Jesse R. Miltier v. Bank of America, N.A.
This is a tort action for wrongful foreclosure. Suit was filed by Jesse R. Miltier against his lender, Bank of America, N.A. (“BOA”). In his complaint, Miltier demanded $200,000 in compensatory damages and $10,000,000 in punitive damages. The jury awarded Miltier $750,000 compensatory damages itemized on the verdict form as $350,000 out of pocket money losses “related solely to foreclosure,” $100,000 out of pocket losses “related solely to lawsuit,” $150,000 emotional distress “related solely to foreclosure” and $150,000 emotional distress “related solely to lawsuit.” The jury also awarded Miltier $300,000 in punitive damages. BOA filed post-judgment motions asking that the compensatory damages be remitted to eliminate “amounts related solely to the lawsuit” and amounts awarded in excess of the $200,000 demanded in the complaint. Miltier responded asserting that the issue of damages over $200,000 was tried by consent. The trial court entered an order reducing the award of compensatory damages to $200,000. Later, the court entered a final order approving the jury’s award of punitive damages in the amount of $300,000. Miltier appeals challenging the reduction of the verdict. His issues include a challenge to the constitutionality of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 15.02 which forbids amendment of pleadings after verdict to increase the ad damnum clause. The Attorney General has appeared on appeal to defend the constitutionality of Rule 15.02. We affirm. |
Carter | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Carlie G. C.
Philip C. (“Father”) appeals from the termination of his parental rights to his minor child, Carlie G. C. (“the Child”), who was five years old at the time of trial. The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that statutory grounds for termination exist and that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the best interest of the Child. Father appeals and challenges the trial court’s findings. We affirm. |
Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Deanna Machelle Fletcher
The Defendant, Deanna Machelle Fletcher, pled guilty to three counts of identity theft, a Class D felony; burglary of an automobile, a Class E felony; three counts of forgery, a Class E felony; and three counts of theft of $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-150, 39-14-402, 39-14-114, 39-14-103 (2010). She was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years’ confinement for identity theft, four years’ confinement for burglary of an automobile, four years’ confinement for forgery, and eleven months and twenty-nine days’ confinement for theft, all to be served concurrently. On appeal, she contends that the trial court erred by denying alternative sentences and ordering confinement. Without the guilty plea hearing transcript, we presume the trial court’s determinations were correct. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andrew Reginald MacKinnon
A Sevier County Circuit Court jury found that the Defendant, Andrew Reginald MacKinnon, violated the implied consent law. See T.C.A. § 55-10-406 (2006) (amended 2008, 2009, 2010). The trial court ordered that his driving privileges be revoked for one year. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion to suppress because the State failed to lay a proper foundation for admitting a witness’s opinion testimony into evidence and (2) the jury instructions for violation of the implied consent law were insufficient because the trial court failed to define “reasonable grounds.” Because the trial court failed to determine the issue of the implied consent violation, submitting it to the jury instead, we vacate the judgment. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andrew Reginald MacKinnon - Dissenting
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the judgment must be vacated and the case remanded for a new hearing. Given that the Defendant does not raise any issue regarding the trial court’s failure to determine the implied consent law violation, that no prejudice has been demonstrated, and that the trial court acted as the thirteenth juror, I would address the issues raised on appeal. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Willard J. Waters v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee sustained a work-related injury to his back in 1988. The settlement of his claim included the right to future medical treatment. During the subsequent years, he received treatment from various physicians for his back. In 2006, his treating physician recommended a spinal fusion. His employer’s insurer, Liberty Mutual, denied that the proposed surgery was necessary for the treatment of the1988 injury. The employee filed a motion to compel the insurer to pay for the proposed surgery, which was granted by the trial court. The insurer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s decision. We affirm the decision. |
Polk | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Napoleon Stephan Meredith
A Davidson County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Napoleon Stephan Meredith, of two counts of aggravated robbery. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to allow the appellant to be viewed from a close distance by the jury and that the error forced him to relinquish his Fifth Amendment right not to testify. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. In Re: Aaron Bonding Company (Elisha Tomlinson and Tommy Gregory)
The trial court found the Defendants, Elisha Tomlinson and Tommy Gregory, in contempt of court for their part in the depleting of $250,000 in certificates of deposit held as collateral for the bond writing ability of Aaron Bonding Company. On appeal, both Defendants contend that the evidence is insufficient to sustain this finding. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Martin
The defendant, Michael Martin, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony; aggravated assault, a Class C felony; and violation of an order of protection, a Class A misdemeanor. The aggravated assault conviction merged into the attempted second degree murder conviction, and the defendant was sentenced to eighteen years as a Range II offender on the attempted second degree murder conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days on the violation of an order of protection conviction, to be served consecutively. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in allowing photographs of the victim’s wounds into evidence; (2) the trial court erred in allowing evidence regarding injuries the victim’s grandparents sustained during the commission of the offense; (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for attempted second degree murder; (4) the cumulative effect of the errors at trial was sufficient to justify a new trial; and (5) the trial court erred in sentencing him as a Range II offender. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anthony V. Jackson v. Ginger Jackson
This appeal involves countless motions filed over a period of nearly nine years following the parties’ contentious divorce. The mother appeals, challenging numerous rulings by the trial court. We affirm in part, reverse in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony V. Jackson v. Ginger Jackson - Concurring/Dissenting
I agree with most of the majority opinion in this case. I find I must dissent from the majority’s decision to vacate the award to Father of statutory interest on Mother’s child support arrearage. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Becka L. A. K.
The trial court allowed the mother of a twelve year old girl to move out of state with the child over the objections of the father and set out a generous visitation schedule so the father could maintain a close relationship with his daughter. Shortly after the move, the father filed a petition for contempt and for change of custody, alleging that the mother had deliberately thwarted his court-ordered visitation to defeat his parental rights. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that the father had proved his allegations, and it transferred custody of the child to him. Since we find that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings, we reverse and reinstate the parenting plan in effect before the father filed his petition and remand to the trial court for crafting of a transition plan. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Devon O’Neal Wiggins
The Defendant-Appellant, Devon O’Neal Wiggins, was convicted by a Dyer County jury of sale of cocaine over 0.5 grams in a drug-free zone, a Class B felony. He was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The trial court ordered that this sentence be served consecutive to a thirty-year sentence for case number 07-CR-461. On appeal, Wiggins claims: (1) the insufficiency of the evidence; (2) the jury instructions should have included the offense of sale of a counterfeit controlled substance; (3) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a bifurcated trial; (4) the testimony of an expert witness violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause; (5) his sentence was excessive; (6) the trial court improperly commented on the evidence; (7) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its closing argument; and (8) cumulative error. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gregory D. Roberts
The defendant, Gregory D. Roberts, was convicted by a Fayette County jury of illegal voting, a Class D felony, for having intentionally voted in a November 2008 election knowing that he was ineligible to vote due to his felony convictions for infamous crimes. He was subsequently sentenced by the trial court as a Range II offender to four years in the Department of Correction, with the sentence suspended to fifteen days in the county jail with the remainder of the time on supervised probation. The defendant raises essentially three issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred by not instructing the jury to disregard a lay witness’s testimony regarding similarities in signatures; and (3) whether trial counsel was ineffective for not moving for a directed verdict. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Becka L. A. K. - Concurring/Dissenting
The juvenile court found that a material change of circumstances had occurred due to Mother’s failure to adhere to the parenting plan, thereby repeatedly frustrating and sometimes preventing Father’s visitation, and that it was in their child’s best interest to be placed in the custody of her father. I would affirm these rulings. |
Humphreys | Court of Appeals | |
David Lee Wright ex rel. Kaitlyn Lee Wright v. Anita J. Wright et al.
We granted this appeal to determine the proper method for computing a reasonable attorney’s fee when the attorney represents a minor. In this case, after the attorney obtained a $425,000 settlement for a minor injured in an automobile accident, the trial court awarded the attorney $141,666.66, or one-third of the recovery, pursuant to the terms of the attorney’s contingent fee agreement with the minor’s father. The court-appointed guardian ad litem appealed the fee award, and the Court of Appeals reversed. Upon remand, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and determined that $131,000 would be a reasonable attorney’s fee, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Reviewing for an abuse of discretion, we hold that the trial court applied the correct legal standard by analyzing the ten factors set forth in Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 8, Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(a). We further hold that the fee award was neither illogical, based on an erroneous assessment of the evidence, nor an injustice to the minor. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Fentress | Supreme Court | |
Collateral Plus, LLC, et al. v. Max Well Medical, Inc.
This is an appeal of the grant of a motion for summary judgment. The parties entered into a loan management agreement providing that a placement fee would be paid only upon the occurrence of certain conditions. The agreement explicitly provided that it would terminate when the underlying bank loan was satisfied. When the underlying loan was repaid, the conditions precedent to the payment of the placement fee had not occurred. The Appellee sought payment of the placement fee when the Appellant was acquired a year later, which the Appellant refused on the grounds that the agreement had terminated. Because the agreement states unequivocally that it terminates upon repayment of the underlying loan, making the placement fee provision unenforceable, we reverse the summary judgment award in favor of the Appellee. We hold that, instead, summary judgment should have been entered in favor of the Appellant. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Collateral Plus, LLC, et al. v. Max Well Medical, Inc. - Dissenting
Because I am of opinion that the $900,000 placement fee was earned when Collateral Plus was successful in securing financial assistance for MAX Well and became payable in February 2008 when the remainder of MAX Well’s stock was purchased, I respectfully dissent from the court’s holding that MAX Well is entitled to summary judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In the Matter of: Jaleia M. R.
The trial court terminated the parental rights of both parents of a four year old girl on the ground of abandonment. The court also found that an additional ground that applied to the father was his failure to legitimate the child, and an additional ground that applied to the mother was her failure to remedy the conditions which led her to lose custody of the child, with little likelihood that those conditions would be remedied in the immediate future. Only the mother appealed. We reverse. |
Lawrence | Court of Appeals | |
Sherry C. Sloan v. William Chadwick Poff
The Juvenile Court found the mother in criminal contempt for violating two orders. The first order governed the manner of the mother’s communications with her son’s father, and the second order governed the father’s right to visit with the child on specific dates. The Juvenile Court sentenced the mother to the Davidson County workhouse for ten days for violating the earlier order, but suspended the sentence for so long as the mother continued to comply with orders. The court fined the mother $50 for violating the second order. On appeal, the mother challenged: the sufficiency of the evidence supporting both findings of contempt; an evidentiary ruling; the suspension of her sentence; the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the child; and the trial court’s recusal without request. We affirm the Juvenile Court in all respects. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Antonio Kendrick v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Antonio Kendrick, appeals the Criminal Court of Shelby County’s dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rodney M. Butler v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Rodney M. Butler, appeals pro se after the Madison County Circuit Court summarily dismissed his post-conviction petition seeking relief from his guilty plea to driving under the influence, fourth offense, a Class E felony, for which he received a three-year sentence with a 35 percent release eligibility. We conclude that Petitioner should have been afforded an evidentiary hearing, and for the reasons stated herein, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Small
The Defendant-Appellant, Michael Small, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies. On appeal, Small argues that the trial court erred in imposing a twenty-year sentence consecutive to his effective sentence of forty years for three previous convictions for aggravated robbery. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stacy Lee Fleming
The Defendant-Appellant, Stacy Lee Fleming, was convicted by a Tipton County jury of delivery of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class B felony. He was sentenced as a career offender to thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Fleming claims: (1) the insufficiency of the evidence; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by restricting the cross-examination of a State’s witness; (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct in its closing argument; and (4) the trial court erred by sentencing Fleming as a career offender. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Tipton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kathy Elaine Schiffner v. Curtis James Schiffner
In a divorce action, Husband appeals trial court’s award of alimony to Wife, asserting that the amount was excessive and the duration was not supported by the evidence. Finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the nature, duration and amount of alimony awarded, the judgment is affirmed. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals |