01A01-9603-CH-00133
01A01-9603-CH-00133
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

01A01-9510-CH-00444
01A01-9510-CH-00444
Trial Court Judge: Cornelia A. Clark

01A01-9603-CH-00135
01A01-9603-CH-00135
Trial Court Judge: Irvin H. Kilcrease, Jr.

01A01-9604-CH-00189
01A01-9604-CH-00189
Trial Court Judge: Robert S. Brandt

Anthony Ray Morris v. Keebler Company, Inc., et al
02S01-9511-CV-00119
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Anthony Ray Morris,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court held that plaintiff failed to provide timely notice as required by TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-21 and that he failed to meet his burden of proving that his injury arose in the course and scope of his employment. The plaintiff appeals these findings. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Plaintiff, 28 at the time of trial, worked for defendant as a route salesman. He testified that in early October 1992, he felt "a sudden pain--not pain, but tingling." He testified that he first felt this when his leg hit the ground getting out of the delivery truck he drove for defendant. After the initial onset of symptoms, plaintiff began to feel that his leg was losing strength. At one point early in the same month, his supervisor noticed him limping and asked him about it. Plaintiff reported feeling numbness and tingling in his leg and that he thought he was losing strength in his leg. The supervisor felt his leg and testified that it felt like "mush." Plaintiff did not report any injury or onset of symptoms at work at this time. Plaintiff testified that his left leg gave out on him in early November while he was shooting baskets. On November 1, 1992, he saw his wife's family practitioner, Dr. Walter Verner. He told Dr. Verner that he had pain in his left thigh and that he had been losing muscle strength in his left leg for about a month. Dr. Verner testified that his notes do not indicate a work-related injury, although that is something that he would normally record. Dr. Verner noted a marked reduction in the plaintiff's deep tendon reflex in his left knee and referred him to Dr. Barry Thompson, a neurologist. Dr. Thompson found left quadriceps weakness and ordered a variety of tests, including an EMG which indicated a possible L4-5 radiculopathy and an MRI which indicated a possible L3 herniated disc on the left. He referred plaintiff to Dr. Joseph Buchignani, a neurosurgeon. 2

Anthony Ray Morris v. Keebler Company, Inc., et al
02S01-9511-CV-00119
Authoring Judge: Per Curiam
Trial Court Judge: Anthony Ray Morris,
This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court held that plaintiff failed to provide timely notice as required by TENN. CODE ANN. _ 5-6-21 and that he failed to meet his burden of proving that his injury arose in the course and scope of his employment. The plaintiff appeals these findings. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Plaintiff, 28 at the time of trial, worked for defendant as a route salesman. He testified that in early October 1992, he felt "a sudden pain--not pain, but tingling." He testified that he first felt this when his leg hit the ground getting out of the delivery truck he drove for defendant. After the initial onset of symptoms, plaintiff began to feel that his leg was losing strength. At one point early in the same month, his supervisor noticed him limping and asked him about it. Plaintiff reported feeling numbness and tingling in his leg and that he thought he was losing strength in his leg. The supervisor felt his leg and testified that it felt like "mush." Plaintiff did not report any injury or onset of symptoms at work at this time. Plaintiff testified that his left leg gave out on him in early November while he was shooting baskets. On November 1, 1992, he saw his wife's family practitioner, Dr. Walter Verner. He told Dr. Verner that he had pain in his left thigh and that he had been losing muscle strength in his left leg for about a month. Dr. Verner testified that his notes do not indicate a work-related injury, although that is something that he would normally record. Dr. Verner noted a marked reduction in the plaintiff's deep tendon reflex in his left knee and referred him to Dr. Barry Thompson, a neurologist. Dr. Thompson found left quadriceps weakness and ordered a variety of tests, including an EMG which indicated a possible L4-5 radiculopathy and an MRI which indicated a possible L3 herniated disc on the left. He referred plaintiff to Dr. Joseph Buchignani, a neurosurgeon. 2

Jeffrey Wolfe v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
02S01-9602-CV-00016
Authoring Judge: Cornelia A. Clark, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. James M. Tharpe
This case is before the Court upon the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, and the Panel's Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated herein by reference. Whereupon, it appears to the Court that the Memorandum Opinion of the Panel should be accepted and approved; and It is, therefore, ordered that the Panel's findings of fact and conclusions of law are adopted and affirmed, and the decision of the Panel is made the judgment of the Court.

Jeffrey Wolfe v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company
02S01-9602-CV-00016
Authoring Judge: Cornelia A. Clark, Special Judge
Trial Court Judge: Hon. James M. Tharpe,
This case is before the Court upon the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, and the Panel's Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated herein by reference. Whereupon, it appears to the Court that the Memorandum Opinion of the Panel should be accepted and approved; and It is, therefore, ordered that the Panel's findings of fact and conclusions of law are adopted and affirmed, and the decision of the Panel is made the judgment of the Court.

03C01-9510-CR-00309
03C01-9510-CR-00309
Trial Court Judge: Stephen M. Bevil

Ali Agha Batebi, v. Patrick Wayne Clark and The Krystal Company
02A01-9410-CV-00228
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly Kirby Lillard
Trial Court Judge: Judge James M. Tharpe

In this case, the defendant, The Krystal Company (Krystal), appeals a jury verdict holding it liable for personal injuries received by the plaintiff, Ali Agha Batebi (Batebi), from a criminal assault by a third party while on Krystal's property. We affirm.

State of Tennessee vs. Phillip Craig Mangrum
01C01-9508-CR-00259
Authoring Judge: Judge David G. Hayes
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jane W. Wheatcraft

The appellant, Phillip Mangrum, pled guilty in the Criminal Court of Sumner County to aggravated burglary, a class C felony. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-403 (1991). The trial court sentenced the appellant as a multiple offender within range II to eight years incarceration in the Department of Correction. The appellant appeals from this sentence, contending, in essence, that (1) the appellant’s status as a multiple offender is not supported by the record; (2) the State’s notice of enhanced sentencing was inadequate under the Sentencing Act and Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12.3; and (2) his sentence is excessive.

State of Tennessee vs. Priscilla Ann Blakemore
01C01-9509-CR-00291
Authoring Judge: Judge John H. Peay
Trial Court Judge: Judge Jane Wheatcraft

This appeal represents three consolidated cases. The defendant pled guilty to three counts of forgery, one count of theft over one thousand dollars ($1000), two counts of passing a forged check, and one count of passing a worthless check. For each count of forgery and passing a forged check, the trial court sentenced the defendant to three years in the Department of Correction as a Range II multiple offender. For the theft offense, the trial court sentenced her to three years in the Department of Correction as a Range I standard offender. For passing a worthless check, the trial court sentenced her to eleven months and twenty-nine days at seventy-five percent (75%) to be served in the Sumner County jail. All sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

Billy Gwinn Mitchell, v. Sam F. Cole Jr. Substitute Trustee, Estate of Prudence Reynolds, and Gerald W. PIckens, Administrator CTA
02A01-9503-CH-00060
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge Hewitt P. Tomlin, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Russell Fowler

The original plaintiff in this case, Billy Gwin Mitchell (“plaintiff” or “Mitchell”) filed suit in the Chancery Court of Shelby County seeking to enjoin the foreclosure of a deed of trust. Named as defendants were Sam F. Cole, Jr., Substitute Trustee of the Estate of Prudence Reynolds, and Gerald W. Pickens, Administrator CTA (“defendants” or by name). Defendants filed an answer and a counter-complaint in which they contended, among other things, that the records of Mitchell’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy case reflected Mitchell’s confirmed amended plan of reorganization mandated that Mitchell pay the mortgage indebtedness to Ms. Reynolds in accordance with the terms of the promissory note. As counter-plaintiffs, Cole and Pickens sought a money judgment for the principal balance due and owing on the note, plus accrued interest and attorney’s fees and costs. At the conclusion of all the proof, the case was submitted to a jury, and after issues of fact had been resolved, the special chancellor entered a judgment in favor of the Reynolds estate in the amount of $41,101.64 on the promissory note and attorney’s 2 fees in the amount of $21,900.00.

Nina Alice Kimble, v. Michael Wayne Kimble
02A01-9503-CV-00049
Authoring Judge: Judge David R. Farmer
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kay S. Robilio

The gravamen of this appeal is child support. Nina Alice Kimble and Michael Wayne Kimble were married in 1985, divorced in 1992 and will be referred to as Wife and Husband, respectively. When  hey married, Wife had a son from a previous marriage and Husband a daughter. Husband adopted the son but Wife did not adopt the daughter.

Robert Cox, Administrator of the Estate of Linda Cox Johnson, Deceased, v. General Care Corp. D/B/A HCA. Regional Hospital of Jackson, Beverly Ann Jetton, Nurse, Shewanna Macky, Receptionist, and Joseph Ragon, M.D.
02A01-9412-CV-00269
Authoring Judge: Judge Holly Kirby Lillard

Appellant has filed a Motion to Rehear Pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. In the Motion, Appellant contends that the Opinion of this Court was based on an incorrect application of the law. Noting that the Opinion states that neither Appellant’s original Complaint or the proposed Amended Complaint allege negligence with respect to laboratory tests conducted on the deceased, Appellant asserts that he was erroneously required to state a legal theory, not simply “facts from which a legal theory can be inferred.”

State of Tennessee, ex rel., Robert F. Smith, Commissioner, Department of Highways, for and on behalf of said department, v. C.W. Simpson, A/K/A Charlier Simpson, Jr.
02A01-9507-CH-00161
Authoring Judge: Judge Alan E. Highers
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor D. J. Alissandratos

The Court below held defendant in civil contempt for violating a permanent 2 injunction that prohibited him from obstructing the right-of-way on a state highway. Defendant has appealed and takes issue with the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss and with the sufficiency of the judgment. We have determined that the record supports the trial court’s finding of civil contempt and, therefore, we affirm.

Billy Gwin Mitchell, v. Sam F. Cole, Jr., Substitute Trustee, Estate of Pudence Reynolds, and Gerald W. PIckens, Administrator, CTA
02A01-9503-CH-00060
Authoring Judge: Senior Judge Hewitt P. Tomlin
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Russell Fowler

The original plaintiff in this case, Billy Gwin Mitchell (“plaintiff” or “Mitchell”) filed suit in the Chancery Court of Shelby County seeking to enjoin the foreclosure of a deed of trust. Named as defendants were Sam F. Cole, Jr., Substitute Trustee  f the Estate of Prudence Reynolds, and Gerald W. Pickens, Administrator CTA (“defendants” or by name). Defendants filed an answer and a counter-complaint in which they contended, among other things, that the records of Mitchell’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy case reflected Mitchell’s confirmed amended plan of reorganization mandated that Mitchell pay the mortgage indebtedness to Ms. Reynolds in accordance with the terms of the promissory note. As counter-plaintiffs, Cole and Pickens sought a money judgment for the principal balance due and owing on the note, plus accrued interest and attorney’s fees and costs. At the conclusion of all the proof, the case was submitted to a jury, and after issues of fact had been resolved, the special chancellor entered a judgment in favor of the Reynolds estate in the amount of $41,101.64 on the promissory note and attorney’s 2 fees in the amount of $21,900.00.

Cassandra Hughlett, v. Shelby County Health Care Corporation, Regional Medical Center at Memphis A/K/A The Med, et al.
02A01-9505-CV-00118
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert L. Childers

The sole issue in this case is whether a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action may recover from a defendant health care provider the amount of plaintiff’s medical expenses paid by the Tennessee Medicaid program which is a part of the federal social security program.

Cassandra Hughlett, v. Shelby County Health Care Corporation, Regional Medical Center at Memphis A/K/A The Med, et al.
02A01-9505-CV-00118
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge W. Frank Crawford
Trial Court Judge: Judge Robert L. Childers

The sole issue in this case is whether a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action may recover from a defendant health care provider the amount of plaintiff’s medical expenses paid by the Tennessee Medicaid program which is a part of the federal social security program.

Michael Anthony Ladd, a minor, by Virginia Ladd, as next friend and legal guardian, v. Hond Motor Co. Ltd., et al., and Erby L. Givens,
01A01-9503-CV-00091
Authoring Judge: Judge William C. Koch, Jr.
Trial Court Judge: Judge Thomas Goodall

This appeal involves a twelve-year-old boy who became paralyzed when he lost control of an all-terrain vehicle and crashed into a utility pole. The boy sued the manufacturer of the all-terrain vehicle in the Circuit Court for Sumner County, alleging that its advertisements falsely and misleadingly depicted all-terrain vehicles as safe enough to be operated by children. The jury returned a verdict for the manufacturer following a lengthy trial, and the child and his mother appealed. We have determined that the trial court’s instructions did not fairly appraise the jury of the plaintiff’s theory of the case and that its supplemental instructions confused the jury about the significance of their verdict. Therefore, we reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial.

Christopher Johnson v.Tennessee Department of Correction - Concurring
01-A-01-9602-CH-00064
Authoring Judge: Judge Ben H. Cantrell
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Ellen Hobbs Lyle

A convicted burglar in the custody of the Department of Correction filed a petition with the Chancery Court of Davidson County for an order directing  the Department to award him additional credits against his sentence for time spent in jail before and after trial, and for sentence reduction credits he allegedly earned during the same period of incarceration. The Chancellor found that Mr. Johnson had already received all the credits to which he was entitled. We affirm-

Jennifer Frank v. Ali Noureddini, Olifate Nouredinni, et al. - Concurring
01A01-9601-CH-00044
Authoring Judge: Judge Henry F. Todd
Trial Court Judge: Chancellor Robert S. Brandt

The Plaintiff, Jennifer Frank, has appealed from summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, American Realty Company, Terry Stephens, Lee  Ann Hoffman, Shirley Adkins and Alan Saturn; and from a judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against the Defendant, Ali Noureddini in the amount of  $50,000. Other captioned Defendants are not involved in this appeal.

Lisa Griggs, v. James P. Mixon, Jimmy R. Worsham, Gene Barksdale, Sheriff of Shelby County, Tennessee, and Shelby County, Tennessee
02A01-9504-CV-00087
Authoring Judge: Presiding Judge Henry F. Todd
Trial Court Judge: Judge Kay S. Robilio

This is a governmental tort liability case arising out of an automobile collision. Defendants, James P. Mixon; Gene Barksdale, Sheriff of Shelby County, Tennessee, and Shelby County, Tennessee, appeal from the judgment of the trial court awarding plaintiff, Lisa Griggs damages for personal injury. Under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act as it existed in 1985, governmental entities could not be tried by a jury, T.C.A. § 29-20-307. Subsequently, prior to the 1994 trial, the case was bifurcated to allow the nongovernmental defendant a jury trial. Thus, Worsham is not a party to this appeal.

State of Tennessee vs. Graple Simpson
02C01-9601-CC-00016
Authoring Judge: Judge Paul G. Summers
Trial Court Judge: Judge Joseph H. Walker, III

The appellee, Graple Simpson, was indicted for possession of a schedule II narcotic with the intent to sell. Following a summary administrative forfeiture, the appellee moved the trial court to dismiss the criminal charge. She argued that the double jeopardy clause prohibited further criminal prosecution. The trial judge granted the appellee's motion and the state appealed. We reverse and remand.

Scarlett J. Love v. College Assessment Services Inc. and Nursing Careers, Inc.
03S01-9510-CV-00118
Authoring Judge: Justice Frank F. Drowota, III
Trial Court Judge: Judge Conrad E. Troutman, Jr.

The plaintiff, Scarlett Lay Love, appeals from the denial of her motion to dismiss, the motion being predicated upon the alleged failure of the defendants, College Level Career Services, Inc., and Nursing Careers, Inc., to perfect an appeal from the general sessions court to the circuit court within the ten-day period provided for in Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-5-108. The sole issue for our determination is as follows: whether a facsimile (fax) transmission of a notice of appeal and appeal bond, sent by the defendants to the clerk of the general sessions court on the final day on which an appeal could be taken, is sufficient to perfect the appeal. For the following reasons, we conclude that the facsimile transmission was not sufficient to perfect the appeal; therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.