In Re: Jayson M.
Father appeals the termination of his parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to visit, contending that he was not properly notified of the hearing to terminate his rights and was denied his right to counsel. Upon review of the record, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Tamala Teague, et al. v. Garnette Kidd, et al.
In this fraudulent conveyance action, a trial by jury resulted in judgment for decedent’s estate against defendants. Defendants filed a motion for a new trial asserting that: (1) the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial after counsel for decedent’s estate made a comment about one of the defendant’s credibility from “past cases” purportedly in the presence of the jury; and (2) no evidence supports the jury verdict. The trial court denied the post-trial motion and affirmed the jury verdict. Defendants appealed. We affirm. |
Polk | Court of Appeals | |
Stephen Wayne Shreve v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Stephen Wayne Shreve, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he challenged his guilty pleas to two counts of aggravated burglary, one count of attempted aggravated burglary, and two counts of theft and his effective ten-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he was given an illegal sentence and that he entered his guilty pleas involuntarily and unknowingly. We affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief. |
Sevier | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Wilson
The Defendant, Christopher Wilson, filed a Rule 9 interlocutory appeal seeking our review of the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress the results of his blood alcohol test based upon a violation of Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013). The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and found that a “good faith exception” to the Defendant’s forced blood draw existed and denied the Defendant’s motion. The Defendant filed an application for an interlocutory appeal, which the trial court granted. On appeal, the Defendant contended that the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress based upon a “good faith exception” to the exclusionary rule. After review, we concluded that the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant’s motion to suppress because, at that time, there was not a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. State v. Christopher Wilson, W2015-00699-CCA-R9-CD, 2016 WL 1627145, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, April 21, 2016). On November 22, 2016, the Tennessee Supreme Court granted Defendant’s application for permission to appeal and remanded the case to this court for reconsideration in light of the supreme court’s recent opinion in State v. Reynolds, 504 S.W.3d 283 (Tenn. 2016). Upon reconsideration in light of Reynolds, we conclude that the officer acted with reasonable good-faith reliance on binding precedent in effect at the time. Accordingly, we reinstate and affirm the trial court’s denial of the Defendant’s motion to suppress. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Wilson-Concurring
My general disdain for the so-called “good faith exception” is fully set forth in my concurring opinion the first time that this case was before this panel. State v. Christopher Wilson, W2015-00699-CCA-R9-CD, 2016 WL 1627145, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, April 21, 2016) (Woodall, P.J., concurring opinion). In light of our supreme court’s embracing of the “good faith exception” in State v. Reynolds, 504 S.W.3d 283 (Tenn. 2016), there is no need to repeat my firm belief that the “good faith exception” should never be recognized in Tennessee. As a judge of an intermediate court, I am required to follow specific precedent of a higher court, in this case, the Tennessee Supreme Court. State v. Irick, 906 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tenn. 1995). I fully accept the principle of law that requires me to follow controlling legal authority even when I do not agree. With all due respect, I concur in results only. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re Martese P.
This appeal arises from the termination of Mother’s parental rights. The child was removed from Mother’s custody in November 2013, when the child was twelve months old, after Mother and the child tested positive for drugs. On the petition of the Department of Children’s Services, the juvenile court adjudicated the child dependent and neglected based on the finding that Mother committed severe child abuse as defined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102. In September 2014, DCS placed the child in the custody of Petitioners. One year later, Petitioners filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. The juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse and the finding that termination of her rights was in the child’s best interest. Mother appealed. We affirm. |
Madison | Court of Appeals | |
Jason Baine v. Brenda Woods
A father appeals the denial of his petition to modify a permanent parenting plan. The juvenile court found no material change in circumstance had occurred sufficient to modify the primary residential parent designation. The court also denied the father’s subsequent motion to alter or amend the judgment. Because the father failed to file a transcript or a statement of the evidence, we presume that the evidence presented at trial supported the court’s determination that no material change in circumstance occurred. Therefore, we affirm both the judgment of the juvenile court and the denial of the father’s motion to alter or amend the judgment to conform to the evidence presented at trial. We also find that this appeal is frivolous. |
Court of Appeals | ||
State of Tennessee v. Gregory T. Phelps
The Defendant, Gregory T. Phelps, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s revocation of his probation for his convictions for felony drug possession and unlawful possession of a firearm and order that he serve his effective four-year sentence in confinement. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Jonathan Gutierrez
The Appellant, Jonathan Gutierrez, was convicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court of one count of first degree premeditated murder and four counts of aggravated assault and received an effective sentence of life plus sixteen years in confinement. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his murder conviction and two of his aggravated assault convictions, that the trial court committed plain error by failing to declare a mistrial when the State did not produce a codefendant’s statement before trial, that the State committed plain error by giving improper closing argument, that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentencing, and that his life sentence is unconstitutional. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rudy Vincent Dunn
The Defendant, Rudy Vincent Dunn, appeals from the Marshall County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation for his conviction for felony drug possession and order that he serve the remainder of his one-year, three-month sentence in confinement. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve his sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Peter M. Napolitano v. Board of Professional Responsibility
This matter initially originated from a fee dispute between attorney Peter M. Napolitano (“Attorney”) and his client Gayle Connelly (“Client”). Client filed a complaint with the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility (“the Board”) regarding the fee dispute in 2008. The Board dismissed this complaint in 2010 without imposing any sanctions. Client sued Attorney over the fee dispute and, after Attorney was deposed in conjunction with the lawsuit, Client filed a second complaint with the Board in 2012. This second complaint alleged that Attorney had mishandled funds in his trust account and lied under oath. The Board prosecuted this second complaint, resulting in a hearing before a hearing panel (“the Panel”). The Panel determined that Attorney had committed ethical violations related to his trust account and by lying under oath. Accordingly, the Panel imposed sanctions against Attorney, including a five-year suspension of Attorney’s law license, with one year of active suspension. Attorney and the Board both sought review in circuit court. The circuit court modified the Panel’s sanctions in part but affirmed the five-year suspension. Both Attorney and the Board sought review by this Court, with Attorney seeking a lesser punishment and the Board seeking disbarment. Additionally, both parties disagree with the Panel’s order of $7,500 in restitution to Client. We hold that the five-year suspension is appropriate and that the Panel did not err in ordering $7,500 in restitution. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment but modify it by adding the requirement of a practice monitor during Attorney’s probationary period. |
Montgomery | Supreme Court | |
In Re: Colby L.
Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to visit and support, contending that her failure to visit and support was not willful. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Jimmy D. Ogle v. Julie D. Duff
Husband and Wife were married for approximately five and one-half years when Husband filed a complaint for divorce. Wife filed a counter-complaint for a divorce. The trial court granted the parties a divorce based on stipulated grounds, classified the parties’ assets as separate or marital, and divided the marital estate. Husband appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in (1) divesting a revocable trust of all assets and refusing to enforce a valid postnuptial agreement associated with the revocable trust; (2) classifying the increase in value of the marital residence as marital property; (3) classifying the increase in value of Husband’s premarital IRA as marital property; and (4) dividing the marital estate equally between the parties given the short duration of the marriage. We affirm as modified and deny Wife’s request for an award of attorney fees on appeal. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Doyan Anderson
The Defendant, Doyan Anderson, was indicted for aggravated assault involving the use or display of a deadly weapon, a Class C felony; aggravated assault based on violation of a court order, a Class C felony; domestic assault, a Class A misdemeanor; and unlawful possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony involving the use or attempted use of violence, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-102(a)(1)(A)(iii), -13-102(c), -13-111, -17-1307. Following a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of domestic assault and both counts of aggravated assault. The jury acquitted the Defendant of the unlawful possession of a firearm charge. The trial court merged the domestic assault conviction into the aggravated assault conviction based on violation of a court order. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a career offender and imposed a total effective sentence of thirty years’ incarceration. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated assault involving the use or display of a deadly weapon and (2) that the trial court committed plain error by failing to require the State to make an election of the distinct conduct it was relying upon regarding the charge of aggravated assault based on violation of a court order. After the initial filing of this opinion, we granted the State’s Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 39 petition to rehear to allow for supplemental briefing on the issue of whether the Defendant’s aggravated assault convictions should be merged. Following our review, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions. However, we merge the Defendant’s two convictions for aggravated assault and remand the case to the trial court for entry of corrected judgment forms reflecting said merger and the resulting sentence of fifteen years’ incarceration. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Carl Adkins
Defendant, Carl Adkins, was found guilty by a jury of the offense of rape of a child and was sentenced to serve twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, Defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction, specifically asserting that (1) his identity as the perpetrator was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt because the victim could not identify him in court, and (2) the victim gave contradictory testimony at trial under oath. Following a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Henderson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua D. Ketchum
In February 2015, a Maury County jury convicted Joshua D. Ketchum (“the Defendant”) of attempted robbery, for which he received a sentence of seven years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that: (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) his sentence is excessive; and (3) the trial court committed plain error by questioning the Defendant during his allocution. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Maury | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael C. Bolden
The defendant, Michael C. Bolden, appeals his Morgan County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated rape of a child, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on rape of a child as a lesser included offense. We affirm the conviction and sentence but remand for correction of a clerical error in the judgment. |
Morgan | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Elizabeth Eberbach v. Christopher Eberbach
We granted this appeal to determine whether the Court of Appeals may exercise discretion and decline to award appellate attorney’s fees when the marital dissolution agreement at issue contains a provision entitling the prevailing party to an award of such fees. In this case, Husband and Wife were parties to a marital dissolution agreement that was incorporated into their final divorce decree (“the Parties’ MDA”). The Parties’ MDA contained a provision for the award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in any subsequent legal proceedings. Following a post-divorce proceeding that resulted in the trial court granting relief and awarding attorney’s fees to Wife, Husband appealed. Wife also prevailed on appeal and sought an award of appellate attorney’s fees from the Court of Appeals under a statutory provision and under the Parties’ MDA. Exercising its discretion, the Court of Appeals declined to award the requested fees under the statute. The Court of Appeals erroneously failed to separately consider an award of the requested fees under the Parties’ MDA. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Williamson | Supreme Court | |
William Dale Alsup v. David C. Alsup
This is a declaratory judgment case. Decedent, mother to the parties, died testate, leaving a holographic will that divided her real property between her two sons, David Alsup/Appellant and William Alsup/Appellee. The probate court admitted the will to probate. Following completion of the probate proceeding, William obtained a survey dividing the property as provided for in Decedent’s will. David refused to accept the survey procured by William, and William then filed this action to quiet title and for ejectment. David filed an answer but did not file a counterclaim or a countervailing survey. William moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Henry | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dewayne D. Fleming
Defendant, Dewayne D. Fleming, was indicted for one count of aggravated burglary, two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of aggravated rape, and two counts of aggravated robbery. Defendant was convicted by a jury as charged. The trial court sentenced Defendant to six years for the aggravated burglary conviction; 12 years for each aggravated robbery conviction; 25 years for the aggravated rape conviction; and 25 years for each of the two especially aggravated kidnapping convictions. The trial court found Defendant to be a dangerous offender and imposed partial consecutive sentencing. The court ordered Defendant’s aggravated robbery sentences to run concurrently with each other and his especially aggravated kidnapping sentences to run concurrently with each other. However, the court ordered that Defendant’s sentences for aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated rape run consecutively, for an effective sentence of 62 years. In this appeal as of right, Defendant asserts that: 1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the accomplice testimony was uncorroborated; 2) the trial court erred by instructing the jury on theories of criminal liability that were not included in the indictment; 3) Defendant’s convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping violate due process because the State failed to establish that the confinement was greater than necessary to commit the other felonies; and 4) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Sumner | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Emmett Lamon Roseman v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Emmett Lamon Roseman, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2013 Marshall County Circuit Court convictions of possession of marijuana with intent to sell, sale of 0.5 grams or more of crack cocaine, delivery of 0.5 grams or more of crack cocaine, and three counts of failure to appear, for which he received an effective sentence of twenty years. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Discerning no error, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief. |
Marshall | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles Brenden Davis v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner’s convictions were affirmed by this court on direct appeal and no Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 11 application for permission to appeal was filed. The Petitioner filed an untimely petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and requesting that he be allowed to file a delayed Rule 11application. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in summarily dismissing his petition because the statute of limitations should be tolled under due process. After a thorough review of the record and applicable case law, we affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lynn E. Harrison v. Edwin B. Harrison, Jr.
This divorce case involves a marriage of eight years’ duration. Because the parties had reached an agreement with regard to the division of certain marital assets, the trial court was requested during a bench trial to divide the parties’ retirement and pension accounts, or the marital portion thereof, and other limited marital assets and liabilities. The trial court considered the relevant statutory factors and apportioned the remaining assets and liabilities 60% to the wife and 40% to the husband. The trial court also awarded the husband $1,000.00 in attorney’s fees and $180.42 in court reporter fees. The husband has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. |
Loudon | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Melvin King
Defendant, Melvin King, was convicted by a Knox County jury of first degree murder, aggravated burglary, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, three counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, reckless aggravated assault, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated animal cruelty. He was sentenced to an effective life sentence. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support dual convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and attempted especially aggravated robbery, that the trial court improperly allowed the State to admit autopsy photographs into evidence, and that the trial court improperly gave the jury an instruction on flight. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, because the trial court did not enter judgment forms disposing of each count of the indictment, we remand the matter to the trial court for entry of a separate judgment form for each count of the indictment. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Bruce Wayne Sutton
Defendant, Bruce Wayne Sutton, pled guilty to attempted initiation of a process to manufacture methamphetamine and received a sentence of nine years and six months. As part of his plea agreement, Defendant reserved two certified questions of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(A) with regard to the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search of a residence. Upon our review of the record and applicable authorities, we determine that based upon his disclaimer of interest in the property, Defendant was without standing to complain about the search. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Lincoln | Court of Criminal Appeals |