State of Tennessee v. Matthew James Chakales
The Petitioner, Andrew Lee Moats, Jr., filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that newly discovered evidence—a recorded interview with Marlene Walker and the prior criminal record of Richard Breeden—mandated a new trial. He further argued that he was entitled to relief because the State failed to disclose this evidence and failed “to reveal all deals with witnesses.” The Knox County Criminal Court summarily dismissed the petition concluding that the Petitioner did not state a cognizable claim for coram nobis relief. Following a review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner has failed to allege the existence of subsequently or newly discovered evidence that would warrant relief under a writ of error coram nobis. The order of summary dismissal is affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Draine v. S & ME, Inc, et al
In this workers’ compensation case, a Hawkins County employee sustained a compensable injury in September 2000. His claim was settled in July 2003. The settlement, which was approved by the Department of Labor and Workforce Development, provided that the employer would continue to provide medical care for the injury in accordance with the workers’ compensation law. In 2009, the employee and his employer’s insurer entered into an agreement closing future medical benefits in exchange for a lump sum payment, subject to approval by Medicare. This settlement closing future medical benefits was approved by the Circuit Court for Knox County by agreement of the parties. Medicare declined to approve the proposed agreement and suggested an alternate, much larger, lump sum payment. The employee filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Sullivan County to enforce the settlement agreement as amended by Medicare. The employer and insurer moved to dismiss, based on improper venue. That motion was denied. After a series of non-evidentiary hearings, the trial court ordered the employer’s insurer to make a lump sum payment in excess of $500,000. The employer and insurer have appealed, contending that the trial court erred by denying their motion to dismiss, and by ordering the $500,000 payment. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We conclude that the trial court erred by denying the motion to dismiss, and therefore reverse. |
Sullivan | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Randy B. Braswell v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Randy B. Braswell, Jr., appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his 2006 convictions for second degree murder and aggravated child abuse and his effective twenty-two-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by finding counsel provided the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Lee Harris
The defendant, James Lee Harris, appeals as of right from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s orders revoking his probationary sentences and ordering the sentences to be served in confinement. The defendant’s counsel has filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to Rule 22 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the motion well-taken and, in accordance with Rule 22 F), affirm the trial court’s orders pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tom Perry Bell vs. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Tom Perry Bell, appeals pro se from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his 1979 and 1984 convictions of second degree criminal sexual conduct and attempt to commit a felony, respectively. Discerning no error, we affirm the post-conviction court’s order. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of James Edgar Miller
Many years prior to the decedent’s death, he was ordered to pay child support. Upon his death, the decedent’s ex-wife filed a claim against his estate seeking recovery of child support arrearages. The personal representative filed an exception, and the trial court denied the claim. The ex-wife appeals. We reverse. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Andrew Lee Moats, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Andrew Lee Moats, Jr., filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that newly discovered evidence—a recorded interview with Marlene Walker and the prior criminal record of Richard Breeden—mandated a new trial. He further argued that he was entitled to relief because the State failed to disclose this evidence and failed “to reveal all deals with witnesses.” The Knox County Criminal Court summarily dismissed the petition concluding that the Petitioner did not state a cognizable claim for coram nobis relief. Following a review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner has failed to allege the existence of subsequently or newly discovered evidence that would warrant relief under a writ of error coram nobis. The order of summary dismissal is affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timmy Dale Britt v. Dyer's Employment Agency, Inc. et al.
The employer, a temporary staffing agency, assigned the employee to work temporarily at a manufacturing facility. The employee sustained a compensable work-related injury three weeks into the assignment and reported the injury to the employer. At about the same time, the manufacturing facility notified the employer that employee’s assignment had ended. Consistent with its business practice, the employer terminated the employee’s employment and did not return the employee to work after the injury. The employee sought workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court awarded benefits; however, citing the temporary nature of the employment, the trial court applied the statute capping the award at one and one-half times the medical impairment rating. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) (2008 & Supp. 2012). The Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel vacated the judgment of the trial court and remanded for a determination of whether the employee had a meaningful return to work. We hold that because the employer neither returned the employee to work after his injury, nor offered him an opportunity to return to work, nor terminated his employment for misconduct, the award of benefits is governed by the statute authorizing benefits up to six times the medical impairment rating, see id. § 50-6241(d)(2)(A), not by the statute capping benefits at one and one-half times the medical impairment rating, see id. § 50-6-241(d)(1)(A). The judgments of the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel and trial court are vacated, and this case is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this decision |
Decatur | Supreme Court | |
Tony Hoover v. Henry Steward, Warden
Pro se petitioner, Tony Hoover, appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to two counts of rape and two counts of incest, and he received an effective sentence of twenty-one years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the judgments were illegal because they did not impose mandatory lifetime community supervision or a sex offender surcharge. Because the Petitioner’s judgments do not reflect the statutory requirement of mandatory lifetime community supervision, we conclude that the judgments for rape are illegal and void. We vacate the Petitioner’s sentences for rape only and remand to the habeas court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the illegal sentence was a bargained for element of the Petitioner’s plea agreement. In all other respects, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mary C. Smith, as Surviving Widow of James B. Smith v. UHS of Lakeside, Inc., et al.
Appellant appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee mental health facility, effectively dismissing the case. Having determined that the trial court failed to state the legal grounds upon which it was granting summary judgment, we vacate the orders at issue and remand for entry of orders that comply with Rule 56.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Cauley McCilton Cross v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Cauley McCilton Cross, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner is currently serving an effective ten-year sentence in the Department of Correction following his convictions for two counts of aggravated sexual battery and three counts of exhibition of obscene materials to a minor. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erroneously denied his petition because the proof established that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. On appeal, he specifically contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss the charges against the petitioner based upon a constitutional challenge to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-504. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of relief. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Desi Kris Moore
The defendant, Desi Kris Moore, was convicted of rape of a child, a class A felony, and aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and received an effective twenty-five-year sentence. In this appeal, the defendant claims his sentence is excessive and contrary to law. Following our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rev. J. M. Shaffer v. Memphis Airport Authority, Service Management Systems, Inc., and John Doe B. through D.
This interlocutory appeal involves comparative fault and amending to add a defendant. The plaintiff suffered slip-and-fall injuries at the defendant airport. The day before the statute of limitations ran, the plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the airport, alleging negligence. The airport’s answer asserted comparative fault but did not identify an additional tortfeasor. In later discovery, the airport identified its janitorial service. The plaintiff amended her complaint to add the janitorial service as a defendant, citing T.C.A. 20-1-119. The defendant janitorial service filed a motion to dismiss, citing the statute of limitations. The trial court declined to dismiss the claims against the janitorial service, holding that the disclosure of the identity of the janitorial service in discovery triggered the 90-day statutory period under Section 20-1-119 in which the plaintiff is permitted to amend the complaint to add a defendant. We reverse, holding that, by the express terms of Section 20-1-119, the statutory 90-day period is not triggered by a defendant’s response to a discovery request. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Eric Sutton v. McKinney Drilling Company, et al.
An employee was pinned between a large crane and a pickup truck. He suffered injuries to his ribs, shoulder, and back. He also suffered a collapsed lung and contusions on his lungs. He recovered from those injuries and was able to return to work for his employer. The trial court found the correct impairment to be 19% to the body as a whole and awarded 28.5% permanent partial disability benefits. The employer contends that the trial court erred by awarding benefits for pulmonary dysfunction. The employee contends that the award was based on an incorrect impairment rating. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Rolando Toyos v. Amanda G. Hammock
After primary residential parent Mother notified Father of her intent to relocate, Father opposed relocation and he petitioned to be named the child’s primary residential parent. The trial court determined the Father had demonstrated a material change in circumstances, but it found the child’s best interests would be promoted by Mother remaining the primary residential parent, and it allowed Mother’s relocation with the child. We affirm in part and we reverse in part. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Dick Broadcasting Company, Inc. of Tennessee v. Oak Ridge FM, Inc. et al.
The legal issues in this appeal revolve around the assignment of three agreements. The first is a Right-of-First-Refusal Agreement that allowed for an assignment with the consent of the non-assigning party. The agreement was silent as to the anticipated standard of conduct of the non-assigning party in withholding consent. The other two agreements—a Time Brokerage Agreement and a Consulting Agreement—were assignable without consent. The primary issue we address is whether the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies to the non-assigning party’s conduct in refusing to consent to an assignment when the agreement does not specify a standard of conduct. Oak Ridge FM, Inc. (“Oak Ridge FM”) contractually agreed for Dick Broadcasting Company (“DBC”) to have a right of first refusal to purchase Oak Ridge FM’s WOKI-FM radio station assets. The agreement was assignable by DBC only with the written consent of Oak Ridge FM. When DBC requested Oak Ridge FM to consent to the assignment of the Right-of-First-Refusal agreement to a prospective buyer, Oak Ridge FM refused to consent. Oak Ridge FM also refused to consent to the assignment of the Consulting Agreement and Time Brokerage Agreement, neither of which contained a consent provision. DBC sued Oak Ridge FM and the other defendants, alleging breach of contract and violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court granted the defendants a summary judgment. DBC appealed, and the Court of Appeals vacated the summary judgment. We hold that where the parties have contracted to allow assignment of an agreement with the consent of the non-assigning party, and the agreement is silent regarding the anticipated standard of conduct in withholding consent, an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing applies and requires the non-assigning party to act with good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner in deciding whether to consent to the assignment. Because there are genuine issues of material fact in dispute, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
Dick Broadcasting Company, Inc. of Tennessee v. Oak Ridge FM, Inc. et al. - Concur
I concur with the Court’s decision to apply the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing to the three contracts involved in this case. I also concur with the Court’s decision that neither party is entitled to a summary judgment because the current record reflects genuine disputes regarding the facts material to their claims and defenses. However, because there is no consensus regarding the scope of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in the context of arm’s length commercial transactions, I write separately to address this important point. |
Knox | Supreme Court | |
In Re: Jeremiah P.A.
This appeal is from an order of the trial court entered on August 14, 2012, which order terminated the parental rights of Jeremy A. to his son, Jeremiah P.A., based upon Jeremy A.’s joining in the petition for adoption filed by Donna J. P., the child’s biological maternal grandmother, on September 20, 2011. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-1-117(f). The order appealed from does not resolve all issues raised in the petition for adoption, or the petition to intervene and adopt filed by Charles R., the child’s biological maternal grandfather. As such, the order is not a final order and this appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Alberto DeLeon v. State of Tennessee
Alberto DeLeon (“the Claimant”) filed a claim pursuant to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act for permanent impairment benefits and moving expense benefits allegedly arising out of an incident that occurred on April 5, 2011, in which the Claimant apparently was shot by his landlord. The claim was assigned to the small claims docket of the Claims Commission. Because we have no jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an order denying a claim appearing on the small claims docket of the Claims Commission, this appeal is dismissed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
John Charles Wilson, et al. v. Tennessee Department of Transportation
The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs’ appeal. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Martin D. "Red" Patterson, as a Citizen of the State of Tennessee, and as Business Manager of the International Union of Operating Engineers Local 369, et al. v. The Convention Center Authority of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson Co.
Respondent Convention Center Authority appeals the trial court’s determination that the residential addresses of employees of third-party contractors contained in payroll records submitted by the contractors to the Convention Center Authority aren ot exempt from disclosure under the Tennessee Public Records Act. Petitioners cross-appeal the trial court’s denial of their request for attorney’s fees and costs. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Torrie Schneider Longanacre v. Matthew Robert Longanacre - Dissent
I dissent from the majority because I believe that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the husband did not prove a ground for divorce. My review of the record leads me to conclude that the husband did, in fact, produce unrebutted evidence that established the ground of inappropriate marital conduct. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Torrie Schneider Longanacre v. Matthew Robert Longanacre - Concur
I fully concur with the decision to affirm the trial court in all respects; I write separately to address the emphasis on reconciliation as a predicate to granting Wife a legal separation for two years even though Husband failed to prove any ground upon which he would be entitled to a divorce. I fully recognize that the trial court had the discretion to grant or deny Wife’s request for a legal separation; however, based upon the facts of this case, I submit the only party who would have a basis to appeal the grant or denial of a legal separation would be Wife, not Husband. This is because Husband failed to prove any ground upon which he would be entitled to a divorce at the time of the hearing. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of Jacob A. C. H.
The trial court terminated the parental rights of Mother to her child, finding that she wilfully failed to visit or support the child. Mother appeals, contending that she lacked the capacity to visit or pay support. Upon our de novo review we determine that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings of fact and its conclusion that Mother abandoned the child and that termination of her rights is in the child’s best interest. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
Aegis Sciences Corporation v. Lou Ann Zelenik, et al.
The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendants in this action for defamation, civil conspiracy, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Plaintiff appeals the award of summary judgment on its claims for defamation and civil conspiracy. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals |