Durrett Investment Company, LP v. The City of Clarksville, TN
M2012-00807-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Richard H. Dinkins
Trial Court Judge: Judge Michael R. Jones

City enacted an ordinance imposing a temporary moratorium on development of land within a 250 foot corridor abutting land owned by developer. Developer sued City asserting claims forinverse condemnation,wrongfultaking,tortious interference with businessrelationships, and damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; City filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which the trial court granted. Developer appeals, contending that the temporary moratorium constituted a taking and that the tortious interference with business relationships and interference with contract rights claims were allowed pursuant to the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s tort claims and reverse the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s inverse condemnation and takings claims.
 

Montgomery Court of Appeals

Timothy A. Baxter v. State of Tennessee
W2012-01393-CCA-R3-CO
Authoring Judge: Judge Roger A. Page
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roy B. Morgan Jr.

The Petitioner, Timothy A. Baxter, appeals the Circuit Court of Madison County’s dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Madison Court of Criminal Appeals

Curtis Keller v. State of Tennessee
W2012-02076-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joe H. Walker III

The Petitioner, Curtis Keller, appeals the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County’s denial of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Lauderdale Court of Criminal Appeals

Marvin Bernatsky and Patricia Bernatsky v. Designer Baths & Kitchens, LLC
W2012-00803-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly M. Kirby
Trial Court Judge: Judge James F. Russell

In this case, we address the bond requirements for an appeal from General Sessions Court to Circuit Court. The plaintiffs sued the defendant for damages in General Sessions Court, and a judgment was entered in favor of the defendant. The plaintiffs sought a de novo appeal to Circuit Court. Within ten days of the General Sessions Court judgment, the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal and paid $211.50 to the General Sessions Court clerk, pursuant to T.C.A. 8-21-401(b)(1)(C)(i). The plaintiffs did not file any further bond at that time, but later filed a $500 cost bond. The Circuit Court dismissed the appeal sua sponte, holding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs had failed to comply with the appeal-bond requirement in T.C.A. 27-5-103. The plaintiffs now appeal. After careful review of the statutes and caselaw, we overrule this Court’s prior decision in Jacob v. Partee, No. W2012-00205-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 3249605 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug 10, 2012), and conclude that payment of a cash bond in the amount of the statutory court costs set out in Section 8-21-401(b)(1)(C)(i) satisfied the plaintiffs’ obligation to “give bond with good security . . . for the costs of the appeal” under Section 27-5-103(a), and so the Circuit Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. Accordingly, we reverse the Circuit Court’s dismissal of the action and remand for further proceedings.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Marvin Bernatsky and Patricia Bernatsky v. Designer Baths & Kitchens, LLC - Concurring Opinion
W2012-00803-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge James F. Russell

I fully concur in Judge Kirby’s well-reasoned analysis, and also agree with Judge Stafford that the word "costs" contained in the statute is ambiguous. I write separately to offer additional historical perspective and to more fully address the implications of the conclusions reached in Jacob v. Partee, No. W2012-00205-COA-R3-CV, 2012 WL 3249605 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2012).

Shelby Court of Appeals

Marvin Bernatsky and Patricia Bernatsky v. Designer Baths & Kitchens, LLC - Concurring Opinion
W2012-00803-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge James F. Russell

I agree with the result reached by the majority in this case. However, I write separately to emphasize my reasoning in concluding that an ambiguity exists, in direct contradiction to our earlier decision in Jacob v. Partee, No. W2012-00205-COA-R3–CV, 2012 WL 3249605 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2012) (perm. app. denied Dec. 12, 2012).

Shelby Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Gregory G. Spiceland
M2011-01196-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert Burch

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Gregory G. Spiceland, was convicted of one count of initiating the process to manufacture methamphetamine and one count of promotion of methamphetamine manufacture. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant to eight years and two years respectively for his convictions, and the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Defendant was ordered to serve a sentence of split confinement with one year of his effective sentence in confinement and the remainder suspended on probation. In this direct appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by ordering a sentence of split confinement. Specifically, Defendant argues that the trial court should not have found that Defendant was engaged in a pattern of criminal conduct and that Defendant’s failure to complete his presentence report indicated that Defendant would not be successful on probation. Defendant also contends that the trial court erred by not ordering Defendant to serve his sentence on community corrections. Following a review of the record, we find that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Defendant to serve a full year of his sentence by incarceration. We therefore reverse Defendant’s sentence and modify it so that Defendant serves 30 days of his sentence in confinement with the balance of his effective sentence served on probation, and remand to the trial court for entry of a judgment in accordance with this opinion.

Stewart Court of Criminal Appeals

Evetta Mai McGee v. State of Tennessee
M2012-00343-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert Crigler

The petitioner, Evetta Mai McGee, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner entered an open plea to one count of rape and was subsequently sentenced to a term of eleven years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, she contends that her plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily because she did not comprehend that a "best interest" plea was actually a plea of guilty. She further contends that her plea was not proper because trial counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately prepare and interview witnesses. Following review of the record, the denial of post-conviction relief is affirmed.

Bedford Court of Criminal Appeals

John Joseph Kratochvil v. State of Tennessee
M2012-00112-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

The petitioner, John Joseph Kratochvil, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner pled guilty to second degree murder and received an agreed to sentence, out of range, of thirty-five years as a multiple offender. On appeal, he contends that his plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily because he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective by: (1) failing to explain the difference between Range I and II sentences, sentencing outside of range, and the elements of the crime; (2) failing to inquire, investigate, or explain how the various circumstance in his case might have led to a competent defense involving "heat of passion"; (3) failing to investigate and move to suppress search warrants issued in the case; and (4) failing to inform the petitioner that the prosecution was statutorily required to provide a Notice of Enhanced Punishment within ten days of trial. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. William Benton Pamplin
M2011-01932-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lee Russell

The Defendant, William Benton Pamplin, pled guilty to burglary of an automobile, vandalism, burning of personal property, and possession of a weapon by a felon. The trial court sentenced him to a six-year sentence, which was to be served on probation. The Defendant’s probation officer filed a probation violation warrant, alleging the Defendant had violated the terms of his probation by filing a false police report. After a hearing, the trial court agreed and revoked the Defendant’s probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court improperly ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it revoked the Defendant’s probation and ordered the Defendant to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Bedford Court of Criminal Appeals

In Re: Dacia S., et al.
E2012-01797-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Suzanne Bailey

The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the parental rights of Sheila W. (“Mother”) to the minor children Dacia S., Aerial W., and Teagan W. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children after finding and holding, inter alia, that DCS had proven by clear and convincing evidence that grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2) and § 36-1-113(g)(3) and that the termination was in the Children’s best interest. Mother appeals to this Court. We affirm.

Hamilton Court of Appeals

Roger T. Johnson v. State of Tennessee
M2012-00845-CCA-R3-CO
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Randall Wyatt, Jr.

The petitioner, Roger T. Johnson, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The petitioner maintains that the dismissal was error because newly discovered evidence reveals that his guilty pleas were the result of fraud; therefore, his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. David Paul Zwarton
M2012-01934-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey S. Bivins
Trial Court Judge: Judge Franklin Lee Russell

David Paul Zwarton ("the Defendant") pleaded guilty to one count of theft of property of $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Defendant was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to three years, leaving the trial court to determine whether the sentence would be served concurrently or consecutively to a four-year sentence imposed by the Coffee County Circuit Court. After a hearing, the trial court ordered that the Defendant serve his three-year sentence consecutively to his Coffee County sentence. The Defendant appealed the trial court’s ruling. Upon our thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Bedford Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Frank L. Glavin
M2012-00550-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge F. Lee Russell

The Defendant-Appellant, Frank L. Glavin, appeals his convictions for evading arrest, a Class E felony, and violating the noncriminal implied consent law. He argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support the aforementioned convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of conviction for evading arrest, and we reverse and vacate the judgment of conviction for violating the noncriminal implied consent law.

Bedford Court of Criminal Appeals

In Re: Selena V. and Liliana V.
E2012-01854-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge James F. Watson

The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for McMinn County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Jennifer K. (“Mother”) to the minor children Selena V. and Liliana V. (“the Children”), born in 2007 and 2008 respectively. After a trial, the Juvenile Court terminated the parental rights of Mother to the Children after finding that the ground of persistent conditions pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(3) had been proven by clear and convincing evidence, and that clear and convincing evidence had been shown that it was in the Children’s best interest for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. Mother appeals to this Court. We affirm.

McMinn Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Steven Hood
E2012-01597-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steven W. Sword

The defendant, Steven Hood, pled guilty to robbery and aggravated assault, Class C felonies, in exchange for an effective sentence of eight years, and the trial court imposed a sentence of incarceration. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of community corrections. After review, we affirm the trial court’s sentencing decision.

Knox Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Cleo D. Gadson
M2012-01521-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge John H. Gasaway

The Defendant, Cleo D. Gadson, entered a best interest guilty plea to attempted second degree murder, agreeing to allow the trial court to determine his sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to nine years, to be served at 30%. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced him because it improperly considered written statements of persons other than the victim. He further contends that the manner of the service of his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that there is no error. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Montgomery Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Khalid N. Bashir
E2011-01798-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jerry L. Smith
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carroll L. Ross

Appellant, Khalid Bashir, was stopped while driving on I-75 North in Bradley County, Tennessee. Tennessee State Troopers issued a speeding citation and searched the vehicle. During the search, they discovered a large bag of marijuana, cocaine, Ecstasy, and two digital scales. The Bradley County Grand Jury indicted Appellant for speeding; driving on a revoked license, second offense; criminal impersonation; possession of cocaine; possession of marijuana; possession of a Schedule I drug; and possession of drug paraphernalia. Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered in the vehicle, arguing that the investigatory stop, length of detention, and warrantless search of his vehicle and backpack were unconstitutional. The trial court denied the motion. Appellant appeals the denial of his motion. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the traffic stop was supported by probable cause and the trooper had probable cause to search the vehicle and backpack. Therefore, we affirm the denial of the motion to suppress.

Bradley Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Frank L. Glavin - concurring in part and dissenting in part
M2012-00550-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert W. Wedemeyer
Trial Court Judge: Judge F. Lee Russell

I respectfully disagree with the conclusion by the majority to vacate the Defendant’s conviction for violating the implied consent law. On appeal, the Defendant specifically argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of violating the implied consent law. The majority vacates the Defendant’s conviction for violating the implied consent law on procedural grounds, an argument not made by the Defendant on appeal.

Bedford Court of Criminal Appeals

In Re: Estate of Charles Thomas James
E2012-01021-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jeffrey D. Rader

This appeal concerns the administration of an estate. Decedent died testate, leaving all of his non-marital property to his surviving spouse and appointing his daughter as executrix. Executrix and Beneficiary initially agreed that administration of the estate was unnecessary. After Beneficiary suffered an injury and was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s Disease, Executrix attempted to parcel out the property to Beneficiary’s intended heirs. Shortly thereafter, Beneficiary sought administration of the estate. The trial court admitted the estate and following lengthy hearings regarding which items belonged in the estate, directed Executrix to pay the expenses and close the estate. Beneficiary did not appeal. Over Beneficiary’s objection, Executrix organized an auction of the items held in the estate to satisfy the expenses. Following the auction, Beneficiary filed a petition in which she alleged that Executrix breached her fiduciary duty to the estate by organizing an auction that resulted in waste and mismanagement of estate funds. The trial court denied the petition. Beneficiary appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Sevier Court of Appeals

Jarvis McClain v. State of Tennessee
W2011-02124-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Roger A. Page
Trial Court Judge: Judge Carolyn Wade Blackett

Petitioner, Jarvis McClain, entered a guilty plea in the Shelby County Criminal Court to especially aggravated robbery and received the agreed-upon sentence of thirteen and one-half years in prison as a mitigated offender to be served at 100% release eligibility. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was denied after an evidentiary hearing. In this appeal, petitioner claims that trial counsel was ineffective for several reasons: (1) failing to explain the terms of his plea agreement; (2) failing to explain the range of punishment for the offense for which petitioner was indicted; and (3) failing to disclose to petitioner evidence discovered by the investigator. He also claims that the ineffective assistance of counsel rendered his guilty plea involuntary. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Ken Parker
W2011-02125-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jeffrey S. Bivins
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Mark Ward

Ken Parker (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder and first degree premeditated murder. The trial court merged the first degree premeditated murder conviction into the first degree felony murder conviction and sentenced the Defendant to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in not granting a mistrial with respect to a police officer’s testimony. Additionally, the Defendant alleges that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Rodney Watkins
W2010-02570-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Joseph M. Tipton
Trial Court Judge: Judge Lee V. Coffee

The Defendant, Rodney Watkins, appeals from his conviction by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-210 (2010). The Defendant is serving a twenty-five-year sentence as a violent offender. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence about rumors regarding the victim’s disappearance, and (3) the trial court erred in ruling that the defense could not cross-examine a witness about the witness’s prior assault of his stepfather. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Jeremy Stevenson
W2011-02053-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge James M. Lammey Jr.

The Defendant-Appellant, Jeremy Stevenson, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery and was sentenced to concurrent sentences of life imprisonment and twenty years. On appeal, Stevenson argues that the evidence is insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator of these offenses. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Shelby Court of Criminal Appeals

Shonda Kay Finchum v. Danny Wayne Finchum
M2012-00975-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Patricia J. Cottrell
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Curtis Smith

Wife and Husband entered into a marital dissolution agreement whereby Husband agreed to pay Wife rehabilitative alimony for three years. Husband terminated these payments and filed a petition to modify when Wife remarried and her employment situation improved. Wife filed motion for summary judgment on the issue asserting that the alimony payments could not be modified or terminated. The trial court ruled the alimony payments could not be modified because they were contractual in nature and awarded Wife her attorney’s fees. Husband appealed both the court’s ruling as well as the award of fees. We reverse the trial court’s judgment that the rehabilitative alimony payments are unmodifiable because the applicable statute expressly provides that a court may modify this type of alimony upon a showing of a substantial and material change of circumstances. We affirm the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees based on the language of the parties’ agreement providing for the award of these fees.

Franklin Court of Appeals