Jeffrey McCoy v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Jeffrey McCoy, pleaded guilty to theft of property valued at $10,000 or more and one count of burglary of a building other than a habitation. The trial court imposed a twelve-year effective sentence to be served consecutively to a previous sentence in South Carolina. The Petitioner appeals the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner maintains that the post-conviction court erred in finding that the petition was barred by the statute of limitations. The State concedes error. After a review of the record and applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand for appointment of counsel and further proceedings consistent with the Post-Conviction Procedure Act. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Bentley Q.
In this termination of parental rights action, the father has appealed the trial court’s final order terminating his parental rights based on several statutory grounds. The maternal grandparents of the minor child, Bentley Q. (“the Child”), filed a petition to terminate the mother’s and father’s parental rights and to allow the maternal grandparents to adopt the Child. As pertinent to this appeal, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that the father had (1) abandoned the Child by willfully failing to visit the Child and (2) failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of or financial responsibility for the Child. The trial court also found by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the Child’s best interest that the father’s parental rights be terminated. The father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
Amy Angell Tucker, Et Al. v. Sandra Jackson Iveson, Et Al.
A plaintiff who developed tendonitis after taking medication prescribed by a nurse practitioner filed a malpractice action against the nurse practitioner and the pharmacy that filled the prescription. Two years later, the plaintiff amended her complaint to add the |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeffrey Van Garrett
Defendant, Jeffrey Van Garrett, was charged with one count of possession of oxycodone, a Schedule II substance, with intent to sell or deliver. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, which was denied by the trial court. Thereafter, Defendant entered into a negotiated plea agreement under Rule 11(c) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, in which he pled guilty to the charge with an agreed four-year sentence as a Range I offender to be served on probation. Defendant attempted to reserve three certified questions of law under Rule 37(b)(2)(A) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, challenging the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress. After review, we conclude that this Court does not have jurisdiction to address the certified questions because the certification did not meet the requirements of State v. Preston, 759 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. 1988). The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. |
Monroe | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Alexis Luttrell Tutor v. Joseph Keith Tutor
In this post-divorce dispute, Appellant Mother and Appellee Father filed cross-petitions seeking modification of the permanent parenting plan for their minor child. Father sought a change in primary residential parent, and Mother sought modification of the parenting schedule and decision-making authority. On its finding that the parties stipulated to a material change in circumstance, the trial court granted Father’s petition and denied Mother’s petition. Because the trial court failed to delineate between the burden of proof for modification of custody and the burden of proof for modification of parenting schedule, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-6-101(a)(2)(B), (C), we vacate the trial court’s order and remand. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
William Boatwright v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, William Boatwright, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his especially aggravated robbery, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and two aggravated assault convictions, for which he is serving a forty-seven-year sentence. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We conclude that the Petitioner received the ineffective assistance of counsel, reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court, and remand this case for a limited motion for a new trial regarding the sufficiency of the evidence issues addressed in the appeal. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William Boatwright v. State of Tennessee - concurring in part and dissenting in part
I concur with the majority opinion in its analysis that Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel. Petitioner’s counsel failed to raise specific issues regarding the lack of sufficient evidence to sustain two convictions, and the issues had merit. However, I disagree with the majority opinion’s conclusion as to the relief to which Petitioner is entitled. This is a unique post-conviction case. I am unable to recall ever before reviewing an appeal wherein the petitioner is entitled to post-conviction relief because, following a thorough review of the evidence at trial taken in the light most favorable to the State, it is clearly shown that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions of especially aggravated robbery of one victim and aggravated robbery of another victim. Petitioner’s counsel failed to make the appropriate argument for judgment of acquittal at the close of the State’s case and failed to argue the issue in the direct appeal to this court. That failure established deficient performance. The review of the evidence at trial, the result of which is stated above, clearly established prejudice to Petitioner as a result of counsel’s deficient performance. Reversing the judgment of the post-conviction court is appropriate. However, remanding the matter to the trial court for Petitioner to have the opportunity to file a motion for new trial denies Petitioner the relief to which he is entitled. As will be discussed herein, it may also be in violation of Petitioner’s constitutional rights to be protected from double jeopardy. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Carlie Z. Et Al.
The is an appeal from an order terminating a father’s parental rights. Because the father did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a), we dismiss the appeal. |
White | Court of Appeals | |
Mark A. Crites v. State of Tennessee
A Williamson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Mark A. Crites, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him as a multiple offender to twelve years of incarceration. The Petitioner appealed, and this court affirmed the conviction and sentence. See State v. Mark A. Crites, No. M2014-00383-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 3508042 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 4, 2015), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 17, 2015). The Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition, claiming he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The Petitioner appeals the denial, maintaining that his counsel was ineffective. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Carey R. Faught v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Carey R. Faught, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his jury trial convictions of aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during a dangerous felony, reckless endangerment, two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated robbery, and his effective forty-eight-year sentence. He contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief on his claim that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to challenge an impermissibly suggestive photograph lineup. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carrington Owens
The Defendant, Carrington Owens, was convicted by a Montgomery County Circuit Court jury of four counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony; twenty-three counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class B felony; and twelve counts of aggravated sexual battery of a child less than thirteen years of age, a Class B felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522 (Supp. 2007, 2010, Supp. 2011) (rape of a child), 39-17-1005 (2006) (subsequently amended) (especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor), 39-13-504 (2018) (aggravated sexual battery). He is serving an effective thirty-seven-year sentence for his convictions. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence from a search of his home and that he was denied the right to confront his accuser face-to-face. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
William Matney Putman v. State of Tennessee
Over twenty-five years ago, William Matney Putman, Petitioner, pled guilty to first-degree felony murder, attempted robbery, and aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole. See William Matney Putman v. State, No. E2004-02192-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 1996634, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 18, 2005), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 19, 2005) (“Putman I”). The postconviction court summarily dismissed Petitioner’s second petition for post-conviction relief. After review, we affirm pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Carter | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. John C. Elrod
The Defendant, John C. Elrod, appeals the trial court’s order imposing confinement after finding a violation of his probation. In two separate cases, the Defendant pleaded guilty to multiple offenses, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of seven years of probation. In May 2019, the trial court issued a probation violation warrant based upon allegations that the Defendant had violated the terms of his probation by testing positive for amphetamines and methamphetamines on November 27, 2018 and January 24, 2019. After a hearing, the trial court revoked his probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation and when it ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Warren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Belinda Bentley Wright v. John Andrew Wright
This is a divorce case. Appellant Husband appeals the trial court’s: (1) classification of certain property; (2) imputation of income for purposes of child support; (3) denial of the parties’ proposed parenting plan; and (4) award of rehabilitative, transitional, and alimony in solido to Appellee Wife. We conclude that the trial court erred in: (1) the classification of certain marital property; (2) the amount of income imputed to the parties’; (3) denying the parties’ proposed parenting plan absent sufficient findings; (4) its award of rehabilitative alimony; and (5) in the amount of transitional alimony awarded. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Wafa Badawi Hindiyeh v. Waleed Fawzi Abed
This is the second appeal of a parenting plan. In the first appeal, Father successfully challenged the adoption of a plan that allocated him only 80 days parenting time; the case was remanded with instructions for the trial court to increase Father’s parenting time. Following a hearing, the trial court adopted Father’s proposed parenting plan which granted the parties equal parenting time, and in so doing, addressed other matters. Mother appeals. We affirm the award of equal parenting time and the adjustment to child support and income tax deductions that necessarily followed; we modify the plan to include certain provisions that were in the previous parenting plan. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Susan Hembree (Schumacher) Deluca v. Kerry James Schumacher
A husband and wife executed a marital dissolution agreement (“MDA”) providing that the husband would pay the wife alimony in futuro even if she remarried. Following the wife’s remarriage, the husband sought to have his alimony obligation terminated pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-121(f)(3), which provides that an alimony in futuro award “shall terminate automatically and unconditionally upon the death or remarriage of the recipient.” The trial court terminated the husband’s alimony obligation, and the wife appealed. We reverse the trial court’s judgment because the parties voluntarily agreed to terms outside of the statute, and their contract is enforceable as written. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Heather R. Wilder v. Joseph C. Wilder
This appeal involves questions of post-divorce child support. In the trial court proceedings, both parties prayed for a modification of support. Additionally, mother pursued an extension of support post-majority for two of her children. While the trial court dealt with the question of post-majority support, it did not address the parties’ requests for modification of the ordinary support owed, father for a decrease, or mother for an increase. Although the trial court addressed post-majority support issues, its order was incomplete even as to those matters, as a specific amount of support was never set. It follows that there is not a final judgment in this case, and we must therefore dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Brandon Burns v. State Farm Fire And Casualty Company
This appeal concerns a plaintiff’s effort to amend a civil warrant. Brandon Burns (“Burns”) had homeowners insurance through State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (“SFFCC”). When SFFCC did not repair the progressing damage to his home caused by a sinkhole, Burns sued “State Farm Insurance” in the Knox County General Sessions Court (“the General Sessions Court”). It was the wrong entity. Nevertheless, Burns obtained a $25,000 default judgment against it. SFFCC, a non-party, somehow and for some reason filed an appeal to the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Circuit Court”). In the Circuit Court, Burns filed a motion to amend. SFFCC filed a motion to dismiss, which the Circuit Court granted as to SFFCC but not as to State Farm Insurance. SFFCC then dismissed its appeal, content to let the General Sessions Court judgment stand against State Farm Insurance. Some months later, Burns made an oral motion to amend in the General Sessions Court, which was granted. The parties agreed to remove the case back to the Circuit Court, which granted summary judgment to SFFCC. Burns appeals. We hold that the General Sessions Court lacked jurisdiction to grant Burns’ motion to amend or otherwise modify its judgment because its judgment became final months before Burns’ motion was noticed for hearing in the General Sessions Court. We affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Freddie L. Smith
The Defendant, Freddie L. Smith, was convicted upon his guilty pleas of four counts of identity theft, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-14-150 (2018). The Defendant pleaded guilty as a Range II offender and agreed to an effective eight-year sentence. The manner of service of his sentence was reserved for the trial court’s determination. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by imposing incarceration rather than an alternative sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Great American Insurance Company v. Pilot Travel Centers, LLC
This appeal arises out of a negligence lawsuit. TLD Logistics Services, Inc. (“TLD”), an interstate common carrier, sued Pilot Travel Centers, LLC (“Pilot”) in the Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”). TLD was a customer of Comdata Network, Inc. (“Comdata”), and Pilot was a Comdata vendor. Upon request from TLD, Comdata issued codes for the creation of Comcheks, negotiable draft instruments TLD used to pay workers. Pilot would print and deliver the Comcheks. TLD alleged that Pilot breached its duty of care by failing to ascertain whether Comchek payees were legitimate, thus causing TLD monetary loss when a rogue TLD employee fraudulently caused numerous Comcheks to be issued that were negotiated by Pilot. Pilot filed a motion for summary judgment. Pilot argued in its motion that TLD should have kept better internal safeguards to prevent what happened with its employee, and that TLD was 50% or more at fault in this matter. The Trial Court granted Pilot’s motion for summary judgment. Great American Insurance Company (“Great American”), subrogee of TLD and substituted as plaintiff mid-proceedings below, appeals to this Court. We hold that reasonable minds could disagree as to whether TLD was 50% or more at fault. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Alvin Ray, et al. v. Anthony Willougby
A pro se defendant appeals a judgment entered against him on a promissory note. Because the defendant failed to file a transcript or statement of evidence, we presume that the trial court’s findings are supported by the evidence. In light of that presumption, we affirm the judgment. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. George Ronald Perez
Defendant, George Ronald Perez, was indicted by the Montgomery County Grand Jury for possession with intent to sell or deliver 0.5 ounce or more of marijuana, simple possession of cocaine, simple possession of methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Defendant entered open guilty pleas to felony possession with intent to sell or deliver 0.5 ounce or more of marijuana, simple possession of cocaine, simple possession of methamphetamine, and possession of drug paraphernalia. A bench trial was conducted on the charge of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and Defendant was found guilty. The trial court sentenced Defendant to consecutive sentences of one year for possession with intent to sell 0.5 ounce or more of marijuana and three years for possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant to 11 months and 29 days for each of his remaining convictions and ordered those sentences to run concurrently with his three-year sentence. Defendant’s sole issue on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Having reviewed the entire record, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Aaron Frank Britton
The defendant, Aaron Frank Britton, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court guiltypleaded conviction of aggravated assault, arguing that the trial court erred by imposing a fully incarcerative sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tonica Alvarado aka Tonica Beckham
The pro se Defendant, Tonica Alvarado aka Tonica Beckham, appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to correct a clerical error on her probation revocation order pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. After review, we remand the case for further findings. |
Hardin | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tavaris Markee Golden
A Madison County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Tavaris Markee Golden, of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, employing a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony, a Class C felony, and attempted voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony, and he received an effective twelve-year sentence. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to merge the attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction into the aggravated assault conviction and that the merger would have negated his conviction of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and the six-year sentence he received for the offense. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals |