State of Tennessee v. Ralph Wilhoite
After a bench trial, the Sevier County Circuit Court convicted the appellant, Ralph Wilhoite, of driving under the influence (DUI), third offense; violating the implied consent law; and violating the financial responsibility law. On appeal, the appellant claims that (1) the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion to suppress evidence that was obtained as the result of an illegal arrest for DUI and (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the appellant’s convictions for DUI and violating the financial responsibility law but modify his conviction for Class A misdemeanor violation of the implied consent law to non-criminal violation of the implied consent law. The case is remanded to the trial court for correction of that judgment and for correction of a clerical error on the judgment of conviction for violating the financial responsibility law. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Norman L. Ricks
The appellant, Norman L. Ricks, pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter in exchange for an agreed sentence of ten years. The plea agreement provided that the trial court would determine whether the sentence would be served concurrently with or consecutively to a previously imposed federal sentence. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. George D. Oakes
The Defendant, George D. Oakes, was charged with one count of second degree murder, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-211. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender to 15 years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for voluntary manslaughter and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing the Defendant. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Timothy Schwandner v. Dana S. Higdon
The driver of a car suddenly passed out, causing her vehicle to strike a stopped pickup truck and seriously injure its driver. The pickup driver sued, and the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that she was not liable for the plaintiff’s injuries because her sudden loss of consciousness was unforeseeable. Since it was undisputed that prior to the accident the defendant had not eaten during a full day of busy activity, the plaintiff argued that it was foreseeable that the she would lose consciousness. The trial court did not agree, and it granted the defendant’s motion. We affirm the trial court. |
Marion | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Landon A. F.
The mother of a nine year old boy filed a Rule 60 motion to vacate an “agreed order” that granted extensive visitation rights to the boy’s father. The order in question was signed by the father’s attorney and was presented to the trial judge without the mother’s signature and without the mother being present. Earlier, the mother had refused to sign the order, claiming that its terms deviated significantly from the agreement the parties actually reached. The trial court signed the document and subsequently denied the mother’s Rule 60 motion. We reverse the trial court. |
Bedford | Court of Appeals | |
William B. Penn v. Board of Professional Responsibility
We have reviewed the record to determine whether Mr. Penn’s petition for writ of certiorari satisfied the requirements identified in Cawood as necessary to confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the trial court. Because Mr. Penn’s petition failed to conform to Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-8-106, in that it was neither “sworn to” nor included language assuring that “it is the first application for the writ,” the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide his petition. For these reasons, the Board’s motion to dismiss Mr. Penn’s appeal is hereby granted, and the trial court’s December 1, 2009 order is vacated. This Court’s March 31, 2011 order allowing supplemental briefing is also vacated. Because the sanction imposed by the Hearing Panel exceeds a three-month suspension and because no appeal was properly perfected, the Board is directed to file a copy of the Hearing Panel’s order for review by this Court in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 8.4. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Everest National Insurance Company v. Restaurant Management Group, LLC
This is a declaratory judgment action filed by an insurance company against its insured and the insured’s customer who allegedly was injured from a fall after stepping in a hole in the insured’s parking lot. The insurance company asked for a declaration that it was not obligated to defend and indemnify the insured against the customer’s personal injury claim. The insured filed a counterclaim asking for a declaration that the insurer was required to defend the claim and indemnify the insured against liability to the customer. On dueling motions for summary judgment, the trial court held that the insurance company was relieved of its obligation to defend and indemnify the insured because the insured waited five months before notifying the insurance company of the claim and that, as a consequence of the insured’s delay, the insurer was prejudiced. During that five months, the insured repaired cracks in the parking lot where the fall allegedly occurred. The insured appeals. We affirm. |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony W. Hutchinson
The Defendant, Anthony W. Hutchinson, was convicted of one count of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-103, 105. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction and (2) the trial court erred by denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christa Gail Pike v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Christa Gail Pike, appeals as of right the judgment of the Knox County Criminal Court denying her petition for post-conviction relief. A Knox County jury found the Petitioner guilty of premeditated first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The jury further found two statutory aggravating circumstances: (1) “[t]he murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death”; and (2) “[t]he murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another.” T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(5), (6) (2006). The jury further found that these two aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury then sentenced the Petitioner to death. The Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the Tennessee Supreme Court. State v. Pike, 978 S.W.2d 904 (Tenn. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1147 (1999). On June 3, 1999, the Petitioner timely filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. In 2001, the Petitioner advised the trial court that she desired to withdraw her post-conviction petition. In 2002, the lower court dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner then sought to reinstate her post-conviction petition. Litigation ensued, after which the Tennessee Supreme Court ultimately determined that the motion to vacate the dismissal order should be granted and remanded the matter to the lower court to reinstate the Petitioner’s postconviction petition. Pike v. State, 164 S.W.3d 257 (Tenn. 2005). Evidentiary hearings were conducted in January 2007, July 2007, and August 2008. On December 10, 2008, the postconviction court entered an order denying the Petitioner post-conviction relief. On appeal to this court, the Petitioner presents a number of claims that can be characterized in the following categories: (1) the post-conviction court should have recused itself; (2) the Petitioner’s trial and appellate counsel were ineffective; (3) the Petitioner is ineligible for the death penalty; and (4) the death penalty is unconstitutional. Following a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nicole Spates
A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Nicole Spates, of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced her, as a Range I standard offender, to serve an effective twenty-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict her of especially aggravated kidnapping; (2) the dual convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery violate the Due Process Clause of the Tennessee Constitution; (3) the trial judge erred by granting the state’s request for a special jury instruction; and (4) her sentence is excessive, and the court misapplied enhancement factors. After a thorough review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Andrew J. Braden, III v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
This is a prisoner appeal from a disciplinary conviction. Because the prisoner did not file his petition for common law writ of certiorari within sixty days of the denial of his disciplinary appeal or demonstrate a timely filing of the petition pursuant to Rule 5.06 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, we do not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider the issues presented. This appeal is dismissed. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Samuel Sherrill
The Defendant, Samuel Sherrill, was indicted for second degree murder, a Class A felony. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of reckless homicide, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to admit testimony from two witnesses regarding the victim’s specific acts of prior violence in support of his assertion that the victim was the first aggressor. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Wayne | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Lynn Hunt Jr.
The appellant, Robert Lynn Hunt, Jr., pled nolo contendere in the Dyer County Circuit Court to abuse and neglect of a child under six years of age, a Class D felony, and received a fouryear sentence. At some point, the appellant was placed on probation. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his original sentence in confinement. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dwight A. Shankle
The defendant, Dwight A. Shankle, was convicted of facilitation of promotion of the manufacturing of methamphetamine, a Class E felony. He was sentenced to four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Range III, persistent offender. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the indictment was faulty. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the trial court. |
McMinn | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Deon Mills and Kenneth Allen Spencer
A Knox County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellants, Michael Deon Mills and Kenneth Allen Spencer, of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of especially aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated burglary. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellants to effective sentences of twenty-five years in confinement to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, Mills argues that the prosecutor committed plain error during closing arguments by referring to his failure to testify. Spencer contends that (1) the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a document not provided to him during discovery; (2) the trial court erred by allowing evidence about weapons that were not used to commit the crimes; (3) an accomplice’s testimony did not provide sufficient corroboration to support the convictions; and (4) the convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and especially aggravated robbery violate due process. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, Mills’ convictions are affirmed. However, Spencer’s convictions are reversed and the charges are dismissed because there is insufficient corroboration to sustain the convictions. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Denzil Russ Partin v. Mary Ava Partin, et al.
This lawsuit arose out of two transfers of real property. Denzil Russ Partin (“Husband”) sued Mary Ava Partin (“Wife”) and Hazel Walden (“Mrs. Walden”), seeking declaratory relief that the two properties Wife transferred to Mrs. Walden, Wife’s mother, were held in trust for Husband, Wife, and their son, Courtney Partin. The Trial Court found that title to the real property at issue was vested in Mrs. Walden, that no resulting trust had been created, and, that, in any event, the statute of limitations had run on Husband’s action. Husband appeals. We hold that although the Trial Court erred in stating that the statute of limitations had run on Husband’s claim, the Trial Court did not err in declining to impose a resulting trust on the real property at issue. We affirm the judgment as modified. |
Campbell | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David A. Hunter
The defendant, David A. Hunter, appeals his Hamilton County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree felony murder, see T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(2) (2006), and attempted especially aggravated robbery, see id. §§ 39-12-101(a)(3), -13-403, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. In addition to contesting the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by denying his motions to suppress his statement and an eyewitness identification. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Judy Davis, as Next Friend of Eloise Gwinn, an Incapacitated Person v. Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc., et al.
This is a nursing home abuse case. The trial court denied Appellant nursing home’s motion to compel arbitration based upon an alternative dispute resolution agreement that was executed by Appellee, the niece of the patient being admitted to Appellants’ nursing facility. The patient had executed a power of attorney in favor of her niece and her niece’s husband, but only the niece had signed the admission papers on behalf of the patient. The trial court determined that the power of attorney created a joint agency, whereby the signatures of both the niece and her husband were required in order to bind the patient, as principal, to arbitration. Affirmed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Estate of Miguel Robles, etc. et al. v. Vanderbilt University Medical Center, et al.
Defendants in medical malpractice action appeal the denial of their motion to set aside order entered on plaintiff’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01 notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice. Defendants contend that, because the certificate of good faith required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122 was not filed with the complaint, dismissal should have been with prejudice. Finding that Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122 does not limit plaintiff’s right to voluntarily dismiss an action without prejudice under the circumstances presented, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Estate of Ernest Dwight King, Deceased
Following the death of her husband, a widow filed a petition in probate court and sought to aggregate the estate’s assets. The decedent had been in partnership with two brothers in a company that owned real estate and operated a nursery. The widow sought to partition the land and sell the partnership’s assets to obtain the estate’s one-third share of the partnership. The trial court ordered the land be sold at auction and the proceeds partitioned as the widow requested, and decreed certain expenses be paid from the sale before the proceeds were distributed to the estate and the two brothers. The brothers appealed the trial court’s decree affirming the payment of certain expenses before the proceeds were divided up among the partners, and claimed the estate should be liable for additional expenses the partnership incurred following the decedent’s death. However, the brothers failed to present evidence to the trial court in support of their arguments, with the result that we are unable to provide the brothers with any of the relief they seek. Accordingly, the trial court is affirmed in all respects. |
Warren | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph C. Barna v. W. Martin Seiler
An investor who lost money on stock transactions filed a claim against his stockbroker that was dismissed in arbitration. The investor then filed a complaint for legal malpractice against the attorney who had represented him in the arbitration proceeding. The attorney filed a motion for summary judgment accompanied by his expert affidavit, declaring that in his representation of the investor he had complied with all applicable standards of legal professional practice. The investor did not respond with an expert testimony contradicting the defendant. Following a series of delays, the trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant attorney after declining to grant another continuance. The former client filed a motion for relief from judgment, and the trial court denied the motion. After the attorney voluntarily dismissed his counterclaim, the judgment became final, and the investor appealed. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Elmwood Apartments v. Jessica Woodson, et al.
This appeal arises out of a detainer action originally filed in general sessions court in which landlord of apartment was awarded possession of leased premises. Tenants filed a petition for writs of certiorari and supersedeas for de novo review to the circuit court, accompanied by an affidavit of indigency; the writs were issued. Landlord subsequently sought dismissal of both writs on several grounds. The court granted the motion, finding that the writ of supersedeas was improperly granted and, as a consequence, review by certiorari was not available as a substitute for appeal. Finding that the court erred in considering grounds for dismissal which were added by landlord within five days of the hearing on the motion, we reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Joseph C. Barna v. W. Martin Seiler - Dissenting
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the movant, attorney Martin Seiler, shifted the burden of persuasion to the plaintiff Joseph Barna for purposes of summary judgment. Admittedly, Mr. Barna did not refute the affidavit of Mr. Seiler, but I submit he did not have to because Mr. Barna was not obliged to come forward with countervailing evidence to create a dispute of fact. This is due to the fact that Mr. Seiler failed to provide a sufficient affidavit or other proof. Specifically, Mr. Seiler’s affidavit, which is the only evidence to support his motion for summary judgment, is insufficient because he failed to provide any specific material fact for this court to consider that pertains to the legal services he actually rendered. Mr. Seiler only informed us of the fact that he has many years of experience as a lawyer in the field of security litigation, which is a relevant and material fact, but by itself is insufficient to refute the specific allegations in the complaint as to what Mr. Seiler failed to do in his representation of Mr. Barna. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Donald L. Seiber v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Donald L. Seiber, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the case should be remanded because the post-conviction court failed to make adequate factual findings and that the post-conviction court erred by denying post-conviction relief. Because the record supports the denial of post-conviction relief, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bennie Joe Poteet, II, Individually and by and Through Evelyn Poteet, as Conservator of Bennie Joe Poteet, II v. National Healthcare of Cleveland, Inc., et al.
This appeal involves a claim of medical malpractice. Bennie Joe Poteet, II, individually and by and through his mother, Evelyn Poteet, as his conservator (collectively “the Plaintiffs”), sued Adam E. Fall, M.D. (“Dr. Fall”) and National Healthcare of Cleveland, formerly doing business as Cleveland Community Hospital (“the Hospital”) (collectively “the Defendants”) for medical malpractice after Mr. Poteet suffered a stroke while admitted at the Hospital which rendered him completely paralyzed from the nose down. Both parties moved for partial summary judgment on Mr. Poteet’s later added claim of negligence per se based on a bonus incentive plan allegedly maintained by the Hospital that indirectly set forth the reduction of MRIs ordered by Dr. Fall as a factor in his annual bonus determination. The trial court granted the Hospital’s dispositive motion on the issue, as well as the Hospital’s motion to dismiss on the bonus issue. Prior to trial, the court also granted the Defendants’ motions in limine to exclude any evidence of the bonus incentive plan offered to Dr. Fall, but denied the Defendants’ motion to exclude all testimony of one of the Plaintiffs’ neurology experts. At the close of the case, the trial court submitted a special verdict form to the jury which instructed that the question regarding the Hospital’s negligence based on insufficient neurology coverage was to be disregarded if neither Dr. Fall nor the treating nurses were found to be negligent. The jury subsequently returned a verdict favorable to the nurses and Dr. Fall, leaving the question on the adequacy of neurology coverage unaddressed. Judgment was entered on the jury’s findings. The Hospital thereafter filed a motion for directed verdict on the neurology coverage issue while the Plaintiffs moved for a new trial on multiple grounds. The trial court denied the Plaintiffs’ motion for new trial but granted the Hospital’s motion for directed verdict as well as the Defendants’ motions for discretionary costs. The Plaintiffs have appealed. We affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals |