Clint Earl Sims v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Clint Earl Sims, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s order denying him post-conviction relief. On appeal, Petitioner argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel when he pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated assault, three counts of domestic assault, three counts of vandalism less than $1,000, one count of false imprisonment, and one count of violating an order of protection. Petitioner also argues counsel’s ineffective assistance rendered his guilty plea unknowing and involuntary. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we conclude Petitioner’s appeal is untimely, the interest of justice does not favor waiver of the untimely notice, and therefore, this appeal is dismissed. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Alsco, Inc. v. Tennessee Department of Revenue
A taxpayer who rented hygienically-clean textiles to its customers challenged the revocation of three industrial machinery tax exemption certificates that it had previously been issued. An administrative judge determined that the taxpayer was not entitled to the exemption because the taxpayer’s operations did not constitute “manufacturing” as they were not necessary for processing tangible personal property. The taxpayer appealed to the Chancery Court for Davidson County. The chancery court reversed after concluding that the administrative decision was not supported by substantial and material evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm the chancery court’s decision. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Patrece Edwards-Bradford v. Kellogg Company, et al.
Employee Patrece Edwards-Bradford filed a petition for benefit determination seeking permanent disability benefits for an alleged back injury. The Court of Workers' Compensation Claims denied Employee's claim, finding that she had not rebutted the presumption of correctness afforded to the causation and impairment opinions of her authorized treating physicians, and was therefore not entitled to permanent disability benefits. Employee has appealed, and the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for consideration and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm. |
Workers Compensation Panel | ||
State of Tennessee v. Riki Kale Moss
In 2020, the Defendant, Riki Kale Moss, was indicted for violation of the implied consent law, driving under the influence (“DUI”) by impairment, and DUI, per se. The Defendant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence resulting from the traffic stop of his vehicle. The trial court granted the Defendant’s motion, and the State filed a motion to reconsider on the grounds that law enforcement had probable cause to stop the Defendant’s vehicle. The trial court issued a revised order denying the motion to suppress, and a jury convicted the Defendant of DUI by impairment and DUI per se. The Defendant appeals the denial of his motion to suppress and also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Monica A. Davalos (Dale) v. Douglas C. Dale
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Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher David Pace
Defendant, Christopher David Pace, entered a partially open plea in which the length of his |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Chad Aaron Reagan v. Rachel Bogart Reagan
The March 9, 2023 order from which the appellant has appealed was not effectively |
Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Jessie Lee Short
The Defendant, Jessie Lee Short, was convicted by a Hardin County Circuit Court jury of |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re James T.
A foster mother filed a petition to terminate parental rights and adopt a minor child. This appeal concerns the rights of a putative father who signed a Voluntary Acknowledgment of Paternity asserting that he was the biological father of the minor child. We have determined that the foster mother had standing to challenge the VAP, and we affirm the trial court’s decision disestablishing the putative father’s status as legal father. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Susan M. Austin v. Tommy Joe Richmond
Mother appeals the trial court’s order dismissing her petition for civil contempt and |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
James A. Welch et al. v. Oaktree Health and Rehabilitation Center LLC d/b/a Christian Care Centers of Memphis et al.
Tennessee’s Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 34-6-201 to -218, includes a provision for limited statutory immunity from civil liability, under certain conditions, for health care providers who rely in good faith on health care decisions made by an apparent agent on a principal’s behalf. Id. § -208. Tennessee’s Health Care Decisions Act, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 68-11-1801 to -1815, includes a similar provision for limited statutory immunity from civil liability, under certain conditions, for health care providers who comply in good faith with health care decisions made by an apparent agent on a principal’s behalf. Id. § -1810. The health care decision in this case is the execution of an arbitration agreement with admission to a nursing home. The agreement was signed by an agent under a durable power of attorney for health care executed several years earlier. After the resident’s death, his estate filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the nursing home on negligence theories. On appeal from the trial court’s denial of the defendant nursing home’s motion to compel arbitration, we hold that the nursing home does not meet the requirements for limited statutory immunity from civil liability under either the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act or the Health Care Decisions Act. Consequently, the trial court did not err in considering evidence on whether the principal had the requisite mental capacity to execute the durable power of attorney for health care. We overrule the holding on the immunity provision in the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 34-6-208, in Owens v. National Health Corporation, 263 S.W.3d 876, 889 n.4 (Tenn. 2007), to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion. We affirm the trial court, reverse the Court of Appeals, and remand to the Court of Appeals. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Paul Lebel v. CWS Marketing Group, Inc.
The plaintiff purchased a home at an auction. The home was sold “as is.” The plaintiff |
Court of Appeals | ||
John Stanley Jarnagin v. Vanderbilt University Medical Center Et Al.
The Plaintiff brought suit alleging the Defendants failed to obtain informed consent prior to conducting a medical procedure. The Defendants responded with a consent form signed by the Plaintiff detailing the potential side effects of the procedure of which the Plaintiff asserted he had not been informed, and they moved for summary judgment. The Plaintiff argued the consent form in the present case was inadequate to establish informed consent. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants. The Plaintiff appealed, challenging the validity of the signed consent form based on an alleged misrepresentation and his inability to read because of an eye condition, and arguing, therefore, that there is a material question of fact as to whether informed consent was obtained. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Defari R.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. The juvenile court |
Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Sarah N. Eakes
The Defendant, Sarah N. Eakes, pleaded guilty to one count of child neglect, and the trial court sentenced her to serve eighteen months in confinement and denied her request for both an alternative sentence and judicial diversion. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied her requests for an alternative sentence and judicial diversion, and she asks this court to enter an order granting both. The State concedes that the trial court failed to consider or weigh the relevant factors in its denial, but it asks this court to remand the case for a new sentencing hearing. After review, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and grant judicial diversion. The matter is remanded to the trial court for the imposition of the conditions, and term of judicial diversion, with the term not to exceed eighteen months. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Waste Management, Inc. of Tennessee v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County By and Through Davidson County Solid Waste Region Board
This appeal involves judicial review of the denial of approval to expand a private |
Court of Appeals | ||
Jon Beck v. Dyer County Board of Education, et al.
A tenured teacher appealed his dismissal for insubordination, neglect of duty, and |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Larry Hasty v. Greyhawk Development Corporation
A plaintiff obtained a default judgment against a corporation. Ten months later, the plaintiff moved to pierce the corporate veil and enforce the judgment against an alleged alter ego of the corporation. The trial court denied the motion. Because the judgment was final and the alleged alter ego was never made a party to the action, we affirm. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Pervis Tyrone Payne
In this case of first impression, the State appeals the trial court’s sentencing hearing order |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mark Anthony Clemmons v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Mark Anthony Clemmons, appeals as of right from the Wilson County Criminal |
Wilson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Demarcus Taiwan Russell, Jr.
I have the privilege to join the majority’s well-reasoned opinion in significant part. |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bradley Sanders, Individually and as Surviving Spouse of Decedent, Kelly Duggan v. Noah Higgins et al.
This appeal involves the disbursement of settlement proceeds proffered by an insurance company in resolution of a claim against it. The plaintiff is the surviving spouse of the decedent, who was killed when she was struck by a vehicle while riding her bicycle. The plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against the vehicle’s driver and the driver’s parents, all of whom were subsequently dismissed from the lawsuit following a settlement unrelated to this appeal. Within the same action, the plaintiff asserted a claim against his and the decedent’s insurer for negligent misrepresentation and negligent failure to procure insurance. The insurer had previously paid a pre-suit settlement to the plaintiff related to uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. In the complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the insurer had misrepresented additional coverage under an “umbrella policy,” leading the plaintiff and decedent to believe they were covered while failing to actually reinstate the umbrella policy when it had been temporarily cancelled months before the decedent’s death. The plaintiff and the insurer eventually reached a confidential settlement. To facilitate the release of claims by both the plaintiff and the decedent’s estate and upon the estate’s motion, the trial court entered an agreed order allowing the estate to intervene. The plaintiff then filed a motion to disburse the settlement proceeds to him, and the estate filed an intervening complaint and opposition to the plaintiff’s motion, asserting that the estate was entitled to one hundred percent of the settlement proceeds related to the umbrella policy claim. Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order granting the plaintiff’s motion to disburse the settlement proceeds to him upon finding that the cause of action against the insurer had not vested in the decedent prior to her death. The court subsequently denied the estate’s motion to alter or amend the judgment. The estate has appealed. Determining that the cause of action against the insurer was based in tort, rather than wrongful death, and accrued to the decedent at the time of her fatal injuries, we conclude that the right to the resulting settlement proceeds belongs to the decedent’s estate. We therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for entry of an order granting disbursal of the settlement funds to the estate. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Demarcus Taiwan Russell, Jr.
The Defendant, Demarcus Taiwan Russell, Jr., was convicted by a Greene County Criminal |
Greene | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Mark David Bond
The State appeals the trial court’s order granting the motion of the defendant, Mark David Bond, to suppress evidence seized during the search of his vehicle after a drug detection canine indicated the presence of narcotics during a sweep around the perimeter of the vehicle. The State challenges the trial court’s conclusion that the canine’s reaction was unreliable due to the canine’s inability to distinguish between the odor of illegal marijuana and the odor of legal hemp. After review, we reverse the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress, reinstate the indictment against the defendant, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Delinquent Taxpayers 2009 (Anthony Decarlo Hayes)
The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks |
Shelby | Court of Appeals |