State of Tennessee v. Courtney Bishop
The defendant, Courtney Bishop, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions for felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court’s refusal to suppress his pretrial statement to police. Because the trial court erred by failing to suppress the defendant’s statement, the defendant is entitled to a new trial. Because the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s convictions for attempted aggravated robbery and first degree murder in the perpetration of attempted aggravated robbery, those convictions are reversed. The conviction for attempted aggravated robbery is dismissed. The conviction for first degree murder is modified to one for second degree murder. Accordingly, the case is remanded for a new trial on the modified charge of second degree murder. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jimmy Dale Qualls
A Hardeman County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, Jimmy Dale Qualls, of thirty-seven counts of sexual battery by an authority figure and one count of incest, Class C felonies, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of thirty-two years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that he is entitled to a new trial because the State failed to make an election of offenses for the sexual battery convictions. The State acknowledges that the trial court committed reversible error. We agree with the appellant and the State that the appellant’s convictions for sexual battery by an authority figure must be reversed because the State failed to make an election of offenses. The case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial for those offenses. The appellant’s conviction for incest is affirmed. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jose Garcia (a/k/a Hilberto Alejandro Rentira Lerma)
A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Jose Garcia, of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, four counts of aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated kidnapping, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of sixteen years, to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; and (2) the trial court erred when it made several evidentiary rulings. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William Alexander Gant
A Davidson County Criminal Court jury found the appellant,William Alexander Gant,guilty of the sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine, tampering with evidence, and evading arrest. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to sentences from two prior convictions. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for selling less than .5 grams of cocaine, that the trial court erred “in allowing the State to present proof derived from evidence that it intentionally destroyed,” and that the trial court erred in sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Thomas Nathaniel Allen v. State of Tennessee
After trial, a jury convicted the Petitioner, Thomas Nathaniel Allen, of first degree murder, and he received a life sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner appeals the Hamblen County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief and writ of error coram nobis. He argues that he is entitled to post-conviction relief based on the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel and prosecutorial misconduct committed by the State. The Petitioner claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to (1) investigate or call several witnesses at trial and (2) retain a jury consultant. He asserts that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by instructing a witness not to talk to the defense. The Petitioner additionally argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying him coram nobis relief based on newly discovered evidence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the post-conviction court. |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, ex rel. Rebecca Estes v. Michael Estes
This is a post-divorce child support case in which Michael Estes filed a petition to modify his child support obligation. The State of Tennessee is providing child support enforcement services to Rebecca Estes pursuant to Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 651 et seq., and Tennessee Code Annotated section 71-3-124(c). The court modified the child support obligation pursuant to a child support worksheet but held Michael Estes in civil contempt for failure to pay support prior to filing the petition for modification. Father appeals. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tina Gail Williamson
Appellant, Tina Gail Williamson, was convicted by a Rutherford County Jury of second degree murder, felonymurder, and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the second degree murder conviction into the felony murder conviction. Appellant was sentenced to life plus twenty years. On appeal, Appellant argues that the circumstantial evidence was insufficient to support her convictions and that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with a sequential jury instruction. We have thoroughly reviewed the record on appeal and have concluded that the circumstantial evidence presented is sufficient to support the conviction. With regard to the jury instructions, Appellant has failed to include them in the record. It is Appellant’s responsibility to do so. Therefore, we are unable to review this issue and it is waived. For these reasons, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael D. Williams
A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Michael D. Williams, of first degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to life in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James W. Swafford, Jr. v. Commissioner of Revenue
After the Tennessee Supreme Court declared the tax on unauthorized substances to be unconstitutional, Plaintiff taxpayer filed a claim with the Department of Revenue seeking a refund of taxes paid. The Commissioner of Revenue denied Plaintiff’s claim for refund on the grounds that it was filed beyond the applicable limitations period. Plaintiff filed suit challenging the denialinthe chancerycourt. The chancerycourtgranted the Commissioner’s motion to dismiss. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Margaret L. Holt
The Defendant-Appellant, Margaret L. Holt, was convicted by a Jefferson County jury of attempted statutory rape by an authority figure, a Class D felony, and statutory rape by an authority figure, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced her as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent sentences of three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Holt argues: (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of a note and a kiss between her and one of the victims, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Jefferson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rene S. Guevara v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Rene S. Guevara, pled guilty in March 1995 to the felony offense of possession of marijuana with intent to sell. A little more than fifteen years later, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief attacking the 1995 conviction. Petitioner asserted he was entitled to relief because his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to advise him regarding “immigration consequences of a guilty plea.” Petitioner claimed that this right was a new constitutional rule of law announced in Padilla v. Kentucky, _____ U.S. _____, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), and that this new constitutional rule of law should be retroactively applied to Petitioner’s case. The post-conviction court entered an order dismissing the petition because it was filed beyond the one-year statute of limitations contained in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-102(a), and because the rule of law was not required to be applied retroactively. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Fredrick Darnell Alexander v. State of Tennessee
Appellant,Frederick Darnell Alexander,was convicted by a Davidson County jury of the sale of less than. 5 grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school. As a result, he was sentenced to twelve years in incarceration, to be served at one hundred percent. Appellant appeals the conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction and that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress Appellant’s statement to police. After a review of the record, we conclude that the evidence, although mostly circumstantial, was sufficient to show that Appellant sold cocaine to an undercover officer within 1000 feet of a school. Further, Appellant not only failed to raise any issue with regard to the motion to suppress in a motion for new trial but also failed to a provide a transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress. Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief unless there is plain error. The record is not clear as to what happened in the trial court because of the lack of a transcript of the suppression hearing. Therefore, we will not review the issue for plain error. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roger W. Christy
A Montgomery County grand jury charged the defendant, Roger W. Christy, with one count of sexual battery by an authority figure, see T.C.A. § 39-13-527 (2006), and one count of sexual battery accomplished by force or coercion, see T.C.A. § 39-13-505. Following a bench trial,the trial court convicted the defendantof sexual battery by an authority figure and acquitted him of sexual battery accomplished by force or coercion. At sentencing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to three years’ probation as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. Having determined that a fatal variance exists between the offense charged in the indictment and the proof presented at trial, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the case. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alex C. Nolan
The defendant, Alex C. Nolan, appeals the sentence of incarceration he received following the revocation of his probation by the Bedford County Circuit Court. He was convicted of possession of cocaine with the intent to sell and sentenced to eleven years of incarceration. However, the defendant was released onto probation by the Department of Correction through the boot camp program. Thereafter, a probation violation warrant was issued, charging the defendant with multiple violations of the terms and conditions of his probation. The defendant pled guilty to violating those terms, but he now contends that the trial erred by ordering the remainder of his sentence be served in incarceration. After review, we conclude that the defendant has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the revocation or in imposing a sentence of incarceration. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rabon Gibson
Appellant, Rabon D. Gibson, pled guilty to three counts of attempted aggravated sexual battery. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied all forms of alternative sentencing and sentenced appellant to an eight-year sentence in theTennesseeDepartmentof Correction. On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for an alternative sentence. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sequatchie | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jackie Hardin v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Jackie Hardin, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from her aggravated assault conviction, claiming she was denied effective assistance of counsel. Petitioner alleges that trial counsel failed to call important witnesses, did not allow her to testify, and failed to conduct discovery. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Fred Allen Owens v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Fred Allen Owens, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to investigate and present a mental health defense. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
E. Jay Mounger et al v. Charles D. Mounger, Jr. et al
The plaintiffs, in their capacity as executors of their mother’s estate, filed this action against their brother alleging that he caused the estate to lose the sale of a valuable piece of lakefront property by maliciously asserting a meritless claim to a portion of the property. The defendant represented himself in a jury trial. The jury awarded the estate $6,000,000. The defendant appeals the judgment entered on the jury’s verdict. We affirm. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Randall Lee Brown
The defendant, Randall Lee Brown, was sentenced, as a Range III, persistent offender, to an effective sentence of eleven years incarceration following his guilty pleas to multiple offenses in Hamilton County. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence and erred by denying him an alternative sentence. However, we are unable to review the defendant’s issues because the record before us does not contain a transcript from the guilty plea hearing, which is needed for complete review. As such, we must presume that the trial court’s determinations were correct and, accordingly, affirm the sentences as imposed. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Denny Merrill Phillips
The defendant, Denny Merrill Phillips, was convicted of one count of solicitation to commit rape in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-528(a)(3), a Class C felony, on the grounds that he followed the victim into a public men’s room and verbally requested that the victim perform fellatio on him. The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, arguing that the State failed to present any facts or evidence from which the jury could have reasonably concluded that the sexual penetration solicited by the defendant would have occurred without the victim’s consent. We note that a jury, when determining whether the sexual act being solicited is to be accomplished with or without consent, may consider the totality of a defendant’s conduct - not just the particular words used by the defendant. However, in this case, even viewing the defendant’s conduct in its entirety, we cannot conclude that the evidence presented was sufficient to establish that the sexual act being solicited by the defendant would have been accomplished absent the victim’s consent. A verbal request for sex or an offer to pay for sex, without more, is simply not a solicitation to commit rape as it lacks proof of the non-consent element which is required. We agree that the evidence presented was sufficient to support a conviction for solicitation to commit statutory rape. However, because our supreme court has established that statutory rape is not a lesser included offense of rape, see State v. Stokes, 24 S.W.3d 303, 305-06 (Tenn. 2000), the defendant’s conviction cannot be amended to reflect that charge. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction must be reversed. |
Campbell | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nigel Kavic Watkins
We granted the State permission to appeal to determine whether the defendant’s dual convictions for reckless homicide and aggravated child abuse violate either the federal or state constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Following briefing, oral argument, and a careful study of Tennessee law governing the issue presented, we ordered the parties in this appeal, and two other pending appeals involving related issues, to submit additional briefs addressing certain specific questions concerning the analyses that Tennessee courts apply in single prosecution cases when determining whether separate convictions under different statutes constitute the same offense for purposes of the double jeopardy protection against multiple punishments. We also scheduled consolidated reargument of these three appeals and invited certain prosecutorial and defense organizations to submit amicus curiae briefs. Having thoroughly reviewed relevant federal and state precedent and carefully considered the briefs provided by the parties and by the amici curiae, we have concluded that the four-factor test set forth in State v. Denton, 938 S.W.2d 373 (Tenn. 1996) should be abandoned. Furthermore, we have not found, nor have we been provided with, any textual reason or historical basis for interpreting the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Tennessee Constitution differently from the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution. Accordingly, we adopt the same elements test enunciated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) as the test for determining whether multiple convictions under different statutes constitute the same offense for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Tennessee Constitution. Applying this test, we conclude that reckless homicide and aggravated child abuse are not the same offense because their elements differ. Thus, the defendant’s dual convictions do not violate either the federal or the state constitutional double jeopardy prohibition. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment merging the reckless homicide conviction into the aggravated child abuse conviction, and we reinstate the reckless homicide conviction. However, we affirm that portion of the Court of Criminal Appeals’ judgment remanding this matter to the trial court for resentencing. |
Smith | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Benjamin William Riffey, Alias
In February 2005, the Defendant, Benjamin William Riffey, alias, pled guilty to facilitation to commit aggravated robbery. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to six years and was placed on probation. Subsequently, the Defendant was transferred to enhanced probation. On February 22, 2011, a violation of probation warrant was filed, the third against the Defendant. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s sentence of probation and ordered that he serve the remainder of his six-year sentence in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by revoking his probation. After a review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lonnie Cross
This appeal presents, among other issues, an issue regarding the application of the federal and state constitutional double jeopardy protections to a single prosecution for multiple offenses arising out of a high speed chase involving a motorist who was attempting to avoid arrest for driving on a revoked license. A Bradley County grand jury returned a seven-count indictment against the motorist. Following a jury trial, the motorist was convicted of five of the offenses and received an effective sentence of eight years. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals upheld four of the motorist’s convictions but, on its own motion, vacated the remaining conviction after determining that it violated the double jeopardy protections in the federal and state constitutions. State v. Cross, No. E2008-02792-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 2432022, at *12 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 17, 2010). We granted both the State’s and the motorist’s applications for permission to appeal. In accordance with our opinion in State v. Watkins, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tenn. 2012), released contemporaneously with this opinion, we find that the defendant’s convictions do not run afoul of the double jeopardy protections in the federal and state constitutions. We also find that the motorist’s conviction under count one of the indictment must be vacated because the trial court committed plain error in its instruction regarding the lesser-included offenses of that charge. With regard to the remaining convictions, we find that the evidence supports the motorist’s convictions and that the sentences imposed by the trial court are not excessive. Accordingly, we remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Bradley | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Trevon Williams
The appellant, Brandon Trevon Williams, appeals the revocation of his probation claiming that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and ordering execution of the original sentence. Finding no error, we affirm the order of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Eugene Poole
Defendant, Anthony Eugene Poole, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for aggravated assault. Defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of assault and sentenced by the trial court to 11 months and 29 days to be suspended on probation. Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence and asserts that: 1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; 2) the trial court erred by not instructing the jury as to the defenses of duress and necessity; 3) the statute of limitations barred his prosecution; 4) his sentence of intensive probation and imposition of a fine was improper; and 5) the trial court erred by ordering Defendant to pay restitution to the victim. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals |