State of Tennessee v. Micah Alexander Cates
The Tennessee Supreme Court has remanded this case for reconsideration in light of State v. Reynolds, 504 S.W.3d 283 (Tenn. 2016). See State v. Micah Alexander Cates, No. E2014-01322-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 5679825, at *1-6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 28, 2015), perm. app. granted, case remanded (Tenn. Nov. 16, 2016). Relevant to the current remand, this court concluded in the previous appeal that a new trial was necessary because the warrantless blood draw was not justified by exigent circumstances and that the evidence obtained from the blood draw should have been suppressed. Upon further review, we conclude that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule permitted the admission of the relevant evidence, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Carter | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Shawn Bough v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Shawn Bough, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis regarding his convictions for felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, for which he is serving an effective life sentence. The coram nobis court dismissed the petition after a hearing because it determined the newly discovered evidence was not credible and would not have led to a different result at the trial. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the court erred by dismissing the petition. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Whitney Kristina Harris
The Defendant, Whitney Kristina Harris, was convicted upon her guilty pleas of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony, and accessory after the fact to first degree murder, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-16-503 (2014) (tampering with evidence), 39-11-411 (2014) (accessory after the fact). The Defendant pleaded guilty as a Range II offender as a term of the plea agreement and agreed to an effective ten-year sentence. The manner of service of her sentence was reserved for the trial court’s determination. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in imposing incarceration rather than an alternative sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court, and we remand the case for correction of a clerical error on the accessory after the fact judgment. |
Carter | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Bryson F.
This is a termination of parental rights case in which the mother and stepfather sought termination of the biological father’s parental rights to his child. The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support the termination on the statutory ground of abandonment for failure to remit child support. The court further found that termination was in the best interest of the child. The father appeals. We affirm. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anna Chick
The defendant, Anna Chick, appeals her Williamson County Circuit Court conviction of failure to appear, see T.C.A. 39-16-609, arguing that Code section 39-16-609 is unconstitutional; that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction; that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence in violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to confront the witnesses against her; that the State failed to establish that the offense was committed before the finding of the indictment; and that the six-year sentence imposed in this case constitutes unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Joletta Summers v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Joletta Summers, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her convictions for voluntary manslaughter, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that she received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel mentioned during opening statement an inculpatory statement that was never introduced into evidence; failed to adequately argue for severance of her case from her codefendant’s; failed to object to the State’s improper closing argument; failed to file a timely motion for new trial; and failed to argue on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to specify the predicate felony in the jury instructions for the employment of a firearm charge. Upon our review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Trina A. Scott v. Sharfyne L'Nell White
A judgment creditor moved to extend her judgment for an additional ten years under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 69.04, and the trial court issued an order requiring the judgment debtor to show cause why the judgment should not be extended. Almost a year later, the judgment debtor filed a motion for relief from the judgment based upon an error in the certificate of service on the show cause order. In her response, the judgment creditor acknowledged that the address shown for the judgment debtor was incorrect but stated that, after the order was returned by the post office, it was mailed to the correct address. The judgment creditor also asserted that the motion for relief was premature because the court had not yet entered an order extending the judgment. The trial court entered an order extending the judgment for an additional ten years. We affirm. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
Karen H. Foster v. Douglas S. Foster
This post-divorce case involves the interpretation of a paragraph in a marital dissolution agreement regarding the allocation of a portion of Husband’s military retirement benefits to Wife. Both parties petitioned the trial court to interpret the terms of the agreement. The trial court held that the agreement awarded Wife 33% of Husband’s actual disposable military retirement pay at the rank of Captain (his rank at the time of the divorce). On appeal, Husband contends that the award was intended to be alimony in solido calculable at the time of the divorce based on the value of his accrued benefits at that time. He also contends that Wife should be bound by her acknowledgment in pre-litigation discussions of $465.86 per month as the correct amount of the award. Having considered the issues advanced on appeal, we agree with the trial court’s interpretation of the marital dissolution agreement and affirm its judgment in all respects. Additionally, we hold that Wife is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees incurred on appeal pursuant to the terms of the marital dissolution agreement and remand this case to the trial court for a determination of the appropriate amount of those fees. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
The Metropolitan Government of Nashville And Davidson County v. RSF Investors, LLC
This appeal arises from an enforcement action by the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Metro”) against the owner of a restaurant located within the Broadway Historic Preservation District in Nashville, Tennessee. Metro commenced the action to require the owner to comply with Metropolitan Code of Laws (M.C.L) § 17.40.410 and the preservation permit the Metropolitan Historic Zoning Commission (“the Commission”) issued upon the application of the owner. Following discovery, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted Metro’s motion and denied the owner’s motion. The order required the owner to remove the portion of the installation that did not comply with the permit. This appeal followed. The owner raises three principal issues. It contends: (1) the glass panels it was ordered to remove do not fall within the purview of the Commission; (2) Metro cannot enforce a permit that has expired; and (3) summary judgment is inappropriate because material facts are in dispute. Metro contends we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the appeal is untimely. We have determined the appeal is timely, and the issues raised by the owner are unavailing. Therefore, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Jonelle Hyde v. South Central Tennessee Development District
Defendant that admitted liability for vehicle accident appeals the award of damages to the injured Plaintiff, contending that the awards for lost wages, lost future earnings, pain and suffering, past and future, loss of ability to enjoy life, past and future, and permanent impairment awards, are against the preponderance of the evidence. Upon a thorough review of the record, we modify the award for past medical expenses; affirm the awards for past pain and suffering, permanent impairment, past loss of ability to enjoy life and for loss of ability to enjoy life in the future, and for lost wages; reverse the award for future pain and suffering; and vacate the award for loss of earning capacity and remand the case for further consideration of the award. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dewayne Jones
The Defendant, Dwayne Jones, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range I, standard offender to five years of incarceration. The trial court also imposed the $7000 fine assessed by the jury. The Defendant raises three issues on appeal: whether the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction due to the Defendant’s pending petition to remove the case to federal court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1443; whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction because the proof did not show that the victim suffered serious bodily injury; and whether the trial court erred in imposing the $7000 fine without making any specific findings of fact regarding the Defendant’s financial circumstances and ability to pay. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Willie Hardy, Jr.
The defendant, Willie Hardy, Jr., appeals his Montgomery County Circuit Court jury conviction of aggravated robbery, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the sentence imposed was excessive. Because the trial court failed to make the requisite findings, we vacate the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing and remand for the limited purpose of making the appropriate findings on this issue. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Willie Hardy, Jr. - concurring in part, dissenting in part
I agree with the majority's conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to support the Defendant's conviction for aggravated robbery and that the record supports the length of the Defendant's within-range sentences. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority's conclusion regarding the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Quintin S., et al.
The Department of Children’s Services filed this petition to terminate the parental rights of the mother and two fathers of four children on various grounds. We affirm the termination of the parental rights of all three parents on multiple grounds, but reverse as to some of the grounds found by the trial court. We agree with the trial court’s decision that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the children. |
Claiborne | Court of Appeals | |
Floyd E. Rayner, III v. Tennessee Department of Correction, et al
Appellant, an inmate in the custody of Appellee Tennessee Department of Correction, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for declaratory judgment under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Specifically, Appellant challenges the Tennessee Department of Correction’s calculation of his criminal sentence, and also challenges the constitutionality of the criminal statutes, under which he was convicted. We conclude that the calculation of Appellant’s sentence comports with the judgments of the criminal court. Appellant’s constitutional arguments challenge his criminal sentence. As such, he has no recourse under the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. Affirmed and remanded. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Rickey Joe Taylor v. Town of Lynnville
This is an appeal from a dispute litigated under the Tennessee Public Records Act. Although the trial court concluded that the Town of Lynnville violated the Act by denying the petitioner’s request for records, the court held that the denial of records was not willful. Accordingly, the petitioner’s request for attorney’s fees was denied. Having reviewed the record transmitted to us on appeal, we disagree with the trial court’s determination that the denial of records was not willful and reverse the trial court on this issue. In light of our conclusion that the denial of records was willful, we remand the case to the trial court to reconsider its decision to deny an award of attorney’s fees. We also remand for a determination of Mr. Taylor’s costs and attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
Alexander A. Stratienko, et al. v. Oscar H. Brock, et al.
This is a jury case arising from the formation and management of a limited liability company. The jury determined that the Appellee developer was entitled to payment for his membership interest in the LLC. The jury also determined that the Appellant investor, his wife, and the LLC should indemnify the developer for the judgment relating to the lease of an adjacent lot. Because there is material evidence to support the jury’s verdict, we affirm and remand |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Robert Allen Territo
Pro se petitioner, Robert Allen Territo, appeals the summary dismissal of his Rule 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence by the Circuit Court for Jackson County. On appeal, the petitioner argues that (1) he should have been sentenced as a Range I offender; (2) the trial court erred by improperly enhancing his sentence above the statutory minimum; (3) the trial court violated Rule 11 by accepting his guilty plea; and (4) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Jackson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Arnold Travis Nunnery
The Defendant was indicted for driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI); driving with a blood alcohol concentration of .08 or more (DUI per se); DUI, second offense; and unlawful possession of a weapon. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a blood draw taken pursuant to a search warrant, and the trial court granted the motion. The State sought and was granted permission to appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9. We hold that the police officer’s execution of the search warrant was unconstitutional, that exigent circumstances did not justify the blood draw, and that the good faith exception does not apply. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment suppressing the results of the blood draw and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Lewis | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rickey Joe Taylor v. Town of Lynnville - Concurring
I concur in the majority’s opinion, but I write separately to express my concern regarding one facet of statutory interpretation in this case. |
Giles | Court of Appeals | |
Zella Balentine v. City of Savannah, Tennessee
This appeal results from the trial court’s ruling that the city was allowed to demolish appellant’s home based on her failure to bring the building into compliance as required by the settlement agreement reached by the parties. Based on appellant’s failure to comply with the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Rules of the Court of Appeals, we decline to address the merits of the case and dismiss the appeal. |
Hardin | Court of Appeals | |
Danny Jones, et al. v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, et al.
The Plaintiffs’ home was sold at foreclosure in May 2011. By way of a suit filed in the Shelby County Chancery Court, the Plaintiffs sought rescission of the foreclosure sale and asserted claims for breach of contract, violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, promissory estoppel, and negligent misrepresentation. The trial court dismissed these claims following the filing of a motion for summary judgment by the Defendants. Discerning no error based on our review of the record, we affirm the action of the trial court for the reasons expressed herein. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Charles Stinson, et al. v. David E. Mensel, et al.
This appeal involves a dispute between landowners over an easement on Plaintiffs’ property that allows the Defendants to use the easement for ingress and egress to their homes. Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the Defendants unlawfully bulldozed the easement, encroached onto Plaintiffs’ property, and used threats and intimidation to prevent the Plaintiffs from coming on or using the non-exclusive easement. Defendants counter-sued, alleging that the Plaintiffs were actually the ones engaging in a campaign of harassment, and that the Plaintiffs were preventing the Defendants from the peace and enjoyment of the easement, which they used as their driveway. Following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that Plaintiffs were liable to Defendants for nuisance, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy. The trial court also enjoined the Plaintiffs from having any use of the easement. Plaintiffs appealed. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and partially vacate the injunction. Specifically, we affirm the judgment of the trial court with respect to the nuisance claim, reverse the judgment of the trial court with respect to the intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy claims, and vacate the permanent injunction against Plaintiffs to the extent that it prohibits them from the lawful use of their property. |
Hickman | Court of Appeals | |
Andrea Renae Hopwood v. Corey Daniel Hopwood
In this post-divorce proceeding, father appeals the trial court’s finding that he was guilty of civil contempt in failing to pay court-ordered financial obligations relative to the parties’ divorce. We affirm the trial court’s finding that Father was in willful contempt of court, but reverse the trial court’s decision to jail Father until he made an $8,122.43 purge payment. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brandon Dewayne Theus
A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Brandon Dewayne Theus, of unlawful possession of a firearm after previously having been convicted of a felony involving the attempted use of force, violence, or a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to nine years in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence discovered as a result a vehicle stop, the sufficiency of the evidence, and his sentence. Upon reviewing the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. However, we remand the case to the trial court for correction of the judgment to reflect that the Defendant was convicted pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1307(b)(1)(A) rather than section 39-17-1307(c). |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals |