Dustin Dwayne Davis v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Dustin Dwayne Davis, was convicted by a jury in 1998 of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, misdemeanor theft and two (2) counts of aggravated rape. As a result, the petitioner was sentenced to a total effective sentence of 100 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the petitioner's convictions and sentence. See State v. Dustin Dwayne Davis, No. 03C01-9712-CR-00543, 1999 WL 135054 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Mar. 15, 1999), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 11, 1999). The petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief in which he alleged, inter alia, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After a hearing, the petition for post-conviction relief was denied. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the post-conviction court's dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief. Because we determine that the petitioner was afforded the effective assistance of counsel, we affirm the post-conviction court's dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Roland Bennett v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Roland Bennett, is currently serving a life sentence imposed in 1984. In 2001, the petitioner's counsel filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis on the basis of newly discovered evidence. After holding an evidentiary hearing on the matter, the coram nobis court dismissed the petition, and the petitioner now brings this appeal challenging that action. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the lower court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Raschad Donnell Simpson
The appellant, Raschad Donnell Simpson, pled guilty to possession of cocaine for resale. As a result of the plea agreement, the appellant was sentenced to serve eight (8) years in incarceration. During his incarceration, the appellant was accepted to and participated in a bootcamp program and on August 29, 2001 was released to probation. Subsequently, a probation violation warrant was issued against the appellant alleging a violation of probation based on a new arrest and conviction. At a probation revocation hearing, the appellant pled guilty to the violation. As a result, the trial court revoked the appellant's probation and ordered him to serve the eight (8) year sentence in confinement. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the appellant's probation, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: TKY
This is an action by the mother of a child, in which she is joined by her husband, to terminate the parental rights, if any, of the apparent biological father of her child. Prior to the commencement of this action, a separate action was filed by the apparent biological father to establish parentage. That parentage action was tried and appealed, the result of which was a ruling that the apparent biological father was not the "legal" father of her child, TKY, that the legal father of TKY was the husband of the child's mother, and the apparent biological father had no parental rights or responsibilities. That ruling renders the issue of the apparent biological father's parental rights, or lack thereof, moot. We therefore vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand with instructions to dismiss the petition to terminate parental rights as being moot. |
Coffee | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. George Hampton
Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty in case No. 03-01711 of three counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felony, involving victims Henry Skelton,MarkMears, and John Norris, and one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, involving victim Myron Raymond. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender, to thirty years for each aggravated robbery conviction and fifteen years for the aggravated assault conviction. Defendant was found guilty in case No. 03-01718 of one count of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, of Dr. Charles White, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to sixty years as a Range III, persistent offender, for this offense. The trial court ordered Defendant’s sentences in case No. 03-01711 to be served consecutively to each other and consecutively to his sentence in case No. 03-01718, for an effective sentence of one hundred and sixty-five years. On appeal, Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Defendant argues, however, that the trial court’s application of enhancement factors in determining the length of his sentences violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court, and the imposition of consecutive sentencing. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Miqwon Deon Leach v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Miqwon Deon Leach, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief arguing that he was denied his constitutional right to testify and that his rights under the Interstate Compact on Detainers were violated. Petitioner also contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance (1) by failing to follow the procedures set forth in State v. Momon; (2) by failing to object to the State’s failure to comply with the provisions of the Interstate Compact on Detainers, and (3) by failing to file a motion for a speedy trial. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Edward Johnson
Following a jury trial, Defendant, Edward Johnson, was convicted of Class E felony theft, and was sentenced to serve six years imprisonment as a Range III career offender. In this appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error by requiring him to go to trial in this case |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lorrie Lisa Crowe v. Kyle Eric Crowe
This appeal arises out of a divorce. The trial court awarded the mother a divorce on the stipulated ground of adultery, named the mother primary residential parent of the parties’ youngest child, named the father primary residential parent of the parties’ second oldest child by consent of the parties, set child support payments for both parties, divided the marital property, awarded mother alimony in futuro, and denied the mother’s request for attorney’s fees. The mother appeals the denial of her request for attorney’s fees, and the father cross-appeals the naming of the mother as the primary residential parent of the parties’ youngest child, the child support amount set for the mother, the division of marital property, and the award of alimony in futuro. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. |
Weakley | Court of Appeals | |
Dana Counts v. Jennifer Lynn Bryan, et al.
Defendants appeal the denial of a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 50 motion for directed verdict. This is Plaintiff's second action against Defendants to recover damages resulting from a personal injury accident. The first action was timely filed and voluntarily dismissed. This action, which is a separate, subsequent action, was commenced within one year of the voluntary dismissal; however, Plaintiff did not plead sufficient facts in the complaint to establish the timeliness of the commencement of the new action. Defendants affirmatively pled the statute of limitations defense in their answer; however, Plaintiff did not amend the complaint nor introduce evidence at trial to address the statute of limitations issue. Defendants put the affirmative defense at issue during closing arguments. The trial court took the motion under advisement, the trial proceeded and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. Thereafter, the trial court elected to take judicial notice of facts appearing in the record in the first action, the date the first action was commenced and the date of the voluntary dismissal, determined the second action was timely filed and denied Defendants' motion. We affirm. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
Michael L. Smith v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Michael L. Smith, appeals from the trial court's order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has failed to establish a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the state's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James R. Blevins v. State of Tennessee
The pro se petitioner, James R. Blevins, appeals from the dismissal of his motion to reopen his post-conviction petition. The states moves the court to affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of this court’s rules. The motion was properly dismissed for lack of merit. Accordingly, the |
Washington | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Elton Bowers v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Elton Bowers, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State's motion is granted. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Certain Underwriters At Lloyds, London v. Ted M. Winestone; J.B. McDonald & Co.; Leonard E. Franklin and Guaranty National Insurance Company
This is a casualty insurance case. A bank had a mortgage on residential property. The homeowner stopped making payments on the mortgage, abandoned the property, and allowed the homeowner’s insurance coverage on the property to lapse. The bank, in order to protect its interest in the property, purchased insurance coverage on behalf of the homeowner. The bank later sold the mortgage to a third party and cancelled the insurance coverage. The new mortgagee purchased insurance coverage for the property. Shortly thereafter, the property burned, resulting in a total loss. The new mortgagee’s insurance company filed the instant lawsuit, asking for a declaratory judgment that the prior insurance policy was still effect at the time of the fire. The trial court held that the prior policy was not in effect at the time of the fire. The new insurance company appealed, arguing that, in the course of the purchase, the prior insurance coverage had transferred to the new mortgagee as assignee of the prior mortgage holder, and that the bank’s cancellation of the prior insurance policy was ineffective. We affirm, finding that the prior insurance coverage was not transferred to the new mortgage holder and that the prior insurance policy was not in effect at the time of the fire. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Ronald E. Crook, et al. v. Angela R. Jock
This appeal lies from a trial court’s entry of a purported consent order of dismissal. The trial court entered judgment based upon the defendant’s submitted consent decree. The plaintiffs contend, however, that they did not consent to the terms of the order as written and withdrew any consent prior to entry of the judgment. Because the statement of the evidence in this case is irreconcilable, we vacate the judgment of the trial court entering the consent decree. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Himelda Fuentes Guzman v. Salvador Guzman Alvarez
Husband and Wife were married in Mexico while wife's divorce from her previous husband remained pending. The couple eventually moved to Tennessee. Following a marriage of approximately eighteen years, wife filed for divorce alleging adultery, inappropriate marital conduct, and irreconcilable differences. Husband filed an answer and counterclaim for annulment alleging that the marriage between the parties was invalid due to wife's prior subsisting marriage. Following a bench trial, the court below declared a marriage by estoppel and granted wife a divorce on the ground of adultery. The trial court then distributed the parties' accumulated property and ordered husband to establish a lifetime trust with income to be distributed to wife and the remainder to the parties' children. The parties were granted joint custody of their four children with wife designated as primary residential parent. From this order, wife appeals. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, as modified. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
John Edward Woods v. Jill Suzanne Woods
This appeal involves the financial aspects of the dissolution of a twelve-year marriage. Even though the husband filed a petition for divorce in the Circuit Court for Williamson County, the parties eventually stipulated that the wife was entitled to divorce on the ground of the husband's adultery. Following a bench trial, the court awarded the wife eighty percent of the net marital estate, $1,000 per month in rehabilitative alimony for three years, $25,000 in alimony in solido, and one-half of her attorney's fees. The husband appealed. We have determined that the evidence does not support the manner in which the trial court divided the marital estate, the amount of the rehabilitative alimony award, the alimony in solido award, or the award for attorney's fees. We modify the judgment accordingly. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Christine Pamela Schoof Goforth v. Terry James Goforth
This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce as it concerns custody of the parties' children. The trial court awarded primary residential custody to Father and provided for visitation with Mother. Mother appeals asserting that, pursuant to the factors set out in T.C.A. §36-6-106, she should have been named primary residential parent. We affirm. |
Tipton | Court of Appeals | |
Arlen Whisenant v. Bill Heard Chevrolet, Inc.
Appellee brought suit against Appellant, a car dealership, after experiencing problems with purchased vehicle. Among other things, Appellee alleged fraud in the inducement. Appellant sought to enforce arbitration agreement in the contract for sale. The trial court ruled that, under Tennessee law, claims of fraud in the inducement are not arbitrable. Appellant appeals the trial court’s judgment. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Cornelius Richmond v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Cornelius Richmond, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for seven counts of aggravated robbery. He claims that Tennessee’s Post-Conviction Procedure Act as applied to his case violates the due process clause and that the trial court erred in sentencing. We affirm the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rhonda (Qualls) Newman v. Gary Ronald Newman
This appeal involves a charge of civil contempt. The plaintiff wife and defendant husband were divorced by final decree entered in May 2001. In the final decree, the husband was ordered to pay the wife alimony in futuro as well as marital debts. He did not do so. In December 2003, the wife filed a petition in the trial court, seeking to hold the husband in contempt as well as an award of the alimony arrearage. The wife gave the husband notice of the contempt proceedings by mailing a copy of the petition and notice of hearing to the husband’s counsel of record. At the hearing, the husband’s counsel moved to dismiss the petition for contempt, arguing that the husband had not received proper notice of the hearing. This motion was denied, and the husband was held in contempt of court and ordered jailed until the contempt was purged. The husband now appeals. We affirm, concluding that the husband received sufficient notice of the petition for contempt. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
Michael William Kwasnik vs. Susan Marie Gillman Kwasnik
In this divorce case, Husband/Appellant appeals and raises issues involving valuation and division of marital property, rehabilitative alimony, and attorney fees. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Nancy Crittenden v. Jerry Green
This is a boundary line case. Appellant appeals from the judgment of the Hamilton County Chancery Court establishing the boundary line as shown by the survey of Appellee's expert. Finding that the survey adopted by the trial court is not in line with Appellee's deed and/or Appellant's deed conveying an additional triangular piece of land, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony Allen
The defendant, Anthony Allen, was convicted by a Shelby County jury and received an effective sentence of 124 years for numerous aggravated rape and aggravated robbery charges consolidated into a single trial. In this appeal, he argues: (1) the trial court erred in consolidating the indictments; (2) the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentences; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress a post-arrest statement; (4) the evidence is insufficient to support three of his convictions; and (5) the State failed to elect the offense for which conviction was sought in two case numbers. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we reverse one of the defendant’s aggravated rape convictions and remand it for a new trial, affirm the remaining judgments of conviction, and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing to determine whether consecutive sentencing is appropriate. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Roger McGee on Behalf of Bridgewood Baptist Church v. Polly Holmes, Kenneth Holmes and Toni Cox
This is a church dispute. The plaintiff, acting on behalf of the unincorporated church, sued several church members for fraud, conversion, and breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court ordered a vote by the remaining church members on whether to pursue the lawsuit, conducted by a special master. The thirty-five church members voted to pursue a claim against three defendants. After years of litigation, and the addition and deletion of certain defendants, the trial court ordered a second vote by church members on whether to continue the lawsuit. The five remaining church members, two of whom were defendants in the original suit, voted to dismiss the lawsuit. The trial court then dismissed the lawsuit. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in ordering a second vote. We affirm, finding that the trial court’s actions were reasonable and within the scope of its authority. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Kenneth Ray Haynes v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Kenneth Ray Haynes, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The judgment is affirmed. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals |