State of Tennessee v. Annon Sara Aloqili
Defendant, Annon Sara Aloqili, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, theft up to $1,000, and misdemeanor evading arrest and was sentenced as a Range I offender to an effective sentence of six years on supervised probation. Following a hearing on a violation of probation warrant, the trial court found Defendant in violation of her suspended sentence, revoked the probation, and ordered her to serve the balance of the sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion in revoking her probation and ordering her to serve the original sentence in confinement. After hearing oral arguments and following a review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
The Estate of Stella Ruth Hughes, et al. vs. C. Ray Adams, et al.
This case involves a motion by the defendants to enforce an alleged “walkaway settlement” agreement. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs—through their former attorney— agreed to a binding settlement agreement. After an evidentiary hearing on the motion, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case. The trial court’s decision is affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bret A. Wines
The Defendant previously entered guilty pleas to various drug related offenses and received an effective sentence of fourteen years’ probation. Four affidavits and arrest warrants alleging violations of his probation subsequently issued, and following a hearing conducted via Zoom video conferencing technology (“Zoom”), the trial court revoked his probation and ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in confinement. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) it was plain error for the trial court to conduct the revocation hearing via Zoom because it “failed to make a specific finding, utilizing the law as articulated in Maryland v. Craig [497 U.S. 838 (1990)],” in violation of his right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution; and (2) the sentence imposed by the trial court was excessive. Upon our review, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Darlene Christmas Murray (Godsey) v. Louis Wade Godsey
This appeal arises from a post-divorce contempt action. Darlene Christmas Murray (“Wife”) filed a petition for contempt in the General Sessions Court for Roane County (the “trial court”) in 2015, alleging that her former husband, Louis Wade Godsey (“Husband”), should be held in contempt for failing to pay Wife retirement benefits to which she was entitled under their final decree of divorce. The trial court found Husband in contempt and awarded Wife, inter alia, $25,000.00 in attorney’s fees as punishment. Because the evidence in the record preponderates against the trial court’s finding that Husband actually and willfully violated a court order, we reverse. |
Roane | Court of Appeals | |
George Gary Ingram v. Dr. Michael Gallagher et al.
This appeal arises from a healthcare liability action wherein the plaintiff initially sued the doctor, the hospital, and two other defendants. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the action without prejudice against all defendants except for the doctor. The doctor subsequently filed an answer to the complaint, stating that the action should be dismissed under the Governmental Tort Liability Act because the hospital, a governmental hospital entity and the doctor’s employer, was not a party to the action. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff filed a “Motion to Alter or Amend,” seeking to set aside the Trial Court’s order of dismissal in order to withdraw his voluntary dismissal of the hospital as a party. The Trial Court denied the plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend, determining that the voluntary dismissal order was a final order and that the plaintiff knew about the doctor’s employment with the hospital prior to the voluntary dismissal. We determine that the Trial Court erred by treating the plaintiff’s motion as a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60 motion, instead of a motion to revise pursuant to Rule 54.02, and further hold that the Trial Court erred by denying the plaintiff’s motion to revise the non-final order of voluntary dismissal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David Thomas Tidwell
The Defendant was indicted by an Obion County Grand Jury of aggravated assault in that he “feloniously and intentionally caused serious bodily injury to Ashley Tidwell in violation of T.C.A. §39-13-102(a)(1)(A), a class C felony[.]” A jury convicted the Defendant of the lesser included offense of misdemeanor reckless endangerment. T.C.A. §39-13-103. The trial court imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended to supervised probation following the service of 180 days in confinement. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction and that the trial court erred in imposing the sentence. Upon our review, we affirm. |
Obion | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Zimmer US, Inc. v. David Gerregano
This is a taxpayer action challenging the Tennessee Department of Revenue’s decision to deny its refund claim. The taxpayer filed a refund claim in December 2015, after which the parties entered into three consecutive extension agreements under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 67-1-1501 and -1802. Shortly before the last extension expired, the taxpayer commenced this action to obtain its refund. The Department responded by filing a motion to dismiss the complaint on the basis the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the one-year statute of limitations to commence the refund action was not extended. Specifically, the Department insisted the extension agreements only extended the limitation periods for it to assess taxes and refund overpayments. For its part, the taxpayer insisted the parties agreed to extend the deadline for filing suit and that its action was timely commenced. The trial court agreed with the Department and dismissed the complaint. We affirm the trial court’s decision because the plain language of each extension agreement references only the assessment and refund of taxes. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Ray Armstrong v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Ray Armstrong, was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone, two counts of delivery of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine in a drug-free school zone, tampering with evidence, and resisting arrest. The drug charges were merged, and the Petitioner was sentenced to serve an effective sentence of fifty and one-half years in prison. He filed a timely post-conviction petition, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court held a hearing and denied relief, and the Petitioner appeals, asserting that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to inform the Petitioner of his sentencing exposure, failing to review relevant discovery with him, failing to call a witness, and waiving on appeal the trial court’s refusal to instruct on a lesser included offense. We conclude that with respect to each claim, the Petitioner has either failed to establish deficiency or has failed to establish prejudice, and we affirm the denial of relief. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Donald Schoenthal and Tara Neutzler
Following the execution of a search warrant on their property, the Defendants, Donald Schoenthal and Tara Neutzler, were separately indicted by a Carroll County Grand Jury in 156-count indictments, which charged each of them with 2 counts of aggravated child neglect or endangerment, 2 counts of attempted aggravated child neglect or endangerment, 34 counts of aggravated animal cruelty, and 118 counts of animal cruelty. The State later dismissed over 120 of these counts. Thereafter, the Defendants separately filed a motion to dismiss the indictment and a motion to suppress evidence. After the trial court denied these motions, Defendant Schoenthal and Defendant Neutzler each entered “best interest” pleas to one count of aggravated animal cruelty (Count 63) and three counts of animal cruelty (Counts 37, 99, and 103). The Defendants’ plea agreements, which were accepted by the trial court, stated in part that each Defendant received a sentence of two years for the aggravated animal cruelty count and eleven months and twenty-nine days for each of the three animal cruelty counts, that these sentences would be served consecutively to one another, that the remaining counts of their respective indictments were dismissed, and that the trial court would determine the manner of service of these sentences. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Defendant Schoenthal to serve a total of 120 days in confinement and Defendant Neutzler to serve a total of 75 days in confinement before serving the remainder of their sentences on supervised probation. Thereafter, the Defendants appealed their cases, arguing that the trial court erred in denying their motions to suppress, and this court later consolidated these cases into a single appeal. After review, we conclude that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the suppression issue because no appeal of right lies for the Defendants pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b) and Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 37(b)(2). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. |
Carroll | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rebecca M. Pomeroy v. Michael L. McGinnis
In this action for conversion, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, who is her brother, unilaterally surrendered an annuity fund that had been titled jointly in their names, received a check for the proceeds, endorsed her signature without her permission, and deposited the proceeds in a bank account to which the plaintiff had no access. Upon the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, in which he asserted that the plaintiff had been an owner of the annuity in name only and that the three-year statute of limitations had expired well before she filed the complaint, the trial court found that the plaintiff was a titled co-owner of the annuity and that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the statute of limitations had been tolled by the defendant’s fraudulent concealment of the cause of action from the plaintiff. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the defendant had fraudulently concealed the cause of action from the plaintiff and that he had committed conversion of the plaintiff’s one-half interest in the check representing the annuity proceeds. The trial court awarded to the plaintiff a judgment in the amount of one-half of the annuity proceeds plus pre-judgment interest calculated from the date of the check’s endorsement. The defendant has appealed. Having discerned a minor mathematical error in the judgment, we modify the amount to reduce it by $90.00, affirming the trial court’s award to the plaintiff in the amount of $59,674.22 rather than $59,764.22. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Alonzo Hoskins
A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Alonzo Hoskins, of six counts of felony murder of the victim, based upon six underlying felonies, and one count of especially aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the Defendant’s convictions for felony murder and imposed a life sentence plus twenty years for especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) all counts of the presentment failed to allege an offense; (2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the cell phone records; (3) the trial court erred by preventing defense counsel from making an inquiry or proper record into the competency of a juror; (4) the prosecutor’s closing argument was improper; and (5) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ivin Lee Robinson
The Gibson County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Ivin Lee Robinson, for first degree premeditated murder in Count 1, first degree felony murder in Count 2, and especially aggravated robbery in Count 3. Immediately prior to trial, the Defendant entered an “open” guilty plea to the especially aggravated robbery charge in Count 3, with the trial court to determine the appropriate sentence for this conviction at a later sentencing hearing. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-403. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of second degree murder in both Count 1 and Count 2. See id. § 39-13-210(a)(1). Thereafter, the trial court merged the two second degree murder convictions, imposed a forty-year sentence in Count 1, imposed a forty-year sentence for the especially aggravated robbery conviction in Count 3, and ordered these sentences served consecutively for an effective sentence of eighty years at one hundred percent release eligibility. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to establish causation for his second degree murder convictions; (2) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide as lesser included offenses of the felony murder charge; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in imposing consecutive sentencing. After review, we remand the case for entry of corrected judgment forms in Counts 1 and 2 as specified in this opinion. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joseph Cox
The Defendant, Joseph Cox, was convicted of assault, a Class A misdemeanor, by a Knox County Criminal Court jury. See T.C.A. § 39-13-101(a)(1) (Supp. 2016) (subsequently amended). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with sixty days to be served in jail and the balance to be served on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the presentment because the State failed to comply with a procedural step in charging him by presentment and because the child abuse statute is unconstitutional,1 (2) the trial court erred in its jury instructions, and (3) the court erred in imposing split confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Elizabeth Harrison v. State of Tennessee
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner, Elizabeth Harrison, pled guilty to theft over $1,000 and burglary of a motor vehicle, and the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to eighteen months in Community Corrections for each count. See Tenn. Code Ann. |
Dyer | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lloyd Crawford
The Defendant-Appellant, Lloyd Crawford, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first-degree felony murder, attempted first-degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and tampering with evidence. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202 (first-degree murder), 39-12-101 (criminal attempt), 39-17-1324 (employing a firearm), 39-13-403 (especially aggravated robbery), 39-16-503 (tampering with evidence). The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of life plus seventeen years. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Abraham Julien Augustin
The Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony; three counts of reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony; attempted aggravated robbery, a Class C felony; criminal conspiracy to commit robbery, a Class D felony; escape, a Class E felony; theft of property valued at $2500 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony; and theft of property valued at $1000 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 30-13-210 (second degree murder) (2018), 39-12- 101 (2018) (criminal attempt), 39-13-402 (2018) (aggravated robbery), 39-12-103 (criminal conspiracy), 39-13-103(a), (b)(2) (reckless endangerment committed with a deadly weapon), 39-16-605 (2018) (escape), 39-14-103 (2018) (theft of property), 39-14- 105 (2018) (subsequently amended) (grading of theft). The trial court imposed an effective twenty-five-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Bradley | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Braylon W., et al. v. Armie Walker, M.D., et al.
This appeal stems from a dismissal pursuant to Tennessee’s Governmental Tort Liability Act. Suit was filed against Appellant’s treating physician, among other defendants, for health care liability involving Appellant’s birth. The trial court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of the physician, finding that, because the physician was an employee of a governmental entity at the time of the incident, Appellant was required by statute to name the physician’s employing governmental entity as a party defendant. Because Appellant failed to do so, the lawsuit against the treating physician could not proceed. Appellant now appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Sullivan County et al. v. Purdue Pharma, L.P. et al.
Having determined that the amount of attorney’s fees awarded and possible further sanctions remain pending in this action, we further determine that the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment. Therefore, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Philip Michael Martinez
A Gibson County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Phillip Michael Martinez, for attempted aggravated sexual battery in Count 1 and solicitation of a minor in Count 2. Prior to trial, the State entered a nolle prosequi for the solicitation of a minor charge. At the conclusion of trial, the jury found the Defendant guilty as charged of the attempted aggravated sexual battery count. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101; 39-13-504(a)(4). Thereafter, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to three years’ incarceration at thirty percent release eligibility, sentenced him to community supervision for life, and ordered him to register as a sexual offender for life. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the forensic interviewer to testify as an expert; (2) the trial court erred in admitting the victim’s forensic interview as substantive evidence; (3) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on flight; (4) the State made two improper comments during its closing argument; and (5) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction because the proof failed to show that he acted for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Travis Payne v. Jessica Payne
This is an appeal from a dismissal of Mother’s petition to modify the parties’ permanent parenting plan. The trial court found that Mother failed to carry her burden of proof in showing a material change of circumstances had occurred. Mother now appeals. Because we find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm its denial of Mother’s petition. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Perry Allen Et Al. v. William B. Lee Et Al.
The Plaintiffs brought this lawsuit to challenge a series of executive orders issued by the Governor of Tennessee in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Namely, the Plaintiffs challenged the Governor’s legal authority to close entertainment and recreational gathering venues, arguing, among other things, that the executive orders were a constitutionally-prohibited implementation of martial law. Although the trial court dismissed the Plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim, we conclude that the underlying matter is moot given the repeal of the complained of closure requirements. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for dismissal of the complaint in light of its mootness. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Miley D.
This is an appeal from a termination of parental rights case. The trial court determined that two grounds for termination had been established as to Father: abandonment by an incarcerated parent pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) and a sentence for child abuse pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(5). The trial court further found the termination of Father’s parental rights to be in the best interests of the two minor children at issue. Although we reverse one ground for termination found by the trial court, we otherwise affirm its order terminating Father’s parental rights. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Penny Lawson et al. v. Hawkins County, TN et al.
This appeal arises from litigation concerning a fatal road accident. Steven W. Lawson (“Decedent”), by and through his wife, Penny Lawson, and on behalf of Corey Lawson, Decedent’s child (“Plaintiffs,” collectively), sued the Hawkins County Emergency Communications District Board (“ECD-911”), Hawkins County, Tennessee and Hawkins County Emergency Management Agency (“the EMA”) (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Circuit Court for Hawkins County (“the Trial Court”) alleging negligence, gross negligence, and recklessness in Defendants’ response to a road washout that led to Decedent’s death. Plaintiffs specifically alleged nepotism in Defendants’ hiring practices and a failure to train. Defendants filed motions for judgment on the pleadings, which the Trial Court granted partly on grounds that claims of recklessness could not proceed against the Defendant entities under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (“the GTLA”). Plaintiffs appeal. We hold that Plaintiffs could, in fact, proceed with their claims of recklessness and gross negligence under the GTLA, and the facts pled by Plaintiffs were sufficient to state claims based upon recklessness and gross negligence. We hold further that, based on the facts alleged at this stage, the third special duty exception to the public duty doctrine applies so as to remove Defendants’ immunity. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Hawkins | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Manning H.
This appeal arises from a mother and a stepfather’s petition to terminate the father’s parental rights to his daughter. The mother and father were married and had a son and a daughter. When they divorced, they agreed to a permanent parenting plan allowing the father equal parenting time with their son but no parenting time with their daughter. In the three and a half years preceding the filing of the petition to terminate the father’s rights, the father fully exercised his parenting time with their son, but he had no contact with their daughter and did not request a modification of the permanent parenting plan. The petitioners alleged three grounds for termination of the father’s parental rights to his daughter—abandonment by failure to visit and failure to support, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-102(1)(A)(i) and -113(g)(1), and failure to manifest an ability or willingness to assume custody, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). The trial court determined that the petitioners proved one of the three grounds, abandonment by failure to visit; however, it found that they failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the daughter’s best interests to terminate the father’s rights. Accordingly, the court denied the petition to terminate the father’s parental rights to his daughter. On appeal, the petitioners contend the trial court erred in denying their petition because the evidence clearly and convincingly established that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the daughter’s best interests. They also contend the trial court erred in finding that they did not prove the father failed to manifest an ability or willingness to assume physical custody as codified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). For his part, the father contends his failure to visit was not willful; therefore, the petitioners failed to prove any ground for termination of his parental rights. We affirm the trial court’s determination that the father abandoned his daughter by failure to visit during the requisite period of time as codified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(i). We affirm its determination that the petitioners failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence all the essential elements of the ground codified in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). We also affirm the trial court’s determination that the petitioners failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the father’s parental rights was in the daughter’s best interest. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the petition. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Winford Paul Wilhoite v. State of Tennessee
In 2017, the Petitioner, Winford Paul Wilhoite, pleaded guilty as charged in case number 25743 to possession with intent to sell 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine, simple possession of Lortab, possession of drug paraphernalia, criminal impersonation, and driving on a revoked license (second offense). See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-434, 3917-418, 39-17-425, 39-16-301, 55-50-504. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of ten years. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, in part, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel for the Petitioner was appointed, and an amended petition was filed. The postconviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appeals. After review, we affirm the postconviction court’s judgment. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals |