State of Tennessee v. Mark Alan Hager
The Defendant, Mark Alan Hager, pled guilty to a charge of burglary of a motor vehicle and to a charge of theft of property valued at $1,000 or more. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-402, -103, -105(a)(3). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the defendant received concurrent terms of one year and three years respectively, on community corrections. Subsequently, the Defendant’s community corrections sentence was revoked, and upon revocation, the trial court imposed a new total effective sentence of six years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences, and (2) that the trial court erred in not awarding sufficient credit for time served on community corrections. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences; however, we remand this case to correct the judgments to reflect the full measure of the Defendant’s community corrections credit. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Christopher Wilson
The Defendant, Christopher Wilson, filed a Rule 9 interlocutory appeal seeking our review of the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence against him. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress the results of his blood alcohol test based upon a violation of Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013). The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and found that a “good faith exception” to the Defendant's forced blood draw existed and denied the Defendant's motion. The Defendant filed an application for an interlocutory appeal, which the trial court granted. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant's motion to suppress based upon a “good faith exception” to the exclusionary rule. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant's motion to suppress. As such, we reverse the trial court's judgment and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Rodger Lee Moon v. Carolyn O'Day Moon
Husband and Wife were married for approximately three years when Husband filed a complaint seeking a divorce. Wife filed a counter-complaint seeking a divorce as well. The trial court awarded Wife a divorce, classified the parties‟ assets as separate or marital, and divided the marital estate. The trial court also awarded Wife transitional alimony for a period of two years. Husband appealed, arguing the trial court erred in (1) classifying a boat he purchased before the marriage as marital property; (2) dividing the marital estate in an inequitable manner; and (3) awarding Wife transitional alimony. On appeal, we affirm the trial court‟s judgment in all respects and grant Wife‟s request for the attorney‟s fees she incurred in defending Husband‟s appeal. |
Anderson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Joshua R. Starner and Caitlyn Metz
A Montgomery County jury convicted Defendant Joshua R. Starner of aggravated child abuse, first-degree felony murder committed during the perpetration of aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect, first-degree felony murder committed during the perpetration of aggravated child neglect, and aggravated sexual battery. The jury convicted Defendant Caitlyn Metz of aggravated child abuse, first-degree felony murder committed during the perpetration of aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect, first-degree felony murder committed during the perpetration of aggravated child neglect, and facilitation of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court dismissed both Defendants’ sexual battery convictions and merged the felony murder convictions. The trial court sentenced Defendant Starner to life in prison for the felony murder conviction and fifteen years for each of the remaining two convictions, aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect. The trial court ordered that Defendant Starner’s fifteen year sentences run concurrently with each other but consecutively to his life sentence. The trial court sentenced Defendant Metz to the same sentences but ordered that all her sentences run concurrently. On appeal, Defendant Starner contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred when it ordered partial consecutive sentencing. Defendant Metz contends that the trial court erred when it denied her motion for severance and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her convictions. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Darryl Claxton
Following a jury trial, Darryl Claxton (“the Defendant”) was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment for the death of Terry Johnson (“the victim”). The Defendant raises the following issues on this direct appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred when it allowed a witness to testify about the Defendant's association with a “group of young men” in violation of Tennessee Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b); (3) whether the trial court erred when it allowed a witness to “speculate” about the disposition of the murder weapon in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 602; and (4) whether the cumulative effect of the errors requires a new trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In Re: Matthew T.
The parents of a son born in May 2013 appeal the termination of their parental rights. In December 2013, the son was removed from his parents’ custody after law enforcement discovered that he was living in a home with two methamphetamine labs. After a hearing, the juvenile court entered an order finding that the son was dependent and neglected and that the parents had committed severe abuse as defined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102(b)(21). Parents did not appeal this order. Three permanency plans were created, all of which required the parents to maintain contact with the Department of Children’s Services, notify the Department of changes in their address or phone number, submit to and test negative on unannounced drug screens, and pay child support. In August 2014, the Department filed a petition for termination of parental rights. The trial court conducted a hearing, which the parents did not attend even though they knew of the date. An employee of the Department was the only witness to testify. She testified that the parents had not updated their contact information, maintained contact with the Department, or engaged in much visitation with their son. In addition, the father did not complete a drug treatment plan, admitted to using illegal drugs, and tested positive for drugs. After the hearing, the court found that the following grounds for termination had been established by clear and convincing evidence: abandonment, substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan, persistence of conditions, and severe abuse. The court also found that termination of parental rights was in the son’s best interest. Parents appealed. In accordance with In re Carrington H., --- S.W.3d ---, No. M2014-00453-SC-R11-PT, 2016 WL 819593, at *12-13 (Tenn. Jan. 29, 2016), we have reviewed the trial court’s findings related to all of the grounds for termination and the best interest of the child and conclude that termination is appropriate based on abandonment, substantial noncompliance, severe abuse, and persistence of conditions. We also hold that termination is in the son’s best interest. Accordingly, we affirm. |
Smith | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ike O. Nwangwa
A Blount County jury convicted the Defendant, Ike O. Nwangwa, of Count 2, operating a motor vehicle while his blood alcohol concentration was .08% or more but acquitted him of Count 1 Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with two days to be served in jail followed by supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by accepting the guilty verdict to Count 2 when the jury acquitted him of Count 1. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles L. Hartley
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant, Charles L. Hartley, pleaded guilty to nine drug-related offenses for a total effective sentence of eight years with the trial court to determine the manner of service of the sentence. After a hearing, the trial court ordered that the Defendant serve one year in confinement and the remaining seven years on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred when it denied him an alternative sentence. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgments. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Robin Ann Longstreth v. Phillip Andrew Longstreth
The issues on appeal arise from a final decree of divorce following a 27-year marriage in which Wife is clearly the economically disadvantaged spouse. The trial court awarded Wife the divorce, divided the property, and awarded Wife alimony in futuro and approximately one-third of the attorney’s fees she requested. Both spouses appeal. Husband contends the trial court erred by awarding Wife alimony in futuro, insisting she could be rehabilitated. Husband also contends Wife had sufficient resources to pay all of her attorney’s fees. Wife challenges the division of property and seeks to recover all of the attorney’s fees she incurred at trial and in this appeal. Both parties challenge the trial court’s decision to include, sua sponte, a mathematical formula pursuant to which alimony will be modified in the future based solely on the parties’ future income thresholds. We agree with the parties that the trial court erred by incorporating an automatic modification of alimony that is based solely on future income thresholds. We affirm the award of alimony in futuro to Wife; however, we vacate that portion of the alimony award that purports to automatically modify alimony based on future income thresholds. We affirm the division of property. We find that Wife should be awarded $18,105.75 of the $29,141 in attorney’s fees and litigation expenses she claims she incurred at trial. Therefore, we modify the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees Wife incurred at trial. As for Wife’s fees incurred on appeal, we find that she is entitled to recover the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees incurred on appeal. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
Elizabeth Mesmer Cocke v. Thomas Lawrence Hunt Cocke
This is an appeal of an order granting a reduction in child support. Mother appeals the trial court’s finding that she is voluntarily underemployed and alleges that the trial court improperly modified the parties’ parenting plan sua sponte. We conclude that the trial court did not modify the parenting plan in this case and affirm the order of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
Mitchell L. Bowers v. Tennessee Department of Corrections, et al
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred by dismissing this action for failure to prosecute. The trial court dismissed the action because the case had been pending for more than one year but no summons had been issued. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
William W. York v. Tennessee Board Of Parole
This appeal arises from the denial of parole. The Tennessee Board of Probation and Parole found that the inmate’s release from custody would depreciate the seriousness of the crime of which he was convicted. The inmate filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari, alleging violations of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the state and federal constitutions. The trial court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the inmate alleges the same state and federal constitutional violations. He also argues that the trial court erred in not letting him conduct discovery and in relying on an affidavit filed in support the Board’s decision. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Anthony T. Brandon
Defendant, Anthony T. Brandon, stands convicted of possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine, possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine base, and possession or casual exchange of marijuana. The trial court imposed an effective twenty-four-year sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine and for possession with intent to sell.5 grams or more of cocaine base; (2) that his sentences were excessive; and (3) that the trial court should have merged Counts 1 through 4 into one conviction. Based on the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we merge Defendant’s convictions for possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine and possession with intent to sell .5 grams or more of cocaine base, but we affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects. |
Bedford | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Guy Lee Powell
After a bench trial, the Defendant, Guy Lee Powell, was convicted of manufacturing a controlled substance, possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver, felony possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of a still. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences for an effective sentence of two years' incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from his premises during a search. After review, we affirm the trial court's judgments. |
Hancock | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Lindsay Meghan Crutchfield v. State of Tennessee
A hearing-impaired student attending a state university was required to live in a dormitory on campus. The university installed a bed shaker and strobe light in the student’s room that would be triggered by the presence of smoke or by a doorbell installed outside the room. The student’s room also had a speaker above the door that was wired into the building’s fire alarm system that sounded an alarm if the dormitory’s fire alarm was activated. On a morning in September 2011, the speaker in the student’s room that was located above the door was activated in response to a false alarm in the dormitory. Believing the sound caused her to suffer further hearing loss, the student sued the State, arguing the State was negligent by subjecting her to the loud alarm. The case was tried by the Tennessee Claims Commission, which found the State liable for the student’s further hearing impairment. The State appealed, and we reverse, holding the student failed to prove proximate cause. |
Court of Appeals | ||
Jana Hill v. Michael Gannon, et al.
This is a wrongful termination case. Appellant appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on her claims of intentional interference with at-will employment and civil conspiracy on the part of Appellees. Because Appellant has not averred facts sufficient to make out a claim for intentional interference with at-will employment, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on that claim. In the absence of an underlying tort, we also affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s claim for civil conspiracy. Affirmed and remanded. |
Putnam | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brady P. Smithson
The appellant, State of Tennessee, appeals the Williamson County Circuit Court’s granting the motion of the appellee, Brady P. Smithson, to dismiss an indictment for two counts of vehicular assault, a Class D felony. On appeal, the State contends that the trial court misapplied the factors in State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999). Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the ruling of the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Kenneth R. Vaught v. Green Bankshares, Inc., et al.
This appeal arises from an effort by a former bank employee to collect certain deferred compensation payments. Kenneth R. Vaught ("Vaught") filed a complaint against his former employer, Green Bankshares, Inc., and its wholly owned subsidiary, Greenbank ("Greenbank"), in the Chancery Court for Knox County ("the Trial Court"). Both sides agree Vaught is entitled to certain deferred compensation. The issue is the amount. According to Greenbank, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") and Troubled Asset Relief Program ("TARP") regulations prevent payment of the total amount requested by Vaught as it would constitute a prohibited "golden parachute." After a trial, the Trial Court found in favor of Vaught, awarding him the full amount. Greenbank appeals. On appeal, FDIC, amicus curiae, argues that the additional deferred compensation payment to Vaught constitutes a prohibited golden parachute. We hold that the Trial Court‘s judgment places Greenbank in the untenable position of having to either disobey the Trial Court‘s judgment or flout federal regulations and FDIC. We vacate the judgment of the Trial Court, remand this case to the Trial Court, and order a 60 day stay, during which time Vaught may pursue, should he elect to do so, other avenues of relief, including via the Administrative Procedure Act ("the APA") to challenge FDIC‘s determination. |
Knox | Court of Appeals | |
Cynthia Elliott v. The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company
Cynthia Elliott (“Employee”) alleged that she sustained a compensable aggravation of her preexisting knee arthritis because of a fall that occurred in the course of her employment at Goodyear (“Employer”). Employer provided medical care for several months through its workers' compensation carrier but then denied the claim for right knee total replacement surgery as well as her claim for disability benefits, based on the opinion of the treating physician that the fall did not aggravate or advance the preexisting condition. Employee then had knee replacement surgery through her group healthcare insurance. The trial court received deposition testimony from three orthopaedic surgeons and medical records from several other doctors. It ruled that the fall at work had aggravated Employee's arthritis and awarded benefits. Employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court's finding of compensability. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment. |
Weakley | Workers Compensation Panel | |
Richard Jeronimus v. Zoila Maria Jeronimus
Divorce proceeding in which Husband contends that the trial court erred in dividing the marital assets and debts, in setting parenting time, and determining that Wife is the economically disadvantaged spouse. Wife contends that the court erred in not ordering Husband to formulate and sign the letter of instruction transferring assets from his IRA account; in not awarding a higher amount in transitional alimony; in failing to designate a party to be responsible for processing the qualified domestic relation orders for two retirement accounts; and in granting the divorce based on Husband’s Amended Complaint for divorce. Wife asks this court to impose restrictions on Husband’s ability to initiate future litigation. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court. |
Williamson | Court of Appeals | |
Deborah C. Russell v. HSBC Mortgage Services, Inc., et al
A homeowner alleges that a mortgage company promised her favorable terms to induce her to refinance her mortgage but the actual loan did not contain the terms discussed. She further alleges that company representatives led her to believe, after she received copies of some of the loan documents, that the discrepancy in the loan terms was a “mistake” that would be corrected. The homeowner filed this case against several entities, including the mortgage company. In the order at issue in this appeal, the trial court granted the defendants summary judgment on all of the homeowner’s causes of action and on their counterclaim. We have concluded that the trial court properly granted summary judgment on the claim for violation of the Truth in Lending Act. With regard to the homeowner’s claims for intentional and negligent misrepresentation, we find that there remain genuine issues of material fact and that the trial court therefore erred in granting summary judgment. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Rakeem Rashan Jones and Giovoanne Tremane Johnson
In a joint trial, Defendants Giovoanne Treymane Johnson and Rakeem Rashan Jones were convicted of first degree felony murder, second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery. As to each, the trial court merged the second degree murder conviction into the felony murder conviction and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. As to the convictions for especially aggravated robbery, each defendant was sentenced to twenty-five years, with the sentences to be served consecutively to the sentence for the felony murder conviction. On appeal, Defendant Jones argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever the defendants for trial; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the convictions; (3) the trial court erred both in the length and manner of service of the sentences; and (4) the court erred in denying his motion for mistrial. Defendant Johnson argues on appeal that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the convictions and that the trial court erred in ordering that the sentences be served consecutively. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Montgomery | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Michael Marks v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Michael Marks, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Delshun Jones
The defendant, Delshun Jones, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he argues: (1) that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during voir dire and rebuttal closing argument; (3) the trial court erred in allowing testimony and evidence of cell phone records into evidence; and (4) the trial court erred in allowing an inmate to testify despite the inmate and the defendant's having a defacto attorney-client relationship. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Marc Baechtle
A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Marc Baechtle, of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and rape. The trial court dismissed the convictions for aggravated sexual battery and rape based upon the statute of limitations and sentenced the Defendant to twenty-five years for the rape of a child conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it: (1) denied his motion to suppress his statement to police; (2) denied his motion to dismiss based upon a violation of the prompt notification requirement of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers; and (3) denied his motion for a bill of particulars. The Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals |