State of Tennessee v. Robert G. Barham
A Madison County Circuit Court jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Robert G. Barham, of driving under the influence, first offense, and driving under a revoked license, fifth offense, both Class A misdemeanors, and imposed a five hundred dollar fine for each. The trial court sentenced Barham to a concurrent term of eleven months and twenty nine days confinement. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence was sufficient to support Barham’s convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Serena Carter
Defendant-Appellant, Serena Carter, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s imposition of a twenty-five-year sentence for facilitation of first degree felony murder. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Colin D. Savage
After pleading guilty to the indicted charges of conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, aggravated burglary, conspiracy to commit theft of property valued at $10,000 or more, and theft of property valued at less than $500, appellant, Colin D. Savage, was tried and convicted on the remaining charges of especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping. The trial court merged the convictions for conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary and conspiracy to commit theft of property valued at $10,000 or more and sentenced appellant to four years in confinement. The court pronounced a six-year sentence for the aggravated burglary conviction, twenty-four years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, twenty-four years for the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, and eleven months and twenty-nine days for theft of property valued at less than $500. The trial court ordered that the sentences for especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping run consecutively to each other, with the remaining sentences running concurrently with them, resulting in an effective sentence of forty-eight years. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and claims the following errors: (1) the State’s evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court erred in declining to merge the convictions for especially aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping; and (3) the trial court erred in ordering the sentences to be served consecutively. After reviewing the record for sufficiency of the evidence, consecutive sentencing, and propriety of the trial court’s refusal to merge the convictions, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jamel Marsh
Defendant-Appellant, Jamel Marsh, was convicted by a Hamilton County jury of voluntary manslaughter and received a sentence of four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Marsh argues: (1) the trial court’s method of selecting and qualifying the jury violated Tennessee Code Annotated sections 22-2-308 and 22-2-313 and as well as Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); (2) the trial court erred in preventing defense counsel from cross-examining Rachel Hixson about whether she received preferential treatment in her unrelated criminal cases in exchange for her testimony against Marsh and erred in preventing defense counsel from making an offer of proof regarding this alleged preferential treatment, thereby violating Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); and (3) his sentence violated Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and his sentence was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment to show that the jury found Marsh guilty of voluntary manslaughter. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Emilie A.M.
This is a termination of parental rights case in which Lisa C. and Michael C. filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Christopher M. to his child. The paternal grandparents filed an intervening petition to adopt the child. The trial court terminated Christopher M.’s parental rights and granted Lisa C. and Michael C.’s petition to adopt the child. Christopher M. appeals the termination of his parental rights. Following our review, we conclude that the court erred in relying upon Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(3) in terminating Father’s parental rights and reverse that ground of termination. Additionally, we are unable to review the remainder of the court’s decision because the final order failed to set forth findings of fact as required by section 36-1-113(k) in support of its second ground of termination. Accordingly, we reverse the termination of Father’s parental rights based upon section 36-1-113(g)(3) and vacate the remainder of the final order. The case is remanded for entry of an order that sets forth sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the termination of Christopher M.’s parental rights. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Eddie L. Readus
The defendant, Eddie L. Readus, was convicted by a Bedford County Circuit Court jury, in count one, of sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine and, in count two, of delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine, Class C felonies, as well as, in count three, of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell and, in count four, of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to deliver, Class B felonies. The trial court merged count two into count one and count four into count three and sentenced the defendant to fifteen years on the two remaining convictions, to be served consecutively. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and also argues that the doctrines of double jeopardy, multiplicity and merger prevented him from being sentenced separately on counts one and three. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Daniel G. Hampton
After the Rhea County grand jury indicted the Defendant-Appellant, Daniel G. Hampton, for one count of first degree premeditated murder, Hampton entered an Alford plea, see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970), to second degree murder, a Class A felony. The trial court accepted the parties’ agreed sentence of fifteen years in the Department of Correction and, after a sentencing hearing, ordered that the sentence be served consecutively to Hampton’s unserved federal sentences. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court erred in ordering a consecutive sentence. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rhea | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Trutonio Yancey and Bernard McThune
A Shelby County jury convicted appellant Trutonio Yancey of aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, carjacking, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The jury also convicted appellant Bernard McThune of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced appellant Yancey to an effective twenty-year sentence and sentenced appellant McThune to a twelve-year sentence. In this consolidated appeal, both appellants challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. In addition, appellant Yancey argues that the trial court erred in not requiring the State to elect upon which dangerous felony it relied for the employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony charge, and appellant McThune argues that the trial court erred by not applying mitigating factors when sentencing him. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm appellant Yancey’s convictions for aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping. Discerning error, we reverse appellant Yancey’s convictions for carjacking and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and remand the case for a new trial. We affirm appellant McThune’s conviction and sentence. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan Lamont Jones
The Defendant-Appellant, Jonathan Lamont Jones, was indicted by a Dyer County grand jury of tampering with evidence, a Class E felony, and resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor. Jones was acquitted of tampering with evidence and convicted of resisting arrest. He was sentenced to six months probation after serving ninety days in confinement. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Steve William Pollock
The Defendant-Appellant, Steve William Pollock, appeals his two convictions for vehicular assault in the Obion County Circuit Court. On appeal, Pollock argues: (1) that the trial court erred in allowing the State’s expert to rely on a study, a copy of which he was not provided, in forming her opinion regarding the likelihood of his intoxication at the time of the collision and (2) that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s proof and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Cole Woodard
The Defendant-Appellant, Cole Woodard, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of sale of cocaine, possession of cocaine with intent to sell, and possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, Class C felonies, and was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to three concurrent sentences of ten years. On appeal, Woodard argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and (2) his convictions violate principles of double jeopardy. Upon review, we affirm the convictions, but we vacate the judgments and remand the case for entry of judgments reflecting merger of the jury verdicts into a single conviction for sale of cocaine. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Doris Sharphine Halliburton
The Defendant-Appellant, Doris Sharphine Halliburton, was convicted by a Dyer County jury of aggravated assault, a Class D felony, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to a term of three years, with Halliburton to serve one year in the Dyer County Jail before serving the remaining two years of her sentence on supervised probation. On appeal, Halliburton argues that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction and (2) her sentence was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Emmett Hartnest, Jr.
The Defendant-Appellant, Emmett Hartnest, Jr., was convicted by a Hardin County jury of driving under the influence (DUI), a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with Hartnest to serve ten days in the Hardin County Jail before serving the balance of his sentence on supervised probation. On appeal, Hartnest argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and (2) his sentence was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Mark Watkins, Surviving Spouse of Amy Rose Watkins v. Affiliated Internists, P.C., et al.
Husband of a decedent filed a wrongful death medical malpractice action against the |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Conservatorship of John Daniel Tate
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right from the trial court’s denial of a motion for |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Conservatorship of Alfonso B. Patton
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Conservatorship of Alfonso B. Patton
This is an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Allen Pollard
Defendant, James Allen Pollard, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for first degree murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged. The trial court merged Defendants’ murder convictions and sentenced him to life in prison for first degree murder and to 18 years to be served at 100 percent for his especially aggravated robbery conviction, which was ordered to be served consecutively to his life sentence. Defendant appeals his convictions and asserts the following: 1) that the State violated the requirements of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963), when it failed to disclose evidence regarding State’s witness Anthony Bowers; 2) the trial court erred by refusing to grant Defendant a continuance to investigate Anthony Bowers; 3) the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress his statement to police; 4) the trial court erred by allowing Detective Windsor to testify regarding his opinion about whether Defendant acted in self-defense; 5) the trial court committed plain error by allowing an officer to testify regarding blood spatter; 6) the alleged errors constitute cumulative error requiring a reversal of Defendants’ convictions; and 7) the trial court erred by ordering Defendant’s sentences to run consecutively. After a careful review of the entire record, we affirm Defendant’s convictions and the lengths of his individual sentences; however, we reverse the trial court’s order of consecutive sentencing and remand for a new sentencing hearing in order for the trial court to state on the record the facts which support consecutive sentencing. See State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tenn. 1995). |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In The Matter Of Abigail F.K.
This appeal concerns the termination of parental rights. The subject child is the eighth born to the appellant mother. The appellant mother failed a prenatal drug screen prior to the birth of the child at issue, so the appellee Tennessee Department of Children’s Services took the child into protective custody three days after birth. A permanency plan was adopted and the mother made efforts to comply with her permanency plan responsibilities. The Department filed a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights as to this child. The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights based on the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan and persistence of conditions. The mother now appeals only as to the grounds for termination. We reverse as to the ground of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan but affirm as to the ground of persistent conditions. On that basis, we affirm the termination of parental rights. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ameale Hudson
A Madison County Circuit Court Jury found the appellant, Ameale Hudson, guilty of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion for a change of venue; (2) denying his motion to bar the State from referring to him by his nickname,“Pistol”; and (3) denying his motion to prohibit the admission of postmortem photographs of the victim. The appellant also contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Alexander Jones
A Gibson County grand jury indicted appellant, Christopher Alexander Jones, for first degree murder. The jury found appellant guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Specifically, he contends that the evidence did not show sufficient proof of premeditation and that his intoxication negated the required culpable mental state for this offense. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support appellant’s conviction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Cameron S.H.
In this parental termination case, the father was appointed counsel at the time the Court held a dependency hearing in the Juvenile Court and the Order appointing counsel in that proceeding also appointed the attorney for the subsequent termination of parental rights trial. When the Petition to terminate the father's parental rights trial was held, neither the father nor counsel appeared at trial and a Judgment was entered terminating the father's parental rights. On appeal, appellant argues that the statue and rule governing this proceeding required notification to the father's attorney. We vacate the Judgment of the Trial Court on the grounds that both the Court and the Department of Children's Services were charged with the knowledge that the appellee was appointed counsel and that the termination Petition's Judgment was prejudicial to the judicial process when the father's lawyer was not notified of the Petition or trial. We vacate and remand for a new trial. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
City of Memphis v. Jason Morris, et al.
A Memphis police officer was terminated after he was involved in a physical altercation with his girlfriend during which she sustained facial injuries. The Civil Service Commission upheld the termination, and the chancery court affirmed. In the initial appeal to this Court, we remanded for the Commission to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Commission issued an amended decision with additional findings. Upon reviewing the amended decision, the chancery court reversed the termination and reinstated the officer. The City appeals, arguing that the Commission’s decision was supported by substantial and material evidence. The officer presents numerous arguments in support of his assertion that reversal of the Commission was proper. We affirm the order of the chancery court in part, but we vacate the reinstatement of the officer and reinstate the Commission’s decision to uphold termination. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Milledgeville United Methodist Church, et al. v. Jimmy G. Melton, et al.
This case involves a dispute over the ownership of a parcel of real property. Appellee church purchased the disputed property from the seller bank in 1974, but failed to record its deed. Through a clerical error, the seller bank sold the disputed property to Appellant real estate investor in 2008. Appellant promptly recorded his deed. After the investor demolished a portion of a wall constructed by the church on the disputed property, the church sued to quiet title and for damages. The trial court ruled that the deed to the investor was void as champertous because the church’s possession of the property was open and obvious at the time of conveyance. Thus the trial court ruled that the church was the true owner of the property. Although we affirm the decision of the trial court, we rely on grounds other than those found by the trial court. |
McNairy | Court of Appeals | |
Traci Jones v. Bernice Jones et al.
This matter arose from a car accident between Traci Jones and Bernice Jones. At trial, the |
Warren | Court of Appeals |