Tarrean V. Nuby v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Tarrean V. Nuby, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for attempted first degree murder and aggravated robbery, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Franklin E. Newbern and Reginald Currie
After a jury trial, both Appellants were found guilty of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver. As a result, they were both sentenced to fifteen years as Range II, multiple offenders. The sentences were ordered to run consecutively to sentences for other offenses for which the Appellants had already been sentenced. After the denial of a motion for new trial and motion for judgment of acquittal, Appellants have appealed to this Court. On appeal, both Appellants contend that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions. Additionally, Appellant Currie insists that the trial court erred in denying the motion for new trial based on the “perjured testimony of a key witness.” After a review of the evidence, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and that Appellant Currie failed to show that the State knowingly utilized false testimony that was material to the conviction. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timothy Watson v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Timothy “Tink” Watson, was indicted by the Dyer County Grand Jury in October of 2005 for two counts of sale of more than .5 grams of cocaine. Petitioner represented himself at trial and was convicted by a jury of one count of sale of more than .5 grams of cocaine. After a sentencing hearing, Petitioner received a fifteen-year 1 sentence as a Range II, multiple offender. Petitioner filed several pleadings referred to as “amended” motions for new trial after a hearing. The trial court denied the motions. Petitioner subsequently pled guilty to five subsequent indictments through a plea agreement that included a waiver of his right to appeal the felony drug conviction from the October 2005 indictment. Petitioner then sought pro se post-conviction relief. After counsel was appointed, an amended petition was filed. The trial court held a hearing on the petition. It was dismissed after a hearing by the post-conviction court because it was untimely and because Petitioner had waived his claims by his plea agreement. Appellant appeals this decision. After a review, we determine that the petition was untimely and, therefore, properly dismissed by the post-conviction court. However, the record fails to include a judgment form for Count One of the indictment. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed, but the matter is remanded to the trial court for entry of a judgment form for Count One of the indictment. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerry Williams
A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Jerry Williams, of alternative counts of aggravated assault. The trial court ordered the convictions merged and imposed a Range I sentence of five years’ incarceration. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the propriety of the five-year sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm. We remand the case, however, for the entry of a single judgment of conviction reflecting the merged convictions. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Casey Treat
A Sevier County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Casey Treat, for driving under the influence and driving under the influence per se. The Defendant pled guilty but reserved a certified question of law, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2), as to whether the absence of the video recording of his stop violated his constitutional rights. After review, we conclude that this Court does not have jurisdiction to address the certified question because it does not comply with the strict requirements of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2), as the certified question is (1) not dispositive of the case and (2) overly broad. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dorothy King, et al v. Virginia Betts, et al
This appeal involves the assertion of the qualified immunity defense in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2008) action filed in state court. A registered nurse employed at a state psychiatric facility publicly disagreed with a change in the facility’s procedures for administering prescription medications at night and on the weekend. When the facility declined to change its procedures, the nurse filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in the Chancery Court for Davidson County against various officials and employees of the then Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, alleging the existence of a hostile work environment and retaliation for the exercise of her constitutionally protected free speech rights. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the nurse’s First Amendment claim and a motion for judgment on the pleadings asserting qualified immunity. The trial court, after considering the products of two years of discovery, granted both of the defendants’ motions and dismissed the nurse’s complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court with regard to both motions based on its conclusion that material issues of fact precluded both motions. King v. Betts, No. M2009-00117-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 4893590 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2009). We granted the defendants’ Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application for permission to appeal to address the procedure for the consideration of qualified immunity defenses in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions filed in Tennessee’s courts and to determine whether the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the facts of this case. We have determined that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because the nurse has failed to demonstrate that the defendants’ response to her criticism of the changes in the procedures for administering prescription medications violated a clearly established right. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Paul M. Stackhouse
The defendant, Paul M. Stackhouse, was convicted of one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to nine years in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals his conviction, claiming that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain expert testimony and by failing to provide a requested special jury instruction regarding same; (3) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing a witness to testify regarding a prior inconsistent statement made by one of the State’s witnesses during the State’s case-in-chief and by refusing to provide a limiting jury instruction regarding same; and (4) the trial court erred by failing to grant a judgment of acquittal. After carefully reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the court below. |
Hamblen | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dorothy King, et al v. Virginia Betts, et al - Concurring
I concur in Parts I, II, III, V, VI, and VII of the majority opinion. I do not concur in Part IV of the opinion addressing whether federal or state procedural rules should apply to a qualified immunity defense because the issue of whether federal or state procedural law applies is not properly before this Court. See Fayne v. Vincent, 301 S.W.3d 162, 171 (Tenn. 2009). |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Charlotte McCarter
In this extraordinary appeal, the Defendant-Appellant,Charlotte McCarter, appeals the Sevier County Circuit Court’s order refusing to grant an interlocutory appeal regarding the denial of pretrial diversion. On appeal, McCarter argues that the prosecutor abused her discretion in denying her application for pretrial diversion by: (1) failing to properly consider her amenability to correction; (2) making “rote statements” that the evidence weighed in favor of denying pretrial diversion instead of properly weighing the relevant factors; (3) relying on the circumstances of the offense and the need for deterrence, where these factors were not of such “overwhelming significance” to justify the denial; and (4) failing to have “substantial evidence” to support her decision to deny pretrial diversion. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Houston Greene
Defendant-Appellant, David Houston Greene, appeals the Sullivan County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation in three different cases. He was originally convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to sell, aggravated perjury, and misdemeanor failure to appear. He received an effective eight-year sentence, all of which was suspended after thirty days incarceration. On appeal, Greene claims that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation and in ordering him to serve the sentences in confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cameron Winselle v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Cameron Winselle, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his convictions of two counts of first degree murder on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner specifically contends that trial counsel committed ineffective assistance by failing to present evidence of his diminished capacity, failing to exhaust peremptory challenges, failing to investigate the facts of the offense, and failing to move for the trial judge’s recusal based upon the trial judge’s previous employment as a prosecutor. The petitioner also contends that appellate counsel was deficient for failing to raise issues on appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Victor A. Askew
The defendant, Victor A. Askew, was convicted by a Montgomery County jury of premeditated first degree murder,attempted second degree murder,and felony evading arrest. He was subsequently sentenced to concurrent sentences of life imprisonment, eight years,and two years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant raised the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence with regard to his first degree murder conviction. Specifically, he contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of the element of premeditation. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgment of conviction |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jose Jesus Alba-Gutierrez
Originally charged with five counts of aggravated burglary and four counts of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000, the defendant, Jose Jesus Alba-Gutierrez, pleaded guilty to five counts of aggravated burglary in exchange for a total effective sentence not to exceed ten years, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court, and the State’s agreement to dismiss the theft charges against him. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the order of a fully incarcerative sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gary Reeves
The defendant, Gary Reeves, appeals his Madison County Circuit Court convictions of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000 and criminal trespass, challenging the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Because sufficient evidence supports both convictions, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Philip Reed Bryan v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, Philip Reed Bryan, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Konstantinos Diotis v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Konstantinos Diotis, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post conviction relief as time-barred. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that application of the statute of limitations in his case is inappropriate because (1) the United States Supreme Court decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, __ U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), should be applied retroactively and (2) principles of due process require the tolling of the statute of limitations. The petitioner waived his claim of due process tolling by failing to present it to the post conviction court. Further, because we conclude that Padilla should not be applied retroactively, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court dismissing the petition as untimely. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
ABN AMRO Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Southern Security Federal Credit Union
Appellant, the second mortgage holder on the subject property, appeals the trial court’s determination that Appellee held a valid first mortgage on the property, when Appellee’s mortgage was taken under a deed of trust that contained a scrivener’s error that incorrectly identified the property’s lot number. The trial court held that: (1) the scrivener’s error was not fatal to Appellant’s deed of trust as the instrument otherwise clearly identified the property; (2) Appellant’s mortgage was superior to Appellee’s; and (3) Appellee’s bid at Appellant’s foreclosure sale created a valid contract, under which Appellee owed Appellant the purchase price. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Dean Marlin
The Defendant, Michael Dean Marlin, was found guilty by a Marshall County Circuit Court jury of three counts of especially aggravated burglary, a Class B felony; aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; robbery, a Class C felony; aggravated assault, a Class D felony; and assault, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court merged the especially aggravated burglary convictions. The court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to twenty years each for the especially aggravated burglary convictions and the aggravated robbery conviction, to ten years each for the robbery and the aggravated assault,and to eleven months and twenty-nine days for the assault, to be served concurrently for an effective twenty-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that double jeopardy protections and Tennessee Code Annotated section 3914-404(d) bar simultaneous convictions for aggravated robbery, especially aggravated burglary, and aggravated assault. We affirm the judgments for robbery and assault, but we reverse the especially aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and aggravated robbery judgments and remand the case for entry of judgments in which the Defendant’s convictions for especially aggravated burglary are modified to aggravated burglary and he is resentenced accordingly, and the conviction for aggravated assault is merged into a judgment of conviction for aggravated robbery. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Donna Lynn Lund v. John Fredrik Lund
This is the second appeal of this post-divorce case to this court. Donna Lynn Lund (“Wife”) and John Fredrik Lund (“Husband”) were divorced in 2008. In the first appeal of the trial court’s classification of marital property, this court held that the increase in value of Husband’s pre-marital annuity was separate property. On remand, the trial court divided the property as consistent with this court’s opinion. Wife filed post-judgment motions and a subsequent motion for Rule 60.02 relief, asserting that the order on remand contained errors of law and that she mistakenly failed to file a timely notice of appeal. The trial court denied the Rule 60.02 motion. Wife appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Larry Edward Moore, Jr.
Defendant, Larry Edward Moore, Jr., was convicted of carjacking, a Class B felony and was sentenced to serve thirty (30) years as a Range III, career offender. This Court affirmed the conviction and sentence in State v. Larry Edward Moore, Jr., No. M2008-00703-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 457493 (Tenn. Crim. App., filed Feb. 10, 2010) (hereinafter “Moore I”). From that judgment,Defendant filed an application for permission to appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 11. In his application, Defendant presented only one specific issue, which is set forth below. In its order concerning the Rule 11 application, the Supreme Court ordered a supplementation of the record on appeal. The Supreme Court also remanded the case to this Court for reconsideration, in light of the supplemental record, of Defendant’s “argument that the trial court erred in not redacting from [the supplemented exhibit] certain portions of [Defendant’s] statement to police.” Upon reconsideration of Defendant’s “redaction” issue, which we initially held was waived for multiple reasons, we conclude the trial court erred, but the error was harmless. Accordingly, we again affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timmie Darrell Boston v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner,Timmie Darrell Boston,appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. After trial, a jury convicted him of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and assault by offensive or provocative contact, a Class B misdemeanor. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender and received an effective twenty-year sentence. In this appeal, the petitioner claims that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel’s failure to (1) object to the prosecution’s use of leading questions when examining the victim, and (2) impeach the testimony of the victim. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
411 Partnership v. Knox County, Tennessee, et al.
The Knox County Board of Zoning Appeals denied plaintiff's use on review application for a proposed shopping center. Plaintiff appealed the decision to the Circuit Court by way of a Writ of Certiorari. The Trial Court upheld the Board of Zoning Appeals' decision and plaintiff appealed to this Court. We reverse the decision of the Circuit Court on the grounds the record before the Board of Zoning Appeals does not contain substantial material evidence to uphold the Board's ruling. We reverse the Judgment of the Trial Court and remand. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Dr. Pepper Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of Dyersburg, LLC v. Reagan Farr, Commissioner of Tennessee Department of Revenue
An in-state bottled soft drink manufacturer argues, pursuant to the bottler’s tax statute, that the in-state distributor to which it sells may pay the bottler’s tax on such sales and utilize its own franchise and excise tax credit. Absent this flexibility, the manufacturer contends, equal protection guarantees are offended. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Department of Revenue, finding that the manufacturer bore the tax burden and that it could not utilize the distributor’s credit. We affirm. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Richard L. Williams v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Richard L. Williams, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his guilty plea to second degree murder and twenty-five year sentence. In his appeal, the petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and did not enter his guilty plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily due to the various failures of trial counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robin Claire Pearson Gorman v. Timothy Stewart Gorman
Husband challenges the trial court’s award of alimony in solido beginning after three years of rehabilitative alimony. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals |