In Re Allainah B.
Cara S. and Bradley S. (together, “Petitioners”) sought termination of the parental rights of Austin B. (“Father”) as to Father’s daughter, Allainah B. (the “Child”). Following a bench trial, the Juvenile Court for Franklin County (the “trial court”) found four statutory bases for termination of Father’s parental rights and further concluded that termination was in the Child’s best interest. Father appealed to this Court. We conclude that the trial court’s decision should be affirmed as to three statutory grounds for termination and vacated as to the fourth ground. We also conclude that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. The ultimate holding of the trial court is therefore affirmed. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee Ex Rel. Larry E. Parrish, P.C. v. The Honorable James B. Cox Et Al.
Appellant brought a mandamus action in the trial court praying that the court would mandate certain actions related to other litigation involving Appellant. The trial court dismissed the action. We affirm the court’s dismissal and, finding the appeal to be frivolous pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-1-122, remand the case for a determination of Appellees’ damages incurred as a result of the appeal. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Briston J. Smith, Jr.
Following a trial, a jury convicted Briston J. Smith, Jr., (“Defendant”) of first degree felony murder and attempted especially aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective life sentence. On appeal, Defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to law enforcement; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting autopsy and life photographs of the victim; and (4) he is entitled to a new trial based on improper prosecutorial argument. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Kyler C. Et Al.
In this second appeal of the termination of a mother’s and father’s rights to their children, we consider the best interest of four children. In the previous appeal, we affirmed that clear and convincing proof established the existence of severe abuse and therefore constituted a ground for termination. On remand, the trial court made appropriate findings and determined that it was in the children’s best interest for the rights of the mother and father to be terminated. On appeal, we conclude that the evidence establishes that termination is in the children’s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Grundy | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Isabella M., Et Al.
This action involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her minor children. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to establish the following statutory grounds of termination: (1) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan; (2) the persistence of conditions which led to removal; and (3) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to care for the children. The court also found that termination was in the best interest of the children. We affirm the trial court. |
Macon | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Kevin McDougle
The Appellant, Kevin McDougle, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary denial of his pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, the Appellant contends that we should remand the case for the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing because his motion states a colorable claim. Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re The Estate of Mary E. Schaumberg
In this action to contest a will, the trial court determined that the contestants were estopped from maintaining their action because they had received property from the decedent’s estate pursuant to the will’s provisions and were therefore bound by its terms. The will contestants have appealed. Determining that the elements of estoppel were not proven, we vacate that portion of the trial court’s final order and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
City of Morristown Et Al. v. Michael W. Ball Et Al.
The trial court granted the cross-plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Because this case is inappropriate for rendering judgment on the pleadings, we reverse. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
Samuel O. McAlister v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Samuel O. McAlister, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his post-conviction petition, seeking relief from his pleas to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, driving on a revoked license, violating the financial responsibility law, and failing to illuminate his license plate and resulting effective five-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel, which resulted in his pleas being unknowing and involuntary. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kimberly Johnson Dougherty v. M.E. Buck Dougherty, III
This accelerated interlocutory appeal is taken from the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion for recusal. Because there is no evidence of bias that would require recusal under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Fayette | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Venessa Baston
The petitioner, Venessa Baston, through counsel, appeals from the Morgan Criminal Court’s judgment summarily dismissing her petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The State has filed a motion to affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20. Following our review, we conclude that the State’s position is well-taken and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kenneth J. Mynatt v. National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 39 Et Al.
This case involves claims of malicious prosecution and civil conspiracy. The trial court dismissed the claims pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6), determining that the plaintiff could not prove that the underlying criminal prosecution had terminated in his favor, a necessary element of a malicious prosecution claim. Regarding the civil conspiracy claim, the court determined that the conspiracy claim was only actionable if the underlying tort were actionable. Having found that the malicious prosecution claim could not stand, the court concluded that the conspiracy claim had to be dismissed as well. The plaintiff timely appealed. Based upon the applicable standard of review, we conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s claims, and we accordingly reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
F & M Bank v. George Raymond Fleming, Jr.
Appellant debtor appeals the trial court’s decision to find certain affirmative defenses waived, to deny his motion to continue the summary judgment hearing in order to conduct discovery, and to grant summary judgment to the defendant bank. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Layton W.
For a second time, a father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. On remand after the first appeal, the trial court determined that there were two statutory grounds for terminating the father’s parental rights and that termination was in the child’s best interest. We conclude that the record contains clear and convincing evidence to support one ground for termination: incarceration under a sentence of at least ten years when, at sentencing, the child was under the age of eight. But, because the trial court’s order lacks sufficient findings regarding the child’s best interest, we vacate and remand. |
Franklin | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terry Lee Gilbreath
A Monroe County jury convicted the Defendant of rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to forty years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it did not suppress electronic evidence against him; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; (3) the prosecutor’s closing argument was improper; and (4) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a new trial. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Raiden H. Et Al.
The appellant filed a motion to accept late-filed notice of appeal. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
Carolyn Diane Long v. Steven Lawrence Long
Following a bench trial in this divorce action, the trial court entered an order in October 2018, granting the parties a divorce and distributing the marital estate. Upon the wife’s appeal, this Court vacated the trial court’s distribution of marital property and remanded, directing the trial court to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law, pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 52.01, concerning the classification and valuation of various real estate and real estate partnership assets. Following an evidentiary hearing on remand, the trial court entered a final order in September 2020. Noting that the parties had stipulated that the wife’s interests in a realty company and two property partnerships were separate property, the trial court found that the wife’s partnership interest in a fourth realty enterprise at issue was marital property and also found that several specific realty assets were marital property. The trial court determined its valuation of each property or property interest and, pursuant to the factors provided in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121(c), set forth what it found to be an equitable distribution of the marital property. Wife has appealed. |
Cumberland | Court of Appeals | |
Bethany Shelton v. Hobbs Enterprises, LLC, Et Al.
Bethany Shelton (“Employee”) filed a petition for benefit determination against Hobbs Enterprises, LLC (“Employer”) alleging an injury to her right shoulder suffered in a work- related accident on August 26, 2017. She sought temporary total, permanent partial, and continued medical benefits. Following the issuance of a dispute certification notice, Employer moved for summary judgment on the basis the only medical testimony, from the Employee’s treating orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Sean Kaminsky, was insufficient as a matter of law to establish causation. The Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims (the “trial court”) denied the motion and denied Employer’s motion to reconsider. Employer sought an expedited appeal before the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, but then sought and was granted a dismissal of that appeal. A trial was held, after which the trial court denied Employee’s claim on the ground she had failed to meet her burden to establish her right shoulder injury arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of her employment with Employer. Employee filed a motion to reconsider, which the trial court denied. She appealed directly to the Supreme Court. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims. |
Workers Compensation Panel | ||
In Re Ryat M.
In this dependency and neglect case, the juvenile court found the child dependent and neglected and awarded custody to Appellees, maternal grandparents. Appellant/father failed to timely perfect an appeal of the juvenile court’s final order in the dependency and neglect matter. However, father filed a petition to set aside or vacate the same, which the juvenile court denied. On appeal, the circuit court accepted jurisdiction over the dependency and neglect matter, and conducted a de novo hearing; however, the circuit court denied hearing as to “other issues,” including father’s petition to set aside or vacate order. We conclude that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to review the dependency and neglect petition; as such, we vacate the circuit court’s order on dependency and neglect for lack of jurisdiction. Because there is a question as to whether father’s notice of appeal concerning his motion to set aside or vacate order conferred jurisdiction on the circuit court to review that motion, we vacate the portion of the circuit court’s order wherein it determined that it would hear no other issues on appeal. We remand to the circuit court for determination of whether father perfected an appeal of the juvenile court’s order denying his motion to set aside or vacate order. If the circuit court determines that father perfected the appeal, then the circuit court should proceed with de novo review of father’s motion. |
Macon | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Artemas A., et al.
This appeal involves a petition to terminate parental rights to four children. The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that six grounds for termination were proven: (1) abandonment by failure to support; (2) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; (3) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan; (4) persistent conditions; (5) severe child abuse; and (6) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the children. The juvenile court also found that termination was in the best interests of the four children. Only the mother appeals. We affirm. |
Benton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ariana Elizabeth Major
The State of Tennessee appeals the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s order granting the Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence recovered during the search of her car. On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred because the police dog performed a reliable “free air sniff,” which resulted in probable cause to search the Defendant’s car. We dismiss the appeal because the State is not entitled to an appeal as of right pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) because the record fails to reflect that the trial court dismissed the relevant indictment counts. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kelvin DeWayne Golden v. State of Tennessee
After being convicted of aggravated sexual battery, Kelvin Dewayne Golden, Petitioner, appealed his conviction and sentence. State v. Kelvin Dewayne Golden, No. W2018- 01477-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 3412527, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 20, 2019), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 14, 2019). They were affirmed on appeal. Id. He subsequently sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. The postconviction court denied relief after a hearing. Petitioner appeals. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sentry Select Insurance Company v. Tennessee Farmer's Mutual Insurance Company, Et Al.
This is an action to declare the rights and responsibilities of Sentry Select Insurance Company (“Sentry”) and Tennessee Farmer’s Mutual Insurance Company (“Farmer’s Mutual”). At issue is the meaning of the “other insurance” clauses in the respective policies—whether one of the carriers is the primary insurer or whether the coverage should be prorated. When the insured filed claims against both carriers for a loss in excess of one million dollars in farm equipment, each carrier insisted the other was the primary insurer. Following a hearing on cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court reasoned that the two-year gap between the insured’s purchase of the Sentry policies and subsequent purchase of the Farmer’s Mutual policy demonstrated that the Sentry policies were intended to be primary, and the Farmer’s Mutual policy was intended to be excess, “particularly in light of the clear unambiguous language of the [Farmer’s Mutual] ‘Other Insurance’ clause.” Thus, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Farmer’s Mutual and this appeal followed. Having realized, as other courts have, that “other insurance” clauses are problematic, in that, they have elevated hair splitting and nit picking to a new art form, and having done some hair splitting and nit picking ourselves, we affirm the trial court but on other grounds. Reading the Sentry and Farmer’s Mutual “other insurance” clauses together, we have determined that the Sentry policies were intended as primary and the Farmer’s Mutual policy was intended as excess. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that Sentry is the primary carrier. |
Macon | Court of Appeals | |
Christina Brooke Tigart v. Charles Shannon Tigart
Appellant/Father and Appellee/Mother’s Marital Dissolution Agreement (“MDA”) and agreed permanent parenting plan (“PPP”) were incorporated into the final decree of divorce. In the PPP, the parties agreed to an upward deviation in Father’s child support obligation. Mother subsequently petitioned the trial court to modify the parenting plan, to hold Father in contempt for failing to comply with certain provisions of the MDA, and to award her attorney’s fees and costs under the MDA. The trial court initially modified the PPP to lower Father’s child support obligations to comport with the child support guidelines; however, the trial court later granted Mother’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59 motion to alter or amend the judgment and reinstated the original upward deviation. The trial court denied Mother’s petition for contempt and her request for attorney’s fees. For the reasons discussed herein, we vacate the trial court’s denial of Mother’s contempt petition and reverse the trial court’s denial of Mother’s request for attorney’s fees and costs under the MDA. The trial court’s orders are otherwise affirmed. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. William C. Austin, Jr.
Defendant, William C. Austin, Jr., appeals from his guilty plea and resulting conviction for driving as a motor vehicle habitual offender (“MVHO”), for which he received a sentence of four years and six months. Defendant does not challenge the other convictions or sentences he received as a result of his guilty plea. On appeal, Defendant argues that after his arrest, but before his guilty plea and sentencing, the Tennessee Legislature amended the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offenders Act and that as a result of the amendment he was entitled to the lesser penalty under the criminal savings statute of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-112 with respect to his conviction for driving as a MVHO. After a review, we agree with Defendant. As a result, we reverse and remand the judgment of the trial court with respect to Defendant’s conviction for driving as a MVHO. We remand the matter for entry of sentences in Counts 2 and 3. The remaining convictions and sentences are affirmed. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals |