John Anthony Gentry v. Former Speaker Of The House Glen Casada Et Al.
M2019-02230-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Andy D. Bennett
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Patricia Head Moskal

A citizen filed a petition of remonstrance with the Tennessee General Assembly and then filed a petition for writ of mandamus in chancery court requesting that the legislative chambers be ordered to hear and consider his petition of remonstrance. The trial court dismissed the petition for writ of mandamus on the basis that the petitioner was not entitled to mandamus relief. We affirm.

Davidson Court of Appeals

Timothy D. Carter v. State of Tennessee
M2019-01014-CCA-R3-HC
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge John D. Wootten, Jr.

The Petitioner, Timothy D. Carter, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In it, he repeats the same issue he raised on direct appeal and his post-conviction petition, namely that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue a search warrant for his vehicle. Because the Petitioner has failed to state a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief, we affirm the denial of the habeas corpus petition.

Trousdale Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Michael Domonic Sales
M2017-01116-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert L. Holloway, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Forest A. Durard, Jr.

A Lincoln County jury convicted Defendant, Michael Domonic Sales, of first degree premeditated murder, for which he received a life sentence. After filing a notice of appeal, Defendant filed a motion with this court requesting that the court stay his direct appeal so that he might seek relief through a petition for writ of error coram nobis. This court granted Defendant’s motion to stay his direct appeal, and Defendant filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis in the trial court. Following a hearing, the trial court denied relief. On appeal, Defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in failing to act as the thirteenth juror and grant a judgment of acquittal based on Defendant’s claim of self-defense; (2) he is entitled to a new trial based on improper prosecutorial argument, including the prosecutor’s assertion that Defendant was a Crips gang member and that Defendant’s possession of a weapon as a convicted felon prevented his claim of self-defense; and (3) the trial court erred in denying his petition for writ of error coram nobis. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we affirm.

Lincoln Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Jenniffer Danine Harper
M2019-01077-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Norma McGee Ogle
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jill Bartee Ayers

After a bench trial, the Robertson County Circuit Court convicted the Appellant, Jenniffer Danine Harper, of driving under the influence (DUI) and sentenced her to eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served as forty-eight hours in jail followed by supervised probation. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Robertson Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Devonta Kevon Curry
W2019-00679-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Camille R. McMullen
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roy B. Morgan, Jr.

The Defendant-Appellant, seventeen-year-old Devonta Kevon Curry, was transferred from juvenile court and convicted by a Madison County jury of aggravated burglary (count one); aggravated robbery (counts two, five, and six); especially aggravated kidnapping (counts three and four); and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony (count seven). See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-403, -13-402, -13-305; 39-17-1324(a). Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a five-year term of imprisonment for the aggravated burglary; a concurrent ten-year term of imprisonment for each count of aggravated robbery; a concurrent twenty-year term of imprisonment for each count of especially aggravated kidnapping; and a three-year term of imprisonment for the possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, to be served consecutively to the aggravated burglary. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-1324(e)(1). The concurrent ten-year term of imprisonment for the aggravated robbery convictions was ordered to be served consecutively to the concurrent twenty-year term of imprisonment for the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions, for an effective sentence of thirty years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence regarding each of his convictions arguing that (1) the State failed to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the offense; and (2) the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions were merely incidental to the aggravated robberies in violation of State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012). The Defendant also appeals the order of consecutive sentencing, arguing that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact in classifying him as a dangerous offender and that the trial court failed to apply certain mitigating factors. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Madison Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Mark Ethan Felices
M2020-00047-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Forest A. Durard, Jr.

The defendant, Mark Ethan Felices, appeals the revocation of his probation, arguing that the trial court erred by ordering that he serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Bedford Court of Criminal Appeals

James Currie v. State of Tennessee
M2019-01132-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge James Curwood Witt, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jennifer Smith

The petitioner, James Currie, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, which petition challenged his guilty-pleaded convictions of burglary of a motor vehicle (5 counts), fraudulent use of a credit card for a value more than $1,000 but less than $10,000 (2 counts), attempt to fraudulently use a credit card, and theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

Frederick Perry v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator Corporation
W2019-01549-SC-R3-WC
Authoring Judge: Judge Kyle C. Atkins
Trial Court Judge: Judge Martha B. Brasfield

Frederick Perry (“Employee”) worked for Thyssenkrupp Elevator Corporation (“Employer”) at a variety of jobs beginning in 1988. On February 22, 2013, Employee was working on a cutting machine cutting steel elevator panels. While attempting to move a large steel panel from the work table to a pallet with a jib crane, Employee slipped and fell. Employee was determined to have suffered a torn labrum in his right hip and a torn meniscus in his right knee, which were surgically repaired. Employee’s treating orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Adam Smith, placed Employee at maximum medical improvement (“MMI”) on June 13, 2014. He assigned Employee anatomical impairment ratings of 3% to the lower right extremity for the right hip injury and 3% to the lower right extremity for the right knee injury, for a combined anatomical impairment rating of 6% to the lower right extremity or 2% to the body as a whole. Dr. Smith placed certain restrictions on Employee. Employer returned Employee to work at another job accommodating his restrictions and providing a higher rate of pay. On March 3, 2015, Employee underwent an independent medical examination by physical medicine and rehab physician, Dr. Samuel Jae Jin Chung, on referral from his attorney. Dr. Chung diagnosed Employee as suffering “[r]esidual from right knee injury requiring extensive surgical intervention with ongoing symptoms of right patellofemoral arthritis” and “[r]esidual from right hip injury secondary to fall with status post surgical intervention with ongoing symptomatology.” Dr. Chung assigned Employee anatomical impairment ratings of 15% to the right lower extremity for the right knee injury and 22% to the right lower extremity for the right hip injury, for a combined anatomical impairment rating of 34% to the lower right extremity or 13% to the body as a whole. Dr. Chung placed certain restrictions on Employee and suggested the possibility of need for a future right knee replacement. A Benefit Review Conference was held on December 2, 2015, resulting in an impasse. The parties were unable to resolve the extent of Employee’s anatomical impairment or his vocational impairment. Employee brought suit. The parties stipulated or agreed that Employee had received all the temporary total disability benefits to which he was entitled, Employer had paid all authorized medical expenses, and the 1.5 multiplier cap applied. The trial court rejected the anatomical impairment ratings of both Dr. Smith and Dr. Chung and adopted its own modified anatomical impairment ratings of 18% to the lower right extremity for the right hip injury and 14% to the lower right extremity for the right knee injury, for a combined anatomical impairment rating of 29% to the lower right extremity or 12% to the body as a whole. The trial court awarded Employee permanent partial disability benefits based upon a vocational impairment of 18% to the body as a whole. Employer has appealed and the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.

Hardeman Workers Compensation Panel

State of Tennessee v. Leonard B. Casteel
M2019-00611-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge John Everett Williams
Trial Court Judge: Judge M. Wyatt Burk

The Defendant, Leonard B. Casteel, pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated assault, and he received a six-year sentence on each count. The Defendant was sentenced to serve one year for each count and to complete supervised probation for the remaining time. The Defendant was released on probation, a revocation warrant was issued, and the trial court found that the Defendant had violated the terms of his probation and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Marshall Court of Criminal Appeals

Karthik Rajendran v. Mary Florence Rajendran
M2019-00265-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joe Thompson

Mother appeals the trial court’s decision to award the parties equal parenting time and to allow the parties to make major educational decisions jointly. We reverse the trial court’s decision to order alternating weekly parenting time and vacate the trial court’s decision regarding major educational decisions. 

Sumner Court of Appeals

Tkach Stokes v. Allenbrooke Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC
W2019-01983-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Arnold B. Goldin
Trial Court Judge: Judge Rhynette N. Hurd

In this health care liability action, the defendant moved to compel arbitration based upon an agreement entered into between the parties that provided for binding arbitration. The plaintiff opposed the defendant’s motion, taking specific umbrage at a provision in the parties’ agreement that indicated the expenses of arbitration would, by default, be subject to a 50/50 split. Contending that he was unable to pay for arbitration expenses, the plaintiff opposed enforcement of the arbitration agreement by advancing a cost-based unconscionability defense. Although the defendant acted to relieve the plaintiff of this asserted burden by offering to pay for the costs of arbitration, the trial court held that the subject fee-splitting provision in the agreement was unconscionable and denied the motion to enforce the agreement and compel arbitration. For the reasons stated herein, while we agree with the trial court that, under the facts of this case, the fee-splitting provision was unconscionable, we hold that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration.

Shelby Court of Appeals

Benjamin McCurry v. Agness McCurry
E2020-01085-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Judge James E. Lauderback

The Notice of Appeal filed by the appellant, Agness McCurry, stated that the appellant was appealing the judgment entered on August 17, 2020. As the August 17, 2020 order does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Washington Court of Appeals

State of Tennessee v. L. Clay Shuler, II
M2019-01231-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas T. Woodall
Trial Court Judge: Judge Angelita Blackshear Dalton

Defendant, L. Clay Shuler, II, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, tampering with evidence, and setting fire to personal property or land. The trial court imposed a sentence of life for first degree murder, six years for tampering with evidence, to be served consecutively to the life sentence, and a concurrent two-year sentence for setting fire to personal property. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Davidson Court of Criminal Appeals

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. SCOTT A. BROWN
M2019-00988-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Glenn
Trial Court Judge: Judge Gary McKenzie

The Defendant, Scott A. Brown, pled guilty to one count of statutory rape, a Class E felony, and one count of possession of more than .5 grams of methamphetamine with intent to sell, a Class B felony, in exchange for an effective sentence of eight years in the Department of Correction. Following a hearing to determine whether the Defendant should be placed on the sex offender registry, the trial court ordered that the Defendant be placed on the registry, which decision the Defendant now appeals. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Clay Court of Criminal Appeals

State of Tennessee v. Kimberly Reed
E2019-01483-CCA-R3-CD
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Kelly Thomas
Trial Court Judge: Judge James F. Goodwin, Jr.

The Defendant, Kimberly Reed, pled guilty to forgery, a Class E felony; identity theft, a Class D felony; theft of property valued at $2,500 or more but less than $10,000, a Class D felony; theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $2,500, a Class E felony; theft of property valued at less than $1,000, a Class A misdemeanor; attempted misdemeanor theft, a Class B misdemeanor; fraudulent use of a credit card, a Class A misdemeanor; criminal impersonation, a Class B misdemeanor; and criminal trespass, a Class C misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-101, -14-103, -14-114, -14-118, - 14-150, -14-405, -16-301. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of ten years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm.

Sullivan Court of Criminal Appeals

In Re Brayla T.
M2019-02265-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Thomas R. Frierson, II
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Melissa Thomas Blevins-Willis

In this termination of parental rights action, the father has appealed the trial court’s final order terminating his parental rights to the minor child, Brayla T. (“the Child”) based on several statutory grounds. The mother and the stepfather filed a petition to terminate the father’s parental rights and to allow the stepfather to adopt the Child after the juvenile court adjudicated the Child dependent and neglected as to the father. The trial court found that statutory grounds existed to terminate the father’s parental rights upon its determination by clear and convincing evidence that the father had abandoned the Child by willfully failing to visit the Child and had failed to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody of or financial responsibility for the Child. The trial court also found clear and convincing evidence of two statutory grounds applicable solely to putative fathers. The trial court further found by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the Child’s best interest to terminate the father’s parental rights. The father has appealed. Having determined that the evidence presented at trial did not support a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the father was a putative father, we reverse as to those two statutory grounds applicable only to putative fathers. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of the father’s parental rights.

Franklin Court of Appeals

Stephen Boesch v. Jay R. Holeman Et Al.
E2019-02288-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Telford E. Forgety, Jr.

This appeal concerns a disassociated partner’s buyout. Stephen Boesch (“Boesch”), Jay Holeman (“Holeman”), and Richard Fraser (“Fraser”) formed a partnership to start a flavored-moonshine and whiskey business, Tennessee Legend. Boesch contributed technical know-how and labor. Early on, Boesch was disassociated from the partnership. Boesch sued Holeman and Fraser (“Defendants,” collectively) in the Chancery Court for Sevier County (“the Trial Court”) alleging, among other things, misappropriation of trade secrets. Later, Crystal Falls Spirits, LLC, an entity created by Holeman, intervened to sue Boesch. At trial, the parties put on competing proof as to the value of Boesch’s interest. Ultimately, the Trial Court adopted Defendants’ value and rejected Boesch’s trade secrets claim. Boesch appeals. Because the experts failed to contend with Tenn. Code Ann. § 61- 1-701, which governs the determination of a disassociated partner’s buyout price when a partnership is not dissolved, we reverse and remand for a new determination in keeping with the statute’s requirements. Otherwise, we affirm the Trial Court’s judgment. We, therefore, affirm in part, and reverse, in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

Sevier Court of Appeals

David Von Brown v. State of Tennessee
W2019-02181-CCA-R3-PC
Authoring Judge: Judge Robert H. Montgomery, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roy B. Morgan, Jr.

The Petitioner, David Von Brown, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for possession of 0.5 gram or more of cocaine with intent to sell, possession of 0.5 gram or more of cocaine with intent to deliver, two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony by a person having a prior felony conviction, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, and the effective seventeen-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Madison Court of Criminal Appeals

Generation 4 Recycling Group, LLC v. Triumph Aerostructures, LLC - Vought Aircraft Division
M2019-01668-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Russell T. Perkins

This is an action for breach of contract and unjust enrichment that arises from an alleged breach of confidentiality during a Request for Proposals (“RFP”) process. The RFP contained a confidentiality provision stating that the defendant would “maintain strict confidentiality of all information provided in response to this RFP.” The plaintiff submitted the lowest bid, but after two requests for revised proposals, which the plaintiff declined to provide, the defendant awarded the contract to another business. In its complaint, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant revealed information about the plaintiff’s proposal to the other bidders in violation of the confidentiality provision to encourage them to lower their bids and, as a consequence, the plaintiff sustained damages. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged the defendant disclosed to the other bidders that they were not the lowest bidder and the percentage by which their bids exceeded the average bid. Following discovery, the trial court summarily dismissed all claims. This appeal followed. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim on the ground that there was a valid contract. We also affirm the dismissal of the breach of contract claim on the ground that there was no evidence to support the plaintiff’s contention that the defendant breached the agreement or that the alleged breach caused the plaintiff to sustain damages.

Davidson Court of Appeals

In Re A.V.N.
E2020-00161-COA-R3-PT
Authoring Judge: Judge Carma Dennis McGee
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jeffrey D. Rader

This case involves a petition to terminate the parental rights of a mother and father. The petitioners alleged four grounds for termination against both parents: (1) abandonment by failure to visit; (2) abandonment by failure to support; (3) persistence of conditions; and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to parent. The trial court found all four grounds were proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court also found that it was in the best interest of the child to terminate both of the parents’ rights. The mother and father appealed separately. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand.

Sevier Court of Appeals

In Re Paisley H. Et Al.
E2020-00174-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Casey Stokes

Father appeals the trial court’s decision to allow grandparent visitation. We vacate and remand the trial court’s order because the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact for us to review its decision regarding its subject matter jurisdiction.

Meigs Court of Appeals

Staci L. Hensley v. Stokely Hospitality Properties, Inc.
E2019-02146-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kristi M. Davis
Trial Court Judge: Judge Rex H. Ogle

In this premises liability case, the plaintiff appeals the trial court’s dismissal of her claims against a hotel based on her failure to satisfy the notice requirements of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.03 for amending her complaint to add a new party. We affirm.

Sevier Court of Appeals

Craftique Construction, Inc. v. Anthony G. Justice, Et Al.
E2018-02096-COA-R3-CV
Authoring Judge: Judge D. Michael Swiney
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Frank V. Williams, III

This is an appeal of a case involving a contract dispute. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

Loudon Court of Appeals

In Re Treylynn T., et al.
W2019-01585-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Judge Kenny Armstrong
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roy B. Morgan, Jr.

This is a dependency and neglect case. Appellee Tennessee Department of Children’s Services received a referral of possible child abuse. Following Appellee’s investigation, the children were placed in foster care. Both parents were arrested on child abuse charges. Thereafter, Appellee initiated a dependency and neglect action in the juvenile court. In her criminal case, Appellant/Mother entered a best interest/Alford plea to the charge of child endangerment. Subsequently, the juvenile court found the children dependent and neglected. On de novo review, the trial court found that: (1) Mother’s Alford plea was dispositive of her guilt on the child endangerment charge; (2) Mother committed severe child abuse under Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-102 (b)(27)(C); and (3) the children were dependent and neglected. Mother appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Henderson Court of Appeals

In Re Treylynn T., et al. - Dissent
W2019-01585-COA-R3-JV
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Roy B. Morgan, Jr.

In this case, the trial court ruled, and the majority affirms, that Mother’s conviction for child endangerment is preclusive evidence that she committed severe abuse in this dependency and neglect action. Because I believe that the majority opinion fails to consider the effect of the diversion that Mother received, I must respectfully dissent.

Henderson Court of Appeals