Robert Eric Collins v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Robert Eric Collins, appeals from the Hawkins County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his two guilty plea convictions for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, Class C felonies, and his effective three-year community corrections sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that counsel provided ineffective assistance by (1) failing to advise him properly of potential conflicts of interest and (2) forcing him to plead guilty by telling him that he could not receive a fair trial in Hawkins County. We affirm the judgement of the trial court. |
Hawkins | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Basil Conner
The defendant pled guilty to two counts of aggravated burglary, Class C felonies, and was sentenced as a range I, standard offender to two concurrent three-year sentences, to be served on probation. The defendant requested judicial diversion, but the trial court denied this request. The defendant now appeals, claiming that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant him judicial diversion. After carefully reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we conclude that the trial court failed to expressly consider numerous criteria that it was required to consider in making the determination of whether to grant or deny judicial diversion. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for reconsideration in light of all relevant factors in a manner consistent with this opinion. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Billie Joe Welch v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Billie Joe Welch, appeals as of right from the Roane County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder, a Class A felony. He received a sentence of eighteen years as a Range I, violent offender. The Petitioner challenges the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief as well as the performance of trial and appellate counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Roane | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Demetrie Owens v. State of Tennessee
A Marshall County jury convicted the Petitioner, Demetrie Owens, of aggravated burglary and two counts of theft of property valued over $1000, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II offender to an effective sentence of ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentence. State v. Demetrie Darnell Owens, No. M2009-02611-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 3448138 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Sept. 2, 2010), no perm. app. filed. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel did not adequately cross-examine the State’s witnesses and because he improperly “opened the door” to proof of a prior bad act by the Petitioner. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Antonio Jamarc Warfield
A Maury County jury convicted appellant, Antonio Jamarc Warfield, of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced him to serve an effective sentence of twenty-one years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the conviction of especially aggravated robbery, modify the conviction of especially aggravated burglary to aggravated burglary, and remand for entry of a judgment on the aggravated burglary conviction consistent with this opinion. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Quinton A. Cage v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Quinton A. Cage, filed an application to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that he was incompetent when his post-conviction petition was filed. The post-conviction court denied the motion,and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we dismiss the appeal as untimely. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Curtis Myers v. Amisub (SFH), Inc., d/b/a St. Francis Hospital, et al.
The plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against several health care providers and subsequently dismissed the lawsuit. He re-filed the action after the legislature enacted Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121, which requires a plaintiff who files a medical malpractice suit to give health care providers who are to be named in the suit notice of the claim sixty days before filing the suit; and Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-122, which requires a plaintiff to file with the medical malpractice complaint a certificate of good faith confirming that the plaintiff has consulted with an expert who has provided a signed written statement that there is a good-faith basis to maintain the action. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on the plaintiff’s failure to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-26-121 and 122. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the plaintiff’s original suit constituted substantial compliance with the statutes’ requirements and that extraordinary cause existed to excuse compliance with the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121. Upon interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. We hold that the statutory requirements that a plaintiff give sixty days presuit notice and file a certificate of good faith with the complaint are mandatory requirements and not subject to substantial compliance. The plaintiff’s failure to comply with Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-122 by filing a certificate of good faith with his complaint requires a dismissal with prejudice. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Daniel Renteria-Villegas et al. v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County et al.
We accepted a question of law certified by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee to determine whether the October 2009 Memorandum of Agreement between the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, by and through the Davidson County Sheriff’s Office, violates the Charter of Nashville and Davidson County or other state law. We conclude that the Memorandum of Agreement does not violate the Charter or any other state law cited by the plaintiffs. |
Supreme Court | ||
State of Tennessee v. Mark Joseph Graves
The Defendant, Mark Joseph Graves, entered a best interest plea to attempted sexual exploitation of a minor, in exchange for a two-year and one-day sentence, as a Range I standard offender, at thirty percent. As part of the Defendant’s plea agreement, he reserved a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) as to whether an affidavit in support of a search warrant must allege when the illegal activity occurred. After reviewing the record and applicable law, we conclude that the Defendant is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction. |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tony L. Pirtle v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Tony L. Pirtle, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, and facilitation of aggravated rape. The petitioner received an effective sentence of thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction DNA testing, alleging that testing would exonerate his co-defendant and, thereby, exonerate the petitioner. The court denied the motion, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eddie Joe Whitaker
Defendant, Eddie Joe Whitaker, was indicted by the Campbell County Grand Jury for driving under the influence (DUI). Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced by the trial court to 11 months and 29 days to be served at 75 percent incarceration. Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence and asserts: 1) the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction; and 2) his sentence was excessive. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Campbell | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua Jermaine Whitehead
Joshua Jermaine Whitehead (“the Defendant”) pled guilty in February 2004 to one count of attempted aggravated sexual battery and one count of aggravated assault. The Defendant was sentenced in May 2004 as a Range I offender to an effective sentence of nine years, suspended after service of one year. Due to repeated probation violations, the Defendant eventually served his entire sentence in confinement. The Defendant was released on August 19, 2011. On October 5, 2011, he filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the basis that he was not informed of the lifetime community supervision consequence of his conviction for the sex offense. After a hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s motion, and this appeal followed. Upon our thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Troy Williams
Appellant, Anthony Troy Williams,was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for driving on a canceled, suspended or revoked license, second offense. Appellant was convicted by a jury and sentenced to six months in jail and a fine of $2,500. On appeal, Appellant, pro se, challenges the constitutionality of the State’s requirement that he have a license to drive in Tennessee. After a review of the record, we determine that Appellant was properly convicted of driving on a canceled, suspended, or revoked license. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Steven Linton Griffith v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Steven Linton Griffith, was convicted in Sullivan County of both the sale and delivery of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school zone. See State v. Steve Griffith, No. E2008-01962-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 1956713, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Jul. 8, 2009), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2009). The trial court merged the convictions into a single judgment. Appellant appealed. Id. This Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court on appeal. Id. Appellant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief in which he argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After a hearing, the postconviction court denied relief. Appellant argues on appeal that the petition was improperly denied. After a review of the record, we determine that Petitioner failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Conservatorship of Leah Angelique Thomas - Cathey J. Tillman, Conservator v. Ronald Marvell Thomas
The probate court appointed a conservator for a disabled young adult. The court awarded attorney’s fees to the petitioner who was appointed as conservator, and to the guardian ad litem, to be paid from the estate of the disabled ward. The court also ordered that another party, who originally sought to be appointed as conservator but withdrew his petition before the hearing, would likewise receive an award of attorney’s fees to be paid from the estate of the ward. The conservator appeals, arguing that the probate court lacked the authority to make such an award to the party who withdrew his petition. We agree, and therefore, we reverse the award of attorney’s fees and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Louis W. Alford
Appellant, Louis W. Alford, was convicted of second degree murder in Coffee County in 1990. As a result, Appellant received a forty-year sentence. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Appellant’s sentence and conviction. State v. Louis William Alford, No. 01C019110CC00300, 1992 WL 50968, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Mar. 19, 1992), perm. app. denied, concurring in results only (Tenn. Jun. 15, 1992). In a separate case, Appellant pled guilty to several charges and received a four-year sentence. This sentence was ordered to be served consecutively to the second degree murder sentence. On direct appeal from the burglary conviction, this Court remanded the matter for resentencing because the judgment form failed to reflect the range of punishment. State v. Louis William Alford, No. 01-C01-9007CR00170, 1991 WL 4951, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Jan. 24, 1991). On remand, the trial court held a sentencing hearing and sentenced Appellant as a Range II, multiple offender. Appellant again initiated an appeal, arguing that his five prior felonies could not be used to enhance his sentence because they pre-dated the Sentencing Reform Act of 1989. This Court affirmed the sentence on appeal. State v. Louis William Alford, No. 01C01-9108CC00227, 1992 WL 50963, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Mar. 19, 1992), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Jun. 8, 1992). Appellant filed a motion to correct his sentence in September of 2011, in which he complained about the miscalculation of his parole date and joinder of his sentences for burglary and second degree murder. The trial court denied the motion. Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration or, in the alternative, a notice of appeal. The trial court issued a second order in which it determined that it had no authority to order the relief sought by Appellant. Appellant filed a notice of appeal. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that Appellant does not have an appeal as of right from the order under Rule 3 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dale England, et al. v. Robert England, et al.
This case is a property dispute between two brothers regarding the width of a right-of-way that affects both their properties. The plaintiff claims the right-of-way is eight feet wide and the defendant should be prevented from expanding the gravel road that runs along the right-of-way to 25 feet because the expansion would require the plaintiff to remove fences, septic tanks, and other permanent structures. The trial court ruled that the right-of-way created by the brothers’ father was intended to be 25 feet wide. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Union | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Oscar E. Ochoa and Beatriz Ochoa
Defendants, Oscar E. Ochoa and Beatriz Ochoa, were indicted by the Bradley County Grand Jury for possession of between 10 and 70 pounds of marijuana with intent to sell. Defendants filed applications for Rule 9 interlocutory appeal seeking our review of the trial court’s ruling that the State did not abuse its discretion when the Assistant District Attorney General denied Defendants’ applications for pretrial diversion. Defendants’ cases were consolidated on appeal. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude that the trial court properly affirmed the State’s denial of pretrial diversion. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles Robert Braun, Jr. v. Nita Lynn Braun
This is a post-divorce appeal. Stepfather assumed a parental role over Mother’s child from a previous relationship even though only one child was born of the relationship between the Parties. Following an agreed divorce, the court ordered Stepfather to submit child support for both children. The court reasoned that as a result of Stepfather’s participation in a petition to terminate the biological father’s parental rights to Mother’s child, the Child lost any right to support from his biological father. Stepfather appeals. We reverse the decision of the trial court but remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Robert Braun, Jr. v. Nita Lynn Braun - Concurring
I do not disagree with the majority opinion’s decision to remand this case to the trial court so it can consider whether an upward deviation in the child support for Titus Braun is appropriate. I write separately to point out that the majority opinion should not be read as carte blanche to transfer automatically – and without legal justification for doing so – the difference between (a) the support previously ordered for two children and (b) that which would have been ordered for one child, as the amount of an upward deviation in the support for Titus. A court cannot do indirectly what it cannot legally do directly. See, e.g., Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., No. 3:05-CV-0475, 2006 WL 3436064 at *2 (N.D. Tex., Nov. 29, 2006). |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
Summer Bay Management, L.C., et al., v. Gatlinburg Town Square Members' Association, Inc., et al.
This Court issued a Show Cause Order setting forth that the Notice of Appeal filed in this case is not "a final judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights and liabilities of the parties"of which "an appeal of right would lie." |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Kathryn A. Duke v. Harold W. Duke, III
The father in this post-divorce action has filed a petition for recusal appeal seeking an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B from the trial court’s denial of his August 13, 2012, motion for recusal. We have reviewed the petition pursuant to the de novo standard of review as required by Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B § 2.06, and we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Kathryn A. Duke v. Harold W. Duke, III - Concur/Dissent
I agree with the majority’s affirmance of the trial court’s denial of Father’s recusal motion. However, I would have held that the grounds previously raised by Father two years earlier were not subject to our review under Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B and, therefore, would have dismissed that part of the appeal. I would affirm denial as to the new grounds upon the reasoning set out in the majority opinion. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Merlina Elijah (Williams) Draper v. Ryan Ashley Williams
This case involves the modification of a parenting plan. The trial court modified the parenting plan upon its finding that a material change in circumstances had occurred such that primary residential custody with Mother was no longer in the child's best interest. On appeal, Mother argues that the trial court erred in granting primary residential custody to Father, and Father argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for attorney’s fees. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Tina Marie Hodge v. Chadwick Craig
This appeal requires the Court to determine whether current Tennessee law permits the |
Maury | Supreme Court |