2850 Parkway General Partnership v. C. Dan Scott, et al
Plaintiff brought an action for declaratory judgment, asking the Court to declare that while plaintiff's sublease required it to pay the property taxes, the master lease required the lessor to pay the property taxes, and asked the Court to declare the lessor liable for the property taxes. Following trial, the Trial Court declared that the sublessee was liable for the property taxes, as it agreed to pay under the sublease. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court on the grounds that under the fact of this case, plaintiff is equitably estopped to avoid paying property taxes, as agreed to in the sublease. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Benjamin M. Bates and Estate of Pearl Bates
This appeal arises from a claim filed against two decedents’ estates to recover the value of improvements made to real estate since 2000. The claimant is one of nine children of the decedents, husband and wife, who died in 1959 and 1962, respectively. The court granted the appellee’s claim for the value of improvements made since 2000 to the decedents’ former home place. Because the decedents died intestate, their real property immediately vested in their heirs in 1962. Therefore, the real estate the claimant improved beginning in 2000 was not owned by either decedent at that time or thereafter; thus, the award of a claim against the estates of these two decedents is a nullity. Accordingly, the judgment is vacated and the case is remanded. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Kimberly Anne Chavez v. James Albert Chavez, Jr.
Wife sought a divorce and Husband counterclaimed for a divorce. The trial court granted the divorce to both parties. Wife was designated the primary residential parent and was awarded transitional alimony and alimony in solido. Husband appeals. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
William N. Nusbaum v. Lucile E. Nusbaum
In this divorce appeal, wife challenges the distribution of husband’s federal retirement benefits, the award of transitional alimony, and the court’s failure to award her attorneyfees. Because of an error in the percentage of husband’s FERS classified as marital assets, we reverse the trial court’s decision. As to transitional alimony, we affirm the award of $500 per month but extend the award until the time of husband’s retirement. We affirm the trial court’s decision regarding attorney fees. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Rheaetta F. Wilson, et al. v. Americare Systems, Inc., et al.
Decedent’s next of kin filed this wrongful death action against an assisted living facility, two nurses, and the facility’s management company for failure to provide proper care and treatment. This appeal concerns only the jury verdict and judgment finding the management company directly liable for failure to provide adequate staff at the assisted living facility. We find no material evidence to support a conclusion that any staffing deficiency proximately caused the decedent’s death. We therefore reverse the judgment finding direct liability on the part of the management company. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sheddrick Harris
The defendant, Sheddrick Harris, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree felony murder, see T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(2) (2006), and especially aggravated robbery, see id. § 39-13-403. At the penalty phase of the trial, the jury found two enhancement factors beyond a reasonable doubt: “[t]he defendant was previously convicted of one (1) or more felonies, other than the present charge, whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person,” see id. § 39-13-204(i)(2); and “[t]he murder was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant, while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, any . . . robbery,” see id. § 39-13-204(i)(7), and it unanimously imposed a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, see id. § 39-13-204(f)(2). At a separate sentencing hearing concerning the especially aggravated robbery conviction, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 60 years’ incarceration as a career offender to be served consecutively to the life without parole sentence. In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of first degree felony murder, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) imposing increased security procedures during trial, (2) denying his motion for mistrial, (3) limiting his cross-examination of a witness, and (4) excluding residual doubt evidence from the penalty phase of the trial. Discerning no paucity of evidence and no error, the judgments of the criminal court are affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. J'Menski Holt
A Madison County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant, J’Menski C. Holt, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence is excessive. Upon review, we affirm the |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jacqueline L. Shultz v. Kirby Fuller
Upon the divorce of the parties, the permanent parenting plan designated the mother as the primary residential parent of the couple’s daughter. Both parties eventually filed petitions to modify the permanent parenting plan. The trial court concluded that there had been a material change of circumstance and that it was in the best interest of the daughter that her parenting be shared equally between the parties. Mother appeals the trial court’s modification decision. We reverse the order of the trial court and remand for further proceedings regarding the best interest of the child. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Sheila Marie Lott vs. State of Tennessee
Sheila Marie Lott (“the Petitioner”) filed for post-conviction relief alleging (1) that she received ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with her open plea and effective sentence of eighteen years and six months to one count of theft over $1000, eight counts of criminal simulation, and one count of fraudulent use of a credit card; and (2) that her plea was not voluntarily made. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner has appealed. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mark Steven Devore v. Rhonda M. Devore
This is a post-divorce case in which Mark Steven Devore (“Husband”) petitioned for modification of child support. Rhonda M. Devore (“Wife”) counter-petitioned for contempt. The trial court held that Husband was no longer liable for child support because the children had reached the age of majority but that the amount of overpayment was offset by obligations provided for in the marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”). The court also held that Husband was liable for future college expenses. Following Wife’s motion to reconsider, the court held that Husband owed $11,230.43 for past due college expenses. Husband appeals. We hold that the court erred because it did not use a child support worksheet to calculate the amount of support owed. We vacate and remand for the court to utilize a worksheet. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, et al. v. Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development and Workers' Compensation Division
This action was filed pursuant to the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-5-322, for contested cases. The petitioner challenges a penalty assessed by the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Division of Workers’ Compensation.The stated reason for the penaltywas the failure to file Form C-20,Tennessee Employer’s First Report of Work Injury, regarding eighteen injuries that occurred in January and February 2003 which were medical only injuries, meaning no disability benefits were owing. The trial court affirmed the penalty. We find the petitioner was not afforded proper notice of the Department’s basis for issuing the penalty in violation of the petitioner’s due process rights under the UAPA, Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-5-307. We also find that the Department exceeded its authority by changing its “interpretation” of Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-2-1-.06, a rule that was unambiguous and, thus, not subject to interpretation. The trial court’s holding is reversed, and this matter is remanded with instructions to vacate the penalty assessed against the petitioner. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jereme Dannuel Little -Disenting Opinion
Based on the cumulative effect of the errors committed in this case, I would reverse the Defendant-Appellant’s convictions and remand for a new trial. Accordingly, for the reasons outlined below, I respectfully dissent. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Sherri A. Elliott
The defendant, Sherri A. Elliott, appeals the trial court’s revocation of her probation. On appeal, she argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering her to serve eight months of split confinement. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tom Perry Bell v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Tom Perry Bell, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 1979 convictions for two counts of second degree criminal sexual conduct and petition for post-conviction relief from his 1984 conviction for attempt to commit a felony. The trial court summarily dismissed both petitions as untimely. The Petitioner contends that the trial court erred by dismissing his petitions without an evidentiary hearing and the appointment of counsel. The Petitioner also contends that the original trial court erred by failing to advise him of his constitutional right against self-incrimination. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jereme Dannuel Little
A Hamilton County grand jury charged the defendant, Jereme Dannuel Little, in case number 253372, with two counts of aggravated robbery, see T.C.A. § 39-13-402 (2006), and, in case number 253374, with one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, see id. § 39-13-305. At the close of proof at trial, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for judgments of |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Billy D. H.
Mother’s parental rights to her son were terminated on grounds that she was mentally incompetent to provide for the child and that the conditions which led to the child’s removal from Mother’s custody persisted. She appeals, contending that the grounds are not supported by the evidence and that termination of her rights was not in the best interest of the child. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Fentress | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Conservatorship of John Daniel Tate
This is the second appeal arising from a disputed “temporary” conservatorship. Three issues are presented: whether the evidence clearly and convincingly established that the respondent was a disabled person in need of the protection and supervision of the court; which party is responsible for the costs of the proceedings under Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-114(a); and which party is responsible for discretionary costs under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2). The petitioner was appointed “Temporary Conservator” and served in this fiduciary capacity for thirty-one months until June of 2010, at which time the trial court terminated the conservatorship upon the finding that the respondent was no longer a “disabled person” as that term is defined in Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-101(7). Over the objection of the ward, the trial court assessed the costs of the conservatorship against the respondent pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-114(a) because a “fiduciary” was appointed, and discretionary costs pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2) upon the finding that the petitioner was the “prevailing party.” The respondent contends this was error because the conservator was merely appointed the “temporary conservator” and the petition to create the conservatorship was ultimately dismissed. We find the evidence presented to the trial court on November 14, 2007, clearly and convincingly established that the respondent was a disabled person in need of a conservator of his person and property; we find no error with the trial court’s conclusion that the petitioner was entitled to recover the costs of the proceedings pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 34-1-114(a) because a conservator was appointed; and we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing discretionary costs against the respondent under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2). Thus, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dontayvis Brown
The defendant, Dontayvis Brown, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of one count of aggravated robbery and two counts of aggravated assault and was sentenced by the trial court to concurrent terms of ten years for each conviction. He raises the following three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) whether the trial court erred in ruling that the State could impeach his testimony with his prior conviction for facilitation of aggravated robbery; and (3) whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge certain lesser-included offenses. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Albert W. Bentley - Concurring
I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. My concern is with the summary disposition of the Defendant’s due process claim of an impermissibly suggestive photographic lineup. The majority opinion relies on State v. Butler, 795 S.W.2d 680, 686 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990), to conclude that the analysis provided in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), need not be used if the identification process was not “unduly suggestive.” “Unduly suggestive” is not a term used in Biggers, which focused on suggestive and unnecessarily suggestive identification procedures. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198-200. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Walter Thomas Godsey Jr.
The defendant, Walter Thomas Godsey, Jr., was convicted by a Chester County Circuit Court jury of driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor, and sentenced to six months in the county jail. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the sentence imposed by the trial court. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Chester | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Albert W. Bentley
A Davidson County jury convicted Defendant-Appellant, Albert W. Bentley, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to a ten-year term of imprisonment in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, Bentley presents the following issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the photographic lineup in which the victim identified Bentley as impermissibly suggestive; (2) whether the evidence, primarily the victim’s in court identification of Bentley, was sufficient to support his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Watry v. Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company, an Illinois Corporation
Insured was injured by an automobile driven by an uninsured motorist. Insured filed a claim with Insurer seeking uninsured motorist coverage benefits and settled for an amount that was less than his actual damages. Insured then sued Insurer seeking damages for fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Act. Insurer filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings which the trial court granted. We affirm the trial court’s judgment because Insured failed to allege sufficient facts to support any of his causes of action. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Michelle Brown v. Brookdale Senior Living, Inc., et al.
Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants on her claims for statutory procurement of breach of contract, common law inducement of breach of contract, and tortious interference with business relationship. Finding that plaintiff failed to establish one or more essential element of each claim, we affirm the trial court’s ruling. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jennifer Bivins, as next of kin and natural parent of Brandon Bivins, deceased v. City of Murfreesboro
Plaintiff filed an action against the City of Murfreesboro pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act, claiming a dangerous and unsafe roadway caused an automobile accident in which her son was killed. The trial court determined the City had no notice of an unsafe or dangerous condition, and entered judgment in favor of the City. Upon appeal, we reversed on the issue of notice, holding that previous accidents on adjacent areas of the roadway provided sufficient notice to the City of a potentially dangerous condition. Upon remand, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff, and assessed 60% fault to the City. We vacate and remand for further findings consistent with Rule 52 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Geoffrey Todd Krasner v. John Arnold
This appeal involves claims of defamation. After words were exchanged in the course of a parenting dispute, the plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant father of the plaintiff’s girlfriend’s daughter. A bench trial was held in which both parties were self-represented. |
Madison | Court of Appeals |