Kisha Dean Trezevant v. Stanley H. Trezevant, III
This is a divorce case between parties who amassed a great amount of wealth and lived an extravagant lifestyle for many years. There are no minor children involved, and this appeal is limited to the trial court’s identification, classification, valuation, and division of marital property, the trial court’s awards of alimony to Wife, and Husband’s convictions for several counts of criminal contempt. One of the most salient issues raised by Husband on appeal relates to the trial court’s decision to use a financial statement prepared by Husband in 2012 to value several properties in the marital estate rather than the certified appraisals that were prepared in the course of litigation for the purpose of valuing the marital estate. According to Husband, this resulted in the court grossly overvaluing the marital estate. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s identification and classification of marital property as well as the trial court’s findings and sentencing related to Husband’s criminal contempt. We vacate the trial court’s valuation and distribution of the parties’ marital property and awards of alimony. We remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Michael Smith v. Shelby County Sheriff's Department
This appeal involves an incarcerated inmate’s filing of a petition for writ of certiorari. The respondent filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the time for filing such a petition had passed. The trial court dismissed the petition as untimely. We affirm. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Ravyn R., Et Al.
This is an appeal from an adjudicatory order of the circuit court in a dependency and neglect appeal. Because the order appealed is not a final, appealable judgment, we dismiss the appeal and remand for further proceedings. |
Greene | Court of Appeals | |
Carl Lester Byrd, Jr. v. Appalachian Electric Cooperative
The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim of outrageous conduct/intentional infliction of emotional distress filed against his employer because the plaintiff had previously filed a workers’ compensation claim against the employer, seeking compensation for injuries arising out of the same incident. The plaintiff has appealed the dismissal of his claim. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment of dismissal. We decline Appalachian’s request for an award of attorney’s fees, determining that Mr. Byrd’s appeal was not frivolous or taken solely for delay. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
Khurshid Ismoilov v. Sears Holdings Corporation, Et Al.
This case presents the issue of a seller’s liability for damages caused by an allegedly defective water heater. The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant seller concerning the plaintiff’s claims of products liability, strict liability, breach of implied warranty, negligence, and unfair or deceptive trade practices, finding these claims to be barred by the expiration of the ten-year statute of repose applicable to products liability actions. The trial court subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of the seller regarding the plaintiff’s remaining claim of breach of express warranty. Determining that no material factual disputes existed, the court held that the seller was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the seller had demonstrated that it had fully complied with the warranty on the water heater at issue. The plaintiff filed a motion to alter or amend, also requesting a more specific order. The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend except that it provided a more definite statement of the basis for its grant of summary judgment in favor of the seller. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Deandrey Peterson
The defendant, Deandrey Peterson, appeals his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and possessing a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, claiming that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence and that the evidence was insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator. Because the trial court erred by admitting evidence that the defendant had committed crimes other than those for which he was on trial and because the error cannot be classified as harmless, we reverse the defendant’s convictions and remand the case for a new trial. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eric Bledsoe v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Eric Bledsoe, appeals as of right from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he requested DNA analysis pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-30-303. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition for post-conviction DNA analysis because the evidence was already tested. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Presson v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Michael Presson, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends (1) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present an “economic motive” defense and failing to call witnesses at trial to support that defense; (2) that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to request a severance for charges that involved two separate victims; (3) that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge certain jurors during voir dire; (4) that trial counsel was ineffective by failing “to call” the Petitioner as a witness at trial; (5) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State’s references to the term “pedophile” and to pornography during its closing argument; (6) that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on certain lesser-included offenses and that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request such instructions; (7) that trial counsel “was ineffective for failing to request that the trial court require the State to make an election of offenses” and “by failing to object to the trial court judge’s election of offenses”; and (8) that post-conviction relief is warranted due to cumulative error. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Kyle F.
This is a termination of parental rights case involving a two-year-old child, Kyle F. (“the Child”). In January 2016, the Sullivan County Juvenile Court (“trial court”) granted temporary legal custody of the Child to the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”). The Child was immediately placed in foster care, where he has remained since that date. DCS subsequently filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the Child’s mother, Debra F. (“Mother”), on September 19, 2016.1 Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that DCS had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Mother had abandoned the Child through conduct exhibiting a wanton disregard for the welfare of the Child prior to her incarceration. Determining that no statutory ground existed for termination of Mother’s parental rights, the trial court declined to address the best interest of the Child. The guardian ad litem timely filed a notice of appeal. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm |
Sullivan | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Landon Webster
A Carter County Criminal Court Jury found the Appellant, Robert Landon Webster, guilty of three counts of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine, one of which was within a school zone. The trial court sentenced the Appellant to a total effective sentence of fifteen years. On appeal, the Appellant contends that his right to confrontation was violated because the State failed to call a confidential informant as a witness at trial and that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Carter | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Wafa Badawi Hindiyeh v. Waleed Fawzi Abed
This appeal arises from a divorce. Wafa Badawi Hindiyeh (“Wife”) sued Waleed Fawzi Abed (“Husband”) for divorce in the Chancery Court for Rutherford County (“the Trial Court”). After a trial, the Trial Court, inter alia, granted Wife a divorce, entered a permanent parenting plan with respect to the parties’ minor son (“the Child”) awarding Wife 285 days to Husband’s 80, and awarded Wife a judgment for the value of a Cadillac less $2,500 Wife received on the sale of her original vehicle for a total judgment of $13,400. Husband appeals to this Court, arguing, among other things, that the Trial Court found no statutory factors applicable to justify such a paltry award of parenting time to him and that the Cadillac at issue was not even marital property subject to division. We vacate the Trial Court’s judgment with respect to the residential parenting schedule and remand for the Trial Court to award Husband significantly more time with the Child. Finding that the Cadillac was not marital property, we modify the Trial Court’s award of $13,400 to Wife to $2,000 to account for only the sale of Wife’s original vehicle. We otherwise affirm the Trial Court. We, therefore, affirm as modified, in part, and vacate, in part, the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
John Armstrong v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, John Armstrong, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends (1) that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition for being untimely filed; and (2) that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Malik Jones-Smith v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Malik Jones-Smith, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. However, we remand the case to the post-conviction court for entry of a corrected judgment form with respect to one of the Petitioner’s convictions. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Gerald Carter
The Appellant, Gerald Carter, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
DeVaughn Edwards v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Devaughn Edwards, filed for post-conviction relief from his convictions of facilitation of kidnapping, facilitation of robbery, and facilitation of aggravated burglary, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Jennie Roles-Walter, Et Al. v. Robert W. Kidd, Et Al.
This is a property damage case. Appellants assert that their property is being damaged by the defective gutter systems of adjacent buildings, which are owned by Appellees. The trial court granted Appellees’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motions to dismiss Appellants’ complaint, finding that Appellants’ claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to claims for property damage. Tenn. Code Ann. §28-3-105. Appellants contend that their complaint sounds in nuisance, specifically temporary nuisance, and not in negligence. Accordingly, Appellants argue that the statute of limitations renews with each rain. While we agree with the trial court that Appellants’ claim is one for negligence and not for nuisance, we conclude that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint as time-barred. Applying the discovery rule and giving Appellants all reasonable inferences based on the averments in their complaint, we conclude that Appellants have pled facts sufficient to survive the motions to dismiss. |
Lincoln | Court of Appeals | |
Fisher Dezevallos v. Terry Burns Insurance Agency, LLC
Appellee brought a claim against Appellant insurance agency for “unlawfully and fraudulently” withdrawing funds from Appellee’s bank account and accepting premium payments on two insurance policies after Appellee allegedly cancelled his policies. Although not asserted as a claim in its general sessions summons, the circuit court, on appeal, awarded Appellee a judgment for unjust enrichment in the amount of $397.00. Because the preponderance of the evidence does not support the judgment, we reverse and remand. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Joel Hartwell
The Defendant, Christopher Joel Hartwell, pleaded guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement in case number C22683 to conspiracy to commit money laundering, a Class C felony, maintaining a dwelling where controlled substances are used, a Class D felony, two counts of possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance in a drug-free zone, a Class D felony, two counts of possession with the intent to manufacture a controlled substance in a drug-free zone, a Class D felony, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a non-dangerous felony, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-903 (Supp. 2013) (amended 2014), 53-11-401 (2008) (amended 2010), 39-17-417 (Supp. 2013) (amended 2014), 39-17-1307 (Supp. 2013) (amended 2014). The Defendant also pleaded guilty in case number C22684 to the sale or delivery of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone, a Class D felony. See id. § 39-17-417 (Supp. 2013) (amended 2014). The Defendant pleaded guilty in case number C22685 to the sale or delivery of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone, a Class D felony. See id. § 39-17-417 (Supp. 2013) (amended 2014). Finally, the Defendant pleaded guilty in case number C23659 to two counts of the delivery of a controlled substance in a drug-free school zone, a Class C felony. See id. § 39-17-417 (Supp. 2013) (amended 2014). After the appropriate merger of the offenses, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to an effective five-year sentence of which three years were to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying judicial diversion, (2) allowing confidential informants to testify at the sentencing hearing, and (3) not requiring the State to produce discovery materials related to the confidential informants. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Julie Christine Ottmer
The Defendant, Julie Christine Ottmer, pled nolo contendere to simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor, and received an agreed upon sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days to be served on probation. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-418. Thereafter, the Defendant filed a motion to withdraw her nolo contendere plea. The trial court denied the motion, finding that there was no manifest injustice to support withdrawal of the plea. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion because she “misunderstood the terms of her plea.” Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Unicoi | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Estate of James Donald Meadows
Appellants, an estate and its co-executors, appeal from the trial court’s order disqualifying their counsel due to a purported conflict of interest. Because the appellants have appealed from a non-final order, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. |
Dickson | Court of Appeals | |
James Robert Oliphant v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, James Robert Oliphant, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, which challenged his 1983 Washington County Criminal Court conviction of assault with intent to commit second degree murder. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Johnson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Eddison Williams v. State of Tennessee
This appeal involves the jurisdiction of the Tennessee Claims Commission to hear an action brought by a former medical student, Eddison Williams (claimant), against the Quillen College of Medicine at East Tennessee State University. Claimant alleged that the State, acting through medical school officials, “negligently breached its contractual duties regarding following policies before dismissing [him] on disciplinary grounds.” He argued his action stated a claim for “negligent care, custody and control of persons,” a category of claims the Commission has jurisdiction to hear under Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8- 307(a)(1)(E) (Supp.2017). The Commission concluded it had no subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Toniann Whitaker v. James B. Devereaux
After Appellant’s son violated an order of protection entered against him, Appellant sought relief from the trial court. Although the trial court ruled on some of the issues raised by Appellant, not all of her claims were adjudicated. We therefore dismiss the appeal due to the absence of a final judgment. |
Jefferson | Court of Appeals | |
In Re Estate of Francis J. Kowalski
Thomas Kowalski, Michael Kowalski, John J. Kowalski, and Margaret Kowalski (“Plaintiffs”) appeal the February 2, 2017 judgment of the Circuit Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) finding and holding, inter alia, that the holographic Last Will and Testament of Francis J. Kowalski (“the Will”) contained a residuary clause such that Francis J. Kowalski (“Deceased”) did not die partially intestate and that the Will granted a conditional life estate in real property located at 2820 Azalea Place (“Azalea Place”) in Nashville to Trevor Walker for as long as Walker operates Thrill Building Music, LLC. We find and hold that the Will does not contain a residuary clause and that Deceased died partially intestate. We further find and hold that the Will granted a fee determinable estate in Azalea Place to Trevor Walker for as long as Walker operates Thrill Building Music, LLC. Given all this, we reverse the Trial Court’s judgment as to whether the Will contained a residuary clause and modify the judgment to reflect that the Will granted a fee determinable estate in Azalea Place to Trevor Walker for as long as Walker operates Thrill Building Music, LLC. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Roy Len Rogers v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Roy Len Rogers, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2010 Rhea County Criminal Court jury convictions of first degree premeditated murder, second degree murder, and reckless endangerment, for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment. In this appeal, the petitioner contends only that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Rhea | Court of Criminal Appeals |