Antonio Maurice Wiggins v. Carol Ann Wiggins
This appeal arises out of a divorce action in which the wife requested alimony. Following a trial, the trial court awarded the wife alimony in futuro and alimony in solido to assist her in paying for health insurance premiums and attorney’s fees, respectively. On appeal, the husband claims the wife had no need for such support; rather, the trial court used the alimony awards as a means to punish the husband for his infidelity. We find that, while the trial court considered the husband’s fault in making its decision, it did so in conjunction with other relevant factors in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(i), including the wife’s financial need, her relative earning potential, her contributions to the marriage, and the parties’ standard of living. Having determined that the trial court applied the correct legal principles, made factual findings supported by the evidence in the record, and reached a decision within the range of acceptable dispositions, we affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Donald R. Wright v. Carol Sieglitz, Et Al.
This is an appeal of a case seeking judicial determination of child support. Because the appellant, Donald R. Wright (“Appellant”) attempted to raise an issue regarding a separate case, which was not timely appealed, and all issues with regard to the instant case were waived, we dismiss this appeal |
Washington | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Crystal W. Et Al.
In this dependency and neglect action, the mother appealed the determination made by the Knox County Juvenile Court (“juvenile court”) that the two minor children at issue were dependent and neglected to the Knox County Circuit Court (“trial court”). The father of the children had initiated the action by filing a petition for dependency and neglect against the mother in the juvenile court, alleging, inter alia, the mother’s inability to properly care for the children due to ongoing mental health issues. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) had intervened in the juvenile court proceedings, and following entry of an adjudicatory order, the juvenile court had awarded legal and physical custody of the children to the father. In a separate proceeding not at issue in this appeal, the juvenile court subsequently awarded temporary custody of the children to the paternal grandfather and step-grandmother. Following a de novo bench trial on the mother’s appeal, the trial court determined that the children were dependent and neglected as to the mother and maintained custody of the children with the paternal grandfather and step-grandmother. The mother has appealed to this Court.1 Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Samuel Lee Bachelor, Jr. v. Aja Michelle Bachelor n/k/a Aja Michelle Burrell
This case involves a divorce that was granted in January, 2019. As a part of their divorce, the parties entered into a marital dissolution agreement which was thereafter incorporated into the final decree of divorce. Subsequently, the Appellant filed a petition for contempt, alleging that the Appellee was in noncompliance with his obligations under the marital dissolution agreement and requested, among other relief, attorney’s fees for having to file the petition. The trial court found that while the Appellee had been noncompliant with the marital dissolution agreement, the noncompliance was not willful and therefore concluded that the Appellant was not entitled to attorney’s fees. For the reasons stated herein, we reverse the trial court’s decision to not award the Appellant her attorney’s fees and additionally award the Appellant her attorney’s fees on appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jarvis Tyvon Morgan
Aggrieved of the Knox County Criminal Court’s revocation of the sentence of probation imposed for his 2016 guilty-pleaded conviction of aggravated assault, the defendant, Jarvis Tyvon Morgan, appeals. He argues that the trial court deprived him of due process by basing its decision on a ground not alleged in the violation warrant. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tammy Lynn Walker
Following a bench trial, the Defendant, Tammy Lynn Walker, was convicted of passing a worthless check, a Class D felony. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in determining that she made a knowing and voluntary waiver of her right to counsel and by requiring her to proceed pro se at trial when she had not executed a written waiver to the effect. The State, after initially contending that the trial court did not err, alternatively argues that the Defendant implicitly waived her right to counsel by failing to retain counsel in a timely manner. In addition, the Defendant, as a separate issue, contends that the trial court violated her constitutional rights when it compelled her to testify against herself. We conclude that the non-indigent Defendant knowingly and voluntarily explicitly waived her right to counsel by her statements and conduct and that she was not compelled to testify against herself. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. |
Campbell | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Ray Perna
The Defendant, Michael Ray Perna, pleaded guilty to a Class E felony violation of the Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-211(d)(1)(A) Sex Offender Registry Act. At sentencing, the Defendant argued that he was acting as the minor victim’s legal guardian pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section (d)(2)(D) and thus was only eligible for a fine by way of punishment, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-211(g)(4). The trial court rejected the Defendant’s argument and imposed a two-year sentence, suspended to probation after ninety days in jail. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Coffee | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brian Howard
Brian Howard, Defendant, was indicted for one count of second degree murder, one count of convicted felon in possession of a firearm, one count of attempted second degree murder, and one count of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. A co-defendant, Quinton Brown, was also indicted for his role in the offenses and the two were tried together. Defendant asked the trial court to bifurcate the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon count prior to trial. The trial court denied the motion. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the lesser-included offenses of voluntary manslaughter and attempted voluntary manslaughter as well as possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and employing a firearm during the commission of a felony as charged in the indictment. Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of 67 years, to be served consecutively to a fifteen-year federal sentence. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Defendant appeals to this Court arguing that the trial court erred by denying the motion to bifurcate the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon charge and that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions where the proof indicated that Defendant acted in self-defense. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand the matter for correction of the judgment form in Count 4 to reflect that the conviction for employing a firearm during the commission of a felony is a class C felony. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeremy Lynn Thornton
The State appeals the trial court’s imposition of a community corrections sentence, arguing the defendant did not qualify for alternative sentencing. Upon our review of the record and the applicable law, we find the trial court erred in not considering all the applicable factors. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the matter for a new sentencing hearing consistent with this opinion. |
Benton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jabari Issa Mandela a/k/a John Wooden v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al.
This appeal arises from a petition for writ of certiorari filed by a prisoner, Jabari Issa Mandela a/k/a John Wooden (“Petitioner”), seeking relief pursuant not only to a writ of certiorari but also including in his petition an action seeking damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due to an alleged violation of his constitutional rights. Following the respondents’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(1) and (6) and Petitioner’s response thereto, the Trial Court dismissed Petitioners’ original civil rights cause of action, filed pursuant to section 1983, due to its impermissible joinder with an appellate cause of action. The Trial Court further granted the motion to dismiss as to the writ of certiorari, in part, because Petitioner had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Because Petitioner has failed to comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 by not presenting an argument concerning whether he had exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing his petition for writ of certiorari, he has waived this issue on appeal. As such, the Trial Court’s dismissal of the petition is affirmed. Petitioner also raises an issue concerning the amount of filing fees he was required to pay by the Trial Court to initiate the current action. On remand, the Trial Court shall revisit its order regarding the amount of filing fees to determine compliance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 8-21-401. |
Lake | Court of Appeals | |
Crystal Spearman, Individually and as Parent and Next Friend of Kenji Lewis, a Minor v. Shelby County Board of Education, et al.
This suit involves an injury sustained by a minor at a track and field tryout at the middle school he attended. The minor’s mother brought suit individually and on behalf of her minor child against the county school system and the school board for the minor’s injuries and subsequent medical expenses. After a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded her $200,000 in compensatory damages. The defendants appealed. We affirm the trial court’s decisions and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael E. White
The defendant, Michael E. White, appeals the order of the trial court revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his original |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Anthony Justice v. Craftique Construction, Inc., Et Al.
A homeowner in a subdivision sued the construction company that developed the subdivision and the president of the company for damages, claiming that the subdivision was a “failed development” because only five out of thirty-one lots were developed before construction ceased and promised amenities, including a club house and swimming pool, were never built. The homeowner obtained default judgments for liability and money damages against the company and a default judgment for liability against the company president. During the trial to determine damages against the company president, the homeowner orally stated his intent to nonsuit his claim for damages while retaining the default judgment for liability. The trial court entered an order nonsuiting the homeowner’s entire claim against the company president. The homeowner appeals, claiming the right to a partial nonsuit. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Scarlet W., et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The Chancery Court for Henderson County terminated the parental rights of a mother to two minor children based upon two statutory grounds: persistence of conditions and a ten-year prison sentence while the children were under the age of eight years old. We reverse the trial court’s finding that the ground of persistence of conditions was satisfied by clear and convincing evidence. We affirm, however, the trial court’s finding that clear and convincing evidence supports termination of the mother’s parental rights based upon her current prison sentence. We also affirm the trial court’s conclusion that termination is in the best interests of both children. |
Henderson | Court of Appeals | |
Dennis Williamson v. Regional One Health, et al.
In this healthcare liability action, Appellant/patient appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee/hospital. The trial court granted summary judgment based, inter alia, on its conclusion that Appellant failed to provide evidence that Appellee’s immunity under the Governmental Tort Liability Act is waived due to some action/inaction of its employee. Affirmed and remanded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher C. Sullivan
The Defendant, Christopher C. Sullivan, was charged with violation of the sex offender registry and perjury. A Sullivan County jury found the Defendant not guilty of violating the sex offender registry and guilty of perjury. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of six years on probation, sixty days of which were to be served in confinement. The Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence, arguing that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict him of perjury, that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting as evidence a judgment of conviction form from New York and the indictment underlying that conviction, that the jury’s verdicts were inconsistent, and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. After review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Jason Allison
We granted permission to appeal to the Defendant to examine the propriety of his convictions for money laundering based on his receipt of payment for drugs he “fronted” to a confidential informant. On separate occasions, the Defendant delivered a quantity of marijuana to the informant. At the time of delivery, the informant paid the Defendant for a portion of marijuana, but the Defendant also fronted additional marijuana to the informant, meaning the Defendant had an expectation that he would be paid later with proceeds from the informant’s sale of the drugs. The Defendant subsequently received payment. Based on these actions, the Defendant was charged with and convicted of two counts of delivering marijuana and two counts of money laundering. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-903(c)(1) (2006); Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-417(a)(2) (2006 & Supp. 2008). The Defendant challenged whether the evidence supported his money laundering convictions, whether those convictions violated double jeopardy protections, and whether the money laundering statute was unconstitutionally vague. The trial court rejected the Defendant’s challenges, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgments. We hold that the evidence supporting one of the money laundering convictions was legally sufficient, because the proof supported an inference that the Defendant purchased marijuana with the proceeds he had received with the intent to promote the carrying on of the sale of marijuana. With respect to the second money laundering conviction, we hold that the evidence was insufficient, because the proof showed only that the Defendant received payment for drugs he had fronted. We further hold that the Defendant’s punishment for both delivery of marijuana and money laundering does not violate double jeopardy protections and that the money laundering statute is not unconstitutionally vague by virtue of its use of the undefined phrase “carrying on.” Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Collier
On July 12, 2019, Defendant-Appellant, Robert Collier, entered a guilty plea to criminal attempt aggravated sexual battery and indecent exposure, for which he received an effective sentence of seven years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days, all of which was to be served on supervised probation. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, 39-13-504 (2019). As part of his sentence, the Defendant was also ordered to register as a violent sex offender and placed on community supervision for life. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-524 (2014). Within three months, on October 15, 2019, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s supervised probation based on a violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-211(d)(1)(B) (2019), which restricts movement of violent sex offenders, and ordered the Defendant to serve the original sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals the order of the trial court arguing that subsection (d)(1)(B) is unconstitutional in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because certain terms including “playground,” “any other specific or legitimate reason,” “stand,” “sit idly,” and “remain” are not defined and ambiguous.” He additionally argues that subsection (d)(1)(B) is overbroad in violation of his First Amendment rights because (1) it applies to all sex offenders even if the offense did not involve a child victim; and (2) the term “playground” can include a church, an offender’s front yard, and places where other adults are present. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Coy McKaughan
The Petitioner, Coy McKaughan, filed a post-conviction petition in the Shelby County Criminal Court seeking relief from his conviction of aggravated sexual battery and accompanying twelve-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The postconviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that (1) his trial counsel was ineffective, (2) his appellate counsel was ineffective, (3) his due process rights were violated by the State’s withholding evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, (4) his due process rights were violated by the State’s assembling a “rigged grand jury foreperson,” (5) the State violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution, and (6) he was denied his constitutional right to a “full and fair” post-conviction hearing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Milton Simpson
The Defendant, Milton Simpson, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s order revoking his probation and imposing an effective ten-year sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to establish that he violated the terms of his probation by breaking the law and that (2) his right of confrontation was violated when a court liaison testified in lieu of his probation officer and when a certified copy of an indictment was introduced as evidence. Following our review, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
IN RE ELLA H.
In this termination of parental rights case, Appellants Mother and Stepfather appeal the trial court’s finding that termination of Father’s parental rights was not in the Child’s best interest. Appellee Father appeals the trial court’s finding that he abandoned the Child by willful failure to visit and willful failure to support. Upon review, we conclude that Father abandoned the Child by willful failure to visit and support. Because the record supports the conclusion that termination of Father’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest, we reverse the trial court as to this issue, and we remand for entry of an order terminating Father’s parental rights. |
DeKalb | Court of Appeals | |
Katrina Walker d/b/a Rainbow Kidz Child Care Center v. Tennessee Department of Human Services
In this Opinion, we are tasked with reviewing two separate cases concerning the State’s oversight of a child care center in Memphis. Somewhat uniquely, these cases were adjudicated under a single docket number in the Shelby County Chancery Court and were appealed to this Court in that posture. One of the cases, which concerns a petition for a writ of mandamus, was originally filed in the Davidson County Chancery Court and was subsequently transferred to the Shelby County Chancery Court. The second case involves judicial review under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. As to the mandamus case at issue, we conclude that venue lies only in Davidson County and, therefore, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter relief. Accordingly, that judgment is vacated, and we direct that the case be transferred back to the Davidson County Chancery Court. As to the case for judicial review, we conclude that the decision of the hearing officer was supported by substantial and material evidence and therefore reverse the trial court and remand for the entry of an order reinstating the hearing officer’s decision. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Fatma Adel Sekik v. Nehad Abdelnabi et al.
In this divorce appeal, Husband challenges the court’s failure to grant a continuance, the child support and alimony obligation imposed, and certain provisions of the parenting plan prohibiting contact with his children and revoking the parental rights set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-101(a)(3)(B). This proceeding also involved allegations of a conspiracy to defraud Wife of funds resulting from a sale of marital property in Gaza during the pendency of the divorce by Husband, his brother, and his brother’s wife; those nonspousal parties challenge the court’s jurisdiction over them and over the property in Gaza, as well as the court’s valuation of that property. They also challenge the court’s rulings that they engaged in a civil conspiracy and whether the judgment imposed against them is supported by the pleadings and the evidence. Upon our review of the issues raised, we discern no reversible error in the rulings of the court and accordingly affirm it in all respects. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Earl Grady, Jr.
The defendant, Robert Earl Grady, Jr., pleaded guilty to two counts of felon in possession of a firearm for which he received consecutive twelve-year sentences for an effective sentence of twenty-four years’ confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred by imposing consecutive terms. Upon our review of the record, the applicable law, and the arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John William Anderson
The defendant, John William Anderson, appeals his Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convictions of attempted theft of property valued at $10,000 or more but less than $60,000 and criminal simulation. He challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the propriety of the sentencing decision of the trial court. The evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, but the trial court erred by imposing a sentence in the absence of a presentence report. Consequently, we affirm the defendant’s convictions but reverse the sentencing decision of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals |