Norman Hill v. Danny Tapia, Jr., et al.
This is a personal injury case resulting from an automobile accident. After the accident, Plaintiff/Appellant learned that he suffered from a degenerative disc disease, which required surgery. Appellant sued the two drivers involved in the accident for damages, which included his medical expenses for the disc surgery. At trial, Appellant’s surgeon’s deposition testimony was read to the jury, in which the surgeon testified that while the accident “aggravated” Appellant’s existing condition, the treatment he received was not “causally related” to the accident. Appellant offered another expert’s testimony, however, that did relate the treatment to the accident. At the close of proof, Appellant moved for a directed verdicton the issue of causation for his medical expenses, arguing that because the surgeon’s testimony was contradictory, it was subject to the cancellation rule. The trial court denied the motion and sent the issue to the jury. The jury returned a verdict for Appellant, but in an amount that did not include the medical expenses he incurred to treat the degenerative disc disease. Appellant was also awarded discretionary costs. After a careful review of the record, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Berry's Chapel Utility, Inc. v. Tennessee Regulatory Authority
This is a direct appeal by newly incorporated Berry’s Chapel Utility, Inc., from a declaratory order by the Tennessee Regulatory Authority. The dispute hinges on whether the TRA had jurisdiction over Berry’s Chapel pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 65-4-101(6)(E) (2010). The TRA held that Berry’s Chapel was a public utility as defined in Tennessee Code Annotated § 65-4-101(6)(E) (2010), thus, it was subject to the jurisdiction of the TRA. Berry’s Chapel asserts it was a non-profit and, thus, it was a non-utility by statutory definition and not subject to the TRA’s jurisdiction. We affirm the decision of the TRA. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Chris Eric Strickland v. Pennye Danielle Strickland
Divorce action in which Mother raises numerous issues, including the designation of Father as the primary residential parent, the parenting plan in which Mother’s parenting time was limited to 120 days a year, child support, and the classification and division of marital property. Mother also challenges the trial court’s decisions to admit the testimony of two witnesses and to exclude the testimony of two other witnesses. We have concluded that the trial court erred in excluding two of Mother’s expert witnesses and in admitting testimony regarding child abuse allegations that should have been excluded based upon Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-409. Having considered the record, including the testimony of Mother’s two experts and excluding the testimony that must be excluded pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-409, we find the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s designation of Father as the Primary residential parent; however, the evidence does preponderate against the parenting schedule which greatly limits Mother’s parenting time. We affirm the trial court’s classification and division of the marital estate in all respects. Because we have concluded that the evidence preponderates against the parenting schedule, we remand this issue to the trial court to adopt a parenting schedule that affords Mother additional parenting time, although not equal parenting time, and to modify the child support award to comport with Mother’s income and the new parenting schedule. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Carolyn Whitesell v. Kaylene Miller and Patricia Moore
The appeal concerns a dispute over personal property. The appellant landlord refused to permit the appellee tenant to renew her lease, and the tenant was forced to leave the premises. Several items of personal property belonging to the tenant were apparently left behind. The tenant sued the landlord for reimbursement for the value of the property. After a bench trial, the trial court ordered the landlord to reimburse the tenant. The landlord now appeals. As the appellate record contains neither a transcript of the proceedings nor a statement of evidence, we affirm. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Athena H. Melfi v. Joseph Thomas Melfi
The parties to this action were divorced by Decree on December 15, 2009. The former husband filed a Motion asking the Court to reopen the case on June 28, 2011. The Motion was styled as a Rule 59 and/or 60 Motion, Tenn. R. Civ. P. At a hearing before the Trial Court, the Trial Judge dismissed the Motions on the grounds that the Court no longer had jurisdiction to entertain these Motions. On appeal, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Latony Baugh, et al. v. United Parcel Service, Inc., et al.
Shortly after the mother of four children was killed in an accident, her husband instituted an action to recover damages for her death; the father of the children moved to intervene in the action and for the court to hold a hearing on whether the husband had abandoned the mother, thereby waiving his right as surviving spouse to participate in the wrongful death action. The trial court did not hold a hearing; rather, it held that the husband was the proper party to pursue the action, allowed the Guardian of the children to represent the interest of the children in the action, and dismissed Father’s petition. The surviving spouse, Guardian and tortfeasor subsequently petitioned the court for approval of a settlement of the wrongful death claim; the court granted the petition. Father appeals, contending that the court erred in failing to hold a hearing on the issue of whether the husband was estranged from the mother, in approving the settlement, and in placing the settlement documents under seal. We remand the case for a hearing on whether the husband waived his right as surviving spouse to participate in the wrongful death action and reverse the court’s placement of the settlement documents under seal; in all other respects the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Gatlinburg Roadhouse Investors, LLC., v. Charlynn Maxwell Porter, et al.
In this action plaintiff charged defendant had breached the contract between them and sought specific performance. The Trial Court held the contracts were ambiguous and construed them in accordance with the actions the parties took in regard to the contracts. The Trial Court ruled in favor of the defendant and dismissed the Complaint, but refused to award the prevailing party attorney's fees as was required in the parties' contract. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court's Judgment, but modify and remand, with instructions to the Trial Court to award the prevailing party her attorney's fees. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roger A. Beu, Jr.
A Roane County jury convicted the Defendant, Roger A. Beu, Jr., of sexual battery by an authority figure. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to three years as a Range I, standard offender, at thirty percent, to serve thirty days in jail, with the balance on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for new trial based on the prosecutor’s improper comments to the jury during closing argument; (2) the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence the written statement of the victim; and (3) there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Roane | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Theresa A. Kerby v. Melinda J. Haws, MD, et al.
A woman who suffered a series of persistent infections after surgery filed a malpractice complaint against the defendant surgeon. Her complaint alleged that the infections were cause by a small metal object that the defendant had negligently left in her body during the surgery. The plaintiff attached to her complaint the statutorily required certificate of good faith, which certified that she had consulted with an expert, who provided a signed statement confirming that he believed, on the basis of the medical records, that there was a good faith basis to maintain the action. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122. After the object was discovered to be a surgical clip of a type that was designed to be retained by the patient’s body, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which the plaintiff did not oppose. The defendant surgeon subsequently filed a motion for sanctions against the plaintiff under Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122 (d)(3), which gives the court the authority to punish violations related to the certificate of good faith. The trial court granted the motion, and awarded the defendant doctor over $22,000 in attorney fees. We reverse. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Sandy Womack, et al. v. Corrections Corporation of America d/b/a Whiteville Correction Facility
This appeal involves the transfer of a state prisoner’s action based on improper venue. The prisoner was housed in a correctional facility located in Hardeman County, Tennessee. The correctional facility is operated by a private entity. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-21-803,the Circuit Court of Davidson County transferred this action to Hardeman County, where the correctional facility is located. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brian Le Hurst
Defendant was convicted of first degree (premeditated) murder after a trial by jury. He was sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, the defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. The defendant also claims that the trial court erred by admitting three pieces of evidence: (1) an excerpt from a 911 call made by the victim several days before his death, in which the victim claimed to be "a little . . . concerned" about the defendant’s behavior; (2) testimony from one of the defendant’s friends to the effect that the friend did not believe that any affair had occurred between the defendant and the friend’s then-wife; and (3) testimony concerning various searches performed on the defendant’s computer involving the name "Missy." Finally, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by granting the State’s request for a special jury instruction concerning the destruction of evidence. After review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction and that the trial court did not err with respect to the evidentiary and jury instruction claims raised by the defendant. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brian Le Hurst - Concurring
I respectfully concur in the results in this case. My departure relates to only one issue – the rationale for affirming the trial court’s admission into evidence a portion of a recording of the victim’s telephone call to the police in which the victim expressed his concern over the defendant’s behavior. Assuming that this evidence passes the hearsay barrier as evidence of the victim’s state of mind, I would have held that the victim’s state of mind as expressed in the recording was irrelevant to the issues on trial. I note that the recording itself does not express the date of the telephone call, but the prosecutor’s oral, in-court preface to the playing of the recording indicates to the trial court that the call was placed on June 5, 2008. Given the somewhat banal comment offered on the recording and the remoteness of nearly three weeks, I see no relevancy of the statement to the issues joined at trial. That said, I would have also held that the error was harmless. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lawrence Ralph, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Lawrence Ralph, Jr., appeals as of right from the Warren County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his drug-related convictions and effective seventeen-year sentence. The Petitioner contends (1) that he received ineffective assistance from trial counsel; and (2) that he was denied access to legal materials that he needed to prepare to represent himself at trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Julio Villasana v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Julio Villasana, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for two counts of aggravated vehicular homicide and one count of leaving the scene of an accident. Petitioner entered guilty pleas to one count of aggravated vehicular homicide, a Class A felony, and one count of leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death, a Class E felony. Following a sentencing hearing, Petitioner was sentenced by the trial court to the maximum sentence of 25 years for aggravated vehicular homicide and two years for leaving the scene of an accident. His sentences were ordered to run concurrently. This court affirmed Petitioner’s sentence on direct appeal. In his post-conviction petition, Petitioner asserted that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that his pleas were involuntarily and unknowingly entered. The post-conviction court denied relief following a hearing. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
David Keen v. State of Tennessee
This appeal involves a prisoner who was sentenced to death in 1991. Nineteen years later, he filed a petition in the Criminal Court for Shelby County seeking to reopen his post-conviction proceeding on the ground that he possessed new scientific evidence of his actual innocence. His evidence consisted of a newly-obtained I.Q. test score purportedly showing that he could not be executed by virtue of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-203 (2010) because he was intellectually disabled. The trial court declined to hold a hearing and denied the prisoner’s petition. The trial court determined, as a matter of the law, that the prisoner’s newly-obtained I.Q. test score was not new scientific evidence of his actual innocence of the offenses to which he earlier pleaded guilty. The prisoner filed an application for permission to appeal the denial of his petition to reopen in the Court of Criminal Appeals. In addition to asserting that the newly-obtained I.Q. test score was new scientific evidence of his actual innocence, the prisoner asserted that this Court’s decision in Coleman v. State, 341 S.W.3d 221 (Tenn. 2011), announced a new constitutional right and, therefore, provided another basis for reopening his petition for post-conviction relief. The Court of Criminal Appeals entered an order on June 29, 2011, affirming the trial court’s denial of the petition to reopen because the I.Q. test score did not amount to scientific evidence of actual innocence for the purpose of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117(a)(2) (2006) and because Coleman v. State did not announce a new rule of constitutional law under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117(a)(1). We granted the prisoner’s application for permission to appeal to address whether the phrase “actually innocent of the offense” in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117(a)(2) encompasses ineligibility for the death penalty in addition to actual innocence of the underlying crime and whether our holding in Coleman v. State established a new constitutional right to be applied retroactively under Tenn. Code Ann.§ 40-30-117(a)(1). We hold that the Tennessee General Assembly, when it enacted Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-117(a)(2), did not intend for the phrase “actually innocent of the offense” to include ineligibility for the death penalty because of intellectual disability. We also hold that Coleman v. State did not establish a new rule of constitutional law that must be applied retroactively under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30117(a)(1). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals denying the prisoner’s petition to reopen his post-conviction petition. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
David Keen v. State of Tennessee - Dissent
In Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790, 792 (Tenn. 2001), this Court held that “the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution prohibit the execution of [intellectually disabled] individuals because such executions violate evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society, are grossly disproportionate, and serve no valid penological purpose in any case.” The next year, the United States Supreme Court reached the same conclusion: |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Akeem T. Goodman
The Defendant, Akeem T. Goodman, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery, Class A felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202, -403 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to consecutive Range I terms of twenty-two years at 100% service as a violent offender for an effective forty-four-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Isaiah L.A.
This appeal concerns a termination of parental rights. The appellees filed a petition for adoption and termination of parental rights with respect to the minor child at issue. The trial court, upon finding clear and convincing evidence of several grounds on which to base termination and concluding that termination was in the child’s best interest, revoked the biological father’s parental rights to the child. The father appeals. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Walter Ray Carter v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Walter Ray Carter, pro se, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his pleadings entitled “Motion of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel” and “Motion to Dismiss Indictment and/or Arrest Judgment” filed on July 18, 2011 in four separate cases. The motions sought relief from certain drug-related convictions entered in 1996 and in 2005. Following our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court was within its discretion to construe the pleadings as petitions for post-conviction relief which are now time barred pursuant to the statute of limitations. The summary dismissal is affirmed. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Scotty V. Nunn v. Tony Howerton, Warden, et al
The Petitioner, Scotty V. Nunn, appeals the Morgan County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 1994 convictions for fraudulent breach of trust and misapplication of contract payments and resulting sentence of fourteen years. The Petitioner contends that he is entitled to relief because of an improper extradition from the Commonwealth of Virginia. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stephen D. Good v. Sunkote Plastic Coatings Corporation et al.
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee sought workers’ compensation benefits, alleging that he injured his back at work on September 30, 2008, and is now totally and permanently disabled. The employer denied that the employee sustained a compensable work-related injury, but alternativelyargued that the employee is not totallyand permanently disabled. The trial court concluded that the employee sustained a compensable work-related injury and awarded 80% permanent partial disability benefits. The employer has appealed, arguing that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the injury was compensable and that, even if the employee proved a compensable injury, the evidence preponderates against the award of 80% permanent partial disabilitybenefits. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Van Buren | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Mikel Hamrick v. State of Tennessee
A Shelby County grand jury returned a seven-count indictment against petitioner, Mikel Hamrick. He entered guilty pleas to four of the counts, including aggravated 1 burglary, especially aggravated stalking, domestic assault, and theft of property less than $500, for which he received an effective four-year sentence. The remaining counts were dismissed pursuant to the plea agreement. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, alleging that his mental instability rendered his guilty pleas involuntary and that the infirmity was compounded by trial counsel’s failure to adequately advise him of the consequences of pleading guilty. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Donald Keith Solomon v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Donald Keith Solomon, appeals as of right from the Bedford County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing his petition for being untimely filed. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Patrick Pope v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Patrick Pope, appeals the Maury County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner is currently serving an effective eleven-year sentence for aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and aggravated robbery. On appeal, he contends that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to investigate possible alibi witnesses in preparing the case for trial. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Nathaniel Richardson v. State of Tennessee
Nathaniel Richardson (“the Petitioner”) entered a best interest plea to second degree murder and received a sentence of twenty years. The Petitioner subsequently filed for postconviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied following an evidentiary hearing. Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |