon Cole v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Demarcus Keyon Cole, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of error |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert L. Cody, III
Defendant, Robert L. Cody, III, was convicted of conspiracy to possess 26 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell within 1,000 feet of a drug-free zone (count one); possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony (count two); possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (count three); and the jury found that Defendant committed a criminal gang offense (count ten) enhancing count one to a Class A felony. The trial court imposed an effective thirty-three year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss counts two and three for failure to charge an offense, and count ten of the presentment for failure to give proper notice of the gang enhancement; (2) that the trial court erred by failing to declare a mistrial after the State read the presentment to the jury; (3) that the trial court erred by excluding Investigator Jinks from the Rule of Sequestration; (4) that the trial court erred by admitting text messages that were not properly authenticated; (5) that the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant’s drug conspiracy conviction in count one; (6) that the criminal gang enhancement violated double jeopardy and the doctrine of collateral estoppel; (7) that the trial court erred in sentencing Defendant under the prior version of the Drug-Free Zone Act; and (8) that this court should resentence Defendant under the 2022 amendments to the Drug-Free Zone Act. Following our review of the entire record, oral arguments, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Wanda Sue Averwater v. James Paul Averwater
In this divorce, the trial court evenly divided the marital estate and denied the wife’s request for alimony. It also ordered wife to pay the attorney’s fees and costs of a third party. On appeal, the wife challenges the court’s decisions on multiple grounds. After a thorough review, we find that the court erred in not dividing the profit from a business the husband created during the pendency of the divorce as marital property. And the court erred in ordering the wife to pay attorney’s fees and costs. We affirm in all other respects. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Adams v. Shavetta Conner, et al.
This case originated in general sessions court with the filing of a pro se civil warrant. The |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Mark A. Roberts v. Ramie R. Marston Roberts
This is an appeal from a final order entered on March 17, 2023. The notice of appeal was |
Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Giorgio Jennings
The Appellant, Giorgio Jennings, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of six counts of |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert J. Whittenburg
A Franklin County jury1 convicted Robert J. Whittenburg, Defendant, of two counts of first degree premeditated murder. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed two consecutive life sentences. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) the State did not present sufficient evidence of premeditation; (2) the trial court improperly denied Defendant’s request for a special jury instruction on premeditation; (3) the trial court improperly addressed concerns about irregularities during jury deliberations; and (4) the trial court impaired the jury when it briefly prohibited smoke breaks and then changed its mind. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the case for resolution of procedural issues related to the change of venue and entry of revised judgments. |
Court of Criminal Appeals |