Sharon Hartman v. Tennessee Board of Regents d/b/a Tennessee Tech University
In this employment dispute, a former employee claims she was unlawfully discriminated against on the basis of her gender. The plaintiff, a long time employee, was terminated after failing to adhere to her employer’s policies and procedures concerning the purchase of inventory and equipment. Claiming this reason was pretextual, she filed this action pursuant to the Tennessee Human Rights Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-101 et seq. After discovery, the employer moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, finding the employer demonstrated that the plaintiff could not establish that a similarly situated male employee was treated more favorably. We affirm. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Matthew Jackson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Matthew Jackson , appeals the Circuit Court of Lake County’s dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lake | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marcus Deangelo Lee aka Marcus Deangelo Jones v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Marcus Deangelo Lee , appeals the Criminal Court of Shelby County’s denial of his motion to reopen post-conviction proceedings. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Griff Lucas v. City of Waverly, Tennessee, et al.
In this inverse condemnation action, the trial court granted summary judgment to condemning authority on ground that statute of limitations barred suit; landowner appeals. Condemning authority urges affirmance of the dismissal on alternative grounds. Finding that the action is not barred by the statute of limitations and that genuine issue of material fact exists which precludes summary judgment, we reverse the dismissal of this action and remand for further proceedings. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
Mitchell Eads, TDOC #243729 v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al
Petitioner filed a Common Law Writ of Certiorari, alleging he was convicted of a disciplinary infraction while incarcerated, and that the conviction was illegal, arbitrary and fraudulent. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the Petition contained no oath or affirmation and did not state it was the first application for a writ pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §27-8-104(a) and 106. Further that petitioner failed to file a certified copy of his inmate trust account statement pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §41-21-807(a). The Trial Court entered an Order of Dismissal for the deficiencies set forth in the Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner has appealed and we affirm the Trial Court's Order of Dismissal on the grounds set forth in that Order. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
Almeta Ellis, as the Administratrix of the Estate of Jonah Ellis, and the Estate of Jonah Ellis, Individually v. Minder Music Limited, Lonnie Simmons and Robert Louis Whitfield
This appeal concerns venue in an action to recover royalties. The plaintiff songwriter resided in Shelby County, Tennessee. The plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit in Shelby County against the defendant music company to recover past-due royalties, asserting that he was the sole author of three musical compositions. The defendant music company, domiciled in the United Kingdom, filed a motion to dismiss based on, inter alia, improper venue. The trial court held that venue was improper and granted the motion to dismiss. We reverse. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Paul E. Kennedy v. Lakeway Auto Sales, Inc.
When the employer refused to provide another panel of physicians following the employee’s negative drug screen result, the employee filed a motion to compel medical treatment. The trial court ordered the employer to provide a panel of three doctors for pain treatment and granted the employee’s request for attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court referred the employer’s appeal to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008) and Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed and the cause is remanded for modification of the trial court’s order. |
Hamblen | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Valerie Cossar Clark and Estate of Ricky Cossar v. Donnie Houston, Larry Sisco, and Brenda Sisco
Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal more than thirty (30) days after the order appealed was entered by the trial court. Consequently, we must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Hardeman | Court of Appeals | |
Alan Bradley Pounders v. Tiffany White Pounders
This is an appeal of an award of attorney fees in a post-divorce matter. The father had filed a petition to modify the permanent parenting plan, seeking to increase his parenting time and reduce his child support obligation. Approximately six months later, after Father’s discovery deposition was taken, he asked the court to dismiss his petition to modify without prejudice. The trial court dismissed the petition but awarded the mother $20,000 for her attorneys’ fees. The father appeals, arguing that the trial court lacked authority to award attorney fees and that the amount awarded was arbitrary and unreasonable. We find that the trial court had the authority to award attorney’s fees, but due to the lack of findings by the trial court regarding the reasonableness of the fee award, we vacate the award and remand for further proceedings. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Victoria Ann Thomas (Rossie) v. Joseph Richard Rossie
The former husband appealed the trial court's order finding him in willful contempt of the |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Arlene R. Starr v. Paul B. Hill, Sr., et al.
A father and his sixteen-year-old son were sued after the son was involved in an accident while driving a vehicle owned, insured, and provided to him by his father. The basis for the suit against the father was the family purpose doctrine, which imposes vicarious liability on the owner of a vehicle for the negligent operation of the vehicle by a family member. Whether the family purpose doctrine applies to the father requires us to address these issues: (1) whether the father, who does not reside in the same household as the son, was a head of the household under the family purpose doctrine; (2) whether the vehicle was maintained for the comfort or pleasure of the family or solely for use by the son; and (3) whether the vehicle was being driven with the father’s permission such that he had control over its use. The essential elements of the family purpose doctrine are that the owner must be a head of the household who furnishes and maintains the vehicle for the purpose of providing pleasure or comfort for the family, and at the time of the injury, the vehicle must have been driven in furtherance of that purpose with the head of the household’s express or implied permission. The trial court granted summary judgment to the father, finding that the family purpose doctrine did not apply. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the family purpose doctrine applied to the father as a matter of law. We hold that the father was a head of the household because he had a family relationship with his son and a duty to support his son and the father furnished and maintained the vehicle for the purpose of providing pleasure or comfort to the family. However, a genuine issue of material fact remains as to whether the father had sufficient control over the vehicle. We vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for trial. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
In Re: A'Mari B.
This is termination of parental rights case involving A’Mari B. (“the Child”), the minor daughter of Troy B. (“Father”) and Rebecca S. (“Mother”). The Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) took the Child as an infant into state custody after both Father and Mother were arrested and jailed. The Child was promptly placed with Christopher N. and Dean N. (collectively, “the Custodians”), the prospective adoptive parents, where she has remained. Five months after obtaining legal custody, the Custodians filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Father and Mother in order to facilitate their adoption of the Child. Following a bench trial, at which Mother appeared, the court terminated both natural parents’ rights to the Child based on the court’s finding of multiple forms of abandonment. Over Father’s objection, his case was tried without his presence or participation. Father and Mother, by separate notices of appeal, challenge the termination order. As to Father, the judgment is vacated and the case remanded for a new trial – our action being based on the fact that Father was denied due process in the termination proceeding. As to Mother, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that there is clear and convincing evidence that she abandoned the Child and that termination of her rights is in the Child’s best interest. Accordingly, as to Mother, the judgment is affirmed |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Alisha J. Glisson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Alisha J. Glisson, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief by the Davidson County Criminal Court. She was convicted of felony murder, aggravated robbery, and three counts of attempted aggravated robbery and received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. The sole issue raised in this appeal is whether trial counsel was ineffective by failing to subpoena a co-defendant at trial. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Hector Alonzo v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Hector Alonzo, appeals pro se from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court for Davidson County. He was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess with intent to sell more than seventy pounds of marijuana within one thousand feet of a school zone, a Class A felony.The petitioner was sentenced to fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he claims: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting him from raising a selective prosecution claim. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
D'Angelo Marquez Jenkins v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, D’Angelo Marquez Jenkins, pled guilty in the Montgomery County Circuit Court to facilitation of aggravated robbery and being a felon in possession of a handgun. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received a total effective sentence of nine years and six months. Thereafter, the petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Specifically, the petitioner complained that trial counsel failed to interview or subpoena witnesses on the petitioner’s behalf or pursue DNA evidence. The petitioner also contended that his guilty pleas were the result of counsel’s ineffective assistance and prosecutorial misconduct. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anthony Ray Adkins et al v. Bluegrass Estates, Inc. et al
The purchasers of lots in a “subdivision known as Timberlake Estates, Phase One” – described in a plat and restrictive covenants as a twenty-lot subdivision – acquired with their deeds the right to use a boat ramp and parking area to be located in a common area within the subdivision. When they learned that additional lots – not located within the combined acreage of the twenty lots – were being advertised for sale along with the right to use the same boat ramp and parking area, they filed this action against their predecessor in interest.1 After a trial on the merits, the court held that only the purchasers of lots in “Phase One” were entitled to use the boat ramp and parking area. The defendants appeals. We affirm. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
Alfie Tucker v. Tabitha Finch
In this legal malpractice case, Alfie Tucker filed suit against his attorney, Tabitha Finch, alleging that she had negligently represented him in his lawsuit against his former employer by failing to timely file his claim with the Tennessee Claims Commission (“TCC”). Ms. Finch filed a motion to dismiss based upon lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that the applicable statute of limitations had passed. The trial court granted Ms. Finch’s motion and dismissed the case. Mr. Tucker appeals. We affirm the trial court’s order of dismissal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Carol D. Davis v. Kolo Lynn Davis, et al
In this post-divorce case, Kolo Lynn Davis (“Husband”) appeals the trial court’s classification of an agreement to maintain health insurance through his company, Cleveland Building Materials (“CBM”), as alimony in futuro. Husband and Carol D. Davis (“Wife”) were married in 1964 and divorced in 1995. Pursuant to the mutual agreement of the parties, Wife was given the option of maintaining health insurance through CBM. In furtherance of this agreement, Wife was given a paid position as a non-voting member of CBM’s board of directors, which allowed her to maintain health insurance through CBM. Wife was tasked with reimbursing CBM for all costs associated with the health insurance coverage. Husband later sold CBM to Kolo Lynn Davis, II (“Son”). Son, through CBM, continued to pay Wife for her services as a board member. In 2005, CBM discontinued its group health insurance, thereby removing Wife from the plan and ceased paying Wife for her services as a board member. Wife filed suit, naming Husband and CBM as parties. Following a hearing, the trial court classified the payments from CBM as alimony in futuro, held Husband personally liable for CBM’s non-payment, and instructed Husband to continue with future payments pursuant to the agreement. Husband appeals. We reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Melvin B. Smith, et al v. Gary Hankins, et al
This appeal involves a boundary line dispute raised by the plaintiff, Melvin B. Smith and his wife, Charlotte E. Smith (“the Smiths”) and a request for an easement by the defendants, Gary Hankins and Stanley Hankins (“the Hankinses”). After a trial, the court entered rulings in favor of the Hankinses as to both the establishment of the boundary line and the easement. The Smiths appeal. We affirm. |
Bledsoe | Court of Appeals | |
Tri Am Construction, Inc. et al v. J & V Development, Inc. et al
This interlocutory appeal stems from a lien enforcement action. Tri Am Construction, Inc. (“Tri Am”) filed a complaint in the Chancery Court for Rhea County (“the Trial Court”) against J & V Development, Inc. (“J & V”), Randall E. Vick, Brenda B. Jung, and Branch Banking and Trust Company (“BB&T”) to enforce a lien. BB&T moved to dismiss Tri Am’s complaint, citing alleged fatal procedural defects. The Trial Court denied BB&T’s motion to dismiss and allowed Tri Am to amend its complaint to cure the procedural defects. We granted permission for this interlocutory appeal. We find that the Trial Court did not err in liberally construing the revised mechanic’s and materialmen’s liens statutes to permit Tri Am to amend its complaint in order to cure the procedural defects. We further find that the Trial Court did not err in declining to hold that BB&T’s rights would be retroactively impaired by the liberal application of the revised mechanic’s and materialmen’s liens statutes. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
American General Financial Services, Inc. v. Unknown Tenant of Foreclosed Property ( Martin Goss)
A show cause order was entered in this case on July 15, 2011, directing the pro se appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The appellant has failed to respond to the show cause order within the time specified. The review of the record reveals that the judgment to which the notice of appeal is directed is not “a final judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all parties” from which an appeal as of right would lie. See Tenn. R. App. P. 3 a). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as premature. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeremy O'Neal
On October 1,2007, Appellant, Jeremy O’Neal, pled guilty in Blount County to one count of felony robbery. He was originally placed on judicial diversion. On April 5, 2010, the trial court set aside Appellant’s judicial diversion for violating the terms thereof. The trial court sentenced Appellant to six years with split confinement of thirty-five days with the remainder to be served on probation. Appellant’s probation officer subsequently filed a violation of probation report in September 2010. After conducting a probation revocation hearing, the trial court determined that Appellant had violated the terms of his probation and revoked Appellant’s probation. The trial court ordered Appellant to serve the balance of his six year sentence in incarceration. Appellant argues on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Appellant to serve his sentence in incarceration. We conclude that there is ample evidence to support the trial court’s decision to revoke Appellant’s probation and to order him to serve the balance of his sentence in incarceration. Therefore, we affirm the revocation of probation and the order that Appellant to serve the balance of his sentence in incarceration. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Billy Tate, a/k/a James Moore, a/k/a Larry Moore
Appellant, Billy Tate, a/k/a James Moore, a/k/a Larry Moore, was indicted by the Hamilton County Grand Jury for burglary of a business and theft of property. Appellant was convicted of burglary of a business and theft of property valued at more than $1,000. As a result, Appellant was sentenced to twelve years of incarceration as a Career Offender. The trial court denied a motion for new trial. On appeal, Appellant complains that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress; the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial; and the trial court erred in admitting testimony about “bootprints” left at the scene of the crime. Because Appellant has failed to provide an adequate record for review on appeal, these issues are waived, and the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Ronell Jones
The appellant, Ricky Ronell Jones, pled guilty to rape, incest, and two counts of sexual battery relating to his eldest daughter and was convicted at trial of rape of a child and incest relating to his youngest daughter. He received a total effective sentence of thirty-seven years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and the imposition of consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Latasha Reid
The appellant, Latasha Reid, pled guilty in the Madison County Circuit Court to nine counts of identity theft and one count of felony theft. She received an effective four-year probation sentence for the identity theft convictions and a two-year probation sentence for the felony theft conviction, to be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of six years. Almost six years later, the trial court revoked the appellant’s probation and ordered her to serve her entire sentence anew. On appeal, the appellant contends, and the State concedes, that the trial court erred by ordering her to serve her effective six-year sentence anew because part of the sentence had expired. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the trial court’s revocation of the appellant’s expired four-year probation sentence. The trial court’s revocation of the appellant’s two-year probation sentence is affirmed. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals |