Diane C. Hanson v. Gary D. Meadows
The mother of two minor children filed a petition on May 5, 2014, in the Chancery Court of Rutherford County seeking an order of protection against the children’s father for her benefit and for the benefit of their two minor children. When the petition was filed, the parties were operating under a parenting plan from Wisconsin state courts, and the Chancery Court of Rutherford County exercised only temporary emergency jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-6-201 to -243. The chancery court granted the petition pending an evidentiary hearing. Unfortunately, the matter stalled for eleven months due to pending criminal charges against the father arising out of the same incident. Following the evidentiary hearing in April 2015, the trial court extended the order of protection as to the mother but dismissed the petition as to the children on the finding the children were not in any danger. Mother appealed. At oral argument, both parties informed the court that custody modification proceedings were ongoing in Tennessee and that the parenting plan had been temporarily modified pending discovery and a full hearing. The only issues on appeal pertain to the welfare of the parties’ two minor children. The chancery court now has jurisdiction over the order of protection, which was filed two years ago, and exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the parenting plan; therefore, the chancery court is responsible for ruling on all current issues concerning the welfare of the children. For these reasons, we conclude the limited issues on appeal are moot because we are unable to provide meaningful relief. Our ruling on the order of protection could conflict with recent rulings by the chancery court that are based on current events, as distinguished from the singular incident on appeal that is now two years old. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
William Wyttenbach v. Board of Tennessee Medical Examiners, et al.
This is an appeal under the Administrative Procedures Act. After the Tennessee Department of Health mailed notice to a physician of alleged violations of the Tennessee Medical Practice Act, the physician retired his Tennessee medical license. Unsatisfied, the Department of Health filed a notice of charges. After a hearing at which the physician did not appear, the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners revoked the physician’s medical license and placed conditions on any future application by the physician for a medical license in Tennessee. The physician appealed to the chancery court, which affirmed the decision of the Board of Medical Examiners. On appeal to this Court, the physician challenges whether the Board possessed personal jurisdiction over him and sufficiency of service of the notice of charges. The physician also argues that his due process rights were violated and that the Board of Medical Examiners lacked authority to revoke a retired medical license. We affirm. |
Davidson | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Brenda Haynes Jackson Claughton
The appellant, Brenda Haynes Jackson Claughton, pled guilty in the Dickson County Circuit Court to two counts of felony theft and received concurrent, four-year sentences to be served on supervised probation. The trial court also ordered that she pay $36,000 restitution. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking probation for her failure to pay restitution when the evidence shows that she had no ability to pay it. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Dickson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ricky Flamingo Brown
The defendant, Ricky Flamingo Brown, appeals the summary dismissal of his motion, filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, to correct what he believes to be an illegal sentence. Because the grounds for relief raised by the defendant have been previously determined and because the defendant failed to state cognizable grounds for relief under Rule 36.1, the interests of justice do not require the waiver of the timely filing of the notice of appeal in this case. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Ann Dodd
The petitioner, Ann Dodd, appeals the Williamson County Criminal Court’s denial of her petition to expunge the record of her 2009 Williamson County General Sessions Court guilty-pleaded conviction of simple possession of cocaine. Because we conclude that the petitioner failed to satisfy the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-32-101(g), we affirm the trial court’s order. |
Williamson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
Huston Foley Lloyd, Jr. v. State of Tennessee
The petitioner, Huston Foley Lloyd, Jr., appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, and the State concedes that summary dismissal was improper. Because the petitioner stated a colorable claim for post-conviction relief, the post-conviction court erred by summarily dismissing the petition. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is reversed, and the case is remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the petitioner’s claims. |
Putnam | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Roy Thomas Rogers
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Roy Thomas Rogers, was convicted of initiating the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class B felony; promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class D felony; possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; and criminal impersonation, a Class B misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-16-301, -17-425, -17-433, -17-435. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twelve years. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred by admitting evidence from a garbage bag found near his residence and (2) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. However, the Defendant failed to timely file his motion for new trial, and, subsequently, his notice of appeal. Because we conclude that the interest of justice does not require us to hear the appeal, we dismiss it as untimely. |
Gibson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
The Estate of James Alfred Jenkins v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company
Two years after he left work for the employer, an employee alleged that he sustained a compensable hearing loss. He died prior to filing suit. His estate subsequently filed this action. The employer denied that the condition was work-related and also asserted that the claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court found for the estate and awarded benefits. The employer has appealed, and the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We conclude that the action was barred by the statute of limitations and reverse the judgment. |
Obion | Workers Compensation Panel | |
In re Benjamin A.
This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Benjamin A., the minor child (“the Child”) of Brent H. (“Father”) and Brandice A. (“Mother”). The Child was taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children's Services (“DCS”) on November 4, 2010, upon investigation of a spiral fracture to his right arm and suspected child abuse. On December 17, 2013, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Father. Mother previously had surrendered her parental rights to the Child in June 2013 and is not a party to this appeal. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that statutory grounds existed to terminate the parental rights of Father upon its finding by clear and convincing evidence that Father had (1) abandoned the Child by willfully failing to provide financial support, (2) abandoned the Child by failing to provide a suitable home, and (3) failed to substantially comply with the reasonable responsibilities and requirements of the permanency plans. The court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father's parental rights was in the Child's best interest. Father has appealed. Having determined that, as DCS concedes, the element of willfulness was not proven by clear and convincing evidence as to Father's failure to support the Child, we reverse the trial court's finding regarding the statutory ground of abandonment through failure to support. We affirm the trial court's judgment in all other respects, including the termination of Father's parental rights to the Child. |
Hamilton | Court of Appeals | |
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Robert Blondin
Automobile insurance company brought action to recover from the defendant payments made under the policy to its insured and her passenger for personal injuries and property damage resulting from an automobile accident between the insured and the uninsured Defendant’s daughter. Judgment was entered in favor of company in the amount of $20,575.00, which was reduced by 20% to $16,460.00 in accordance with the court’s apportionment of 20% fault to the policy holder. Defendant appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss, the award of damages, and the allocation of fault. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tiffany Clegg
The Defendant-Appellant, Tiffany Clegg, appeals the trial court’s revocation of her probation and reinstatement of her effective eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant-Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by reinstating a sentence of full confinement. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Blount | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Charles Owens
The defendant, Charles Owens, filed an unsuccessful Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence, the alleged illegality being that he was not present, either in person or by video, at his sentencing. He asks that his conviction and sentence be declared illegal and void. The trial court concluded, without a hearing, that the motion failed to state a colorable claim for relief, and this appeal followed. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the motion, pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Tyler Fitzgerald Raybon-Tate
The defendant, Tyler Fitzgerald Raybon-Tate, pled guilty to five counts of aggravated burglary; one count of theft of property valued at $10,000 or more; two counts of theft of property valued at $500 or less; one count of carjacking; one count of kidnapping; two counts of felony evading arrest in a motor vehicle; and one count of driving on a suspended license. The defendant had agreed to be sentenced as a Range II offender, and the court was to determine the alignment of the sentences. Subsequently, the court imposed eight-year sentences for each of the five counts of aggravated burglary; seven years for the theft of property over $10,000; eleven months and twenty-nine days for each of the two counts of theft of property $500 or less; seventeen years for carjacking; nine years for kidnapping; three years for one evading arrest charge and six years for the other; and six months for driving on a suspended license. Concluding that the defendant had an extensive record of criminal behavior and was a dangerous offender, the trial court ordered that the sentences for the carjacking conviction and for two aggravated burglaries be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of thirty-three years. The defendant appealed, arguing that consecutive sentences should not have been imposed, for he was not a dangerous offender. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. |
Davidson | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
In re Estate of Terry Paul Davis
Christinia Davis (“Wife”), Terran Denise Davis (“Terran”), and Taylor Ann Davis (“Taylor”) appeal the April 17, 2015 order of the General Sessions Court for Bount County Probate Division (“Probate Court”) upholding the Last Will and Testament of Terry Paul Davis (“the Will”). Wife, Terran, and Taylor raise an issue regarding whether the Probate Court erred in finding that the presumption of undue influence arising out of the proven confidential relationship between Terry Paul Davis (“Deceased”) and Olive K. Davis (“Davis”) was rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. We find and hold that although a confidential relationship was proven between Deceased and Davis, clear and convincing evidence was proven to rebut the presumption of undue influence. We, therefore, affirm. |
Blount | Court of Appeals | |
In re Candace J., et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition seeking to terminate the mother’s parental rights with respect to the minor child. The juvenile court found that statutory grounds existed to terminate the mother’s parental rights upon its finding by clear and convincing evidence that the mother (1) abandoned the child by her willful failure to visit, (2) abandoned the child by her willful failure to provide a suitable home, (3) failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the permanency plans, and that (4) the conditions that led to the child’s removal still persisted. The juvenile court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Having thoroughly reviewed the record and considered the arguments presented on appeal, we affirm the juvenile court’s judgment in all respects. |
Rutherford | Court of Appeals | |
James R. Sterchi, Jr. v. Louis B. Savard, Jr., As Executor of The Estate Of L. Basil Savard, Sr.
This appeal concerns a conflict of law choice between Tennessee and Florida law. James R. Sterchi, Jr. (―Mr. Sterchi‖) sued L. Basil Savard (―Mr. Savard‖) in the Circuit Court for Bradley County (―the Trial Court‖) for the wrongful death of Mr. Sterchi’s mother Rosalind Savard (―Mrs. Savard‖) in a car accident in Florida.1 Mr. Savard filed a motion for summary judgment. Florida law prevents Mr. Sterchi from pursuing his claim while Tennessee law does not. All interested parties were domiciled in Tennessee. The Trial Court held that Florida law applies and granted Mr. Savard’s motion for summary judgment. Mr. Sterchi filed an appeal to this Court. We hold that under ―the most significant relationship‖ test as adopted by our Supreme Court in Hataway v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53 (Tenn. 1992), Tennessee has the more significant relationship to the occurrence and parties in this case, and, therefore, Tennessee substantive law applies to Mr. Sterchi’s wrongful death action. We reverse the judgment of the Trial Court. |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
James R. Sterchi, Jr. v. Louis B. Savard, Jr., As Executor of The Estate Of L. Basil Savard, Sr.-Concurring
I concur fully in the majority’s decision in this case. I write separately solely to express my opinion that inasmuch as this action was initiated subsequent to July 1, 2011, the standard of review for summary judgment delineated in Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-16-101 (Supp. 2015) applies. See Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 249 (Tenn. 2015) (noting that in contrast to the action in Rye, which was initiated in 2009, Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-16-101 “applies to actions filed on or after July 1, 2011.”) (citing Act of May 20, 2011, ch. 498, 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts § 3 at 471). The statute provides: |
Bradley | Court of Appeals | |
Melanie Jones, individually and on behalf of Matthew H. v. Shavonna Rachelle Windham, et al.
This Rule 10 appeal stems from a vehicular accident involving a minor child who was struck by a van driven by the employee of a children's daycare. The child's mother filed suit alleging negligence against the employee-driver of the vehicle and asserted claims for negligent hiring, negligent retention, and negligence per se against the driver's employers. The mother also averred that she should recover punitive damages based on the conduct of the Defendants. The employers, the individual owners of the daycare, admitted vicarious liability for the negligence of their employee and moved for partial summary judgment on the direct negligence claims asserted against them. They argued that it was improper to proceed against them on an independent theory of negligence when they had already admitted vicarious liability. The employers, along with the employee-driver, also sought summary judgment with respect to the punitive damages claim. Although the trial court granted the employers' motion with respect to the direct negligence claims, it denied the motion with respect to the claim for punitive damages. On appeal, we reverse the trial court's dismissal of the direct negligence claims asserted against the employers and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
Melanie Jones, individually and on behalf of Matthew H. v. Shavonna Rachelle Windham, et al. - Dissent
I must respectfully dissent from the majority's Opinion, and I believe Tennessee should adopt the preemption rule. In my view, once an employer has admitted respondeat superior liability for an employee's negligence, it is improper to allow a plaintiff to proceed against the employer on a negligent hiring or negligent supervision theory of liability. |
Shelby | Court of Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Dana Yearwood
The Defendant-Appellant, Dana N. Yearwood, appeals the trial court’s revocation of her probation and reinstatement of her effective five-year, eleven-month, and twenty-nine day sentence in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, Yearwood argues that the trial court improperly reinstated a sentence of confinement without consideration of her presentence report and improperly revoked her probation. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. |
Van Buren | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Holmes
The Defendant, James Holmes, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder during the attempt to perpetrate a robbery, attempted especially aggravated robbery, attempted first degree murder, attempted carjacking, and employing a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a) (2014) (first degree murder), 39-13-202(b) (2014) (first degree felony murder), 39-13-403 (2014) (especially aggravated robbery), 39-12-101 (2014) (criminal attempt), 39-13-404 (2014) (carjacking), 39-17-1324(i)(1) (2014) (dangerous felony), 39-17-1324(b) (2014) (employing a firearm during the attempt to commit a felony). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court and remand for correction of the judgments. |
Shelby | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Orlando Freeman
Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Michael Orlando Freeman, was convicted of attempted second degree murder, as a lesser included offense of attempted first degree murder; aggravated assault by infliction of serious bodily injury; and attempted aggravated rape by use of a deadly weapon. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-202, -13-102, -13-502. He was acquitted of especially aggravated kidnapping. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-305. The Defendant received an effective sentence of twelve years as a Range I, standard offender with release eligibility at thirty percent. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support each of his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss based on the State's failure to preserve evidence pursuant to State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999); (3) the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, which prejudiced the outcome of his trial; and (4) the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. Following our review, we conclude that the Defendant's issues are without merit, and the judgments of the trial court are affirmed in all respects. |
Hamilton | Court of Criminal Appeals | |
State of Tennessee v. James Daniel Cruze, II
In 2013, the Defendant, James Daniel Cruze, II, pleaded guilty to sale of a Schedule II controlled substance, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years, to be served at 35%, suspended after the service of 365 days. In 2015, the Defendant's probation officer filed a probation violation report in which he alleged that the Defendant had absconded, thereby violating several of the rules of his probation. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant's probation and ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. On appeal the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it ordered that he serve his sentence as a result of what he deems “minor infractions” of his probation. We affirm the trial court's judgment. |
Sevier | ||
In re K.F.R.T. et al.
This is a termination of parental rights case. The case proceeded to trial on the amended petition of the Department of Children's Services seeking to terminate on multiple grounds the parental rights of L.M. to his children, K.F.R.T., L.E.M.R., and B.A.M.R. (collectively the children). The trial court dismissed the petition after a bench trial, finding and holding that DCS “ha[d] failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence any ground sufficient to justify termination of [father's] parental rights.” Whittney N.L. Good, guardian ad litem for the children, appeals. We reverse because we hold that the evidence clearly and convincingly shows that father is guilty of a pattern of criminal conduct “exhibit[ing] a wanton disregard of the child[ren].” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv) (2014). We find clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the children to terminate father's parental rights. |
Hamblen | Court of Appeals | |
In re K.F.R.T. et al. - Concurring and Dissenting
D. MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J., concurring and dissenting. I concur in most of the majority’s opinion. I, however, cannot concur with the majority in its decision to reverse the Juvenile Court’s finding as to wanton disregard. I would affirm the Juvenile Court on this issue as well as on all other issues. As such, I also cannot agree with the majority’s decision concerning best interest as that issue never is reached if there is no ground for termination.
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Hamblen | Court of Appeals |