State of Tennessee v. Terry Bonds
Appellant, Terry Bonds, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation, claiming that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to revoke his probation because his sentence had expired. Appellant also claims that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. The State contends that this court should dismiss the appeal because the notice of appeal was untimely and deficient in form. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tracy Direll Woodard
The defendant, Tracy Direll Woodard, entered open guilty pleas to three counts of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine, see T.C.A. § 39-17-417(c)(2)(A); three counts of the delivery of less than .5 grams of cocaine, see id.; sale of a counterfeit controlled substance, see id. § 39-17-423(a)(1); and delivery of a counterfeit controlled substance, see id. § 39-17-423(a)(2). At sentencing, the trial court merged each delivery conviction into the corresponding sale conviction and imposed an effective sentence of 16 years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant argues that the sentences are excessive. We affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court. On remand, however, we direct the trial court to correct the judgments to properly effectuate merger of the alternative counts of sale and delivery. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timothy L. Jefferson v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Timothy L. Jefferson, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis which challenged his 2001 guilty-pleaded conviction of second degree murder. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Dakota L.M.
This is a termination of parental rights case in which the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services sought to terminate the parental rights of Brandon M. and Anthony T. to their minor child. The trial court terminated Brandon M.’s parental rights, finding that there was clear and convincing evidence to support termination based upon, abandonment, substantial non-compliance with the permanency plans, and persistence of conditions and that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the child. Brandon M. appeals the court’s best interest determination. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Melvin J. Reed, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Melvin J. Reed, Jr., appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. In this appeal, he asserts that the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing his petition because principles of due process require the tolling of the statute of limitations in his case. Because we agree that the petitioner alleged grounds for due process tolling of the post-conviction statute of limitations, we reverse the dismissal of his petition and remand the case for a hearing to determine whether due process requires tolling of the statute of limitations. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Vincent D. Steele
Following his guilty pleas to reckless aggravated assault, assault, and possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine, the Montgomery County Circuit Court sentenced the defendant, Vincent D. Steele, as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of four years, 11 month and 29 days, and 11 years’ imprisonment, respectively, to be served consecutively to a previously-imposed sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues that the sentence imposed was excessive both in length and manner of service. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
JRM Investments, Inc. v. National Standard, LLC
The circuit court granted the Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12.02(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Rozbeh Zaire v. Amir Roshan-Far
This appeal arises out of a lawsuit in which plaintiff sought recovery on claims of fraudulent inducement, breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and intentional misrepresentation with respect to the purchase of real property; the trial court awarded judgment to plaintiff only on the claim for negligent misrepresentation only. Both parties appeal. We affirm the judgement in all respects |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Caroline Tippens-Florea v. Johnathan Matthew Florea
Following a short marriage, the parties were divorced. The issues raised in this appeal by the husband pertain to the marital classification and valuation of the husband’s gun collection, the award of one year of transitional alimony to the wife, and the award of $15,000 for the wife’s attorney’s fees. For her part, the wife contends the husband has not paid the judgment for her portion of the marital estate, $8,065.94, and that she is entitled to post-judgment interest. We find no error with the valuation of the marital estate or the award of transitional alimony and attorney’s fees and, thus, affirm the trial court. As for the wife’s claim for postjudgment interest on any portion of the marital estate which the husband has not paid, it is an issue for the trial court to determine whether the husband has failed to timely pay any portion of the judgment and, if so, to award post-judgment interest pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 47-14-121 & -122. The wife also seeks to recover attorney’s fees she incurred on appeal. We find she is entitled to recover her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and remand for the trial court to make the appropriate award. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Ted A. Puckett v. Ray Lyons
This is an appeal from an order entered by the Circuit Court for Bedford County denying the appellant leave to proceed in that court on a pauper’s oath. Because the order appealed does not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph Barna v. Preston Law Group, P.C. et al.
Plaintiff appeals from the summary dismissal of his legal malpractice claim against his former attorney who represented him during an arbitration of a securities dispute. Finding that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that Defendants negated an essential element of Plaintiff’s claim, causation, we affirm the summary dismissal of the action. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Douglas Stogner v. Roseann Stogner (Sullivan)
In this post-divorce proceeding, Mother appeals the trial court’s order enjoining the parties from allowing their child to be in the presence of a friend of Mother’s. Father appeals the trial court’s calculation of the number of days he exercises parenting time for purposes of determining his child support. Finding that the court erred in its calculation of the number of days of Father’s parenting time, we vacate the award of child support and remand for a redetermination. We affirm the trial court’s issuance of the injunction. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandi Nichole Miller
The defendant, Brandi Nichole Miller, appeals the revocation of her probation and reinstatement of her original twelve-year sentence, arguing: (1) that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking her probation; (2) that her due process rights were violated by the fact that the trial court relied on grounds that had formed the bases for her prior probation revocations and were not alleged in the instant revocation warrant; and (3) that the trial court erred by ordering her to serve sentences that had already expired. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court revoking the defendant’s probation and reinstating her twelve-year sentence in the Department of Correction. |
Giles | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Franklyn Nathaniel Morgan v. Kandi Tonyelle Morgan
Franklyn Nathaniel Morgan (“Father”) filed this divorce action after his spouse, Kandi Tonyelle Morgan (“Mother”), was hospitalized because she had ingested an overdose of medication. Father was given temporary custody of the parties’ daughter who was four years old when the parties separated. Mother then obtained temporary custody based on proof that the Father allowed the marital residence to become filthy and dangerous. After a hearing, the court entered a temporary parenting plan based on “week-about” parenting. After a trial, the court made Mother the primary residential parent during the school year and Father the primary residential parent during the summer. The court also awarded Father parenting time during the spring break and two-thirds of the Christmas break. The court further ordered that Father would pick up the child after school and exercise parenting time from then until he went to work at 6:00 p.m. on his workdays, or until 7:00 p.m., when Mother got off from work on her workdays. Mother had 252 parenting days and Father had 113. The court set Father’s child support according to the Child Support Guidelines (“the Guidelines”), but allowed Father a downward deviation of $30 per month based on the extra parenting time after school, which the court found was not taken into account by the Guidelines. Mother appeals. We modify the judgment to designate Mother the sole primary residential parent. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Emily N.I., et. al.
This is a termination of parental rights case in which the Tennessee Department of Children's Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Teresa O. and Harrison O. Teresa O. was the mother of three children, while Harrison O. was the father of two of those children. The trial court terminated Teresa O.'s parental rights to all three children and terminated Harrison O.'s parental rights to his two children. Teresa O. and Harrions O. appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Ardell Hamilton Trigg
In this case, we address the following two matters: (1) the proper procedure for obtaining appellate review of a judgment of a probate court created by private act upholding a claim filed by the Bureau of TennCare against the estate of a TennCare recipient and (2) the right of TennCare to obtain reimbursement for properlypaid TennCare benefits from real property owned by the recipient at the time of her death. After the decedent’s will was admitted to probate in the Putnam County Probate Court, TennCare filed a claim against her estate seeking reimbursement for services provided through theTennCare program. The decedent’s personal representative filed an exception to this claim. After the probate court upheld TennCare’s claim, the estate appealed to the Circuit Court for Putnam County. The circuit court determined that the decedent’s real property was not subject to TennCare’s claim, and TennCare appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal from the probate court and that the appeal should have been filed with the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, it vacated the circuit court’s judgment and affirmed the judgment of the probate court. In re Estate of Trigg, No. M200902107-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 497459, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2011). We granted the estate’s application for permission to appeal to determine whether the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over the estate’s appeal from the probate court’s order upholding TennCare’s claim and whether real property owned by the recipient at the time of her death is subject to TennCare’s claims. We have determined that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction over the estate’s appeal from the probate court’s judgment regarding TennCare’s disputed claim and that the real property owned by the decedent at the time of her death is subject to TennCare’s claims for reimbursement. |
Putnam | Supreme Court | |
Donna Clark v. Sputniks, LLC et al.
In these consolidated cases, the primary issue is whether there is liability insurance coverage for the plaintiffs’ injuries resulting from an altercation on the premises of the insured’s bar and restaurant. The insurer denied coverage and declined to defend the insured based on its determination that there was no coverage under the terms of the policy. We hold that based on the clear terms of the policy agreement, there is no liability coverage because the incident arose from an assault and battery, which was an excluded cause, and because there is no nonexcluded concurrent cause to provide coverage. We further hold that estoppel by judgment does not apply to collaterally estop the insurer from arguing the lack of coverage. The judgment of the trial court is reversed. |
Sumner | Supreme Court | |
Leonard Gamble v. Sputniks, LLC et al.
In these consolidated cases, the primary issue is whether there is liability insurance coverage for the plaintiffs’ injuries resulting from an altercation on the premises of the insured’s bar and restaurant. The insurer denied coverage and declined to defend the insured based on its determination that there was no coverage under the terms of the policy. We hold that based on the clear terms of the policy agreement, there is no liability coverage because the incident arose from an assault and battery, which was an excluded cause, and because there is no nonexcluded concurrent cause to provide coverage. We further hold that estoppel by judgment does not apply to collaterally estop the insurer from arguing the lack of coverage. The judgment of the trial court is reversed. |
Sumner | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandi Nichole Miller
The defendant, Brandi Nichole Miller, appeals the revocation of her probation and reinstatement of her original twelve-year sentence, arguing: (1) that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking her probation; (2) that her due process rights were violated by the fact that the trial court relied on grounds that had formed the bases for her prior probation revocations and were not alleged in the instant revocation warrant; and (3) that the trial court erred by ordering her to serve sentences that had already expired. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court revoking the defendant’s probation and reinstating her twelve-year sentence in the Department of Correction. |
Giles | General Sessions Courts | |
Leslie Raydell Jones v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Leslie Raydell Jones, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kenneth E. Diggs v. LaSalle National Bank Association, et al.
This is an appeal from the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The trial court found that the Appellant’s claim sounded in fraud. However, the trial court ruled that the Appellant failed to plead fraud with particularity and dismissed. Affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jonathan Lawrence v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jonathan Lawrence, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated robbery, and resulting effective sentence of twenty-five years in confinement. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he did not plead guilty knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jamiel D. Williams v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Jamiel D. Williams, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Barry D. McCoy
In this interlocutory appeal by the State, the State challenges the trial court’s ruling denying the State’s request to admit into evidence at trial the video-recorded interview of the minor victim pursuant to newly-enacted Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-7-123. Because the trial court erred by reaching the constitutional question before it was ripe for review, the ruling of the trial court is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Consumer Advocate & Protection Division of the Office of the Attorney General of Tennessee v. Tennessee Regulatory Authority
This is an appeal from an order of the Tennessee RegulatoryAuthority(“TRA”). The appeal was filed by the Consumer Advocate and Protection Division of the Office of Tennessee’s Attorney General. It challenges the TRA’s authority to allow a gas company to recover attorney fees that were incurred in a proceeding before the TRA that did not involve ratemaking, and the TRA’s authority to order that the attorney fees be recovered from asset management funds. We conclude that the TRA has the authority to order that such litigation fees be recovered as any other reasonable and prudent operating expense of the utility, and that the TRA acted within its authority in ordering that the fees be paid out of asset management funds. The TRA’s decision, therefore, is affirmed. |
Court of Appeals |