Stephen Wheeler v. Cleo Wrap, Inc. et al.
In this workers’ compensation action, the employee suffered a fractured wrist as a result of workplace accident. He contended that he also sustained a neck injury and post-traumatic tress disorder from the accident. The trial court awarded benefits for the wrist injury only, and the employee has appealed. We affirm the judgment. |
Shelby | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Monte Hull
A Shelby County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, Monte Hull, and Co-Defendant, Johnny Williams, charging them with aggravated robbery. Following a consolidated jury trial, Defendant and Co-Defendant Williams were convicted of the offense. However, Co-Defendant Williams is not part of this appeal. Defendant received a sentence of eight years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James H. Harris, III v. Edward K. White, III
This is a dispute between two attorneys. Attorney 1 hired attorney 2 to represent him. Attorney 2 sued attorney 1 for attorney fees, and attorney 1 counterclaimed for legal malpractice. The trial court granted attorney 2 summary judgment on the attorney fee claim, and a jury found in favor of attorney 2 on the legal malpractice claim. On appeal, attorney 1 challenges both decisions on multiple grounds. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Estate of George H. Steil, II
The only issue in this case is whether a divorced wife was entitled to continue to receive alimony after the untimely death of her former husband. The wife argued that the support award was in the nature of alimony in solido, which is for a fixed total amount that does not abate upon the death of the obligor. She relies upon an Agreed Interim Order that provided that the husband would pay the wife “spousal support in the amount of $500 per month for a period of three years. . . .” The executrix of her former husband’s estate contended that the terms of the Agreed Interim Order were irrelevant, because the order was superseded by the Marital Dissolution Agreement (MDA), which was incorporated into the final decree of divorce. The MDA included the $500 per month alimony provision, but provided that the husband’s alimony obligation would end if the wife remarried, and it did not mention the three year period or any other time limitation. The executrix accordingly argued that the MDA award was in the nature of alimony in futuro, which abates upon the death of the obligor by operation of law. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(f)(1). The trial court found that the omission of the three year period from the MDA was an inadvertent oversight, that the parties intended the alimony award to be in solido, and that the wife was accordingly entitled to receive support from her former husband’s estate. We reverse, because the MDA establishes the award and provided for alimony in futuro. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Shandra Kay Hattaway v. Kevin Todd Hattaway
In this divorce appeal, Husband challenges the trial court’s division of marital property, alimony award, permanent parenting plan, award of discretionary costs, and award of attorney fees to Wife. We have determined that the trial court erred in requiring Husband to pay more rehabilitative alimony than he can afford, in awarding him only 28 days a year in parenting time, and in awarding discretionary costs for expert fees for case preparation. In all other respects, we affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Charles E. Thompson v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Charles Thompson, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of his three separate petitions for post-conviction relief in case numbers P-24665, -22149, and -27258. Petitioner was convicted, following guilty pleas, of the first degree murder of Eddie Johnson and attempted first degree murder of Brenda Hampton. Following jury trials, he was convicted for the aggravated assault, especially aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated kidnapping of Paloy Finnie, see State v. Derrick M. Vernon, et al., No. W1998-00612-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 490718 at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, filed Apr. 25, 2000), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 16, 2001); and the first degree murder of Dedrick Taylor, see State v. Charles Thompson, No. W1998-00351-CCA-R10-CD, 2001 WL 912715 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, filed Aug. 9, 2001), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 31, 2001). In his brief, Petitioner asserts that the indictments in the three cases above were defective. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Deshay Peoples v. State of Tennessee
A Davidson County Grand Jury indicted petitioner, Michael Deshay Peoples, Jr., for first- degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, two counts of aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated kidnapping. The State dismissed one of the aggravated robbery counts. Following a trial on the remaining counts, a jury found petitioner guilty as charged and sentenced him to life in prison for felony murder. The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing on the remaining counts and ordered concurrent sentences of eighteen years at one hundred percent for especially aggravated robbery; ten years at thirty percent for aggravated robbery; and ten years at one hundred percent for aggravated kidnapping. This court affirmed the convictions and sentences, and the supreme court denied permission to appeal. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief by checking several boxes on the standard form, but he added no supporting facts. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition. Finding no error, we affirm the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of the petition. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mary Claudine Holland v. Robert Shields Holland
This appeal involves the “spousal impoverishment” provision of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988. Mary Claudine Holland and Robert Shields Holland were married in 1967. Robert Shields Holland was placed in a nursing home for health-related problems in 2009. Mary Claudine Holland filed a complaint for separate maintenance in which she sought division of the marital assets and income. The trial court granted her request and filed an order reflecting its decision. The Tennessee Department of Human Services filed a motion to intervene and to set aside the order. The trial court denied the motions. The Tennessee Department of Human Services appeals. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with instruction to the court to reconsider the complaint for separate maintenance with the Tennessee Department of Human Services present as an intervening party. |
Union | Court of Appeals | |
Beth Proffitt v. Smoky Mountain Woodcarvers Supply, Inc., et al.
This appeal arises from the termination of Beth Proffitt (“Plaintiff”) from employment at Smoky Mountain Woodcarvers Supply, Inc. (“the Corporation”). Plaintiff, a minority shareholder in the Corporation, sued the Corporation, as well as the other shareholders Mac Proffitt and Ray Proffitt (collectively, “the Defendants”) in the Circuit Court for Blount County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court bifurcated the issues of liability and damages. Plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the Defendants breached their fiduciary duty to her. After a trial on the matter of liability, the Trial Court found the Defendants liable for breach of fiduciary duty. After the hearing on damages, the Trial Court awarded damages to Plaintiff, including lost salary and bonus. The Trial Court also awarded Plaintiff her attorney’s fees. The Defendants appeal. We find that the Trial Court did not err in finding that the Defendants did breach their fiduciary duty to Plaintiff. We, however, reverse the award of attorney’s fees to Plaintiff. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
Robert B. Ledford v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, Robert B. Ledford, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis attacking his convictions of second degree murder, kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and theft. On initial review, this court affirmed the coram nobis court’s summary denial because we concluded that coram nobis relief was not available to provide relief from a guilty-pleaded conviction. Robert B. Ledford v. State, No. E2010-01773-CCA-R3-PC (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, May 4, 2011). The petitioner applied for permission to appeal this court’s decision with the Tennessee Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. On March 8, 2012, the supreme court granted the application for permission to appeal for the purpose of remanding the case to this court for reconsideration in light of the supreme court’s opinion in Wlodarz v. State, ___S.W.3d ___, No. E2008-02179-SC-R11-CO (Tenn. Feb. 23, 2012). Following our reconsideration, we conclude that the petitioner failed to present a justiciable claim warranting coram nobis relief and affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Joshua E.R., Jr.
The trial court terminated parents’ parental rights on the grounds of severe child abuse. We affirm. |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
John Leslie Byrnes v. Joyce Marie Byrnes
The parties, John Leslie Byrnes (“Husband”) and Joyce Marie Byrnes (“Wife”), were divorced in 1998. Under the divorce judgment, they were to have equal parenting time with their two minor children. Some six years later, in 2004, Husband filed a petition to change the custody arrangement. The petition was granted ex parte on an “emergency” basis. The ex parte order temporarily placed sole custody of the children with Husband and required Mother to pay monthly child support of $652. For reasons that Wife blames on Husband and the trial court, and Husband blames on Wife, a hearing was not held on the custody and support issues until 2009, more than five years after Husband was named the sole custodian. Eventually, the court entered an order, to which Wife agreed, decreeing that Wife was liable to Husband for a child support arrearage of $20,874.24, a figure that includes interest and Wife’s share of medical expenses. In the same order, the court decreed that Husband was entitled to an award of attorney’s fees in an amount to be determined at a future hearing. That hearing was later scheduled for a date certain. Wife’s counsel did not appear at the hearing on attorney’s fees and the court proceeded, in counsel’s absence, to hold Wife liable for fees of $30,315. Wife filed a motion to set aside the award of attorney’s fees which the court denied. She appeals, challenging the child support arrearage and the denial of her motion to set aside the award of attorney’s fees. We affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Branch Banking & Trust Company v. Townsend, LLC and E. William Henry
This Court issued a Show Cause Order on April 19, 2012 directing appellants to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
The Peoples Bank v. Raymond E. Lacy
Plaintiff Bank brought this action to enforce a Loan Modification Agreement and promissory note. The Bank alleged that defendant had breached the Agreement and it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Defendant answered, arguing that the Bank had breached its contract with him and was not entitled to judgment. The Bank moved for summary judgment and the Trial Court determined there was no disputed issue of material fact under the Loan Modification Agreement and the amount owed on the note, granted partial summary judgment to the Bank and ruled the partial summary judgment was final pursuant to Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 54.02. On appeal, we affirm the Trial Court's Judgment and remand for trial on defendant's Counter-Claim. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Edwin Dewan Reese
Edwin Dewan Reese (“the Defendant”) pled guilty to (1) one count of driving after having been declared an habitual motor vehicle offender and (2) one count of failure to appear. There was no agreement as to the Defendant’s sentence. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a standard offender to one year, six months on each offense. The trial court also ordered the Defendant to serve his sentences consecutively. The Defendant now appeals both the length and consecutive service of his sentences. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Garry Lee Nance
The Defendant, Garry Lee Nance, appeals from the trial court’s revocation of his probation and order that he serve part of his remaining sentences in confinement. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s judgments pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Delta Faucet Company v. Jeffrey Noles - Concurring in part and dissenting in part
I concur fully in the majority’s conclusions on all issues except for the notice of the aggravation or advancement of the carpel tunnel syndrome claim, and it is on that issue that I must respectfully dissent. On the issue of notice the trial court found that “Notice was available to Delta not only through its pre-employment physical, but through its own doctor's records, particularly Dr. Pearce who performed CT surgery on Noles. No prejudice was shown to Delta by any delay in notice.” I fully agree with the majority’s conclusions that Delta did not receive proper notice from the preemployment physical and Dr. Pearce’s medical records. The majority correctly states that Mr. Noles testified that he informed Delta’s plant nurse that he had numbness in his left hand and right thumb at the time he reported his elbow injury and that Delta did not produce the plant nurse to testify at trial. The majority then states that Mr. Noles’ testimony on that point was unrefuted at trial. Since the trial court had resolved some conflicts in evidence in favor of Mr. Noles, the majority infers that the trial court accredited Mr. Noles’ testimony on the notice issue as well. Based upon this inference the majority concludes that Delta received notice of the advancement of the carpel tunnel injury by way of Mr. Noles’ conversation with Delta’s plant nurse. |
Madison | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Mahmoud Awad Mohammad v. Nairman Faraj Meri
This post-divorce appeal concerns a one-time, one-week extension of parenting time. The trial court granted the mother’s petition to extend her parenting time from one week to two weeks for a vacation with her family. After the mother’s vacation was over, the father filed his appeal. We dismiss the appeal on grounds of mootness. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Devaries M. Locke
A Davidson County jury found appellant, Devaries M. Locke, guilty of possession of a firearm. The parties stipulated to his status as a felon, but the jury was not so informed. As a result of the jury’s decision and the stipulation, appellant was convicted of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender, to three years of split confinement with one year to serve followed by two years of supervised probation. On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction and argues that his sentence is excessive. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tehren Carthel Wilson
The defendant, Tehren Carthel Wilson, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of identity theft, a Class D felony, and theft of property, a Class A misdemeanor, and was sentenced to an effective term of twelve years, eleven months and twenty-nine days. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court’s denial of his request to charge fraudulent use of a credit card as a lesser-included offense of identity theft. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand for entry of a corrected judgment in Count 3, identifying the defendant’s identity theft conviction as a Class D felony instead of a Class C felony. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Delta Faucet Company v. Jeffrey Noles
An employee alleged that he sustained a work-related injury to his elbow and that his work aggravated his pre-existing carpal tunnel syndrome. His employer denied the claims, asserting that the employee’s elbow problem was related to a prior injury and that his carpal tunnel syndrome was not caused or worsened by his work. The trial court awarded benefits for both injuries. The employer appealed, contending that the trial court erred in finding that the employee sustained a compensable injury to his elbow. The employer also contends that the trial court erred in finding that the employee’s carpal tunnel syndrome was compensable and that the employee gave proper notice of the carpal tunnel injury. The employer also appeals the trial court’s finding that the employee did not have a meaningful return to work, the award of temporary total disability benefits, and the amount of the award to the employee. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Jean Ann Fiorazo Beck v. James Martin Beck
This is a post-divorce action, concerning the Appellant Husband’s obligation to pay alimony in futuro to Appellee Wife. Husband and Wife entered into a marital dissolution agreement “MDA”), which was incorporated and made part of the final decree of divorce. The MDA provided that both parties would exchange tax returns each year and that, if these returns were not proferred, then alimony would be suspended until they were. Wife provided her tax returns after redacting her personal information. Husband concluded that the redaction was breach of contract and, without prior court approval, unilaterally stopped making alimony payments. Because the MDA provision for alimony in futuro lost its contractual nature upon being incorporated into the trial court’s order, and because Husband failed to obtain court approval before he suspended payments, we conclude that he lacked authority to stop those payments. Therefore, the award of arrears was proper. Affirmed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Betty Jean Langford v. James Harvey Harrison, Jr., et al.
Following appellant’s petition to eject from real property, appellees counterclaimed seeking a declaration of the boundaries between their properties and those of appellant, sole possession of their properties, a permanent injunction against appellant, and damages for libel or slander of title. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in favor of appellees and find this appeal to be frivolous. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gary L. Graham
The defendant, Gary L. Graham, was convicted by a Fayette County Circuit Court jury of driving under the influence (“DUI”), and the court found the defendant guilty of DUI third offense and violation of the implied consent law. The court merged the DUI convictions and sentenced the defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended to misdemeanor probation upon service of 145 days at 75% in the county jail, and suspended the defendant’s driver’s license for two years as a result of his violation of the implied consent law. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence convicting him of DUI. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Larry C. Pittman v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Larry C. Pittman, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals |