State of Tennessee v. Alexander R. Vance and Damonta M. Meneese
We granted permission to appeal to the Defendant, Alexander R. Vance, to determine whether the trial court committed reversible error by permitting the State to elicit testimony about a statement made by a non-testifying codefendant whose trial was severed and whose statements were the subject of a motion in limine the trial court had granted. The trial court permitted the testimony after determining that defense counsel had “opened the door” during cross-examination and that the doctrine of curative admissibility permitted the testimony in order to correct a misleading impression created by the cross-examination. The defense objected to the testimony on various grounds. Those grounds did not include constitutional claims under the state and federal confrontation clauses. After the close of proof, the jury convicted the Defendant of one count of second degree murder, an alternative count of first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and three counts of aggravated assault. The trial court merged the second degree murder conviction into the first degree murder conviction and imposed an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus twenty-one years. In his motion for new trial, the Defendant reiterated his arguments against the admission of the “curative” testimony and raised for the first time a contention that the testimony violated his constitutional rights of confrontation. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgments. Applying plain error review to the Defendant’s constitutional claims, we hold that, while the trial court erred in admitting the contested testimony, substantial justice does not require that plain error relief be granted. We also hold that the Defendant is not entitled to relief on the claims he preserved for plenary review. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Brenda Gibbs v. Capital Resorts Group, LLC, Et Al.
This appeal involves the denial of a motion to dismiss and to compel mediation and arbitration. The Trial Court determined that the plaintiff had properly challenged the mandatory arbitration provisions of the contract, including the delegation clause, on the basis of fraudulent inducement of the contract including the delegation clause. The Trial Court, therefore, denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss and to compel mediation and arbitration. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Arnold Demoss
The Appellant, James Arnold Demoss, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and driving on a revoked license, fourth offense, a Class A misdemeanor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court was to determine the length and manner of service of the sentences. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Appellant as a Range II, multiple offender to ten years in confinement for aggravated burglary and to a concurrent sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days for driving on a revoked license, fourth offense. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for alternative sentencing. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Daniel Wade Wilson
Daniel Wade Wilson, Petitioner, challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 in which he sought to correct what he alleged was an illegal sentence for felony murder. Petitioner argues that the conviction violated the prohibitions against double jeopardy and that the trial court failed to follow the mandate of this Court after retrial. After a review of the record and the issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Sidney W. White, et al. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
Appellants were injured in a car accident and, with the permission of their insurance company, Appellee State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”), settled with the at-fault driver for his policy limits under his coverage with United Services Automobile Association (“USAA”). To fully recover for their injuries, Appellants notified State Farm of their willingness to settle or submit their underinsured motorist (“UIM”) claim to binding arbitration. After evaluating Appellants’ claim, State Farm informed Appellants that it would not offer a settlement for the UIM claim because it believed they had been fully compensated by the payment from USAA. Appellants, in response, demanded that State Farm elect to either participate in binding arbitration or decline arbitration and preserve its subrogation rights under Tennessee Code Annotated section 56-7-1206 (“the Statute”). Believing that its obligation under the Statute was never triggered, State Farm refused to make an election. Appellants filed an action for declaratory judgment asking the trial court to declare that State Farm failed to comply with the Statute. On competing motions for summary judgment, the trial court granted State Farm’s motion and denied Appellants’ motion. Finding no error, we affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Harley Crosland
The State appealed the trial court’s application of the Criminal Savings Statute to the Defendant’s conviction for “Theft over $500,” arguing that the court improperly imposed a misdemeanor sentence for the Defendant’s guilty plea to Class E felony theft and that the amendments to the theft grading statute changed the elements of the offense, rather than the punishment for the offense. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103 (2014) (generic theft statute), 39-14-105 (2014) (amended 2017) (theft grading statute). Upon review, a majority of this court dismissed the appeal after concluding that the State had no appeal as of right under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 or Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-402. State v. Harley Crosland, No. M2017-01232-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 3092903 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 21, 2018), perm. app. granted and case remanded, No. M2017-01232-SC-R11-CD (Tenn. Dec. 5, 2019) (order). On December 5, 2019, the Tennessee Supreme Court granted the State’s application for permission to appeal and remanded the case to this court for reconsideration in light of the supreme court’s opinion in State v. Menke, No. M2017-00597-SC-R11-CD, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2019 WL 6336427 (Tenn. Nov. 27, 2019). Harley Crosland, No. M2017-01232-SC-R11-CD (Tenn. Dec. 5, 2019) (order). Upon further review, we affirm the trial court’s imposition of a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the Defendant’s theft conviction, we reverse the portion of the judgment stating that this theft conviction is a Class E felony, and we remand the case to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment form reflecting that the Defendant’s amended offense and conviction offense are theft of property valued at $1,000 or less and that this theft conviction constitutes a Class A misdemeanor. |
Lewis | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Khaled Eleiwa, et al. v. Suzanne Abutaa f/k/a Izdihar Jabr
Petitioners appeal the dismissal of a petition for civil and criminal contempt related to alleged violations of a permanent injunction against the Respondent. In response, the Respondent appeals the dismissal of two protective orders she concurrently sought against the Petitioners. As the trial court’s order failed to provide sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law for review, we vacate the trial court’s ruling and remand the matter for further consideration. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Nikki Bodie Pate
The Defendant, Nikki Bodie Pate, pleaded guilty to two counts of custodial interference. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court granted the Defendant’s request for judicial diversion and placed the Defendant on probation for eighteen months. On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred when it granted the Defendant judicial diversion. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Sequatchie | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
James Edward Bostic, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, James Edward Bostic, Jr., appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief and denial of related motions. On appeal, he asserts that the Tennessee Department of Correction refuses to comply with an order by the trial court awarding him jail credit and that the matter should be remanded to the trial court for the trial court to resolve. He also asserts for the first time on appeal that his post-conviction counsel was ineffective because she failed to assist him in his fight for jail credit. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tennessee Democratic Party v. Hamilton County Election Commission; Mark Goins In His Official Capacity As State Election Coordinator; And Robin Smith
Political party filed suit against the county election commission and the State election coordinator requesting injunctive relief to prevent a county election commission from allowing a replacement for a candidate in another party’s primary election for the office of state representative who had withdrawn from the race after the qualifying deadline; the plaintiff party also sought a declaration that the withdrawal of the original candidate did not allow for a replacement under the circumstances presented. The primary election ensued, and the replacement candidate advanced to the general election; thereafter, the trial court denied the injunction and granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss the action. After the appeal was filed but before argument, the general election was held and the other party’s candidate was elected. We have determined that this case is moot and, accordingly, dismiss the appeal; we deny the request for damages for a frivolous appeal. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Anthony Dowlen v. State Of Tennessee
The petitioner, Anthony Dowlen, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing the petition stated a colorable claim for relief and the post-conviction court erred in dismissing the petition without the appointment of counsel. Following our review, we find the trial court erred in dismissing the petition as it stated a colorable claim thus warranting the appointment of counsel. Accordingly, we reverse the order of summary dismissal and remand the case for further proceedings pursuant to the |
Rutherford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Christina Lee Cain-Swope v. Robert David Swope
This is the second appeal stemming from the divorce of the parties. After a remand from this Court, the trial court established the amount of alimony in futuro that Wife owed to Husband based on Wife’s ability to pay and Husband’s need for alimony. The trial court also declined to grant a downward deviation in Wife’s child support payments based on her payment of extraordinary educational expenses. The trial court’s ruling was based on a proposed parenting plan never agreed upon by the parties yet referenced by this Court in its initial opinion. We affirm the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro. However, we vacate the trial court’s denial of a downward deviation and remand the decision to the trial court for further consideration. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Derrick Wade v. State of Tennessee
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner, Derrick Wade, received an effective thirty-year sentence for his convictions for two counts of second degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, and attempted first degree murder. The Petitioner filed a timely post-conviction petition, which was denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner asserts that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that his pleas were not entered knowingly or voluntarily because he was under duress due to the circumstances of his plea. After a thorough review of the record, we discern no error and affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Aaron Patrick Taylor v. Joseph Winston Harsh
Plaintiff filed claims of slander, defamation, and interference with prospective economic advantage against defendant deputy sheriff in his individual capacity. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that he was entitled to immunity. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed plaintiff’s claims on the basis of immunity. Because we cannot discern whether the trial court relied on the proper law in its ruling, we vacate the trial court’s judgment. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Tyler Cole Deaton v. Katlyn Nicole Williams
This appeal involves a contentious dispute over the designation of the primary residential parent for a child born to the unmarried parties. Having carefully reviewed the voluminous record before us, we reverse the decision of the trial court and designate the mother as the primary residential parent. The case is remanded for entry of a permanent parenting plan consistent with this court’s opinion. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Glenn Fred Glatz
The defendant, Glenn Fred Glatz, appeals his Sevier County Circuit Court jury convictions of attempted sexual exploitation of a minor and contributing to the delinquency of a minor, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred by admitting certain testimony into evidence. Because the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant’s conviction of attempted sexual exploitation of a minor, that count is reversed, and the charge is dismissed. We affirm the defendant’s conviction of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Glenn Fred Glatz - separate opinion
I join in the majority opinion except that portion of the opinion which examines the issue of evidence admitted in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). This issue is waived. The State correctly argues it is waived. Defendant acknowledges the issue is waived, but seeks relief in plain error review. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Edward Lee Hood, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Edward Lee Hood, Jr., appeals the coram nobis court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis in which he challenged his 2009 convictions of two counts of rape of a child and two counts of incest. After a review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Morrieo Allen
Defendant, Morrieo Allen, was indicted for the offense of first degree felony murder in the perpetration of robbery. At the conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief, Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, asserting that the State failed to prove venue in Shelby County and that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion. A jury found Defendant guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced Defendant to life in prison. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal when the proof at trial was insufficient to prove venue in Shelby County; and (2) that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Having reviewed the record on appeal and applicable law, we find no error. The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Marc Douglas Swindle ET AL. v. Karen Goodlow ET AL.
This appeal stems from a workplace injury on a construction site. On his first day on the job, Marc Douglas Swindle (“Plaintiff”) fell from the roof of a building that was under construction. It is undisputed that Plaintiff was authorized to work on the job site and that he was working in the course and scope of his employment when injured. What is disputed is the identity of his employer: whether he was in the employ of the general contractor or one of the subcontractors. Plaintiff initially filed a claim with the Tennessee Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims, naming the general contractor as his employer; however, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his workers’ compensation claim when the general contractor filed a response stating that Plaintiff was not its employee. Thereafter, Plaintiff and his wife filed this tort action in circuit court to recover damages from the general contractor, two of its subcontractors, and the owner of the property for the injuries he sustained at the construction site. Finding it undisputed that Plaintiff’s injuries were sustained in the course and scope of his employment, the circuit court held that it was without jurisdiction to consider the tort claims because the workers’ compensation exclusive remedy doctrine applied. For these reasons, the court dismissed the complaint. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jeremy Randall C. Ledbetter
The Defendant, Jeremy Randall C. Ledbetter, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of two counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony; two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony; two counts of soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class B felony; and one count of exploitation by displaying sexual acts to a minor, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-522 (2018) (rape of a child), 39-13-504 (2018) (aggravated sexual battery), 39-13-529(a) (soliciting sexual exploitation of a minor) (Supp. 2011, Supp. 2012, Supp. 2013), 39-13-529(b)(1) (displaying sexual acts to a minor). The Defendant is serving an effective eighty-one years for the convictions. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) the State’s election of offenses was inadequate, (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a severance, (4) the court erred in admitting evidence, and (5) his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bradley David Townsend v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Bradley Townsend, appeals the Roane County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his two convictions of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and resulting sentence of eight years. On appeal, he contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to request jury instructions on certain lesser-included offenses. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the Petitioner received the ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to his conviction of aggravated sexual battery in count twenty-one. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court as to that count and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Roane | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jamaal Mayes v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Jamaal Mayes, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2003 guilty-pleaded conviction for attempted rape of a child. Petitioner argues that the statute of limitations should be tolled on due process grounds to assert a laterarising claim, namely that he did not become aware that he was subject to community supervision for life until more than ten years after his plea. After a hearing, the postconviction court dismissed the petition as untimely. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Mona Word v. Knox County, Tennessee, Et AL.
This appeal arises from a lawsuit alleging racial discrimination in the workplace. Mona Word (“Word”), an African-American woman who worked in the Knox County Clerk’s Office for 19 years, sued Knox County Clerk Foster D. Arnett, Jr. (“Arnett”) in his individual and official capacity, Knox County, Tennessee (“Knox County”), and the Knox County Clerk’s Office (“Defendants,” collectively) asserting a number of claims, including violations of the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“the THRA”). According to Word, she was denied opportunities for promotion because of her race, and was singled out for discipline because of her race, as well. Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the Circuit Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) granted. Word appealed to this Court. Accepting Word’s factual allegations as true as is required at the motion for judgment on the pleadings stage, we hold that Word alleged enough to withstand Defendants’ motion with respect to certain of her claims against Knox County and Arnett in his individual capacity. However, we affirm the Trial Court’s dismissal of Word’s claims against Arnett in his official capacity and the Knox County Clerk’s Office, as well as Word’s claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The judgment of the Trial Court thus is affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part, and this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Garrick Graham
The Petitioner, Garrick Graham, filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The Sullivan County Criminal Court granted the motion in part and denied the motion in part, and the Petitioner appeals the trial court’s denial. Based upon our view of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals |