James Daniel Marshall v. Jenine Estelle Marshall
Husband appeals the entry of a default judgment and the resulting Final Decree in a divorce action. Wife filed a complaint for divorce; Husband filed an answer and counter-complaint. Later in the proceedings, Wife filed a motion for default judgment and other relief against Husband due to his failure to comply with the court's discovery deadline. The trial court entered an order granting a default judgment against Husband, striking his pleadings, and deeming Wife's discovery requests admitted. Husband timely filed a motion to set aside the order on the ground he did not receive proper notice of the hearing, which the trial court denied. We have determined that Husband did not receive proper notice; as a consequence the order granting the default judgment and other relief is void. Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law in denying Husband's motion to set aside the order. The court's failure to set aside the order also greatly impaired Husband's right to assert the defenses and affirmative claims that were stricken. Accordingly, the Final Decree is also reversed and we remand for a new trial of the issues properly raised by the parties in their pleadings subject, of course, to Husband complying with discovery and the trial court's orders. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
First Horizons Home Loan Corporation d/b/a First Tennessee Home Loans, et al.
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Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Gerald and Helen Lilly, Individually and as Guardians and Next of Kin of Tadarius M. Moore, Deceased v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, et al.
Plaintiffs, the guardians and grandparents of a fourth-grader at Amqui Elementary School filed this wrongful death action against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County. While at school, the decedent became ill. After school employees cared for him for a period of time, his condition worsened; school employees then called 911 and performed CPR while awaiting for the paramedics. Tragically, the child died on the way to the emergency room. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant did not properly train or supervise its school employees and that Defendant's employees were negligent in failing to secure proper medical care. The trial court summarily dismissed the action upon findings that Defendant had not breached a duty to the decedent and that its actions were not the proximate cause of decedent's death. Plaintiffs appeal. We reverse finding there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. George John Byrd
The Defendant-Appellant, George John Byrd, was convicted by a Knox County jury of three counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. He was sentenced to twenty-five years for each aggravated rape and to twelve years for aggravated assault. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The sole issues presented for our review are whether the trial court erred by (1) allowing testimony of certain thefts by Byrd; and (2) allowing a nurse to testify about statements made by the victim during her medical examination. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey Booth
The Defendant-Appellant, Jeffrey Booth, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felonies; one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; and one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. Booth received concurrent sentences of twenty years for each of the two especially aggravated kidnapping convictions, eight years for the aggravated robbery conviction, and three years for the aggravated assault conviction, for an effective sentence of twenty years in confinement. On appeal, Booth argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the prosecutor made improper comments during closing argument; (3) his separate convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault violate due process pursuant to State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991) and State v. Dixon, 957 S.W.2d 532 (Tenn. 1997); (4) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication; (5) the trial court erred in failing to merge the two convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping. Upon review, we merge the dual especially aggravated kidnapping convictions into a single conviction and remand the case to the trial court for entry of corrected judgments to reflect the merger of these convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jose A. Iniguez
Defendant, Jose A. Iniguez, was convicted by a Madison County jury of stalking, a Class A misdemeanor, and driving while unlicensed, a Class C. Misdemeanor. For stalking, the trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months, 29 days and for driving while unlicensed a sentence of 30 days, to be served concurrently in the county jail. On appeal, Defendant's sole issue is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for his stalking conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles Bates v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Charles Bates, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He pled guilty to criminal attempt to commit aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony, in exchange for a sentence of six years in the Shelby County Correction Center as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, he argues that counsel was ineffective and that his guilty plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. After careful review, we affirm the denial of relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
John Steven Davidson, Jr. v. Mary Molteni Davidson
Wife appeals the trial court's designation of Husband as primary residential parent of the parties' two children and reduction of Wife's parenting time with one of the children. We vacate the trial court orders at issue and remand the case for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Valenti Mid-South Management, LLC v. Reagan Farr, Commissioner of Revenue, State of Tennessee
Plaintiff filed suit in chancery court to challenge an assessment of Plaintiff's franchise tax liability by the Department of Revenue. The chancery court upheld the assessment. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Oscar Paul Guess, III v. City of Manchester, a Tennessee Municipality, et al.
Discharged city employee filed a petition for writ of certiorari challenging his termination by the city. The trial court remanded the case to the board of mayor and aldermen based upon the court's determination that there was evidence of bias on the part of one alderman and that the record did not allow the court to determine the grounds relied upon by the board in terminating the employee. We have determined that the trial court erred in remanding this case. The city employee waived the issue of possible bias on the part of one alderman by failing to raise it at any time during the hearing before the board. Moreover, the board was not required to make specific findings on the reasons for its decision. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
Cascade Ophio, Inc., DBA C.W. Ohio, Inc. vs. Modern Machine Corporation, A Tennessee Corporation, et al
Machine Tool & Die, Inc., now known as CMTD, Inc. ("the Seller"), and Modern Machine Corporation, a Tennessee corporation ("Modern Tennessee" or "the Buyer"), regarding a machine that the Seller had agreed to build for the Customer. After the Seller agreed to build the machine, the Seller entered into an agreement with the Buyer to sell its assets to the Buyer, including the Seller's contract to build the machine for the Customer. The machine was never built, prompting this lawsuit. Following a bench trial, the court held that the Seller and Buyer were liable to the Customer for the down payment made on the machine purchase. The court further held that the Buyer was liable to the Customer under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act ("the TCPA"), trebled the Customer's damages, and held the Buyer responsible for the attorney's fees of the Customer. The court also held the Buyer liable to indemnify the Seller, including the attorney's fees of the Seller. The court also pierced the corporate veil of the Buyer and held parties related to the Buyer jointly liable with the Buyer. The Buyer and its related parties appeal. We reverse in part and modify in part. Except as modified or reversed, the judgment is affirmed. Case remanded. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dionis Nick Papa
The defendant, Dionis Nick Papa, appeals the sentencing decision of the Davidson County Criminal Court. Because the record supports the trial court's ordering a sentence of confinement, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Terry James Lee A/K/A Terry Lee Williams v. State of Tennessee
The defendant, Terry James Lee aka Terry Lee Williams, appeals the revocation of his probation. He initially entered guilty pleas to felony evading arrest, reckless endangerment, and reckless aggravated assault, for which he received a total effective sentence of four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He served six months of his sentence before being placed on intensive probation. On appeal, he argues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to revoke his probation and contends his sentence had expired. The State has moved the Court to affirm the revocation of probation pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After careful review, we affirm the revocation of probation pursuant to Rule 20. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lindsey Ray Butler
Defendant, Lindsey Ray Butler, was indicted by the Maury County Grand Jury in a one-count indictment for possession of marijuana with intent to sell in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-17-417(a)(4)(g)(1). Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of simple possession of marijuana, and the judgment reflects that he was sentenced by the trial court to serve 11 months and 29 days, consecutive to a five-year sentence he is currently serving. In this direct appeal, Defendant challenges the legality of a search of his residence. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kane Stackhouse
The defendant, Kane Stackhouse, aggrieved of his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus twenty years, appeals contending that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress his statements. We discern no error regarding the motion to suppress; however, we conclude, via plain error, that the trial court erred by failing to merge the second degree murder conviction into the merged convictions of first degree felony murder. Accordingly, we vacate and remand for the verdict of second degree murder to be merged into the judgment of first degree felony murder. In all other respects, the judgments of conviction are affirmed. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Donna Shedd, et al. v. Community Health Systems, Inc., et al.
Father seeks to intervene in the wrongful death action filed by Mother for the death of the parties' daughter. The trial court found Father waived his right to intervene through inaction. We find the trial court abused its discretion in declaring Father's motion untimely, and therefore, we vacate the order denying Father's motion to intervene, and we remand for further proceedings. |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
Robert Edwards, et al. v. City of Memphis, et al.
Appellants, police officers with the Memphis Police Department, filed suit against the City and the Director of Police Services, claiming that the City violated Memphis City Charter Section 67 by failing to promote the officers to the rank of Captain after thirty years of service. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the City, and the officers appeal. Finding that the relevant case law clearly establishes: (1) that Appellants have no legal right to work as Captains, a rank that no longer exists; (2) that the City's decision to abolish this rank for operational purposes was not discriminatory; and (3) that Section 67 of the City Charter is a retirement tool and not a guarantee of employment, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan Greer
The defendant, Jonathan Greer, was convicted by a Fayette County jury of robbery, a Class C felony, and sentenced to serve fifteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant has raised the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. Specifically, he contends that his conviction is precluded by State v. Owens, 20 S.W.3d 634, 638 (Tenn. 2000), because the State failed to establish that the taking of the property was contemporaneous with the use of violence or fear. Following review of the record, we affirm the judgment of conviction. |
Fayette | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Johnny Lee Lewis v. State of Tennessee
Following a jury trial, the Petitioner, Johnny Lee Lewis, was convicted of two counts of facilitation of second degree murder, a Class B felony, and one count of aggravated arson, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. __ 39-11-403, -13-210, -14-302. This Court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. See State v. Johnny Lee Lewis, No. M2002-01350-CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 22398394 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Oct. 21, 2003). The Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying him relief because: (1) trial counsel failed to request that the jury be sequestered; (2) trial counsel failed to interview and present witnesses; (3) trial counsel failed to object, based on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), to the use of enhancement factors during the Petitioner's sentencing hearing; (4) trial counsel failed to object, based on the Confrontation Clause, to testimony regarding a co-conspirator's statements; and (5) the cumulative effect of trial counsel's errors denied him a fair trial. After our review, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Andre L. Mayfield v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Andre L. Mayfield, filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis, challenging his convictions for aggravated robbery, aggravated rape, rape, and two counts of aggravated kidnapping based on newly discovered evidence. The coram nobis court summarily dismissed the petition without a hearing. Petitioner appeals. We determine that the coram nobis court properly dismissed the petition after finding that the "newly discovered" evidence relied upon by Petitioner would have provided "insignificant assistance to the defense of the charges" had it been presented at trial. Accordingly, the judgment of the coram nobis court dismissing the petition is affirmed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Don Mask Brown, Jr.
The Defendant-Appellant, Don Mask Brown, Jr., was convicted by a Hardeman County jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced as a violent offender to forty years for second degree murder and, as a multiple offender, to fifteen years for the aggravated robbery. The trial court ordered these sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of fifty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Brown claims: (1) the trial court violated the principles of Blakely v. Washington by finding that several enhancement factors were applicable; and (2) the trial court should not have imposed consecutive sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Scott Winfrey
The Defendant, David Scott Winfrey, pleaded guilty to twenty-nine Class A misdemeanors consisting of one count of aggravated criminal trespass, one count of stalking, thirteen counts of harassment, and fourteen counts of violation of an order of protection. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days for each offense and ordered that ten of his violation of an order of protection sentences run consecutively. In a previous decision, we remanded this matter for re-sentencing, concluding that the trial court erroneously applied Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13- 113(g). See State v. David Scott Winfrey, No. M2008-01429-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 2486180 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Aug. 14, 2009). The defendant now appeals the consecutive sentences imposed upon re-sentencing and contends that they are not in accordance with our previous opinion in this matter. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lamario Sumner A/K/A Lamario Fleming v. State of Tennessee
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Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcos Acosta Raymundo, A/K/A Marcos Raymundo Acosta
The Defendant, Marcos Acosta Raymundo, a.k.a. Marcos Raymundo Acosta, was charged with one count of aggravated child abuse of a child less than eight years old, a Class A felony, one count of aggravated child neglect of a child less than eight years old, a Class A felony, and two counts of child abuse of a child less than six years old, a Class D felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. __ 39-15-401(a), -402(b). Following a jury trial, he was convicted of four offenses: one count of attempted aggravated child abuse of a child less than eight years old, a Class B felony, and the other three offenses as charged. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years for count one, attempted aggravated child abuse, twenty-five years for count two, aggravated child neglect, four years for count three, child abuse, and four years for count four, child abuse. The trial court ordered that count two was to be served concurrently with count one, and that counts three and four were to be served concurrently with each other, but consecutively to count two. Thus, the trial court sentenced the defendant to a total effective sentence of twenty-nine years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him; and (2) his convictions for counts one, two, and four violated the principles of double jeopardy. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the State presented insufficient evidence to convict the defendant of count two, aggravated child neglect, and that the defendant's convictions for count one, attempted aggravated child abuse, and count four, child abuse, violate the principles of double jeopardy. Thus, we reverse the defendant's convictions on counts two and four, and affirm his convictions on counts one and three. We remand to the trial court for a redetermination of concurrent and consecutive sentencing. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Philip Michael Patterson
The Defendant-Appellant, Phillip Michael Patterson, pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Blount County to two counts of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony, one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, two counts of theft of property between $1,000 and $10,000, a Class D felony, and one count of theft under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. He received an effective sentence of thirty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Patterson subsequently appealed his guilty pleas, and a protracted procedural history developed. On appeal, two of Patterson's claims remain: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying, without a hearing, his "Motion for Modification or Reduction of Sentence"; and (2) whether his convictions are void because he did not sign the plea agreement. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals |