Pete C. Jenkins v. State of Tennessee
On March 31, 1994, the petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to two counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and was sentenced as a Range I offender to fifteen years for each count. The plea agreement required the sentences to be served consecutively. The petitioner brought a petition for the writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose consecutive sentences and that the judgments were consequently void. The trial court denied the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Thomas Mayers
After a trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, attempted aggravated burglary, a Class D felony, and theft of property over $500, a Class E felony. He was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 25 years. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to dismiss his indictment or suppress testimony regarding destroyed evidence; (2) allowing the State to present certain photographs taken of the defendant, on grounds that they were not properly authenticated; and (3) ordering him to serve his sentence on the attempted aggravated burglary consecutively to his sentence for aggravated burglary because both crimes should have been considered part of the same criminal episode. We conclude that the defendant has waived the first claim by virtue of his failure to prepare an adequate brief and record and that the trial court did not err by allowing admitting the photographs and ordering consecutive sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court accordingly. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kevin DeWitt Ford v. State of Tennessee
On January 18, 2011, Petitioner, Kevin DeWitt Ford, filed a pro se petition for writ of error coram nobis. He subsequently submitted two amended petitions, also pro se. Petitioner attacked seven convictions in the Davidson County Criminal Court for aggravated robbery. Petitioner pled guilty to the offenses but reserved for appeal a certified question of law. On appeal, this court affirmed the convictions. State of Tennessee v. Kevin DeWitt Ford and Clifford Sylvester Wright, No. M2003-00957-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 677280 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 23, 2005) perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Oct. 24, 2005). Petitioner’s post-conviction relief petition was denied by the trial court. This Court affirmed. Kevin DeWitt Ford v. State of Tennessee, No. M2007-01727-CCA-R3-PC, 2009 WL 564226 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 5, 2009) perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 15, 2009). The coram nobis court dismissed the petition, as amended, without an evidentiary hearing, on two bases. First, the petition was filed outside the applicable statue of limitations. Second, even if the petition had been timely field, it did not state a cognizable claim for a writ of error coram nobis. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Earl Thomas Burgess v. Ford Motor Company
A management employee working for Ford Motor Company was to become an employee of Ford’s wholly owned subsidiary when the subsidiary was made an independent company. The manager wanted to remain employed by Ford and sought to transfer back to an hourly position before the spinoff took effect. The manager’s supervisor promised the manager his benefits and pay would not change as an employee of the subsidiary and that he could return to an hourly position with Ford after the spinoff until such time that the subsidiary was purchased by a third party. The subsidiary was purchased by a third party five years later, but Ford did not permit the employee to transfer back to Ford at that point. After the employee asked to transfer back to Ford, Ford offered its hourly employees a special retirement plan whereby they were offered lifetime health and pension benefits. The employee would have been eligible to participate in this plan if he had been allowed to transfer back to Ford. The employee filed suit against Ford, claiming promissory estoppel and seeking damages based on the amount he would have received under the special retirement plan. A jury found Ford liable for promissory estoppel and awarded the employee damages. Ford appealed, arguing (1) the employee’s claim was preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act and (2) the employee failed to prove all the elements of promissory estoppel. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Michael B. Adams v. State of Tennessee
This Court issues a show cause order on July 19, 2012, directing the pro se incarcerated appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The appellant is seeking a review of the decision on a claim pending on the small claims docket of the Tennessee Claims Commission. "No appeal may be taken from a commissioner's decision regarding claims appearing on the small claims docket." Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-403(a)(2). |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
James Bostic v. State of Tennessee and Warden David Sexton
This is an appeal from a final order of dismissal in the Circuit Court, entered on April 11, 2012. The appellant did not filed a notice of appeal until August 9, 2012. This Court issued a show cause order directing appellant to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The appellant has responded to the show cause order by motion which does not show good cause why the appeal should not be dismissed. |
Johnson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Devarick D. Nicks
The appellant, Devarick D. Nicks, pled guilty in the Montgomery County Circuit Court to two counts of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell or deliver. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court was to determine the length and manner of service of the sentences. After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received an effective eight-year sentence to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC). The appellant contends on appeal that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his sentences in confinement. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Larry A. Wade
Defendant, Larry Wade, was indicted by the Hamilton County Grand Jury for premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. Following a pretrial hearing on Defendant’s motion to suppress, which the trial court took under advisement, Defendant entered a guilty plea to second degree murder on the same day as the suppression hearing. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court denied after two separate hearings. On appeal, Defendant asserts that the trial court’s failure to rule on his motion to suppress prior to accepting his guilty plea violated his due process rights, and consequently, Defendant’s guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered, and Defendant asserts that it was a manifest injustice to deny Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Karen Stoner v. Brittany C. Amburn
Karen Stoner (“the Executrix”), in her capacity as the Executrix of the Estate of Irma M. Collins, brought suit against Brittany C. Amburn seeking to divest ownership of certain real property out of Amburn and into her name in her representative capacity. The suit was grounded in the Executrix’s claim that the subject property was fraudulently conveyed to Amburn by the latter’s stepfather, Larry C. Collins (“the Judgment Debtor”), a judgment debtor of the Estate. The Executrix alleged that the transfer was made for the purpose of shielding the property from execution on her judgment. At the conclusion of the proof in a jury trial, the court held that no reasonable minds could reach a conclusion other than that the conveyance was fraudulent in nature. The court directed a verdict in favor of the Executrix. The court vested all right, title and interest to the property in the Executrix. Amburn appeals. We affirm. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
William Fisher v. Jerry Lester, Warden
The Petitioner, William Fisher, appeals from the Hickman County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. He contends that his sentence has expired. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Francisco Miquel Jose v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Francisco Miquel Jose,appeals from the Putnam County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that his 2004 guilty plea to misdemeanor theft of property was not knowingly made because he was not advised of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea, that the statute of limitations should be tolled because Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), announced a new rule of constitutional law that did not exist at the time of his plea, and that due process requires tolling of the statute of limitations due to the circumstances surrounding his guiltyplea. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Calvin D. Norris v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Calvin D. Norris, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2007 conviction for possession with intent to sell one-half gram or less of cocaine and his ten-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his guilty plea was unknowing, involuntary, and unintelligent because he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Daysia D. et al.
Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights. She asserts the trial court |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
Susan Daniel v. Brittany Smith
In this negligence case, the jury returned a verdict in the amount of the plaintiff’s medical |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee v. James E. Brown
Defendant in suit to recover property taxes appeals from the trial court’s grant of summary |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
W. Stanford Blalock v. Preston Law Group, P.C., et al.
A plastic surgeon entered into a five year lease on office space, and defaulted on the lease after the first month. The landlord’s attorney filed separate lawsuits in general sessions court for breach of the lease contracts against the lessee, who had personally guaranteed the lease, and against the lessee’s personal corporation. The landlord obtained duplicate judgments for unpaid rent as well as for attorney fees. The general sessions judge informed the landlord that he was only entitled to collect one judgment. The lessee appealed to the circuit court, but paid the general sessions judgment in full while the circuit court action was still pending. The landlord’s attorney then filed a “partial satisfaction of judgment” and another complaint for attorney fees in general sessions court, followed by another complaint in circuit court, alleging that additional rents had accrued while the litigation continued. The lessee responded by filing a complaint for abuse of process against the landlord’s attorney, alleging that the attorney filed meritless complaints in order to drive up the fees he could collect. The landlord’s attorney filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the statute of limitations for abuse of process had passed, and that in any case no abuse of process could be shown. The trial court granted the motion. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Carol Ann Graybeal v. Howell H. Sherrod, Jr.
In 2003, Carol Ann Graybeal (“the Client”) filed this action against her former attorney and lover, Howell H. Sherrod, Jr. (“the Lawyer”), after he refused to give her an accounting regarding an investment she had made through him. In response to her demand for an accounting, he had accused her of stealing and damaging property, the value of which allegedly exceeded the value of her investment. In the answer later filed to her suit, he demanded a setoff; his answer was joined with a counterclaim seeking relief with respect to the stolen and damaged goods. Six years later, the case came on for trial. The court entered its first judgment on April 23, 2010 (“the April 2010 judgment”). The court found in favor of each of the parties regarding various of their respective claims, with the result that the Lawyer received a net judgment of $10,760.13, before interest. The Client filed a motion to alter or amend the April 2010 judgment. The court entered a second, almost identical, judgment on September 15, 2010 (“the September 2010 judgment”), in which it denied the Client’s motion. The Lawyer later filed a motion for discretionary costs as well as a motion to alter or amend the September 2010 judgment. In March 2011, the Client filed a motion for relief from the September 2010 judgment. In an order entered August 5, 2011 (“the August 2011 judgment”) and designated as “final,” the court granted the motion for discretionary costs in part, denied the Lawyer’s motion to alter or amend, and granted the Client’s motion for relief with respect to the calculation of prejudgment interest and the taxing of costs. The Lawyer appeals from the August 2011 judgment. The Client attempts to raise several issues of her own. We conclude that the merits of one of the earlier judgments – the September 2010 judgment – are not before us because what the Lawyer has labeled as a “motion to alter or amend” that judgment is not, despite its label, one of the motions recognized by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59.01 as having the effect of “extending the time for taking steps in the regular appellate process.” We find no reversible error in the August 2011 judgment. Accordingly, we affirm that judgment. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mark Takashi
A Knox County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Mark Takashi, of aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect, Class A felonies. The trial court merged the convictions, and the appellant received a twenty-five-year sentence to be served at 100%. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing him to represent himself at trial and that his sentence is excessive. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rodney W. Schutt v. Jodie Ann Miller (Schutt)
This appeal concerns post-divorce motions to set aside a marital dissolution agreement. The parties were divorced based on a mediated marital dissolution agreement. Shortly after the final decree was entered, the appellant wife filed post-divorce motions to set aside the marital dissolution agreement. The original trial judge first recused herself as to certain issues in the proceedings, and then later recused herself as to the entire case, so the post-divorce matters were ultimately heard by a special judge. All told, the appellant wife filed over 83 post-divorce pleadings, most involving efforts to set aside the parties’ marital dissolution agreement. Eventually, the trial court denied the wife’s motions to set aside and awarded the appellee husband over $61,000 in fees as sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. The wife now appeals. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
David White v. Empire Express, Inc. and Empire Transportation, Inc.
The case involves a lease-purchase agreement. The plaintiff is a truck driver. The co-defendants are two affiliated companies – a truckload hauling company and a leasing company. The plaintiff truck driver worked for the hauling company. The truck driver entered into a lease-purchase agreement with the leasing company to purchase the truck he drove in his work for the hauling company. His lease payments on the truck were made via weekly payroll deductions; the hauling company deducted the amount of the lease payments from the truck driver’s payroll and transferred those amounts to the leasing company on his behalf. If the driver earned less than the amount of the lease payment, the hauling company paid the lease payment anyway and the deficiency became a debt that the truck driver owed to the hauling company. At the end of the lease, the lease-purchase agreement required the truck driver to pay the residual value of the truck. He was allowed to pay this over the course of one year, also through weekly payroll deductions. After the final residual payment was made, the leasing company refused to give title of the truck to the plaintiff truck driver because he still owed money to the affiliated hauling company. The defendant leasing company then repossessed the truck and sold it. The plaintiff truck driver filed this lawsuit against both defendant companies, alleging breach of contract, conversion, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The trial court granted summary judgment to the truck driver on his breach-of-contract claim, and it conducted a bench trial on the breach-of- contract damages and the remaining claims. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court held in favor of the plaintiff on all of his claims and awarded both compensatory and punitive damages. The defendants now appeal. We affirm the award of compensatory damages and reverse the award of punitive damages. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ricardo Rodriguez v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Ricardo Rodriguez, brings a post-conviction challenge to his 2004 guilty plea for sale of a controlled substance based on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010), in which the Court concluded that trial counsel’s failure to advise a defendant that his guilty plea would result in deportation amounted to deficient representation. In this case, the post-conviction petition was not filed within the one-year limitations period specified by the Tennessee Post-Conviction Procedure Act, and it was dismissed by the post-conviction court based on the statute of limitations at Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-30-102(a). The petitioner contends that Padilla should be retroactively applied and that his claim falls into an exception to the statute of limitations for new constitutional rules with retrospective application. See T.C.A. § 40-30-102(b)(1) (2006). Alternatively, the petitioner claims that due process tolls the statute of limitations or that the rule is an old rule with retroactive application. The petitioner also challenges the knowing and voluntary nature of his plea and brings a habeas corpus challenge based on his incomplete knowledge of English. We conclude that, because Padilla does not warrant retroactive application and because due process does not require the statute of limitations to be tolled, the petition was time-barred. We further conclude that the post-conviction court properly denied relief on the petitioner’s remaining claims and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Klein Adlei Rawlins v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Klein Adlei Rawlins, appeals the Sumner County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted by a jury of first degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse. He was sentenced to consecutive sentences of life with the possibility of parole and twenty years. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred: (1) by concluding that he received the effective assistance of counsel; and (2) by denying his request for funds to assist post-conviction counsel in investigation of the post-conviction petition. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the denial of relief. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Richard Hanke, Sr.
The Defendant-Appellant, Richard Hanke, Sr., entered a plea of guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to robbery (count one), aggravated burglary (count two), aggravated assault (count three), and two counts of kidnapping (counts four and five), all Class C felonies. He additionally pleaded guilty to retaliation for past action (count six) and possession of a weapon with intent to employ in offense (count seven), both Class E felonies. The trial court imposed a term of six years’ confinement for the robbery, aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and each kidnapping. It further imposed a sentence of two years for possession of a weapon with intent to employ in offense and retaliation for past action. The trial court ordered the concurrent term of six years’ confinement in counts one, two, and four to be served consecutively to the concurrent term of six years’ confinement imposed in counts three, five, and seven. Count six was ordered to be served consecutively to all other counts, for an effective sentence of fourteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred in ordering partially consecutive sentencing. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cortino Harris v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Cortino Harris, appeals as of right from the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to investigate and call at trial several eyewitnesses to the crime. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
De Lano Parker v. Shelby County Government Civil Service Merit Board and The Shelby County Sheriff's Department
Appellee corrections officer’s employment with the Shelby County Sheriff’s Office was terminated for appearing in a video in which he stated that he had been a gang member. The Civil Service Merit Board affirmed the termination. The officer filed a petition for judicial review in the Shelby County Chancery Court, arguing that there was not substantial and material evidence to sustain his termination and that the termination violated his First Amendment rights. The trial court ruled that the Civil Service Merit Board’s decision was not supported by substantial and material evidence. We reverse the trial court’s ruling that the Board’s decision was not supported by substantial and material evidence, but vacate and remand to the Civil Service Merit Board for consideration of Appellee’s First Amendment argument. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |