Angela Michelle Newberry v. Jeremy Mack Newberry
In this post-divorce case, Angela Michelle Newberry appeals the trial court’s modification of the permanent parenting plan. She challenges the trial court’s decision to change the designation of primary residential parent from her to her former spouse, Jeremy Mack Newberry. She also attacks the court’s decree reducing her co-parenting time. We hold that father failed to meet his burden of establishing a material change in circumstances affecting the children’s well-being, as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 6-101(a)(2)(B) (2017). Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and reinstate the parenting plan as originally agreed to by the parties and ordered by the court in the final divorce judgment. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Kevin Clark v. State of Tennessee
An Overton County jury convicted the Petitioner, Kevin Clark, of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of aggravated assault, one count of reckless endangerment, one count of aggravated arson, and one count of abuse of a corpse. The trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of two consecutive life sentences. This court affirmed the trial court’s judgments on appeal. State v. Kevin Clark, No. M2912- 01744-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 6145812 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Nov. 21, 2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 8, 2014). The Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief in which he alleged, as relevant on appeal, that the post-conviction court erred when it denied his petition for post-conviction relief because: (1) he was deprived of his right to an impartial jury because of an improper communication between a juror and a witness; and (2) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. He further contended that the post-conviction court erred when it: (1) did not limit the scope of cross-examination of the Petitioner’s witness to questions relevant to the post-conviction petition; and (2) did not consider all the issues presented in his petition for postconviction relief. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment. |
Overton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Bobby Chism v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Bobby Chism, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief from his guilty plea to two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, and one count of employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The Petitioner argues that his guilty plea was involuntary and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Aden H.
The mother and step-father of a child appeal the denial of their Petition to Terminate the Parental Rights of the father of the child on the grounds of abandonment by failure to support. Upon a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Lisa Edwards
Following the denial of her application for pretrial diversion, the defendant, Lisa Edwards, petitioned the Knox County Criminal Court for a writ of certiorari. The trial court denied the petition for writ of certiorari but granted the defendant’s request for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Because we find no abuse of discretion, we affirm the denial of pretrial diversion in this case. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Desiree Daniels Disterdick v. John Disterdick
In this divorce action presenting issues concerning the classification and distribution of the parties’ assets, the trial court determined that an oil and gas investment purchased during the marriage was the wife’s separate property, as was her engagement ring. The trial court fashioned an equitable distribution of the parties’ marital property and debts and denied the wife’s claim for alimony. In doing so, the trial court excluded any consideration of assets formerly owned by the parties that were held by a trust at the time of trial. The husband has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: D.T.
In this termination of parental rights case, the Department of Children’s Services filed a petition to terminate the rights of R.T. with respect to his child, D.T.1 At trial, DCS alleged a single ground for termination: persistence of conditions. The court found clear and convincing evidence. By the same quantum of proof, the court also found that termination is in the child’s best interest. Father appeals. We affirm. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Dakota M. Et Al.
Father’s rights to his son were terminated based upon his stipulation that the Department of Children’s Services could prove that grounds to terminate existed and upon the Court’s conclusion that termination was in the child’s best interest. Father appeals. Upon our review, we conclude that Father’s stipulation that the evidence satisfied the statutory grounds for termination was a nullity. We also conclude that the trial court’s order does not contain adequate factual findings with respect to the grounds for termination to provide for a meaningful review. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the court and remand the case. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
Betty Jo Goodman v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, Et Al.
A borrower filed a pro se petition against a mortgage company and law firm seeking to enjoin a foreclosure sale. The trial court issued the injunction but, upon motion of the mortgage company and law firm, set aside the order granting injunctive relief after finding the order void. The trial court also found that the borrower’s petition failed to state a claim and dismissed the action. We vacate in part and affirm in part. |
Maury | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Audrey T.
In this post-divorce proceeding, Father appeals the reduction of his parenting time. Because he has failed to include a transcript or statement of the evidence in accordance with Rule 24 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, we presume that the evidentiary record supports the trial Court’s decision. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
Rose Coleman v. Bryan Olson
When a divorce complaint is filed and served, a statutory injunction goes into effect prohibiting both parties from changing the beneficiary on any life insurance policy that names either party as the beneficiary without the consent of the other party or a court order. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-106(d)(2) (2010). Jessica Olson sued her husband, Bryan Olson, for divorce. A week later, Ms. Olson, while seriously ill, changed the beneficiary on her life insurance policy from her husband to her mother. Ms. Olson died a few days later. Her mother, Rose Coleman, collected the life insurance benefits. Ms. Coleman sued Mr. Olson for grandparent visitation under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-306 (2010). Mr. Olson responded that he did not oppose visitation, and therefore, Ms. Coleman was not entitled to court-ordered visitation. In addition, Mr. Olson countersued to recover the life insurance benefits. The trial court awarded the insurance benefits to the Olsons’ child, finding that Ms. Olson had intended to remove Mr. Olson and substitute their child as the insurance beneficiary. The trial court ordered Ms. Coleman to pay the remaining life insurance funds into the court registry, to account for her expenditures, and to pay a judgment for expenditures that did not benefit the child. The trial court also granted Ms. Coleman’s petition for grandparent visitation. The Court of Appeals reversed, awarding the life insurance benefits to Mr. Olson based on Ms. Olson’s violation of the statutory injunction and its consideration of Mr. Olson’s financial needs. In addition, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s award of visitation to Ms. Coleman. We hold that (1) Ms. Olson violated the statutory injunction under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-4-106(d)(2) when she removed Mr. Olson as her life insurance beneficiary; (2) the Olsons’ divorce action abated when Ms. Olson died and the statutory injunction became ineffective; (3) a trial court, after the abatement of a divorce action, may remedy a violation of the statutory injunction after considering the equities of the parties; (4) the trial court erred by awarding the life insurance benefits to the Olsons’ child based on the pleadings and the evidence; (5) the Court of Appeals erred by awarding the life insurance benefits to Mr. Olson without sufficient evidence of the equities of the parties; (6) the trial court, on remand, may remedy the violation of the statutory injunction by awarding all or a portion of the life insurance benefits to either or both parties after hearing additional evidence and considering the equities of the parties; and (7) Ms. Coleman was not entitled to court-ordered grandparent visitation absent Mr. Olson’s opposition to visitation. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals; we reverse and vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. |
Montgomery | Supreme Court | |
Kenneth E. Raymer v. Maintenance Insights, LLC, Et Al.
Kenneth Raymer (“Employee”) sustained a compensable injury to his left shoulder on July 8, 2011, and a compensable injury to his neck on December 18, 2012. He filed separate civil actions seeking permanent disability benefits for his injuries. The actions were consolidated for trial. The trial court awarded 30% permanent partial disability for the shoulder injury and 50% permanent partial disability for the neck injury and commuted both awards to lump sums. Maintenance Insights, LLC and Logistics Insight Corporation (collectively “Employer”) have appealed, contending the disability awards are excessive and that Employee did not demonstrate that the awards should have been commuted. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Rutherford | Workers Compensation Panel | |
In Re K. O. Et Al.
The trial court terminated the parental rights of A.D.G. to her children, K.O. and K.G. Because the court did not “make[] specific findings of fact and conclusions of law,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(k) (2017), we remand the case to the trial court for the entry of an appropriate order. |
Smith | Court of Appeals | |
Corey Mitchell v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Corey Mitchell, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He raises two issues on appeal: (1) he was denied a full and fair hearing in the post-conviction proceedings, and (2) his guilty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made due to the ineffective assistance of counsel rendered by his trial counsel. After review of the arguments of the parties and the entire record, we conclude that Petitioner is entitled to relief on his first issue. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand this matter for a new hearing. Furthermore, the interests of justice require that under the circumstances of this case, and to insure the public perception of a fair and impartial hearing, the post-conviction proceedings must be heard by a different judge than the one who has previously heard the proceedings. In light of our conclusion and disposition of the first issue, issue two is pretermitted at this time. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Matthew Dixon v. State of Tennessee
The pro se Petitioner, Matthew Dixon, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus and post-conviction DNA analysis. Following our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Homeowners of Ash Grove Estates v. Carla Hurley, et al.
This appeal arises out of a suit to enforce restrictive covenants. Plaintiffs filed suit seeking an injunction to prevent their neighbors from operating a commercial horse facility. After a hearing, the court permanently enjoined Defendants from using or allowing their property to be used for a commercial horse operation and from constructing any additional buildings before they built a residence on the property. The trial court also ruled that Defendants did not have to remove or relocate the already-constructed “run-in shed” at this time, but that once a residence is built, the shed must be removed or moved to the rear of the residence. Defendants appeal. Upon our review, we reverse the judgment enjoining Defendants from conducting a commercial horse operation; in all other respects we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Appeals | |
Alexander Alaka v. Short Cut Auto Sales & Repairs, Inc.
The plaintiff appeals the circuit court’s judgment for damages sustained to his vehicle, a reduction from the amount awarded in general sessions court. We vacate the final order and remand for entry of an order that sets forth sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of the circuit court’s decision. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Emmalee O., et al.
This appeal involves the issue of past child sexual abuse by a parent. After the original trial de novo, the father was found guilty of severe child abuse and was enjoined from contact with the child and another daughter. A prior appeal resulted in an affirmance of the trial court’s finding. In re Emmalee O., 464 S.W.3d 311 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015). After permission to appeal was denied by the Tennessee Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court, the father filed a motion to vacate or modify the 2014 ruling of the trial court. After the trial court denied the relief requested, the father again appealed. We affirm the trial court’s decision. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Town & Country Jewelers, Inc., et al. v. Andrew Timothy Sheriff, et al.
Over ten years after entry of a judgment, the judgment creditors filed a motion for scire facias to revive the judgment. The trial court denied the motion based on a determination that expiration of the statute of limitations deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, the judgment creditors argue that their motion was timely because the debtor revived the debt by agreeing that the debt was nondischargeable in bankruptcy. We conclude that the trial court possessed subject matter jurisdiction but that revival does not apply. So we affirm as modified. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Johnson Real Estate Limited Partnership v. Vacation Development Corp., et al.
This action involves a long-term ground lease in which the defendant lessee paid for and maintained an insurance policy on the property for its benefit. The defendant surrendered the premises after the motel facility constructed on the land was destroyed by a wildfire before the expiration of the lease. The plaintiff lessor filed suit, seeking an equitable lien on the policy and its proceeds, a constructive trust against the insurance rights and recovery, a claim on the policy as a third-party beneficiary, and injunctive relief. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. We affirm. |
Sevier | Court of Appeals | |
Clayton Pickens v. John R. Underwood, et al.
This appeal arises from a dispute over a construction contract between Clayton Pickens (“Pickens”), a general contractor, and John R. Underwood (“Underwood”) and his wife Suzanne Curtin (“the Underwoods,” collectively). Pickens sued Underwood initially in Chancery Court but later transferred to the Circuit Court for Blount County (“the Trial Court”) for allegedly failing to pay him under a contract to build the Underwoods’ home. Underwood filed counterclaims against Pickens alleging, among other things, fraud, cost overruns, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and entering into a construction contract in excess of the monetary limit on Pickens’ contractor’s license. This case was tried before a jury. The jury found the Underwoods breached the construction contract and awarded Pickens $147,340.25. The jury also found that Pickens breached the contract through certain errors in construction and awarded the Underwoods $10,740.00. The Trial Court entered its final judgment affirming the jury’s verdict and awards of damages. The Underwoods appeal, arguing in part that Pickens should have been limited to his actual documented expenses because he entered the construction contract in excess of his contractor’s license limit. We hold, inter alia, that under the law in effect at the time of the execution of the contract, Pickens was not limited in damages to his actual documented expenses. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
David Michael Blevins v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, David Michael Blevins, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court improperly found: (1) that he had waived his independent claim regarding a speedy trial violation and (2) that trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to raise the speedy trial issue. Having reviewed the record before us, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Sullivan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cornell Poe v. City of Jackson Mayor Jerry Gist, et al.
A passenger on a Jackson Transit Authority bus was arrested as a result of an altercation with the driver; the arrest led to the passenger’s parole being revoked and his resulting incarceration. The passenger brought suit, asserting claims for slander and libel under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act and Tennessee Public Protection Act against the Transit Authority and certain of its employees, and the Mayor and various employees of the City of Jackson. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and this appeal followed. Upon our review, we have determined that the complaint fails to allege causes of action under the Governmental Tort Liability Act and the Public Protection Act, and that the causes of action asserted against the individual defendants are barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the case. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Regions Mortgage, et al. v. Joseph Willie Brown, et al.
This appeal arises from a marathon of litigation, as many as eleven separate civil actions, all of which pertain to the defendants’ former property in Eads, Tennessee that Regions Mortgage, Inc. (“Regions”) purchased at a foreclosure sale in 2013. See Brown v. AmSouth Bank, No. W2016-02596-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 1319169, at *1-2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2018). At issue here is the grant of a writ of possession to Regions by the General Sessions Court of Shelby County in a forcible entry and detainer action, which decision the defendants appealed to the circuit court. When the circuit court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the defendants appealed to this court. Due to profound deficiencies with the defendants’ brief, specifically the failure to comply with Rule 6 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, we dismiss the appeal. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Nathaniel Walker v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Nathaniel Walker, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were unknowingly and involuntarily entered. Following our review, we affirm the summary denial of the petition. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals |