In re Mac L.
This appeal arises from the juvenile court's termination of a biological father's parental rights. The juvenile court found clear and convincing evidence of three grounds for termination and that termination of the father's parental rights was in the best interest of the child. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the grounds for terminating parental rights set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(g)(9) and relied upon by the juvenile court were inapplicable to the father in this case. Nevertheless, because there was clear and convincing evidence of two grounds for termination of the father's parental rights and that termination was in the best interest of the child, we affirm. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Carlos Martinez v. Steve Lawhon, et al
An undocumented employee sustained a compensable work-related injury and reported the injury to the employer. Two doctors examined the employee, one assigning a 16% medical impairment rating and the other assigning a 24% medical impairment rating. Because of the employee’s undocumented status, the employer did not return the employee to work after the injury. The employee sought workers’ compensation benefits and challenged the constitutionality of the statutory provision potentially limiting his award to one and one-half times the medical impairment rating in such circumstances. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-241(e) (2008 & Supp. 2013). The Attorney General filed an answer defending the constitutionality of the challenged section. The trial court held the challenged statute unconstitutional on the basis of federal preemption and awarded permanent partial disability benefits of 84% to the left arm, or three and one-half times the 24% medical impairment rating. The Attorney General and the employer appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Michael Deon Mills v. State of Tennessee
Michael Deon Mills (“the Petitioner”) was convicted of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of especially aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated burglary by a Knox County jury. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of twenty-five years with release eligibility after service of 100% of the sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, this court affirmed the Petitioner's convictions. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied. The Petitioner argues on appeal that trial counsel's performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. On appeal, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief to the Petitioner. |
Knox | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Tony K. Gribble v. Alcoa Inc.
In this workers’ compensation case, the trial court found that the employee failed to carry his burden of proving that his knee injury arose out of his employment. On appeal, the employee asserts that the trial court erred in finding that his knee injury did not arise out of his employment. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Blount | Workers Compensation Panel | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Michael Ferrell
The Defendant, Christopher Michael Ferrell, was convicted by a jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210. The trial court imposed a sentence of twenty years’ incarceration to be served at one hundred percent. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, specifically arguing that he should have been acquitted for acting in self-defense or convicted instead of voluntary manslaughter; (2) that the trial court erred in denying his request for a special jury instruction regarding the State’s failure to preserve evidence; (3) that the trial court committed several errors when instructing the jury on self-defense; (4) that the trial court abused its discretion in setting the length of his sentence; and (5) that he is entitled to a new trial based upon cumulative error. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Allen Sprouse v. Tiffany Dotson
This appeal requires us to interpret a version of a juvenile court statute effective prior to July 1, 2016. A juvenile court magistrate held a hearing on competing petitions to modify a parenting plan filed by a child’s parents. The magistrate announced her ruling from the bench at the conclusion of the hearing but did not enter a written order until several days later. Mother, dissatisfied with the magistrate’s ruling, filed a request for a rehearing before a juvenile court judge. Mother filed her request within five days of the entry of the magistrate’s order but ten days after the hearing before the magistrate. The juvenile court concluded that mother’s request for rehearing was untimely and confirmed the magistrate’s findings and recommendations as an order of the juvenile court. Because we conclude that the time for requesting a rehearing ran from the entry of the magistrate’s written order, mother’s request for rehearing was timely. Therefore, we reverse. |
Robertson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ellis Johnson
The defendant, Ellis Johnson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and was sentenced to thirteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the victim to testify about her injuries; (2) the trial court erred in ruling that the State could introduce five of his prior convictions for impeachment purposes; (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (4) he is entitled to relief due to the cumulative effect of the errors. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Brian Garrett Wallace v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Brian Garrett Wallace, entered an open guilty plea to five counts of attempted especially aggravated exploitation of a minor and one count of attempted sexual battery. The trial court imposed an effective eighteen-year sentence to be served at 35 percent as a Range II offender which included consecutive sentencing. On appeal, this Court upheld the sentence. State v. Brian Garrett Wallace, No. M2013-01172-CCA-R3-CD, 2014 WL 1883704 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2014). Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance and that Petitioner’s guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Following a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Robertson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Dustin T., et al.
The Department of Children's Services (“DCS”) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the mother and father to their three children. The father was incarcerated in Georgia when the children were determined to be dependent and neglected, and the mother tested positive for illegal drugs and had illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia in her home when the children were removed. DCS developed three permanency plans over the course of eighteen months, with responsibilities set out for each parent. When it appeared that neither parent was in substantial compliance with the third plan, DCS filed a petition to terminate their rights. The trial court found the evidence clearly and convincingly supported the grounds DCS alleged for terminating the parents' rights and determined it was in the children's best interest that their parents' rights be terminated. Both the mother and father appeal the termination. We affirm the trial court's judgment. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
William George Cox v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, William George Cox, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his 2008 Davidson County Criminal Court guilty-pleaded convictions of aggravated burglary and theft of property, for which he received an effective sentence of 10 years. In this appeal, the petitioner contends only that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court but remand for correction of clerical errors in the judgment forms. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Terry L. Brazzell
In this appeal, the defendant, Terry L. Brazzell, challenges the denial of his pre-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea to one count of vehicular homicide and challenges his Range II, 20-year sentence imposed for that conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Debbie Tran v. Manila Bui, Et Al.
This case concerns a constitutional challenge to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 20-12-119(c). When the trial court grants a motion to dismiss pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, Section 20-12-119(c) provides for an award of reasonable attorneys' fees to the dismissed party. In this case, the trial court granted Appellees the statutory maximum of $10,000 in attorneys' fees. Appellant challenged the constitutionality of the statute on the ground that it violated the separation of powers doctrine. The trial court rejected Appellant's challenge, ruling that Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-12-119(c) is remedial in nature and does not violate Article II, section 2 of the Tennessee Constitution. Discerning no error, we affirm |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
In Re: Dustin T., Et Al. - DISSENT
J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J.,W.S., dissenting in part. I concur in the majority Opinion with regard to the trial court’s findings on the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans, persistent conditions, and abandonment by wanton disregard. I also agree that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests. Because I cannot agree that the State has met its burden to show clear and convincing evidence of Mother’s abandonment by willful failure to support the children, however, I must file this partial dissent. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Daryl Bobo v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Daryl Bobo, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective (1) in failing to adequately explain to him the terms of a plea offer made by the State; (2) in failing to adequately meet with and prepare him for trial; and (3) for failing to adequately cross-examine the State’s witnesses. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Charles Graham aka Charles Stevenson v. Grady Perry, Warden
The Petitioner, Charles Graham a/k/a Charles Stevenson, appeals as of right from the Hardeman County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In his petition, the Petitioner argued that his conviction for simple possession was improperly enhanced and that his conviction for tampering with evidence was invalid because the evidence was not destroyed. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his conviction for simple possession is void because the trial court unlawfully relied on forty-year-old convictions from other states to enhance his sentence. Also, he argues that the trial court clerk's failure to include the judgment form for his simple possession charge in the record on direct appeal denied the Petitioner consideration of the merits of his direct appeal. Finally, the Petitioner argues that the cumulative effect of these two errors results in structural constitutional error, which invalidates his conviction for tampering with evidence. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal order of the habeas corpus court. |
Hardeman | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Grace Ann Blair
The Defendant, Grace Ann Blair, was charged in a two-count indictment with driving under the influence (“DUI”) and DUI per se, Class A misdemeanors. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401(1), (2). She moved to dismiss the charges after discovering that her blood sample was destroyed a little over one year after her arrest. The trial court granted the dismissal, finding that the sample contained potentially exculpatory evidence which could have shown that the Defendant’s actions were involuntarily undertaken while she was under the influence of Ambien. The State appeals. Because we have determined that the Defendant’s due process rights were not violated by the destruction of the sample, we reverse the dismissal of the charges and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Cheryl Ellen Mouton v. Michael J. Mouton
In this parental relocation case, the trial court erred in finding that the mother did not have a reasonable purpose in relocating to another state for her employment. Furthermore, mother's purpose in relocating was not vindictive. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is reversed. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
Regions Bank v. Chas A. Sandford
This appeal arises from the trial court’s entry of a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff bank filed a complaint seeking a judgment against the defendant on a sworn account. After several attempts, the plaintiff was unable to obtain personal service of process on the defendant and attempted to obtain service of process by mail. The plaintiff’s process server sent the summons by certified mail to the defendant’s residential address, and the mailing was returned marked “unclaimed.” The plaintiff filed proof of service, indicating that service had been properly completed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4.04(11), and filed a motion for default judgment. A copy of the motion for default judgment was sent by mail to the defendant at the same residential address. The defendant filed a response “by special appearance” opposing the bank’s motion for default judgment based on insufficiency of service of process. Following a hearing, the trial court entered a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant appealed. On appeal, we conclude that the trial court entered a default judgment in violation of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 4.04(10), which expressly provides, “Service by mail shall not be the basis for the entry of a judgment by default unless the record contains a return receipt showing personal acceptance by the defendant[.]” We therefore vacate the trial court’s order entering a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff and remand this matter for further proceedings. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Stanley Bernard Gibson
The primary issue presented is whether the Drug-Free School Zone Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-432, applies when a defendant is convicted of facilitation of an offense listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-417. The defendant was convicted of facilitation of possession with intent to deliver .5 grams or more of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school. The trial court applied the Act to increase the defendant’s felony classification and to require service of the entire minimum sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. State v. Gibson, No. M2014 00598-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 3867567, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 23, 2015). We granted review to address whether the Act applies to a conviction for facilitation and whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. The State concedes the trial court erred by applying the Act to require service of the entire minimum sentence but argues the Act is a separate criminal offense and supports the higher felony classification. Based on the clear language of the Drug-Free School Zone Act, we hold the Act does not apply to a conviction for facilitation. Therefore, the trial court erred by increasing the felony classification and by requiring service of the entire minimum sentence. Further, we hold the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for facilitation. |
Davidson | Supreme Court | |
Marvin Davis v. State of Tennessee
The Petitioner, Marvin Davis, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his rape of a child conviction, for which he is serving a twenty-five-year sentence. He contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that the post-conviction judge erred in denying the Petitioner’s motion to recuse. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. David T. Morrow
The appellant, David T. Morrow, appeals the summary denial of his Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The appellant's sentences have expired. He argues, however, that he is entitled to relief because he received concurrent sentences instead of statutorily required consecutive sentences, and the trial court erred in summarily denying his motion without a hearing. Following our review, we conclude the appellant does not state a colorable claim for relief, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Dillon E.
This appeal concerns termination of a mother’s parental rights. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Montgomery County (“the Juvenile Court”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of Autumn N. (“Mother”) to her minor child, Dillon E. (“the Child”). The central issue of this parental rights case is Mother’s alleged prescription drug abuse. After a trial, the Juvenile Court found that four grounds were proven against Mother sufficient to terminate her parental rights to the Child, and that termination of her parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to this Court. DCS argues that the Juvenile Court erred in declining to find one additional ground for termination. We affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court in its entirety. |
Montgomery | Court of Appeals | |
William Gordon Ball v. Marjorie Happy Hayes Ball
This is an appeal from a “Final Hearing Order” in a divorce action. That order, however, did not resolve the issue of whether the husband had improperly deducted amounts he expended for moving services and rental of a storage building from his pendente lite alimony obligation due to the wife. Because the order appealed does not resolve all claims presented in the proceedings below, we dismiss this appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Calvin E. Bartlett v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Calvin E. Bartlett, received an effective ten-year sentence as the result of a January 2015 plea agreement that disposed of two felonies and six misdemeanors in two different cases in the Madison County Criminal Court. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were made unintelligently. The post-conviction court denied relief, and Petitioner timely appealed. Because Petitioner failed to prove that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, the decision of the post-conviction court is affirmed. |
Madison | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Darren Brown v. State of Tennessee
Petitioner, Darren Brown, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis after the coram nobis court determined that the petition was untimely. We affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |