Linda Epps v. Civil Service Commission of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, and the Metropolitan Action Commission
This appeal arises out of a dismissal of a petition for writ of certiorari in which review was sought of the denial of a grievance filed by an employee of the Metropolitan Action Commission’s Head Start program. The grievance was initially denied by the Executive Director of the Metropolitan Action Commission. The employee then appealed the grievance to the Metropolitan Civil Service Commission, which assigned the appeal to an administrative law judge; after a hearing, the administrative law judge denied the grievance. Upon further appeal, the Civil Service Commission overturned the administrative law judge’s decision and held in favor of the employee; the Civil Service Commission transmitted its decision to the Board of Commissioners of the Metropolitan Action Commission as a recommended final order. The Board of Commissioners rejected the recommended decision and voted to deny the grievance. When the employee sought to appeal the Board of Commissioner’s decision to the Civil Service Commission, that Commission responded that it had no further authority to hear the appeal because the employee was not an employee in classified service and because the Metropolitan Action Commission had final authority on grievance decisions involving employees of the Head Start program. The employee then sought review by writ of certiorari in chancery court, which found that the employee was not a civil service employee and was, therefore, not entitled to a second appeal to the Civil Service Commission; the court also found that the Metropolitan Action Commission had conformed to the applicable grievance process. On appeal, the employee asserts that she was employed in a civil service position and entitled to the grievance process set forth in the civil service rules. Finding that the grievance procedure applicable to employees in the classified service is not applicable to the employee and that the Action Commission properly exercised final authority on the grievance, we affirm the action of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony Bruce Colston v. Melinda Kay Colston
In this post-divorce proceeding, Husband appeals the trial court’s order requiring him to pay an alimony arrearage of $86,000.00. We affirm the judgment for the arrearage and remand the case for reconsideration of the requirement that Husband pay the arrearage at $1,500.00 per month. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Kathy H. Wright v. James Charles Wright
In this post-divorce proceeding, the trial court granted the father sole custody and decision making authority over the parties’ minor children. The mother appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court on all issues. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Earl Offutt
This case is before the court after remand to the Davidson County Criminal Court for sentencing after this court reinstated three convictions for attempted incest that the trial court incorrectly merged with three attempted rape convictions. On remand, the trial court sentenced the Defendant, David Earl Offutt, to serve four years for each of the Class D felony attempted incest convictions and ordered that the sentences be served consecutively to each other but concurrently with an effective eighteen-year sentence the Defendant was serving for other convictions. See T.C.A. §§ 39-12-101 (attempt), 39-15-302 (2010) (incest). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by imposing maximum sentences for his attempted incest convictions and ordering that they be served consecutively. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cadlerock, LLC v. Sheila R. Weber
The plaintiff, an assignee to a foreign judgment, filed a petition to domesticate the judgment pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, found at Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-6-101 et seq. The defendant objected to the enrollment of the foreign judgment because it was assigned. After a hearing on the matter, the trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion to domesticate the foreign judgment and dismissed the case. The plaintiff appeals. Our review of the record reveals that the plaintiff properly followed the statutory requirements to enroll a foreign judgment. Accordingly, the trial court erred. We reverse. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Marla H., Individually and as Next Best Friend to her Daughter Moriah F. H. v. Knox County, et al.
This is an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The mother of a middle school student filed suit against Knox County, the Knox County Board of Education, and the City of Knoxville after her daughter viewed graphic photographs of her dead father during a presentation on the dangers of drunk driving. The trial court found the City of Knoxville liable for the student’s emotional injuries because the school resource officer who distributed the photographs intended to evoke an emotional response. We conclude it was generally foreseeable that providing graphic accident scene photographs to seventh grade students could cause serious or severe emotional harm in a student related to a victim depicted therein. Thus, the school resource officer owed a duty to exercise reasonable care when displaying the photographs to a class that potentially included students related to the victims. The evidence, however, preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the school resource officer failed to exercise reasonable care. We reverse the decision of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Nancy L. Blue v. State of Tennessee
A jury convicted the Petitioner, Nancy L. Blue, of two counts of rape of a child and two counts of incest. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed her convictions but modified her sentences. See State v. Nancy Blue, No. W2008-00187-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 1097450, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Apr. 23, 2009), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. Sept. 28, 2009). The Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief; however, the postconviction court granted the State’s motion to dismiss, finding that the petition was not timely filed. The Petitioner alleges that both prison notaries were unavailable for several days preceding the date that her petition was due and, because of their absence, she was not able to get her petition to the appropriate prison authorities for mailing until the day after the one-year statute of limitations ran. After our review, we remand to the post-conviction court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether sufficient evidence exists to warrant tolling the statute of limitations for due process concerns and whether the Petitioner timely filed her petition for post-conviction relief. |
Haywood | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carlos Walls
A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Carlos Walls, of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, violent offender to twelve years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that the trial court erred in admitting the defendant’s statement to the Department of Children’s Services as evidence, and that the trial court applied improper enhancement factors. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sally Jo Witty v. Christopher Cantrell et al.
Sally Jo Witty is a teacher employed by the Blount County School System. She filed this action after her request to draw pay from a pool of donated sick leave was denied. She named as defendants the trustees appointed to administer the pool (collectively “the Trustees”). She also sued the Blount County Board of Education (“the School Board”) and alleged it is vicariously liable. She demanded the full monetary value of the requested sick leave and also asked for damages to compensate her for the mental suffering resulting from the “wrongful” decision to deny her benefits. The trial court held that the Trustees were an independent body for which the School Board could not be held vicariously liable. It also held that the Trustees were immune from liability in their individual capacities and that the action filed against the Trustees in their official capacity was a petition for writ of certiorari that was not timely filed. Therefore, it dismissed the complaint. Witty appeals. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in part and vacate it in part. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Derek Deon Hester
The defendant, Derek Deon Hester, stands convicted of felony murder; aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony; and aggravated rape of a child; a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range I, violent offender to a life sentence for the felony murder conviction; as a Range I, violent offender to twenty years for the aggravated child abuse conviction, to be served concurrently with the life sentence; and as a Range III, violent offender to forty years for the aggravated rape of a child conviction, to be served consecutively to the life sentence, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the state withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963); that the trial court erred in granting the state’s motion to consolidate the cases; that the trial court erred in the admission and exclusion of certain evidence; and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Following our thorough review of the record, the parties’ arguments, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Alonzo Fishback v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Alonzo Fishback, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and possession of a weapon during the commission of an offense. He argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Elmi Adulahi Abdi
A Davidson County jury convicted the defendant, Elmi Adulahi Abdi, of attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, consecutive to his sentence in Davidson County case number 2006-A-30. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by admitting videotape evidence; and (3) the trial court erred by enhancing the defendant’s sentence and ordering him to serve his sentence consecutive to case number 2006-A-30. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Steven Craig Wilcox
The defendant, Steven Craig Wilcox, pled guilty to conspiracy to promote the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class E felony, in exchange for a four-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the defendant’s request for an alternative sentence, ordering instead that the defendant serve his term in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in imposing a sentence of confinement. After review, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court. |
Moore | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Steven R. Chance v. State of Tennessee
This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner, Steven R. Chance, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. Upon a review of the record, we are persuaded that the habeas corpus court was correct that the Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. This case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Cheatham | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lisa Faye Roland Camp v. Randy Coleman Camp
This post-divorce appeal involves recusal of the trial judge. In the initial divorce proceedings, the trial judge recused himself based in part on friendship with the parties. A special judge was appointed to hear the case. The special judge tried the divorce, divided the parties’ property, and awarded the wife alimony in futuro. Several years later, the husband filed a petition to terminate or modify his alimony obligation. The trial judge who had previously recused himself declined to do so for the post-divorce proceedings. After a hearing, the trial judge terminated the husband’s alimony obligation. The wife appeals, arguing that the trial judge should have recused himself and that he erred in terminating the alimony. We reverse the trial court’s decision on recusal, and therefore vacate the trial court’s ruling on the husband’s petition to modify. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
Andrew Soimis v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Andrew Soimis, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Dwane Washington v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Dwane Washington, appeals the post-conviction court’s ruling that he failed to prove prejudice by clear and convincing evidence after his case was remanded for a determination of prejudice. The proper standard of review was whether the petitioner had shown that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. After a careful review, we conclude that the post-conviction court used the wrong standard in requiring the petitioner to prove prejudice by clear and convincing evidence and that the record before us clearly establishes that there was a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel’s inaccurate assurances that the petitioner was eligible for boot camp, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. We reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court, vacate the petitioner’s judgment of conviction, and remand the case for a trial. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John W. Foster, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, John W. Foster, Jr., appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for aggravated robbery and resulting sentence of thirty years to be served at sixty percent before eligible for release. The petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jordan Ashton Danelz v. John Gayden
This is a parentage action in which an adult child seeks retroactive child support from his biological father. The juvenile court dismissed the petition. After a thorough review of the record, we vacate the judgment of the juvenile court for failure to join a party pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 19, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Denise Jeremiah and Timothy Jeremiah v. William Blaylock
The plaintiff home buyer and defendant home seller entered into an agreement to repair a drain at some future date because it had been improperly piped out of the buyer’s house. When the time for performance came, the drain was not moved, resulting in damages to the buyer’s home. The buyer sued for breach of contract. The circuit court granted a directed verdict to the defendant on the ground that there was no consideration to support the contract. We find that the mutual promises made by the parties constituted adequate consideration. We accordingly reverse the trial court and remand this case for such further proceedings as necessary. |
Marshall | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lakeya Peoples
In this State appeal, the State challenges the Madison County Circuit Court’s decision dismissing the charges against the defendant and expunging them from her record, claiming that the trial court was without jurisdiction to take the action because the judgment had become final. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tony Arness Degraffreed
A Tipton County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Tony Arness Degraffreed, of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years in confinement to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, (2) the trial court erred by refusing to require the jury to determine whether his penetration of the victim was digital or penile, and (3) the State improperly commented on the appellant’s failure to testify during it closing argument. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee v. Richard A. Demonbreun
Property owner seeks review of the trial court’s decision that two citations were properly issued against him because he did not have a permit for hosting historic home events on his property as required by the Metropolitan Government. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee, by and through Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter for the State of Tennessee v. NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading Company
This appeal involves in personam jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. Appellant State of Tennessee brought suit against Appellee tobacco product manufacturer, under the Tobacco Escrow Fund Act, Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 47-31-101 et seq., alleging that Appellee had failed to make escrow deposits, as required under the Act, for cigarettes sold in Tennessee. Based upon the trial court’s finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the Appellee, it entered summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer. The State appeals. Upon review, we conclude that: (1) the facts of this case show that the manufacturer intentionally used a distribution system with the desired result of selling its product in all fifty states, including Tennessee, so as to support a finding that the manufacturer had minimum contacts with the State necessary to invoke the exercise of personal jurisdiction; (2) the exercise of personal jurisdiction, under the facts of this case, is reasonable and fair; (3) the manufacturer is subject to regulation under the Act; and (4) the Act is not unconstitutional. Moreover, we conclude that: (1) Appellee is a tobacco products manufacturer, as defined by the Escrow Fund Act; (2) Appellee’s cigarettes were sold in Tennessee; and (3) Appellee is, therefore, liable for escrow payments under the Escrow Fund Act. Consequently, we grant the State’s motion for summary judgment. The order of the trial court is reversed, and the matter is remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of Appellant State and for calculation of the escrow amount owed by Appellee and entry of judgment thereon. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Venus L. Lowery v. Larry G. Womble, II
In this child-support matter, Father appeals the trial court’s determination of his parenting time and income for the purpose of setting his child support obligation. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals |