Stephen Charles Johnson v. Elizabeth Kay Johnson
E2022-01635-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Richard B. Armstrong, Jr.

Because the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court
lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Kenneth J. Mynatt v. National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 39 Et Al.
M2020-01285-SC-R11-CV
Authoring Judge: Chief Justice Roger A. Page
Trial Court Judge: Judge Darrell Scarlett

Kenneth J. Mynatt (“Plaintiff”) served as the vice president of the local chapter of his union. He filed an action for malicious prosecution and civil conspiracy against the union, the local chapter, and several individuals associated with the union. He alleged that after he publicly criticized the union’s financial waste, its leadership accused him of misusing union funds. Those accusations led to his indictment on two felony charges. In the resulting criminal case, the State filed a motion to retire the charges for one year, and those charges were ultimately dismissed after the year passed. In Plaintiff’s complaint for malicious prosecution, he stated that he continued to maintain his innocence, that he refused any plea deals, and that the criminal case terminated in his favor because it was ultimately dismissed. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the retirement and dismissal of the criminal charges was not a favorable termination on the merits. Thus, they argued his complaint was missing an essential element of a malicious prosecution claim. The trial court agreed and dismissed the complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the underlying criminal proceedings terminated in his favor. The defendants sought review from this Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals did not apply the correct standard for determining what constitutes a favorable termination for the purpose of a malicious prosecution claim. We conclude that the prohibition in Himmelfarb v. Allain, 380 S.W.3d 35 (Tenn. 2012), precluding a factintensive and subjective inquiry into the reasons and circumstances leading to dispositions in civil cases also applies to dispositions in criminal cases. We hold that plaintiffs can pursue a claim for malicious prosecution only if an objective examination, limited to the documents disposing of the proceeding or the applicable procedural rules, indicates the termination of the underlying criminal proceeding reflects on the merits of the case and was due to the innocence of the accused. Under this standard, Mr. Mynatt did not allege sufficient facts for a court to conclude that the dismissal of his criminal case was a favorable termination. We therefore reverse the holding of the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court’s judgment granting the motion to dismiss.

Harry Clint Weaver, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
E2022-00228-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge William K. Rogers

The petitioner, Harry Clint Weaver, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction
relief, which petition challenged his 2019 Sullivan County Criminal Court
guilty-pleaded convictions of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, three
counts of aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, and aggravated domestic assault, for
which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the petitioner
argues that the post-conviction court erred in allowing trial counsel to remain in the
courtroom while the petitioner testified during the evidentiary hearing and that he was
deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Emanuel Kidega Samson
M2022-00148-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Jill Bartee Ayers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Cheryl A. Blackburn

Defendant, Emanuel Kidega Samson, was convicted of three counts of civil rights intimidation, one count of first-degree premeditated murder, seven counts of attempted first-degree murder, seven counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, twenty-four counts of aggravated assault, and one count of reckless endangerment. He received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for his firstdegree murder conviction. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of 281 years for the remaining convictions to be served consecutively to the life sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court improperly excluded expert testimony as to his mental health; that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for civil rights intimidation, attempted first-degree premeditated murder, and first-degree premeditated murder; that his conviction for civil rights intimidation in Count 3 of the indictment and his convictions for employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony violated double jeopardy; that the State failed to make an election of offenses as to his convictions for civil rights intimidation; that the trial court erred by admitting a note he wrote; that the trial court erred by admitting a portion of the recordings of his jail phone calls; that the trial court incorrectly charged the jury that his failure to remember the facts of the offenses was not a defense; and that his sentence was improper. Following our review of the entire record, oral argument, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Ronnell Barclay v. State of Tennessee
W2022-00406-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert L. Holloway, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jennifer Johnson Mitchell

Petitioner, Ronnell Barclay, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s
denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his convictions for
rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and sexual exploitation of a minor by electronic
means. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel
because counsel (1) did not communicate to Petitioner that the victim made a new
disclosure on the first day of trial; (2) failed to request a continuance after the State
informed the trial court and Petitioner of the new disclosure; and (3) incorrectly informed
Petitioner of his potential exposure at trial as a result of the new disclosure. Following our
review, we affirm in part; however, we remand the case to the post-conviction court for
further findings of fact and conclusions of law relative to the exposure issue.

In Re Isaiah W. Et Al.
E2022-00575-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge William Erwin Phillips, II

This is a dependency and neglect case concerning two minor children. Appellee Tennessee
Department of Children’s Services received a referral of potential child abuse. Following
a brief investigation, the oldest child was taken into DCS custody after he admitted to
sexually assaulting Appellant, his mother. Three days later the juvenile court sua sponte
ordered the younger child into DCS custody due to allegations of domestic violence and
sexual abuse in the home. Later, the juvenile court adjudicated both children dependent
and neglected. On de novo review, the circuit court found the older child dependent and
neglected under Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-102(b)(13)(A) and found both
children dependent and neglected under section 37-1-102(b)(13)(F) and (G). Mother
appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

James L. Henry, Jr., Et Al. v. Elizabeth P. Casey Et Al.
E2022-00933-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Pamela A. Fleenor

This appeal stems from the trial court’s dismissal of two creditors’ claims against the
personal representatives of the decedent debtor’s estate. The creditors claimed that the
personal representatives breached their fiduciary duties to the estate by failing to exercise
the decedent’s statutory right, as a surviving spouse, to take an elective share of his
deceased wife’s estate when the time limit for doing so had not yet expired at the time of
the decedent’s death. The creditors also asserted claims against other parties associated
with the personal representatives for conspiracy and inducement. In dismissing the
creditors’ complaint, the trial court determined that (1) Tennessee statutory law provides
that a personal representative of the surviving spouse’s estate “may” take an elective
share on behalf of the surviving spouse who has died, (2) “may” indicates that the
decision is discretionary, (3) the personal representative maintains the same discretion to
elect that the surviving spouse held, (4) the personal representative owes no duty to
creditors of the estate to make the election, and (5) the right to elect is not an asset of the
estate that can be deemed “wasted” if unexercised. The creditors have appealed.
Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Shelby Brooks
E2022-00564-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Rex H. Ogle

The defendant, Shelby Brooks, appeals the Sevier County Circuit Court’s order revoking
her probation and requiring her to serve the balance of her five-year sentence for the sale
of a Schedule II controlled substance and the sale of a Schedule III controlled substance in
confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Christopher Ray Smith
M2022-00646-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge Forest A. Durard, Jr.

The Appellant, Christopher Ray Smith, entered a guilty plea to three counts of misdemeanor failure to appear, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-609, with the length and manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days’ imprisonment for each count, with counts two and three to be served concurrently to a consecutive term in count one. The trial court suspended the sentence to supervised probation following service of six months’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence. Upon review, we modify the sentence in count one and remand for entry of corrected judgment form as to that count. In all other respects, we affirm.

Curtis O'Neal Shelton, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
M2022-00849-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Matthew J. Wilson
Trial Court Judge: Judge William R. Goodman, III

A Montgomery County jury convicted Petitioner, Curtis O’Neal Shelton, Jr., of two counts of first degree felony murder, one count of especially aggravated burglary, four counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated kidnapping, and seven counts of attempted aggravated robbery. After merging the two felony murder convictions, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to an effective term of life in prison plus twenty years. Petitioner appealed, and this court affirmed his convictions and sentence. Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. On appeal, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) communicate with Petitioner effectively; (2) raise sufficient, proper objections to the State’s evidence; (3) introduce evidence on Petitioner’s behalf; and (4) file a timely motion for new trial. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Joel C. Riley Et Al. v. Hector G. Jaramillo Et Al.
E2022-01181-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Judge W. Jeffrey Hollingsworth

This is a dispute involving the usage and subdivision of real property in McMinn County.
The plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment that a restrictive covenant contained in the
deed to their property applied to other parcels originating from the same parent tract.
Upon competing motions for summary judgment and following a hearing, the trial court
entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissing
the plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. The trial court determined that the language in the
plaintiffs’ deed was not sufficient to create an express restrictive covenant upon the
property subsequently conveyed to the defendants and that the plaintiffs did not produce
sufficient evidence of a “common plan” for the original tract such as would warrant
imposition of an implied negative reciprocal easement. The plaintiffs have appealed.
Discerning no reversible error, we affirm

Alyssa Vandyke v. Lilly Cheek ET AL.
M2022-00938-COA-R10-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge Adrienne Gilliam Fry

We granted this extraordinary appeal to determine whether the Governmental Tort Liability Act, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-20-307 and 29-20-313(b), requires severance in cases involving both non-governmental and governmental entities.  Following the legislature’s amendment of these statutes in 1994, we conclude that, when a jury is demanded, the entire case against both non-governmental and governmental entities shall be tried to a jury without severance. 

The State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Joan Ross Westerman Et Al. v. Peggy D. Mathes Et Al.
M2022-00611-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Anne C. Martin

The trial court granted Defendants/Appellees’ motion for a directed verdict at the close of Plaintiff/Appellant’s proof. Discerning no error, we affirm.

State of Tennessee v. Jasmine Lashay Bland
W2022-00174-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. Campbell, Sr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge A. Blake Neill

The Defendant, Jasmine Lashay Bland, was convicted by a Tipton County Circuit Court
jury of leaving the scene of an accident, assault, and burglary of a vehicle. She was
sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to concurrent terms of two years
for the felony burglary of a vehicle conviction, six months for the assault conviction, and
thirty days for the leaving the scene of an accident conviction, with the sentences suspended
after thirty days of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court
committed reversible error by not allowing her to cross-examine the victim about a
potential source of bias related to the victim’s alleged insurance claim for personal injuries.
Based on our review, we conclude that this issue is waived because it was not raised in the
trial court. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Emma Glover v. Paul Duckhorn
W2022-00697-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert Samual Weiss

At issue is whether Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-104(a)(2) extends the statute of
limitations for a personal injury action to two years when a traffic citation for the violation
of Memphis City Code Ordinance § 11-16-3 for Failure to Maintain Safe Lookout is issued
to the driver alleged to be at fault. Stated another way, is an exception created to the oneyear
statute of limitations for personal injuries if a person involved in an automobile
accident receives a ticket for the violation of a municipal ordinance from that accident?
The trial court ruled in the negative. We affirm.

Meredith Lee Taylor v. Christopher Bryan Taylor
M2022-00140-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Judge M. Wyatt Burk

This is a divorce action filed by Meredith Lee Taylor (“Mother”) against Christopher Bryan Taylor (“Father”). The trial court divided the marital estate nearly equally and granted Mother primary residential custody of the parties’ child. Father was granted 130 days per year of parenting time. Father appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in its valuation of several marital assets. He also asserts that the trial court should have awarded him more parenting time. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Wayne C. Lance v. Alcoa Hotel Hospitality
E2022-01430-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Clarence E. Pridemore, Jr.

Because the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court
lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

State of Tennessee v. Shaquil Murphy
E2022-00605-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. Campbell, Sr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steven Wayne Sword

The Defendant, Shaquil Murphy, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court jury of
attempted first degree premeditated murder, attempted second degree murder, unlawful
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, two counts of aggravated assault, and two
counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. On appeal,
the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for the attempted murder and
employing a firearm convictions and argues that the trial court erred by not dismissing the
employing a firearm counts of the indictment and by including duty to retreat language in
the jury instruction on self-defense. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the
trial court.

In Re Nevaeh S.
E2022-00959-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge John W. McClarty
Trial Court Judge: Judge J. Michael Sharp

A mother appeals from the termination of her parental rights to her child on the ground of
severe child abuse. She concedes the ground for termination, but challenges the trial
court’s finding that termination of her parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We
affirm the trial court’s conclusion that clear and convincing evidence supports the
aforementioned ground for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interest.

State of Tennessee v. Joel Michael Guy, Jr.
E2021-00560-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Steven Wayne Sword

The defendant, Joel Michael Guy, Jr., appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury
convictions of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of felony
murder, and two counts of abuse of a corpse, challenging the denial of various motions to
suppress evidence, the admission of certain evidence, the constitutionality of the statute
prohibiting abuse of a corpse, and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
convictions of abuse of a corpse and arguing that the cumulative effect of the errors entitles
him to a new trial. Because the defendant did not have standing to challenge the
warrantless entry into the house where the murders occurred, we affirm the denial of the
defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from the crime scene on grounds different
than those upon which the trial court relied. Even if the defendant had standing to challenge
the entry into the house, the entry was supported by probable cause and exigent
circumstances, and the evidence was in the officers’ plain view. The trial court correctly
concluded that the search of the backpack was an appropriately-conducted inventory
search. The trial court did not err by refusing to suppress surveillance video obtained using
the receipts discovered from the unlawful search of the defendant’s Louisiana residence
because the trial court correctly concluded that the police would have inevitably discovered
the surveillance video during the course of the investigation. The trial court did not err by
admitting evidence that the victims intended to stop providing financial support to the
defendant. The proscriptive statute criminalizing the abuse of a corpse is not void for
vagueness, and the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support the defendant’s
convictions of these offenses. Finally, because we conclude that the trial court did not
commit any error, no error obtains to accumulate. We affirm the judgments of the trial
court.

Stacey Lee (Boyett) v. Brett Carr Boyett
M2022-00060-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Trial Court Judge: Phillip R. Robinson

A father appealed an order requiring his children to receive the COVID-19 vaccine.  While the appeal was pending, both children received the vaccine.  Because we determine that the appeal is moot, we dismiss the appeal.

State of Tennessee v. Rickey Latinos Haymer
M2022-00515-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Tom Greenholtz
Trial Court Judge: Judge James A. Turner

The Defendant, Rickey Haymer, appeals his convictions of crimes involving the attempted unlawful purchase or possession of a firearm. He argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions because his actions in seeking to purchase a firearm did not constitute a “substantial step” toward the completed crimes. He also argues that the trial court committed plain error in admitting various text messages showing his contact with the putative seller. On our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

State of Tennessee v. Justin Darnay Graves
W2021-01405-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge Donald H. Allen

The Defendant-Appellant, Justin Darnay Graves, was convicted as charged by a Madison
County jury of simple possession of cocaine, felon in possession of a firearm, and
possession of drug paraphernalia, for which he received an effective sentence of six years’
plus eleven months and twenty-nine days’ imprisonment to be served consecutively to
several unrelated convictions including case numbers 20-330 (sale and delivery of heroin),
20-331 (sale and delivery of heroin and sale and delivery of methamphetamine), 20-332
(sale and delivery of heroin and sale and delivery of methamphetamine),1 20-334
(possession of drugs; traffic offense; introduction of contraband into a penal facility;
driving without a license; tampering with evidence), 2 and 20-335 (leaving the scene of
accident resulting in death), two of which were committed while the Appellant was
released on bond. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-20-111(b). Prior to trial, the Appellant filed a
motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the traffic stop which formed the basis of
his convictions. As grounds for the motion to suppress, the Appellant argued that “the
amount of time between the initial traffic stop and the arrival of the [canine] unit [was]
unreasonable” and in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
and article I, section 7 of the Constitution of Tennessee. Following a hearing, the trial court
denied the motion to suppress. In this appeal, the Appellant challenges the trial court’s
denial of his motion to suppress and the trial court’s imposition of partially consecutive sentencing. Because the State failed to establish that the otherwise lawful traffic stop was
not unreasonably prolonged in time and scope, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court,
vacate the judgments, and dismiss the case.

Fred Hayward v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority d/b/a Erlanger Health System Et Al.
E2022-00488-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Chief Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kyle E. Hedrick

This health care liability action was brought against a hospital and a physician. The
plaintiff sent pre-suit notice to three1 potential defendants prior to initiating the action. The
trial court found, however, that the plaintiff failed to include as part of the pre-suit notice
a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization because one of the six core elements was
incorrect on the authorization. Following a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Tenn. R.
Civ. P. 12.02(6), the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the action against the
defendant hospital due to noncompliance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121. The plaintiff
argues, among other things, that he should have been allowed to conduct limited discovery
in order to determine whether the defendant hospital had been prejudiced by his failure to
provide a HIPAA-compliant medical authorization. We vacate the trial court’s grant of the
motion to dismiss and hold that the plaintiff should have been permitted to conduct limited
discovery regarding whether prejudice existed for the trial court to consider in its
determination of whether the plaintiff substantially complied with the pre-suit notice
requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121.

Jane Doe v. John David Rosdeutscher, M.D., Et Al.
M2022-00834-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Senior Judge William B. Acree

All of the claims asserted in this action arise from a prior healthcare liability action in which Jane Doe (“Plaintiff”) sued Dr. John Rosdeutscher and his medical group for damages resulting from breast reduction surgery. In the action now on appeal, the complaint asserts claims for invasion of privacy, abuse of process, intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract against Dr. Rosdeutscher, his medical group, and the attorneys who represented them in the prior healthcare liability action. All of Plaintiff’s claims pertain to the fact that the defendants filed Plaintiff’s medical records in the healthcare liability action, which included nude photographs of Plaintiff and details about her sexual and mental health history—information that Plaintiff contends had “nothing to do” with her healthcare liability claims. The defendants responded to the complaint by serving a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 11 notice on Plaintiff’s counsel. Shortly thereafter, the defendants filed a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02 motion to dismiss all claims on various grounds. The trial court granted the Rule 12 motion, dismissed all claims, and assessed $10,000 in damages pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-12-119 against Plaintiff. The trial court also assessed Rule 11 sanctions against Afsoon Hagh, Plaintiff’s attorney, in the additional amount of $32,151.67. Plaintiff appealed; her attorney did not. Finding no error, we affirm. We also find this appeal to be frivolous and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including a determination of the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses incurred by the defendants in defending this appeal and entry of judgment thereon.