State of Tennessee v. Mateem Hudson
A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Mateem Hudson, of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-three years in confinement to be served at 100%. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce evidence about his other bad acts and that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Derrick Brandon Bush v. State of Tennessee
This appeal concerns the retroactive application of Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461 (Tenn. 2010), in which this Court held that trial courts have an affirmative duty, before accepting a guilty plea to a crime carrying a mandatory sentence of community supervision for life, to inform the defendant desiring to plead guilty of the consequence of lifetime supervision. In April 2011, a prisoner, who pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted rape in December 2000, filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Criminal Court for Sumner County alleging that his guilty pleas were not knowingly or intelligently entered because he had not been informed that he would be subject to lifetime community supervision following his release from prison. The trial court decided that the Post-Conviction Procedure Act’s statute of limitations should be tolled on due process grounds and that the prisoner was entitled to post-conviction relief because Ward v. State should be applied retroactively. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, finding no grounds for due process tolling and that Ward v. State did not announce a new rule of constitutional law requiring retroactive application. Bush v. State, No. M2011-02133-CCA-R3-PC, 2012 WL 2308280 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 15, 2012). We granted the prisoner’s appeal to clarify the standards governing retroactive application of this Court’s authoritative interpretations of the Tennessee Constitution and to resolve related issues in the interpretation of the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. In accordance with the retroactivity framework for post-conviction proceedings the Tennessee General Assembly codified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-122 (2012), we have determined that our holding in Ward v. State does not require retroactive application and, therefore, that the prisoner is not entitled to tolling under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102(b)(1) (2012). We also hold that the prisoner’s case does not warrant due process tolling. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Sumner | Supreme Court | |
Beverly Beal, et al. v. Benton County, et al.
This case results from a county employee’s assertion that the county’s decision to require some employees to contribute to their insurance premiums, while not requiring a contribution from others, violates equal protection. The trial court granted summary judgment to the county, concluding that the legislation was rationally related to a legitimate government interest. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm and remand. |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Lee Nelson-Concurring
I write separately to express my opinion that the result of this case is mandated by the following language in Powers v. State, 343 S.W.3d 36, 55 (Tenn. 2011): |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Roy Shotwell Jr. v. State of Tennessee
In 2007, a Fayette County jury found petitioner guilty of two counts of rape and one count of sexual battery. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. This court denied petitioner’s direct appeal, and he subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. He now appeals from the post-conviction court’s order denying relief. Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel failed to object to evidence that petitioner had been admitted to a mental health facility and when counsel did not appeal the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress certain statements. Following our careful review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Willie Lewis Tolbert v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Willie Lewis Tolbert, pleaded guilty to two counts of robbery, one count of carjacking, and one count of unlawful possession of a weapon. Pursuant to petitioner’s plea agreement, the trial court imposed a sentence of eight years. Petitioner applied for probation, which the trial court denied, and the trial court ordered petitioner to serve his sentence in confinement. Petitioner filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel: (1) failed to properly communicate with petitioner prior to his guilty plea submission hearing; (2) failed to adequately advise petitioner regarding whether he would receive probation; and (3) made an incorrect prediction that petitioner’s case would be dismissed in general sessions court. He further argues that these errors rendered his guilty plea involuntary. After our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gary S. Holman
The defendant, Gary S. Holman, stands convicted of aggravated burglary, employing a firearm in the commission of a dangerous felony, false imprisonment, first degree felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. He is currently serving an effective sentence of life plus eleven years. On appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred by not allowing extrinsic evidence to be used to impeach a witness under Tennessee Rules of Evidence Rule 613(b);(2) that the trial court erred by allowing prejudicial photographs of a victim into evidence; and (3) that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Following review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions. However, the petitioner’s remaining two issues are waived for failure to prepare an adequate record on appeal. As such, the judgments of conviction are affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dean Heath v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Dean Heath, filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis concerning his convictions in the Shelby County Criminal Court for first degree murder with a sentence of life imprisonment and for especially aggravated robbery with a sentence of 25 years to be served concurrently with the life sentence. The petition was dismissed without an evidentiary hearing, and Petitioner appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Lee Nelson
In 1990, the petitioner was convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon, second degree burglary, and aggravated rape. He received an effective sentence of twenty-five years. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal and in post-conviction litigation. In 2010, the petitioner filed a Motion for Post-Conviction DNA Testing of a knife believed to have been brandished during the crimes, and the post-conviction court denied the motion after a non-evidentiary hearing. This court remanded the case to the post-conviction court for reconsideration in light of Powers v. State, 343 S.W.3d 36, 56 (Tenn. 2011). On remand, the post-conviction court conducted another hearing and again denied the motion. On appeal, the defendant claims that the post-conviction court erred by: (1) finding that the knife at issue was not in adequate condition to permit DNA testing; and (2) holding that exculpatory results would have been insufficient to establish a reasonable probability that the defendant would not have been prosecuted or convicted of the crimes. After review, we agree that the post-conviction court applied incorrect legal standards and reached erroneous results when it made these determinations. Using the correct legal standards as set forth by our supreme court in Powers, the defendant has established his entitlement to DNA testing of the knife handle. The judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the post-conviction court for entry of an order granting the request for DNA analysis. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gary S. Holman - concurring in part and dissenting in part
Although I agree with most of the conclusions set forth in the majority opinion, in my view, the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury properly pursuant to State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012), constitutes plain error. Therefore, I would reverse the defendant’s conviction for false imprisonment and remand the case to the trial court for a new trial as to that offense. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Ronald Yates v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Ronald Yates, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree murder and attempt to commit first degree murder and his sentence of life plus twenty-three years. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Teresa Vincent v. Jerry S. Johnston, Sr.
This boundary line dispute involves a five-acre parcel of real property (“Disputed Property”) in McMinn County to which the petitioner and respondent, who own adjoining parcels, both claim ownership. The petitioner filed a petition to quiet title, requesting that she be declared the owner of the Disputed Property, and for declaratory judgment as to damages she claimed as a result of the respondent’s alleged trespass, encroachment, and harvesting of timber. The respondent filed a counter-petition, alleging that he was the rightful owner of the Disputed Property; raising affirmative defenses of waiver/estoppel, champerty, and adverse possession; and requesting damages for the petitioner’s alleged encroachment and destruction of boundary markers. Following a bench trial, the trial court declared the petitioner the owner of the Disputed Property, dismissed the respondent’s counter-petition, and dismissed all claims for damages. The respondent appeals. We affirm the trial court’s finding that title to the Disputed Property is vested in the petitioner. We determine, however, that the respondent has established the statutory defense of adverse possession, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-2-103 (2000), only to the extent that certain improvements encroach upon the Disputed Property, and we reverse upon this ground. We remand to the trial court for determination as to the extent of the encroachments. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. |
McMinn | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio Marques Peebles
The defendant, Antonio Marques Peebles, appeals his Davidson County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated robbery, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the statements he made to law enforcement officers and the evidence obtained following his arrest, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and that the sentence imposed was excessive. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alex W. Gibson
Pursuant to his guilty-pleaded convictions, appellant, Alex Wayne Gibson, was sentenced to four years, suspended to probation, for aggravated burglary and several misdemeanor charges. A probation violation warrant was issued that alleged several technical violations as well as a failed drug screen. Following a probation revocation hearing, the trial court revoked appellant’s probation and ordered execution of the four-year sentence. It is from this order that he now appeals. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Jocilyn M.P.
In August of 2012, Chloe S.K. (“Mother”) and Timothy A.K. (“Step-father”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Joshua A.P. (“Father”) to the minor child Jocilyn M.P. (“the Child”) and to allow Step-father to adopt the Child. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its Final Order Terminating Parental Rights on August 19, 2013 terminating Father’s parental rights to the Child after finding and holding, inter alia, that clear and convincing evidence existed of grounds to terminate Father’s parental rights to the Child pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102 (1)(A)(iv) for both willful failure to support and for wanton disregard, and that clear and convincing evidence was proven that it was in the Child’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. We affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights to the Child. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Christopher Vance Smalling v. Sarah Rebecca Smalling
We granted Christopher Vance Smalling’s (“Husband”) application for extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 10 to consider issues related to his suit for divorce from his wife Sarah Rebecca Smalling (“Wife”). This divorce case reached an unexpected impasse when the Chancery Court for Sullivan County (“the Trial Court”) refused to set a hearing in the matter until a Temporary Parenting Plan concerning the parties’ minor child was entered. Husband appeals, arguing both that he had complied with local rules by submitting a suitable Temporary Parenting Plan and that state law does not require the filing of a Temporary Parenting Plan in circumstances like those of this case. We hold that the local rules are in conflict with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-403 because they require the filing of a written Temporary Parenting Plan even though the statute specifically states this is not required if the parties agree, as in this case, to a Temporary Parenting Plan. We also hold that even if we err in our judgment that Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-403 conflicts with and overrides the local rules, Husband complied with the local rules by submitting a Temporary Parenting Plan. We reverse the Trial Court. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Chad Richard Dietz
Defendant, Chad Richard Dietz, pled guilty to the Class B felony offense of initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine. There was no agreement between the State and Defendant as to the sentence. Following a sentencing hearing, Defendant’s counsel specifically requested the trial court to impose a sentence of split confinement comprised of 365 days in jail with probation transferred to Alabama, and to include rehabilitation for alcohol and drug abuse. The trial court instead ordered a sentence of eight years and six months of confinement in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court should have ordered his sentence to be served in the Community Corrections program. Following a thorough review of the record and the briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule of the Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee 20. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael A. Talley
This is an appeal as of right by the State after dismissal of charges following the trial court’s order which granted the motion to suppress evidence filed by Defendant, Michael A. Talley. The evidence which was ultimately suppressed had been seized pursuant to a search warrant. Defendant’s motion asserted that the affidavit filed in support of the issuance of the search warrant lacked probable cause to justify the search. Following a hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement. Ultimately the trial court entered an order granting the motion to suppress and subsequently entered an order which dismissed the cases in Docket No. 21635 in the Circuit Court of Maury County “[d]ue to suppression of the evidence.” After a thorough review of the law and the entire record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marty M. Clark
A Madison County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Marty Clark, charging him with possession of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of possession of cocaine and attempted possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for possession of cocaine and six months for attempted possession of drug paraphernalia to be served concurrently with each other and consecutively to an unrelated case. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (2) that the trial court erred in refusing to give the absent material witness instruction to the jury. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Erica Lawrence
Defendant, Erica Lawrence, was indicted, along with her co-defendant Charles Bragg, by the Shelby County Grand Jury for first degree felony murder. Defendant filed a motion to suppress a statement she gave to police in which she admitted that she was present during the murder but stated that her co-defendant committed the murder. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to suppress, and the State filed an application for an interlocutory appeal, which this court granted. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, and therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court to grant Defendant’s motion to suppress. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bryan Williams
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Bryan Williams, was convicted of two counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony; two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; four counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; ten counts of felony violation of community supervision conditions, a Class E felony; six counts of misdemeanor violation of community supervision conditions, a Class A misdemeanor; simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; and indecent exposure, a Class B misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-102, -13-304, -13-305, -13-502, -13-511, -13-526, -14-403, -17-418. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of sixty-two years to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) that the rape victims were actually accomplices to the crimes and that their testimony was uncorroborated; (3) that the State was allowed to reopen its proof to the prejudice of the Defendant; (4) that the State raised issues in its rebuttal argument that had not been raised in the Defendant’s closing argument; and (5) that the Defendant “was sentenced improperly.” Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roy Pierson Jr.
The Defendant-Appellant, Roy Pierson, Jr., was convicted by a Shelby County jury for possession of one hundred or more recordings that did not clearly and conspicuously disclose the name and address of the manufacturer in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-139 (Supp. 2009). He received a sentence of twenty-five months in the workhouse to be served at thirty percent. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the trial court improperly denied the Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (3) the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence seized from his business. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James D. Beaird v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, James D. Beaird, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based upon allegations that Counsel failed to exclude or introduce certain evidence at trial and failed to conduct a reasonable investigation prior to trial. Additionally, he asserts that the cumulative errors made by Counsel entitle him to relief. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Otis Melvin, Jr.
The Defendant-Appellant, Otis Melvin, Jr., was convicted by a Perry County jury of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103, -105 (2010). The trial court denied Melvin’s request for judicial diversion and sentenced him as Range I, standard offender to one year in the Department of Correction. The sentence was suspended to two years on supervised probation. Melvin was also ordered to pay $7,022.11 in restitution to the Social Security Administration. On appeal, Melvin argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court abused its discretion in denying him judicial diversion. Upon review, we affirm the theft conviction and the two-year probationary sentence imposed by the trial court. However, we remand the matter for entry of an amended judgment consistent with this opinion. |
Perry | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shannon Ann Maness and Daryl Wayne Maness
Appellants, Daryl and Shannon Maness, were each indicted by the Chester County Grand Jury for two counts of aggravated statutory rape. After a jury trial, Appellants were found guilty as charged. They were each sentenced to an effective sentence of three years. The trial court denied Appellants’ request for alternative sentencing. On appeal, Appellants argue that the trial court erred in denying their motions in limine requesting the exclusion of certain sexually explicit photographs, that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions, and that the trial court erred in denying their request for alternative sentences. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the motion in limine and that the evidence was sufficient. However, we conclude that the trial court based the denial of alternative sentencing on deterrence grounds without sufficient evidence as required under State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2000). Therefore, we affirm Appellants’ convictions, but remand for a new sentencing hearing. |
Chester | Court of Criminal Appeals |