State of Tennessee ex rel., Herbert S. Moncier, et al., v. Nancy S. Jones, et al.
Petitioner appeals the dismissal of his complaint, which asserted numerous claims relating, inter alia, to the practice monitor condition of his suspension from the practice of law. The trial court dismissed the complaint finding the defendants in the action were immune under either sovereign immunity, judicial immunity, quasi-judicial quasi-prosecutorial immunity, qualified immunity, or Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, Section 27 immunity. The trial court further found that the action was a collateral attack on the ruling by the Tennessee Supreme Court regarding Petitioner’s suspension; thus, it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to rule on matters in the disciplinary proceedings. We affirm the trial court’s ruling on all claims except for the Public Records Act, which we remand to the trial court for a determination of whether the records requested are subject to inspection and whether they have in fact been made available for inspection. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State ex re. Herbert S. Moncier, et al v. Nancy S. Jones, et al
Attorney disciplined by the Board of Professional Responsibility filed suit against the Board’s counsel seeking damages for her conduct of the disciplinary proceeding and her removal from the position of Disciplinary Counsel; Attorney appeals the dismissal of his action. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Herbert S. Moncier v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
An attorney disciplined by the Board of Professional Responsibility brought suit against the Board asserting violations of the Open Meetings Act and the Public Records Act. We have concluded that the trial court properly determined that the Open Meetings Act does not apply to the Board. Furthermore, we find no error in the trial court’s determination regarding the attorney’s right to records from certain Board meetings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State ex rel. Tanya Aina-Labinjo v. Metropolitan Nashville Board of Public Education, et al
Metropolitan Nashville Board of Education appeals the issuance of a writ of mandamus compelling it to hear an appeal of the termination of a non-teaching employee. The Board contends that the chancery court lacked jurisdiction to issue the writ and that state law preempts the right to a hearing granted to employees of the Board under the Metropolitan Charter. We affirm the holding that the chancery court has jurisdiction under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 16-11-102(a) and 29-25-101 to issue the writ; we vacate the judgment issuing the writ and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing as to whether the Board has developed a policy with respect to the dismissal of employees as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-2301(b)(1)(FF) and whether such policy preempts the pertinent provisions of the Metropolitan Charter. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State ex rel. Tanya Aina-Labinjo v. Metropolitan Nashville Board of Public Education, et al. - Dissent
I concur in the majority’s holdings affirming the trial court’s jurisdiction and vacating the mandamus. However, I do not agree with the decision to remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on the declaratory judgment claim. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kenneth Hubanks
This case presents an appeal to this Court after remand by order of the Tennessee Supreme Court. The Defendant, Kenneth D. Hubanks, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant at his residence. The Defendant entered a plea of nolo contendre to his charges, felony cocaine possesion, felony marijuana possession, and possession of drug parahernalia but reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). In this appeal, the Defendant raises the issue of whether the affidavit upon which the search warrant was issued established probable cause to search his residence. After review, we hold no error occurred. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Patrick Peebles
Appellant, William Patrick Peebles, and his two co-defendants, were indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for three counts of aggravated rape, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of use of a firearm during commission of a dangerous felony. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of all charges. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of fifty-eight years. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to offer in evidence a videotape of an interview conducted by an officer, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. After thorough review of the record, we determine that Appellant’s issues have no merit. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brenda Faye Brewington v. State of Tennessee
Brenda Faye Brewington, Petitioner, was convicted by a Sumner County jury of two counts of aggravated child abuse of children age eight and under and two counts of child neglect of children under age six. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to an effective sentence of twenty-five years to be served at 100 percent. Petitioner was unsuccessful on direct appeal. State v. Brenda Faye Brewington and Brian Dewayne Brewington, No. M2007-01725-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 142321 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Jan. 21, 2009). Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying her petition and that she received ineffective assistance of counsel because her trial counsel was a Sumner County constable at the time he represented her. She argues that his representation was deficient because there is a statutory prohibition on the practice of law by constables in the county for which they serve and that there is an inherent conflict when an attorney is a constable and represents a client for criminal charges. She also argues that this deficiency resulted in prejudice. We conclude that there is no statutory prohibition on the practice of law by a constable. However, such a situation does constitute a conflict so that representation of a client by a constable would be below the competence required of criminal representation. Nonetheless, the post-conviction court did not err in denying the petition because Petitioner was unable to prove that she was prejudiced by the deficient representation provided by trial counsel. Therefore, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Daniel Ray Prince
Appellant, Daniel Ray Prince, entered pleas without recommended sentences to one count of burglary of a building other than a habitation and two counts of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. The two counts of theft of property merged into one count by operation of law. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced appellant as a Range II, multiple offender to two six-year sentences to be served concurrently with each other but consecutively to sentences imposed in other jurisdictions. He appeals the trial court’s sentencing him as a Range II offender and imposing partial consecutive sentences. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John W. Smith v. State of Tennessee
This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to dismiss or in the alternative to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner, John W. Smith, has appealed the Davidson County Circuit Court order dismissing his second petition for writ of habeas corpus in which Petitioner alleged that: (1) his sentence is illegal; and (2) his guilty plea was not knowingly or voluntarily entered. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in dismissing the petition and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gregory Bryan Austin
Defendant, Gregory Bryan Austin, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated statutory rape with an agreed sentence of two years for each count to be served concurrently, with the trial court to determine the manner of service of the effective sentence. The trial court ordered that Defendant serve six months of his effective two-year sentence in confinement with the balance served on supervised probation. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying him full probation. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andre Harris
A Shelby County jury convicted appellant, Andre Harris, of first degree murder in the perpetration of a theft, first degree premeditated murder, and theft of property valued under $500. The trial court merged the murder convictions. Appellant was sentenced to life for first degree murder and to eleven months, twenty-nine days for theft, to be served concurrently in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, appellant submits the following issues for review: (1) whether the trial court erred by admitting a video taped portion of appellant’s interrogation from “The First 48”; (2) whether the trial court erred by admitting autopsy photographs; and (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support appellant’s convictions for premeditated murder and murder in the perpetration of theft. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Chad Medford
The defendant, Chad Medford, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court convictions of felony murder, aggravated burglary, especially aggravated kidnapping, especially aggravated robbery, and employing a firearm during commission of a dangerous felony, claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the statements he made to police and by denying admission of his unedited statement at trial, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and that the trial court erred by admitting certain witness testimony. The defendant also challenges his sentence alignment. Discerning no reversible error, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan Carl Davidson
The Maury County grand jury indicted appellant, Jonathan Carl Davidson, for driving under the influence, second offense, and violation of the open container law. Following an unsuccessful motion to suppress the evidence, appellant entered a guilty plea to driving under the influence, second offense. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State dismissed the violation of the open container law charge, and the trial court sentenced appellant to eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail, with forty-five days to serve. As a condition of the plea agreement, appellant reserved the right to certify a question of law challenging the legality of the initial traffic stop. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timothy Chatman v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Timothy Chatman, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that his guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary and that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terry Fossett
The defendant, Terry Fossett, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and statutory rape by an authority figure, a Class C felony. He was sentenced to twenty-five years at 100% on the rape of a child conviction and three years as a Range I offender on the statutory rape conviction, to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the State should have obtained a psychological examination of the victim. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Webster
The Defendant, Michael Webster, challenges his bench trial conviction for theft of property, over $500, a Class E felony, contending that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to prove his knowing commission of the offense and that the value of the property exceeded $500. After a review of the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the property at issue exceeded $500, modify the conviction to theft of property, $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor, and remand the case to the trial court for resentencing. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of Mittie T. Alexander
Conservator filed suit to rescind a pre-conservatorship conveyance of real property by ward to her niece. The jury found in favor of niece and the trial court entered judgment on the jury verdict. Conservator appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in limiting the testimony of her expert witness. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of Brian J. & Nicole J.
This case involves an appeal from juvenile court to circuit court. The maternal grandmother of the child at issue filed a petition in juvenile court against her daughter, seeking court-ordered visitation with her grandson. The respondent mother of the child filed an answer denying all of the grandmother’s allegations and also filed a counter-petition for injunctive relief against the grandmother. The juvenile court granted the grandmother’s petition for court-ordered visitation but did not adjudicate the mother’s petition for injunctive relief. The mother then appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The mother now appeals. We affirm the decision of the circuit court, vacate the orders of the juvenile court based on subject-matter jurisdiction, and remand to the juvenile court, with specific instructions, for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gwendolyn Hagerman
The Defendant, Gwendolyn Hagerman, was found guilty by a Sullivan County Criminal Court jury of five counts of rape of a child. See T.C.A. § 39-13-522 (1997). She was sentenced as a Range I offender to twenty years for each conviction, to be served at 100% as a child rapist. The trial court ordered partial consecutive sentencing, for an effective sixtyyear sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) there was a material variance between the presentment, the bill of particulars, the election of offenses, and the proof; (3) the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss the charges due to pre-accusation delay; (4) the trial court erred in declining to conduct an in camera review of Department of Children’s Services records; and (5) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jasper Lee Vick v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jasper Lee Vick, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing he was denied the right to a speedy trial and he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Aaron White
Defendant, Robert Aaron White, was indicted by the Montgomery County Grand Jury for one count of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Both counts of aggravated assault and the firearm offense were dismissed prior to trial. Defendant was convicted by a petit jury of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder and sentenced by the trial court to serve 23 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Defendant appeals his conviction and asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by refusing to allow Defendant to cover his facial tattoos during trial. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mary L. Sparks v. James E. Dillingham, et al and James E. Dillingham, et al v. Prestige Title, LLC, et al
This case presents a question of first impression regarding the scope of the term “lender” as used within the Tennessee Home Loan Protection Act. The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment: Plaintiff claiming that the Defendants were “lenders” subject to the Act and Defendants claiming that they were not “lenders” subject to the Act. The trial court concluded that Defendants were not “lenders,” and therefore it granted summary judgment in Defendants’ favor. For the following reasons, we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants, we grant partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John T. Freeland Jr.
The Defendant, John T. Freeland, Jr., appeals from his Madison County Circuit Court convictions of first degree premeditated murder, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1); first degree murder committed in the perpetration of an especially aggravated kidnapping, see id. § 39-13-202(a)(2); especially aggravated kidnapping, see id. § 39-13-305; and tampering with evidence, see id. § 39-16-503(a)(1). Following a bench trial regarding both guilt and punishment, see id. § 39-13-205, the trial court sentenced Defendant to death for each first degree murder conviction based upon its findings that the defendant was previously convicted of one or more felonies whose statutory elements involve the use of violence, see id. § 39-13-204(i)(2); the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant, see id. § 39-13-204(i)(6); the murder was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant, while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, an aggravated robbery, see id. § 39-13-204(i)(7); and that these aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court also imposed consecutive sentences of 20 years’ incarceration for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction and five years’ incarceration for the tampering with evidence conviction. In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions of first degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping, Defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress statements and the imposition of the death penalty. Because we determine that the trial court failed to merge the first degree murder convictions at sentencing, we remand the case for correction of the judgments to effectuate proper merger. In all other respects, however, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Travis Nipper
The appellant, Travis Nipper, was indicted for the Class D felony of Theft of $1,000 or more by the McMinn County Grand Jury. After a trial by jury, he was convicted of the Class E felony of Theft over $500 and was sentenced to one year in the Department of Correction. The appellant appeals his conviction and sentence, stating that his due process rights were violated when the trial court excluded defense evidence during trial that allegedly had been ruled admissible in a pretrial hearing, and that he had been improperly denied an alternative sentence to incarceration. We affirm the appellant's conviction and sentence. |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals |