State of Tennessee v. Chris L. Robinson
The defendant, Chris L. Robinson, pleaded guilty to possession of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony, in exchange for an eight-year sentence, leaving the trial court to determine whether he would serve the sentence concurrently with or consecutively to his six-year sentence in Davidson County Criminal Court case number 2009-I-508. The trial court ordered that the defendant serve the eight-year sentence consecutively to the six-year sentence. On appeal, the defendant argues that the imposition of consecutive sentences was inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the sentencing statutes. Following our review, we affirm the sentence of the trial court and remand solely for entry of an amended judgment reflecting that the defendant’s sentence in this case is to run consecutively to his sentence in case number 2009-I-508. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Danny D. Holmes
The Defendant-Appellant, Danny D. Holmes, appeals the revocation of his probation. He pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Rutherford County to robbery and aggravated assault, both Class C felonies. Holmes received an effective sentence of six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he was granted an alternative sentence of six years on probation. Holmes claims on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation and imposing the original term of confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jerry W. Alley, Jr.
The defendant, Jerry W. Alley, Jr., entered pleas of guilty in the Hardin County Circuit Court to one count of the initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, see T.C.A. § 39-17-435 (2006); one count of simple possession of methamphetamine, see id. § 39-17-418(a); one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, see id. § 39-17-425(a)(1); and one count of child neglect, see id. § 39-15-401(a). The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of eight years to be served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant challenges the imposition of a fully incarcerative sentence. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kristopher Smith
Defendant-Appellant Kristopher Smith was convicted by a Shelby County jury of aggravated kidnapping and rape, both Class B felonies. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to an effective ten-year term of imprisonment in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, Smith claims the trial court erred by: (1) failing to sustain his Batson challenge to the prosecution’s peremptory strikes of two African American males; (2) finding that “the prosecution’s explanation of its peremptory strike of a white male sufficiently sex neutral”; (3) finding that his prior aggravated robbery conviction was admissible for impeachment purposes; (4) denying his motion for judgment of acquittal and new trial; and (5) imposing an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Daniels v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, James Daniels, was convicted by a Cocke County jury of first degree murder and attempted second degree murder. He was sentenced to concurrent sentences of life in prison and twelve years, respectively. Petitioner’s convictions were affirmed on direct appeal and the supreme court denied permission to appeal. State v. James Wesley Daniels, No. E2006-01119-CCA-R3-CS, 2007 WL 2757636 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Sept. 24, 2007), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Feb. 4, 2008). Subsequently, Petitioner sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition for relief. Petitioner appeals. After a review, we determine that Petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing evidence that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Cocke | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Administrative Resources, Inc. v. Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance
This case involves judicial review of the Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance’s denial of a staff leasing company license. The trial court reviewed the denial of the license under the common law writ of certiorari standard and upheld the decision. Finding that the denial was unsupported by substantial and material evidence, we vacate the decision of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Dodson
The defendant, Anthony Dodson, was convicted of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony, and sentenced to twenty-five years as a Range I, standard offender. The defendant now appeals, claiming insufficient evidence to support his conviction and that the sentence imposed by the trial judge was excessive. After reviewing the record, we find error in neither the defendant’s conviction nor his sentence, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Larry Alan Whited and William Henry Rutherford
The co-defendants, Larry Alan Whited and William Henry Rutherford, appeal their resentencing, which resulted in their receiving effective sentences of forty-five years and twenty-seven years, respectively. Both defendants argue on appeal that the trial court misapplied enhancement factors, weighed the only applicable enhancement factor too heavily, and failed to apply an appropriate factor in mitigation. Following our review, we conclude that the trial court committed no error by not applying any factors in mitigation but that its use of the defendants’ juvenile adjudications and violations of probation to enhance the sentences violates the principles announced in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). Accordingly, we modify the defendants’ respective sentences for second degree murder to twenty-one years, one year beyond the presumptive midpoint of twenty years, and their sentences for reckless endangerment to one year and six months, six months beyond the presumptive minimum sentence of one year. In addition, we modify Whited’s aggravated assault sentences to four years, one year beyond the presumptive minimum sentence of three years. This case is, therefore, remanded to the trial court for entry of modified sentences in accordance with this opinion. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Darryl Dewayne Bonds
The Defendant, Darryl Dewayne Bonds, pleaded guilty to one count of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102(a)(2). Sentencing was left to the discretion of the trial court. After conducting a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to four years to be served in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in setting the length of his sentence and by denying alternative sentencing. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mack Transou v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, Mack Transou, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for writ of certiorari or, in the alternative, petition for writ of error. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Young Bok Song v. Tennessee Department of Children’s Services, et al.
The petitioner, Young Bok Song (“Song”), a prisoner serving a 65-year sentence resulting from convictions for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery, filed a petition for declaratory judgment, requesting that the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) be directed to release to him copies of its investigative records from his criminal case. The trial court dismissed the petition on the grounds of sovereign immunity and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Song appeals. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Benedicta Kurunwune Obi v. George Obi - Concurring
I concur with the majority’s decision; however, I would assess costs of this appeal against Mr. Obi (“Husband”), not Mrs. Obi (“Wife”), in that this appeal was a result of Husband’s omissions. Further, I write separately to state that I believe, upon proper application pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 37 by Wife on remand, the trial court may consider imposing monetary sanctions against Husband in the form of expenses and/or attorney fees. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Odell Binkley v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee
The appellant sought a special exception to establish a waste transfer facility. The Metro Council, pursuant to its authority under the Metropolitan Code, disapproved of the proposed location. The appellant sought a writ of certiorari and the trial court dismissed the appeal. The appellant appealed to this court. We affirm the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Victor W. Isaac, M.D. v. The Center for Spine, Joint, and Neuromuscular Rehabilitation, P.C.
In this employment contract dispute, the plaintiff seeks to recover a bonus from his former employer. He asserts the defendant breached the contract by failing to pay a bonus as provided in the employment agreement; alternatively, he asserts a claim for promissory fraud. The trial court summarily dismissed plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. Following a bench trial on the promissory fraud claim, the trial court ruled in favor of the defendant and ordered plaintiff to pay defendant $64,471.86 in attorney fees pursuant to the employment agreement. We affirm and remand with instructions that the defendants be awarded reasonable and necessary attorney fees incurred on appeal. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Leon Booker
A Dyer County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Leon Booker, of two counts of driving while his driver’s license was revoked, second or subsequent offense. See T.C.A. § 55-50-504. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of 11 months and 29 days, to be served as six months’ incarceration followed by placement in a community corrections program. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Finding no evidentiary insufficiency, we affirm. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terrence Shaw
Appellant, Terrence Shaw, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of misdemeanor reckless endangerment, a lesser included offense. The trial court sentenced Appellant to six months and ordered Appellant to serve the sentence on probation. The trial court denied Appellant’s request for judicial diversion. On appeal, Appellant claims that the trial court improperly denied judicial diversion and that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. After a review of the record, we determine that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. Consequently, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, Appellant’s conviction is vacated, and the charge is dismissed. In the event of a further appeal, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying judicial diversion. |
Shelby | ||
Benedicta Kurunwune Obi v. George Obi
The trial court granted the wife a judgment of divorce after the husband failed to respond to requests for discovery and a motion to compel. After the judgment became final, the husband, who had been represented by counsel earlier in the proceedings, filed a pro se Rule 60 motion for relief, arguing that he was deprived of proper notice because the address on the certificates of service appended to each unanswered motion and notice was not accurate, with the result that he did not receive the motions and notices. The trial court denied the husband’s Rule 60 motion, but since husband’s address was incorrect on the certificates of service, we conclude the trial court erred and should have granted the husband relief from the parenting plan and child support provisions of the judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order as to those provisions and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Eloise J. Storey Peggie Sherrill Huber v. Lawrence G. Yohanek, CPA, a/k/a Larry G. Yohanek, Sharron S. Yohanek, and John Gary Storey
This lawsuit was filed by the decedent’s daughter against other family members alleging undue influence, conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy. After the decedent suffered a stroke, the family members, as attorney in fact and signatory on the decedent’s bank accounts, made gifts from the decedent’s assets to themselves and to other family members. After the decedent died, the plaintiff daughter filed this lawsuit, alleging that the defendant family members wrongfully depleted the decedent’s assets during her lifetime so as to deprive the plaintiff of her specific bequest in the decedent’s will. The defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment on various grounds. The trial court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion finding, inter alia, that the plaintiff did not submit evidence to support several of her claims, and that several claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The Plaintiff now appeals. On appeal, we apply the Tennessee Supreme court’s revised analytical framework for summary judgment motions, requiring the defendant movants to either conclusively establish facts supporting an affirmative defense or negate an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim. Applying this standard, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Jerry Alan Richards v. Tina Lou Richards
This is a post-divorce case where both parties sought to modify the existing custody arrangement. At the time of the divorce, the parties agreed to equal co-parenting time. Upon the mother’s request for modification, the court designated her as the primary residential parent and awarded the father standard co-parenting time. The trial court also ordered the father to pay child support and certain outstanding expenses incurred by the mother toward the child’s care. Further, the mother was awarded her attorney fees. In the initial appeal, we found that a material change in circumstances had not been proven. Accordingly, we reversed the trial court’s modification of the original custody arrangement and reinstated the initial permanent parenting plan. We also vacated the trial court’s order as to child support, the payment by the father of expenses incurred by the mother, and the award of attorney fees to the mother, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. The matter was reheard, with the parties stipulating that there has been a material and substantial change in circumstances. The trial court again named the mother primary residential parent, with the father having co-parenting time every other weekend and on an alternating two-week schedule in the summer. The father appeals. We hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffrey D. Key, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Randall Eugene Key et al v. Blount Memorial Hospital, Inc. et al.
This is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment to the defendant hospital in a medical malpractice wrongful death case. The trial court struck as untimely the materials filed by the plaintiff in opposition to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The responsive materials were filed less than five days before the date originally scheduled for a hearing on the defendant’s motion; however the hearing was continued for several months. Having struck the plaintiff’s filings, the court held that the motion negated violation of the standard of care and causation and granted the motion as unopposed. The plaintiff contends on appeal that the defendant did not negate either violation of the standard of care or causation; that the materials responsive to the motion should not have been stricken; and that, if the materials filed in opposition to the motion are considered, the plaintiff presented issues of material fact for trial. We vacate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brooke Lee Whitaker
Defendant, Brooke Lee Whitaker, was indicted for aggravated rape. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, she was allowed to plead guilty to the lesser included offense of rape, with the trial court to determine the length of the sentence after a sentencing hearing. Defendant was sentenced to serve twelve years, and she appeals, arguing that the sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Andrew Helton v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Andrew Helton, appeals the habeas corpus court’s order summarily dismissing his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and applicable law, we affirm the court’s judgment. |
Hickman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alvin Phillips
assault by the use or display of a deadly weapon. After a bench trial, Appellant was convicted of the charge. Appellant was later sentenced to four years as a Range I, standard offender. He was ordered to serve the sentence on supervised probation and attend domestic violence counseling. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. After a review of the record, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Shirley Larhonda Gagne
A Campbell County jury convicted the Defendant, Shirley LaRhonda Gagne, of driving under the influence (“DUI”), third offense; driving on a suspended license, second offense; possession of drug paraphernalia; violation of the seatbelt law; and violation of the open container law. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with 130 days to be served in confinement and the remainder to be served on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence testimony pertaining to a blood sample taken from her; and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction for DUI, third offense. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Campbell | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Chelsey D. Crews v. Jessie C. Staggs
Primary residential parent appeals determination that the parties rotate the federal tax exemption for their minor child on a yearly basis. At the time the determination was made, the trial court had not determined the amount of child support to be paid by the alternate residential parent in accordance with the child support guidelines. We reverse the decision and remand for reconsideration of the award of the exemption. |
Maury | Court of Appeals |