Allan Joseph Robles v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Allan Joseph Robles, appeals the Henry County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for aggravated sexual battery and resulting twelve-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to file a motion to suppress his confession to police. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Henry | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Devin Banks
This appeal involves a defendant who shot two persons during a robbery at the home of one of the |
Shelby | Supreme Court | |
Ronald Watson v. Roberto Garza, et al.
This appeal involves a motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process. The summons issued for service on the defendant-appellee was served by the deputy sheriff on a co-defendant. The trial court granted the defendant-appellee’s motion to dismiss. We affirm. |
Crockett | Court of Appeals | |
Pedro and Griselda Valadez, Individuals and as parents and next Friends of Fatima Valadez, a Minor v. Newstart, Llc,
In this appeal we are asked to reverse the trial court’s grants of summary judgment to Appellees and adopt a loss of chance theory of recovery, thus allowing Appellants to recover for Appellees’ alleged failure to timely notify them that their unborn child was afflicted with spina bifida such that they could participate in a clinical trial. Because our supreme court has expressly stated that Tennessee does not recognize a cause of action for loss of chance, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Larry Darnnell Pinex - Dissenting
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the Defendant’s dual convictions of attempted aggravated rape and attempted aggravated sexual battery implicate principles of double jeopardy protections. My reasons are two-fold. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Larry Darnnell Pinex
The Defendant, Larry Darnnell Pinex, was convicted of attempted aggravated rape, a Class B felony, attempted aggravated sexual battery, and attempted especially aggravated burglary, Class C felonies. He was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to twenty-five years for attempted aggravated rape and to twelve years for each of the remaining offenses. The twenty-five-year sentence was ordered to be served concurrently with the sentence for attempted aggravated sexual battery but consecutively to the twelve-year sentence for attempted especially aggravated burglary, for an effective sentence of thirty-seven years in the Department of Correction. He presents five issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions for attempted aggravated sexual battery and attempted especially aggravated burglary; (2) whether the rape and battery convictions violate constitutional proscriptions against double jeopardy; (3) whether the State should have been required to make an election of offenses; (4) whether his conviction for attempted especially aggravated burglary should be modified to attempted aggravated burglary based upon Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-404(d); and (5) whether he received an excessive sentence. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Tennessee Constitution precluded convictions for both attempted aggravated rape and attempted aggravated sexual battery because the evidence showed that the Defendant made one continuous attempt to rape the victim. Consequently, we vacate the judgment of the trial court as to the Defendant’s conviction for attempted aggravated sexual battery, as that offense should have been merged with the Defendant’s conviction for attempted aggravated rape. We also modify the conviction for attempted especially aggravated burglary to attempted aggravated burglary and order a sentence of ten years for that offense. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marcus Conner
The Defendant, Marcus Conner, appeals from the sentencing decision of the Lincoln County Circuit Court. In June 2007, the Defendant entered guilty pleas to three counts of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine, Class B felonies, and two counts of selling less than .5 grams of cocaine, Class C felonies. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective fourteen-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender and ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that a sentence of community corrections was appropriate. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Lee Jeffcoat
The defendant, Michael Lee Jeffcoat, pled guilty to three counts of delivery of twenty-six grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to eighteen years in the Department of Correction on each count, with the sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying him alternative sentencing, and he also argues that the eighteen-year sentences imposed by the trial court were excessive. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Muhammad Ziyad v. Estate of William B. Tanner, Sr.
This appeal involves a claim against a decedent’s estate for one million dollars. The probate court denied the claim on various grounds, and we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Joyce Trail v. State of Tennessee, Department of Commerce and Insurance (Insurance Division)
The Commissioner revoked appellant’s license to sell insurance and fined her $7,000.00. Appellant petitioned for review by the Trial Court, who affirmed the determination made by the Commissioner. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Andre Davis
The defendant, Andre Davis, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to fourteen and one-half years as a Range III, persistent offender. In this appeal as of right, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, that the trial court erred in admitting a non-testifying witness’s statement from a police report to impeach the defendant’s testimony, that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the victim’s prior acts of violence and gang affiliation, that the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive, and that these cumulative errors deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial and due process. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Edith L. Staggs v. Travelers Indemnity Co., a/k/a St. Paul Travelers
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, Edith Staggs, brought this action, claiming that she fell, injuring her hip, as a result of a slippery floor while working at Hardee's. Her employer's insurance company, Travelers Indemnity Co., claims that she fell as a result of a seizure. The trial court awarded benefits to Ms. Staggs, and found her to be a credible witness. Travelers Indemnity Co. appeals, arguing that the trial court ruled incorrectly when it determined that Ms. Staggs was a credible witness and that she sustained a compensable injury. We affirm the trial court's judgment. |
Overton | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Rene Burns v. Randstad North America, L. P., et al.
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case, the trial court ruled that the employee, Ms. Rene Burns, sustained a 49% permanent partial disability to the hand. The employer asserts that the trial court erred because it considered Ms. Burns’ disfigurement and alleged fear of equipment as part of the vocational disability award. Consequently, the employer contends that the trial court’s award was excessive. We agree and modify the award to 35% permanent partial disability. |
Wilson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Glenda Overton v. Regis Corporation
This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded the employee, Glenda Overton, 80% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole and temporary partial disability benefits in a stipulated amount. It also awarded a 25% lack of good faith penalty on the temporary disability for non-payment. The employer, Regis Corporation, has appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in finding that Ms. Overton sustained a permanent injury or, in the alternative, that the amount of the award is excessive. Regis also contends that the trial court erred in assessing the penalty for non-payment of the temporary disability benefits. We affirm the award of permanent disability and reverse the assessment of the penalty for non-payment. |
Overton | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Barbara Stricklan and husband, Reed Stricklan, v. Johnny C. Patterson
In this action for damages for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident, the jury returned verdicts for the plaintiffs. Defendant has appealed and on appeal raises the issues of whether there was sufficient and competent proof to support plaintiff’s claim for medical expenses; whether the Court erred in allowing plaintiff's treating physician to offer an opinion on permanent impairment, and he questioned whether the jury verdict was contrary to the "weight of evidence". On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Monroe | Court of Appeals | |
Jeffrey W. Haithcote v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jeffrey W. Haithcote, filed a motion to reopen his post-conviction petition, arguing that (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) the State failed to keep a record of his preliminary hearing; (3) the State breached the plea bargain to which the Defendant agreed; (4) newly discovered evidence is available in the form of tapes, witness statements, and transcripts; (5) his motion to withdraw his guilty plea was not heard; (6) the State improperly used his prior convictions to impeach him and enhance his sentence; (7) his convictions violated the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States Constitution; and (8) the State failed to make certain transcripts available to him. The trial court summarily denied the motion. Following our review, we dismiss the appeal. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Hannah, et.al. v. Alltel Publishing Co.
The Court’s decision in this case alters summary judgment practice in Tennessee by dramatically changing the moving party’s burden of production. From henceforth, parties seeking a summary judgment in Tennessee’s courts will no longer be able to shift the burden of production to the nonmoving party by demonstrating that the nonmoving party’s evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of a claim or defense asserted by the nonmoving party. This change in direction goes far beyond what is required to determine whether the summary judgment in this case was or was not appropriate. The Court’s decision will undermine, rather than enhance, the utility of summary judgment proceedings as opportunities to weed out frivolous lawsuits and to avoid the time and expense of unnecessary trials. |
Monroe | Supreme Court | |
James D. Young, Administrator, Estate of Alva L. Young, v. Jere R. Young
In this Estate, the Executor sued a legatee for a debt owing the Deceased. The parties settled that action by an Order stating that the indebtedness owed to the Decedent by the legatee at the time of death would be treated as an advancement to the legatee in the distribution of the Estate. In the final accounting by the Special Master, the Master found that the legatee defendant owed the Estate $45,942.64. This finding was concurred in by the Trial Court and, on appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court. |
Smith | Court of Appeals | |
Travis Goodman, et al. v. Kathy Jones Kelly
Travis and Stephanie Goodman (“Buyers”) filed a lawsuit for monetary damages or rescission of a residential deed due to defects in a septic system. Buyers sued under the theories of breach of contract, misrepresentation, fraud and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Buyers argue that they did not plead a violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-5-208 (2004) of the Tennessee Residential Property Disclosures Act; however, the trial court treated the case as one under the Act. The jury returned a verdict for Seller. Reviewing the record de novo, we hold that the theories of breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation were pleaded and supported by the proof. These causes of action should have been charged to the jury. We also hold that the parties litigated the issue of intentional misrepresentation and that the trial court charged the jury on this issue. In addition we hold that material evidence supports the jury’s verdict for Seller under theories of intentional or willful misrepresentation of the condition of the subject property under the statute or common law. Accordingly, we affirm in part, vacate in part and remand with instructions. |
Morgan | Court of Appeals | |
Donald Clark v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, Donald Clark, appeals the dismissal of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction or, in the alternative, affirm the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of the motion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petitioner did not comply with the statutory requirements for seeking discretionary review of the dismissal of his motion, this court has no jurisdiction in the case. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carl Ross v. Tennessee Department of Correction
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the chancery court erred in finding that the West Tennessee State Penitentiary Disciplinary Board acted within its jurisdiction and did not act illegally, arbitrarily or fraudulently and substantially complied with its policies and procedures in dismissing Appellant’s claims that: (1) the Board deviated from TDOC Policy No. 502.01(VI)(E)(4)(a) by failing to dismiss one of the charges against Appellant; (2) the Board deviated from TDOC Policy 502.01(VI)(E)(3)(c)(6) and (VI)(E)(3)(d)(1)-(4) by failing to call Officer Hankins; (3) the Board deviated from TDOC Policy 502.01(VI)(E)(3)(e) by failing to independently assess and verify the reliability of the confidential informant; (4) the Board deviated from TDOC policy 502.01(VI)(E)(3)(i)(1) by finding Appellant guilty of possession of a controlled substance without any evidence; and (5) the Board deviated from TDOC Policy (VI)(E)(3)(k)(5) by failing to provide detailed reasons for its decisions and failing to summarize the evidence which led to the Board finding Appellant guilty. We affirm. |
Lauderdale | Court of Appeals | |
Karen Crespo, et al. v. Carol McCullough, et al. - Dissenting
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Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Karen Crespo, et al. v. Carol McCullough, et al.
Karen Crespo and Freddie Crespo filed this medical malpractice action in August 2007, alleging negligence preceding the birth of their daughter, Laura Crespo, in December 2001. The defendants – OB/GYN physician Carol McCullough, OB/GYN nurse Jerilyn H. Boles, Tennessee Women’s Care, P.C., and Women’s Health Alliance, P.C. – moved for dismissal, claiming the suit is barred by this state’s three-year statute of repose for medical malpractice claims, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-116(a) (2000), as interpreted by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Calaway v. Schucker, 193 S.W.3d 509 (Tenn. 2005). The plaintiffs allege that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to their case. The State of Tennessee intervened to defend the statute’s constitutionality. The trial court dismissed the case, but stated in its order that “Plaintiffs’ constitutional arguments are important [and] worthy of review” and “would be best addressed by the appellate courts.” The plaintiffs appeal. We hold that Calaway’s interpretation of § 29-26-116(a) – extending the statute of repose to minors – effectively overturned a body of law that the plaintiffs had reasonably relied upon, and that the sudden reversal of those precedents, without any opportunity for the plaintiffs to pursue their vested claims, worked a violation of these plaintiffs’ due process and equal protection rights. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Samuel D. Leggett, et al. v. Duke Energy Corporation, et al.
Plaintiffs sued natural gas companies under the Tennessee Trade Practices Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §47-25-101, et seq., alleging that the natural gas companies conspired unlawfully to increase the wholesale price of natural gas. The trial court granted the natural gas companies’ motion to dismiss on the basis of federal preemption. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: The Adoption of A.E., E.E., and E.E.
This case involves a parental termination proceeding where Father originally consented to termination of his parental rights, but now appeals on the ground that his surrender was procedurally deficient and made under duress. Father also alleges that the trial court erred when it failed to grant him leave to conduct discovery on opposing counsel and when the trial court failed to recuse itself. On appeal we find no error; the trial court properly granted Mother’s petition to terminate parental rights, Father failed to present any proof that he was under duress when he consented to the motion to terminate or that he was entitled to depose opposing counsel, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for recusal. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Appeals |