Opinions
ROBERT MICHAEL SWAFFORD v. CATHERINE LYDIA TRAIL SWAFFORD
Husband and Wife divorced. In dividing the marital estate, the trial court determined that an account inherited by Wife had been transmuted into marital property and that Wife had dissipated a substantial portion of the transmuted account. Considered as a whole, the trial court allocated the marital estate in a manner that Wife asserted was inequitable. She repeatedly requested findings by the trial court explicating its division of marital estate. The trial court declined to provide such findings. On appeal, Wife challenges the trial court’s classification of the aforementioned account and its conclusion that she dissipated the account. Wife also challenges the trial court’s overall division of marital property both as being inequitable and for the insufficiency of the trial court’s findings. We affirm the trial court’s ruling as to transmutation. We vacate the trial court’s ruling as to dissipation and the trial court’s division of property, and we remand for further proceedings. |
Rhea | Court of Appeals | |
Berkeley Research Group, LLC v. Southern Advanced Materials, LLC
This case addresses whether the Uniform Arbitration Act confers subject matter jurisdiction on Tennessee courts to confirm an arbitration award when the parties’ arbitration agreement specified that arbitration would occur in another state. Berkeley Research Group, LLC and Southern Advanced Materials, LLC entered into a contract which provided that any dispute would be resolved by arbitration in Pennsylvania, not Tennessee. A dispute arose and the parties entered arbitration, which resulted in an award to Berkeley. Berkeley sought to confirm the arbitration award in Shelby County Chancery Court. The trial court confirmed Berkeley’s arbitration award and entered judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that while the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction, it lacked personal jurisdiction over Southern. We find that Tennessee courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to confirm an arbitration reward when the parties agreed arbitration would occur in another state. As a result, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to confirm an award resulting from an arbitration the parties agreed would occur in Pennsylvania. We vacate the judgments of the lower courts and dismiss the petition to confirm the award. |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Raymond Benson
The defendant, Raymond Benson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of reckless homicide and convicted felon in possession of a handgun for which he received an effective sentence of four years suspended to supervised probation. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for reckless homicide and asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to impeach a State’s witness with prior convictions. Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Stephanie Paige Roper (now Stephanie Paige Bruce) v. Wesley Garrett Roper
In this post-divorce dispute, a father petitioned to modify the permanent parenting plan and child support. The mother counterpetitioned for civil contempt alleging the father had willfully violated the parenting plan. After a bench trial, the court denied the father’s petition and held him in civil contempt. Because the evidence preponderates in favor of a finding of a material change in circumstance sufficient to modify the residential parenting schedule, we vacate the denial of the father’s petition to modify the parenting plan and remand for the court to determine whether modification is in the child’s best interest. We reverse the court’s decision to hold the father in civil contempt for failure to maintain insurance coverage because the decision lacked sufficient factual support. Given our disposition of these issues, we also vacate the court’s award of attorney’s fees to the mother as the prevailing party. Otherwise, we affirm. |
Cheatham | Court of Appeals | |
THOMAS N. ALLEN v. TAMMY LYNCH ET AL
The April 2025 order from which the appellant has appealed was not effectively entered, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 58. Therefore, there is no final appealable judgment, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Heather Fisher
A Rhea County jury convicted the Defendant, Heather Fisher, of possession with intent to |
Rhea | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Patricia Slate v. Smiley Bail Bonds et al.
The plaintiff, Patricia Slate, appeals the dismissal of her complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against either of the defendants. Because the appellant’s brief is profoundly noncompliant with Rule 27 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we dismiss this appeal. |
Wilson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bobby V. Summers
The Defendant, Bobby V. Summers, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to facilitation of first degree murder. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Burma Anderson v. Saint Thomas Midtown Hospital et al.
This appeal presents the question of whether, under the Health Care Liability Act, a party in a wrongful death action can rely on a prior beneficiary’s pre-suit notice after succeeding to that beneficiary’s interest in the wrongful death litigation. The trial court concluded that such reliance is permissible. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Rickey Benson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Rickey Benson, acting pro se, appeals from the order of the Shelby County Criminal Court summarily dismissing his petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. After review, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RONALD EUGENE FOX, II
Defendant, Ronald Eugene Fox, II, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree murder, tampering with evidence, and initiating a false report. He challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence for his first degree murder conviction, the trial court’s denial of his motion to continue, and the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of first degree murder. Defendant also argues that the cumulative effect of the errors at trial warrants reversal of his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Armon Yusef Pazouki v. State of Tennessee
In this case of first impression, Petitioner, Armon Yusef Pazouki, entered a conditional guilty plea to domestic assault pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313 (“the judicial diversion statute”). As part of the plea agreement, the trial court entered an order granting Petitioner judicial diversion and placing him on supervised probation for eleven months and twenty-nine days. At a subsequent revocation hearing, Petitioner conceded that he had violated the conditions of his diversionary probation, and pursuant to a new agreement with the State, the trial court revoked Petitioner’s judicial diversion and imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days suspended to supervised probation. Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the revocation proceedings and that his plea agreement in that proceeding was unknowing and involuntary. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, finding that Petitioner could not collaterally attack a revocation of judicial diversion through a post-conviction petition. On appeal, Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in finding that the Post-Conviction Procedure Act does not apply to proceedings relating to the revocation of judicial diversion. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kevin Carnett v. State of Tennessee, et al.
We do not reach the merits of the appeal due to Appellant’s failure to comply with the briefing requirements outlined in Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a), and Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee. |
Chester | Court of Appeals | |
Brian S. Waggoner, M.D. v. Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners
A physician disciplined by the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners challenges the reasonableness and necessity of the costs assessed against him. We find substantial and material evidence to support the cost assessment and affirm the chancery court’s decision affirming the Board’s final order. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Armon Yusef Pazouki v. State of Tennessee (Concurring)
In this case of first impression, Petitioner, Armon Yusef Pazouki, entered a conditional guilty plea to domestic assault pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-313 (“the judicial diversion statute”). As part of the plea agreement, the trial court entered an order granting Petitioner judicial diversion and placing him on supervised probation for eleven months and twenty-nine days. At a subsequent revocation hearing, Petitioner conceded that he had violated the conditions of his diversionary probation, and pursuant to a new agreement with the State, the trial court revoked Petitioner’s judicial diversion and imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days suspended to supervised probation. Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the revocation proceedings and that his plea agreement in that proceeding was unknowing and involuntary. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, finding that Petitioner could not collaterally attack a revocation of judicial diversion through a post-conviction petition. On appeal, Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in finding that the Post-Conviction Procedure Act does not apply to proceedings relating to the revocation of judicial diversion. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Avery H.
This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her special needs child. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that several grounds for termination were proven and that termination is in the best interest of the child. We reverse one ground for termination but otherwise affirm and remand for further proceedings. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Juanita M.
In this action to terminate parental rights, the mother, father, and child all tested positive for methamphetamine. Accordingly, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) took the child into protective custody, and the child was adjudicated dependent and neglected. Despite completing many of DCS’s requirements, the mother and father continued to fail drug tests. DCS filed a petition for termination of parental rights, and the trial court determined that three grounds supported termination as to both parents: (1) persistence of the conditions that led to the child’s removal, (2) severe child abuse, and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume physical custody of or financial responsibility for the child. The trial court also concluded that termination of both parents’ rights was in the child’s best interest. Both parents have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Juanita M.-Dissent
I concur with most of the majority’s analysis of the grounds for termination of the parents’ parental rights. However, I disagree with the finding of severe abuse by the father and I disagree that the best interests of the child require termination. |
Dyer | Court of Appeals | |
Mark Lavon Ford v. April Corrine Ford
This appeal arises from a divorce with minor children. Appellant/Mother appeals the trial court’s designation of Appellee/Father as the primary residential parent of the parties’ youngest children. Discerning no error, we affirm. Both parties request awards of appellate attorney’s fees, which are denied.
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Jackson | Court of Appeals | |
TRAVIS SAXTON v. JESSICA SAXTON
A self-represented party seeks accelerated interlocutory review of the trial court’s order denying her motion seeking disqualification of the trial court judge. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE JACOB E. ET AL.
This is an appeal from a final order entered on March 26, 2024. The notice of appeal was not filed with the Appellate Court Clerk until October 12, 2025, more than thirty days from the date of entry of the order from which the appellants are seeking to appeal. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Bentley E.
Mother and Stepfather petitioned to terminate Father’s parental rights. The trial court found two grounds for termination and that termination was in the child’s best interest. This Court reversed the finding of grounds, but the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the ground of abandonment by failure to support and remanded the matter to the trial court for entry of additional findings as to the best interest analysis. On remand, the trial court again found that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm |
Obion | Court of Appeals | |
IN RE GIAVANNA K.
In this parental termination case, the trial court found that one ground for termination of the mother’s parental rights had been proven by clear and convincing evidence but failed to make findings of fact to support this conclusion. We vacate and remand for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by statute. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
John Winder v. Kenneth Woods, et al.
This appeal concerns a dismissal for lack of service of process. The trial court determined that appellant failed to properly effectuate service and comply with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marlikka Jordan
The Defendant, Marlikka Jordan, was convicted by a Rutherford County jury of aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony, and aggravated child neglect, a Class A felony, for which she is serving an effective fifteen-year sentence in confinement. See T.C.A. § 39-15-402 (2025) (subsequently amended) (aggravated child abuse and neglect). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the victim’s injuries observed on or about August 1, 2020, and that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals |